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1.1. Introduction 
 There have been almost fifty years since Harry Eckstein‘s classic 
monograph, A Theory of Stable Democracy
1
, where he sketched out the 
basic tenets of the ‗congruence theory‘, which was to become one of the 
most important and innovative contributions to understanding democratic 
rule. His next work, Division and Cohesion in Democracy is designed to 
serve as a plausibility probe for this ‗theory‘ and is a case study of a 
Northern democratic system, Norway
2
. What is more, this line of his work 
best exemplifies the contribution Eckstein brought to the methodology of 
comparative politics through his seminal article, ‗Case Study and Theory in 
                                                 
1
 Eckstein, Harry. 1961. Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, Princeton University, p 15 
2
 Eckstein, Harry. 1966. Division and Cohesion In Democracy: A Study of Norway, 
Princeton University Press, p 35 
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Political Science‘3, on the importance of the case study as an approach to 
empirical theory. This article demonstrates the special utility of ‗crucial 
case studies‘ in testing theory, thereby undermining the accepted wisdom in 
comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better.  
 Although not along the same lines, but shifting the case study unit of 
research, I intend to take up here the challenge and build upon an equally 
unique political system, the Swedish one. Bearing in mind the peculiarities 
of the Swedish political system, my unit of analysis is going to be further 
restricted to the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Svenska Arbetare 
Partiet. However, my research stays within the methodological framework 
of the case study theory inasmuch as it focuses on a single political system 
and party.  
 The Swedish SAP endurance in government office and its electoral 
success throughout half a century
4
 are undeniably a performance no other 
Social Democrat party has yet achieved in democratic conditions. Therefore, 
it is legitimate to inquire about the exceptionality of this unique political 
power combination. Which were the different components of this 
dominance power position, which made possible for SAP‘s governmental 
office stamina? I will argue here that it was the end-product of a 
combination of multifarious factors such as a key position in the party 
system, strong party leadership and organization, a carefully designed 
strategy regarding class politics and welfare policy.  
 My research is divided into three main parts, the historical incursion, 
the ‗welfare‘ part and the ‗environment‘ part. The first part is a historical 
account of the main political events and issues, which are relevant for my 
case study. Chapter 2 is devoted to the historical events unfolding in the 
1920-1960 period: the Saltsjöebaden Agreement, the series of workers‘ 
strikes in the 1920s and SAP‘s inception. It exposes SAP‘s ascent to power 
in the mid 1930s and the party‘s ensuing strategies for winning and keeping 
political office that is its economic program and key economic goals. The 
following chapter – chapter 3 – explores the next period, i.e. the period from 
1960s to 1990s and covers the party‘s troubled political times, its peak and 
the beginnings of the decline. The 1960s are relevant for SAP‘s planning of 
a long term economic strategy – the Rehn Meidner model, a new way of 
macroeconomic steering, based on the Keynesian model, but adapted to the 
new economic realities of welfare capitalist societies. 
 The second and third parts of this study develop several hypotheses 
related to SAP‘s ‗dominant position‘ (endurance in politics and in office) 
and test them afterwards. Mainly, the twin issues of economics and 
environment are raised and their political relevance for the party analyzed. 
On one hand, globalization and its spillover effects over the Swedish 
                                                 
3
 in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., 1975. Handbook of Political Science, New York, Freedom 
House, p 159 
4
 As of the 1991 election, there were about 56 years – more than half century – of 
interrupted social democratic ‗reign‘ in Sweden. 
 6 
welfare system are important causal factors in explaining the transformative 
social-economic challenges the party had to put up with. On the other hand, 
Europeanization and environmental change influenced to a great deal SAP‘s 
foreign policy choices and its domestic electoral strategies. The implications 
of globalization on the Swedish welfare system will make the subject of two 
chapters – chapters four and five, respectively, whereupon the 
Europeanization consequences will be treated at length in the third part of 
this work – chapters six and seven, respectively. Apparently, at first sight, 
the link between foreign policy and electoral strategy is difficult to prove 
and uncanny, in the least. However, in the SAP‘s case there is a bulk of 
literature and public opinion statistical data able to show that governmental 
domestic policy and party politics are in a tight dependence to foreign policy 
decisions and sovereignty issues. Again, these country characteristics and 
peculiar causal relationships are outlined in the first chapters and explained 
in the second and third parts.   
 The sixth chapter explores the presupposed relationship between 
Europeanization and environmental policy, on one hand, and SAP‘s 
environmental policy formulation and simultaneous agenda-setting at the 
international level, on the other hand. This chapter describes Swedish 
leadership in environmental policy formulation on two simultaneous fronts 
and across two different time spans.    
 The last chapter, chapter eight – while trying to develop a 
conclusion, explores the alternative theories plausible in explaining the 
outlined hypotheses and points out the reasons why these theories do not fit 
as valid alternative explanation to my systemic corporatism thesis as the 
main causal factor determining SAP‘s ‗dominant position‘. Among the 
alternative theories, I would consider Traedgaardh L. and Bo Rothstein‘s 
historical exceptionalism thesis and the public opinion thesis, which alone 
are not able to explain the half century social democratic endurance in 
government in the Swedish case. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
1.2.1. Theories of political parties and Scandinavian democracy: 
where does the SAP stand? 
 There are mainly 3 three different theoretical streams to studying the 
way political parties behave in relation to voters, to each other and to the 
institutions of the state. Ware classifies them as being founded on, 
respectively, sociological, institutional and competition or rational-choice 
explanations
5
. Because these approaches rest on conflicting theoretical 
starting points, they are difficult to reconcile and therefore mutually 
exclusive. The sociological approach has been most useful in identifying the 
social origins of political parties and, more indirectly, how this influences 
                                                 
5
 Ware, Alan. 1996. Political Parties and Party Systems,  New York,  Oxford University 
Press, p 322 
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their contemporary behavior. Although, it has been evoked by many 
political science authors, this approach was most significantly expressed in 
the work of Lipset and Rokkan. The institutional theoretical stream deals 
less with parties‘ origins than with their internal organization and legal and 
political environment. But, it is the third approach, the competition-based 
approach associated with Downs (1957)
6
 and the rational-choice school that 
most influences the framework employed by this study. Much like the 
institutional approach, Downs‘s is more concerned with analyzing and 
predicting the behavior of parties rather than with explaining their genesis. 
But, unlike it, the downsian approach focuses on parties‘ relations with 
voters and, crucially, with other parties. 
 This in turn contains echoes of other important contributions to 
political science. Tsebelis‘s notion of ‗nested games‘ involves an attempt to 
explain apparently irrational behaviour. A political actor, he suggests, might 
be involved in different but simultaneous interaction with other actors, and 
the effects of juggling different objectives in different arenas could – if the 
observer was not aware of all the games being played, lead to what appears 
to be irrational behaviour
7
.  
 On the theory of party behaviour, the understanding that party 
leaders have different goals, and that these can sometimes come into 
conflict, is presented most clearly by Hamel and Janda. They envisage a 
party‘s leadership as having different goals: votes, in competition with other 
parties; unity between itself, its membership and its associated 
organizations; and policy implementation, which has at different times 
forced Social Democratic leaders to bid for support from other parties in 
order to build parliamentary majorities. 
 Based on Downs‘s spatial theory of political parties and statistical 
data, I develop a theoretical explanation of SAP‘s rise and decline, which 
combines ingredients of neo-corporatism, interest-group and policy network 
theory. The latter is especially employed here to explain the environmental 
or ‗welfare provision‘ dimension in chapters 6 and 7. 
 According to Lijphardt A. (1999),
8
 Sweden is a consensual multiparty 
democracy with a dominant and factionalized Socialist party and a highly 
salient socio-economic dimension of partisan conflict. Therefore, taking into 
account the 3 three concepts relevant to the study of multiparty systems, ‗the 
effective number of parties‘ and ‗factionalized or closely allied parties‘ and 
‗issue dimensions of partisan conflict‘, I develop an explanation of ‗SAP’s 
electoral success‘ based on the concepts of ‗dominant party within a 
multiparty system‘ and ‗socio-economic factionalized party‘9.  
                                                 
6
 Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. NY, Harper and Row, p 58 
7
 Tsebelis, George. How political institutions work. Princeton: PUP, 2002, p 11 
8
 Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p 29-31 
9
 Blondel, J. 1968. ‗Party systems and patterns of government in Western democracies‘, in 
Canadian J. of Political Science 1: p180–203; Taagepera, R. 1979. ‗Eﬀective Number of 
 8 
 In addition to the above concepts, Lijphardt introduces a third one, the 
‗issue dimensions of partisan conflict‘, which takes into account those issues 
having relevance for the content and intensity of party programs and for 
what Downs terms the ‗office-seeking function of parties‘. These are – in 
order of their importance: 1. the socio-economic, 2. the religious, 3. the 
cultural-ethnic, 4. the urban-rural, 5. the regime support, 6. the foreign 
policy and 7. The post-materialist support; they are ‗salient issues‘ not only 
for parties‘ office seeking, but also for their policy-making capabilities once 
in government
10
. The socio-economic issue is the most important of the 
issue dimensions inasmuch as it is present in every democratic debate. 
Being synonymous with the left/right dichotomy, it is a key point on the 
agenda of both leftist and rightist oriented parties and governments. Leftist 
governments have systematically produced a higher rate of growth of the 
public sector of the economy, larger central government budgets, more 
income equalization, greater efforts to reduce unemployment, and more 
emphasis on education, public health and social welfare spending than 
rightist governments.
11
  
 The second most important issue dimension is the religious one and 
this is obvious – in Lijphart‘s view – from the fact that the differences 
between religious and secular parties did not wane across Europe yet. 
However, as important as it may seem, I would not linger on over that 
because it would make the object for discussion in the last chapter where 
alternative explanations would be considered. Although the third dimension 
– the urban-rural dimension – does not rank so high as an issue, but only 
acquires medium salience in Sweden, it would nonetheless be treated here 
because of the importance of the Agrarian interests in Swedish politics. The 
distinction between this dimension and the following two is not clear and 
the literature is divided as to the precise meaning of each. The fourth and the 
fifth dimensions – to be considered in this research – are ‗the foreign policy‘ 
dimension and ‗the materialist vs. post-materialist‘ dimension. The foreign 
policy issue is not an issue in itself, but it is merged with the latter 
dimension in the sense that foreign policy choice is a matter of public 
                                                                                                                            
Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe‘, Comparative Political Studies 12, p 
3–27. It is Jean Blondel (1968) and then Rein Taagepera (1979) who introduced and 
elaborated ‗the effective number of parliamentary parties‘ as the optimal measure for how 
the number of parties in party systems should be counted. It is equally a classification of 
party systems based on the numbers and relative sizes of political parties, which are 
depicted as hypothetical seat shares, and an index based on the following formula 
N=1/(Si)(Si) in which Si is the proportion of seats of the 1-th party. For instance, the 
effective number N of parties in Sweden is 3.5, which is the effective number in multiparty 
systems with only one dominant party. It ‘the effective number of parties’ measures 
quantify the degree of power-sharing in multi-party systems. 
10
 ‗Salience‘ is the intensity which the above issues acquire across time and across the 
political spectrum; they are formative of the partisan conflict. Lijphardt makes a distinction 
between dimensions of high salience and those of medium intensity or those that varied 
between high and low intensity over time. 
11
 Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, p 79 
 9 
opinion and materialist versus post-materialist individual options
12
. These 
issue-dimensions revolve around the two issues of participatory democracy 
and environmentalism that both fit the cluster of values of what Ronald 
Inglehart has called ‗postmaterialism‘13. 
 Post-materialism is a new source of partisan cleavage and it has 
become the source of a new dimension in only a few party systems. The 
explanation lies in the fact that it has emerged only in the more developed 
countries
14
 and only recently. The Swedish Center parties have made a 
smooth transition from old-fashioned rural to modern environmentalist 
values. But, these aspects are going to be tackled at length in chapters 6 six 
and 7 seven. However and without any doubt, it is certain that, in the 
Swedish case, the post-materialist dimension takes over the foreign policy 
issue having a medium degree of salience. Moreover, the urban-rural issue 
dimension is assimilated as disguising the post-materialist dimension by 
many specialists of Sweden.  
 I assume that any internal cleavage within the SAP on a particular 
issue is suddenly perceived by the large mass of voters and spreads itself in 
concentric circles (The farther it travels from the center, the more powerful 
it becomes.), thus becoming even more salient/relevant. Therefore, I am 
going to account for the cleavages internal to the SAP, which are presumed 
to be reflected in the final votes. This is due to another peculiarity of 
Swedish politics, i.e. there are almost differences between the party 
militants and sympathisers and the wider mass of voters, their cohesion is 
almost perfect. This is a contextual situation due to the historical 
intertwining between LO and SAP members, a unique political situation in 
the entire world.  
 
1.2.2. Welfare state theory 
 The missing link between a party‘s issue dimension and consensus 
democracy is the party‘s performance in government, which in the Swedish 
case is synonymous with the welfare provision capacity of the SAP – as I 
operationalize the variable ‗party’s performance in government‘. According 
to Lijphardt, there are four areas of government activity in which the 
qualities of consensus democracy are likely to manifest themselves: social 
welfare, the protection of the environment, criminal justice and foreign aid. 
                                                 
12
 For a distinction between ‗soft‘ foreign policy and traditional foreign policy, see Kjellen, 
2007. A new environmental diplomacy. London, Sage, p14 
13
 Inglehart found that, especially among middle class people in Western democracies, a 
high priority is accorded to goals like ‗seeing that the people have more say in important 
government decisions‘. Moreover, in the richer nations the cluster of postmaterialist values 
also included the objective of ‗trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.‘ 
This latter point is a key element in my argument of a factionalized SAP over the 
environmental problem, which is a double-edged element being both an endogenous and an 
exogenous dimension; Inglehardt, R. 1990. Culture shift in advanced industrial societies. 
Princeton, PUP, p 10-13 
14
 See Table A. The HDI Human Development Index in OECD countries in the appendix. 
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From the four, I am going to look upon only two of them, social welfare and 
protection of the environment, respectively. As to the ‗foreign aid‘ 
component, it will not be trespassed, but only reminded exhaustively in 
chapter six, where Swedish leadership in environmental policy is addressed. 
 The first indicator of the degree to which democracies are welfare 
states is Gosta Esping Andersen‘s (1990)15 comprehensive measure of 
‗decommodification‘ – that is, the degree to which welfare policies with 
regard to unemployment, disability, illness, and old age permit people to 
maintain decent living standards independent of pure market forces. Among 
the 18 eighteen OECD countries surveyed by Esping-Andersen in 1980, 
Sweden has the highest score of 39.1 points and Australia and the US the 
lowest – 13.0 and 13.8 points, respectively. Consensus democracy has a 
strong positive correlation with the welfare scores. Wealthy countries can 
afford to be more generous with welfare than less wealthy countries, but 
when the level of development is controlled for, the correlation between 
consensus democracy and welfare becomes even a bit stronger. 
 Another indicator of welfare statism is social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP gross domestic product in the same eighteen OECD 
countries in 1992, analyzed by Manfred G. Schmidt (1997). Sweden is again 
the most-welfare oriented democracy with 37.1 percent social expenditure. 
The correlation with consensus democracy is again strong and significant, 
and it is not affected when the level of development is controlled for. 
 Esping Andersen‘s typology of welfare states (1990)16 assigns 
Sweden to the ‗institutional redistributive welfare state model‘.  
 
1.2.3. Neo-corporatism, policy networks and the role of ideas 
 The neo-corporatist phenomenon and the theoretical tool of ‗policy 
networks‘ are going to be central to my analysis of the ‗dominant position‘ 
of the SAP within the Swedish political spectrum. The existence of neo-
corporatist societal relations and the relevance of policy networks in 
international policy framing represent the ‗policy‘ factors whereby I explain 
a ‗politics‘ reality. Both concepts are based on the activity and centrality of 
interest groups in the policy-making process, which influences political 
arrangements in a democratic system. Therefore, it is worth mentioning – at 
least exhaustively – Olson‘s theory of interest groups, their genesis and 
strategies of action in order to clarify their place in this research and its 
hypotheses. Afterwards, the relationship between ‗policy‘ and ‗politics‘ is 
explored through a summary of Wilson‘s and Lowi‘s typologies of public 
policies. Richardson, Jordan, Pierson and Bomberg are relevant here for 
their work on policy networks while Bouwen and Tsebelis for their analysis 
of veto points effects within the context of new institutional structures.  
                                                 
15
 Esping-Andersen, Gosta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton University 
Press, 1990, p 128-9 
16
 Esping-Andersen, Gosta.  The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton University 
Press, 1990, p 116-120 
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 The issue of ‗selective benefits‘ and the problem of the free-rider are 
crucial in understanding the formation of powerful lobbies having 
concertation strategies relative to the government structures (Grossman & 
Saurugger, 2006)
17
. Olson aims to explain the paradox of collective action 
by highlighting the difference between inclusive and exclusive groups and 
between selective and collective benefits. For a latent interest group to 
succeed, it must reward its adherents with selective incentives such as
18
 
positive and negative incentives. These incentives are similar to the idea of 
selective benefits, or benefits which apply only to the constituent members 
of a group and not to the entire population like in the case of collective 
benefits. Positive incentives are those individual retributions which can be 
cut off lest members non-participation in collective actions organized by the 
group. In the latter case, the ‗free-riders‘ are sanctioned and the cohesion is 
thus enforced. As well, the dichotomy between ‗rival‘ and ‗non-rival‘ 
goods, ‗excludable‘ and ‗non-excludable‘ goods, lays at the core of public 
action theory inasmuch as it defines its main characteristics and riddles. 
‗Excludability‘ entails that – once the benefits of the collective action have 
been secured, it is impossible to exclude the non-participants – who did not 
pay by their involvement in the successful collective action in the first place 
– from enjoying them. Second, collective goods are non-rival goods; that is, 
the marginal increase of their consumption (with one or more units) by one 
or more individuals does not decrease their availability or the quantity 
accessible for the others. 
 Among the modes of action pertinent to interest group activity, I 
would only mention negotiation, expertise and politisation as they are most 
practiced by Swedish interest groups. On the reasons of interest groups‘ 
involvement in collective action, the question of their resources, incentives 
and modes of action... is relevant here not only because the study object is a 
Nordic stable democracy with powerful interest groups, but also on account 
of the fact that interest groups played a key role in Swedish neocorporatism. 
 In what concerned the Swedish model, Olson did not shrink from 
addressing issues of both national and international collective action 
problems connected with it. For instance, when comparing the US with 
Sweden, he observed that either may be market-augmenting if it provides 
                                                 
17
 Grossman, Emiliano and Sabine Saurugger. ‗Les groupes d’intérêt en France: 
transformation de rôles et enjeux politiques ‗, Revue Française de Science Politique, 2006, 
ch4 and ch6 
18
 Olson distinguishes between small priviledged groups, intermediate or medium sized 
groups and latent or big-sized interest groups. The first ones are the most successful 
regarding the end-result of their collective action, while the last two are subject to certain 
conditions in order to be effective. His typology wouldn‘t be exhaustive without 
mentioning the distinction between ‗exclusive‘ and ‗inclusive‘ groups. The first ones are 
those ‗rent-seeking‘ groups, which are able to achieve economic or rent advantages by 
means of ‗capture‘ strategies. An example of such ‗rent-seeking‘ and ‗capture‘ strategy is 
the competition for a public good whose price and availability is fixed by the market such 
as the highest price for a certain good. 
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appropriate incentives and protects property rights or – in his own words – 
‗high-taxing encompassing governments as Sweden are not necessarily 
worse than low-taxing individualistic governments as the US‘19. Surveying 
Sweden in the 1980s, Olson observed that although its high-taxes did have 
the disincentive effects that neo-classical economists pointed to, these did 
not do nearly as much harm to the Swedish economy as protectionists 
special-interest groups would have done. Sweden did well because it was a 
small open economy
20
. At the same time, however, he was beginning to 
have doubts about the argument for – and hence from – encompassing 
organizations in his work RADON. In a Scandinavian symposium on this 
book, he came close to acknowledging that his argument lacked micro-
foundations. As the ‗Swedish model‘ ran into serious trouble, with negative 
growth and high unemployment, beginning in the mid-1980s, Olson 
returned to the subject. He now conceded that ‗at the time that RADON was 
written I had only an incomplete and partly intuitive understanding of the 
dynamics and stability conditions of encompassing interest organizations‘. 
Encompassing organisations of labor and capital were not necessarily either 
stable or as benign as he had earlier made them out to be. They might be 
captured internally by distributive coalitions of their own. The LO was – 
according to Olson – becoming the victim of its own special interests. 
 Olson‘s view on interest group lobbying at the micro-level can be 
extrapolated at the international macro-level with single states as actors. In 
his book, ‗The rise and decline of nations‘, he offers a plausible explanation 
for the importance of free trade and exchange mechanisms in Northern 
democracies. According to Olson, the recourse to free exchange is the only 
viable alternative to elude ‗institutional sclerosis‘ in neo-corporatist 
democracies. ‗Market and free exchange penalize those economic groups – 
under governmental protection – which capture rents from the public 
budget by exposing them to worldwide competition‘21. Institutional 
‗stability‘ of political regimes can become dangerous inasmuch as more 
stable a regime is, more permeated it becomes by interest groups. This 
situation is also known as Olson‘s ‗institutional sclerosis‘ hypothesis. Up to 
a certain point, one could rely on this explanation in the Swedish case, 
except that – since the 1995 EU entry – things have slightly changed. In any 
case, these particular aspects will make the subject of chapters 4 four and 5 
five. Tsebelis (2002)
22
 has developed this theoretical perspective with a new 
concept, the concept of the ‗veto points‘.  
                                                 
19
 For Olson, good government is the same as ‗market-augmenting government‘; see 
footnote below 
20
 Olson, Mancur.  The rise and decline of Nations, Harvard University Press, 1965, p 32 
21
 Grossman, Emiliano and Sabine Saurugger. ‗Les groupes d’intérêt en France: 
transformation de rôles et enjeux politiques ‗, Revue Française de Science Politique, 2006, 
p 101 
22
 Tsebelis, George.  Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ:. 
Princeton University Press, 2002, p 13 
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 After a brief discussion of the main concepts characterizing the 
relationship between the state and the non-state actors – public or private 
actors, I am going to take a look at the many possible types of this 
relationship and try to answer the question ‗What is neo-corporatism?‘ The 
theory of neo-corporatism is historically and economically bound, that is, it 
has developed in the second half of the twentieth century to describe a new 
way of interest representation in economic sectors based on intensive 
negotiations. In his work on ‗Trends towards corporatist intermediation‘, 
Schmitter (1979)
23
 developed the theory of neo-corporatism by delimitating 
it from fascist autoritarian corporatism. He restates Manoilesco‘s old 
differentiation between ‗pure corporatism‘ and ‗subordinated corporatism‘ 
into a new one, ‗state corporatism‘ versus ‗societal corporatism‘, both of 
them the result of economic transformation in pluralist societies, but along 
different paths
24
. According to Schmitter, the two other precursors of 
neocorporatism as a theory are John M. Keynes and Andrew Shonfield. Not 
only is Keynes the architect of a new strand in economic theory-keynesian 
or welfare economics, but, in his essay, ‗The end of laissez-faire‘, he traces 
up a new model of socio-economic organisation characterised by the 
increasing role of the state in steering the economy.  
Therefore, neo-corporatism should bee understood as a systemic 
response to the accruing demands of the societal actors towards the state and 
the state‘s ensuing ‗overloading‘. An important trait of neo-corporatism is 
that it entails employees‘ responsibility in the production process by means 
of their active involvement economic policy and the public budget 
decisions. 
 Any discussion on the lobbying strategies of interest groups always 
ends with an examination of their lobbying and networking strategies, which 
prompt an in-depth study of the idea of ‗policy networks‘. In order to bridge 
the gap between the alternative explanations on the genesis and role of 
interest groups in advanced Western democracies, a new strand of analysis 
has issued, which permits to bridge the gap between policy analysis and 
interest group theory. It is policy network analysis, which fills the missing 
link in the theoretical void left by ‗the twilight‘ of neo-functionalist 
explanations of integration processes. While neo-corporatism is the 
independent variable which explains the decline of the social welfare 
component, policy networks make up for the other independent which 
explains leadership in environmental policy. On the other hand, foreign 
policy is the other variable which intervenes at the decision stage within the 
party when government foreign policy choices are questioned, but does not 
directly explain the dependent variable, electoral change. For this reason, I 
come up with a new variable, normative leadership, which is based on the 
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role of ideas in policy network building. Since Swedish environmental 
leadership is a function of normative influence – as I am going to show in 
the sixth chapter, and normative influence is the very foundation of foreign 
environmental policy, it follows then that European environmental policy 
can be explained – to a certain extent – by Swedish interests, foreign as well 
as domestic. That is why policy change as a series of different outcomes, 
expectations and forms of adaptation to exogenous pressures 
(Europeanization and globalization) is a key variable when explaining 
Swedish environmental leadership by dint of policy network building 
capability
25
. 
At this point, an exhaustive review of the literature on policy 
networks is necessary inasmuch as my conceptualization of the Swedish role 
on furthering environment as a new issue in international politics resides on 
the capacity of the Swedish government – in concert with its diplomacy – to 
build policy networks and coalitions in international for a such the UN and 
the EU. Precisely, policy network theory enables to refine the liberal 
intergovernmentalist assumption of states as only policy entrepreneurs and 
go into more detail on the role of individual actors within member states. 
Since I assume these individual actors‘ interests as explanatory of the 
national preference formation at the European and international level, I am 
indebted to seek affiliation to rational choice and liberal 
intergovernmentalist theoretical strands. However, in assuming so, I do not 
conceive of states as unitary actors, but as aggregates of different, conflict 
interests at the bottom of sovereign states. In an effort to aggregate the 
interests of these multiple actors, I call upon the agency stress of policy 
network theories, which, in addition to making sense of the ‗nested games‘ 
                                                 
25
 The concept of policy networks is a concept that is widely used today, but the roots of its 
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a distinctive form of governance, a form of steering, contrasting to markets and hierarchies. 
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Both approaches have a bias towards national policymaking, looking at the relationship 
between state and society within national boundaries. In an era where domestic 
policymaking increasingly takes place on other levels than the national such as the 
transnational and European level, networks need to be analyzed here too. 
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these many stakeholders play in the policy process (Tsebelis, 1990)
26
, it 
explains the role of advice, consultation, expertise and technocratic 
rationality in the highly segmented nature of EU policy-making. A second 
reason for which I tend to attribute considerable weight to these actor-based 
approaches of policy-making theory is because norms, ideas, shared values 
and knowledge did indelibly play an important part into building Swedish 
international leadership over environmental issues since the beginning of the 
1970s (Kjellen, 2007; Bolin, 2007)
27
. As the literature on the Swedish role 
in prodding binding international agreements on clean air, climate change 
and chemicals proves, the Swedes relied to a high extent on the power of 
scientific persuasion. These observations alone are enough to justify my 
choice of liberal intergovernmentalism as the bedrock theoretical ground for 
my endeavor to account for SAP‘s electoral change over the years, but not 
enough to exclude policy network and communicative action theories out of 
my analysis of policy-making in European and international arenas. In 
explaining electoral variance, I use intergovernmentalist accounts of the 
domestic formation of national interests – what Moravcsik calls ‗the demand 
side‘ of decision-making at the European level28, and, finally, when 
considering the formation of policy decisions – the final policy output – at 
the supranational level, I rely on strategic bargaining of intergovernmental 
imprint with a mix of policy network and communicative action theories
29
. 
However, institutions define and constrain the strategies the agents (actors) 
adopt in pursuit of their interests. He attributes rational state behavior to 
dynamic political processes in the domestic polity and political outcomes to 
institutional capacity to structure political situations. This view is akin to the 
historical institutionalist perspective, which regards structures – if not 
antecedent to actors‘ interests, then at least influencing them to a great deal. 
Surprisingly enough, my analysis of electoral change – an example of 
political output – cannot be insulated from sectoral analyzes of policy or 
policy network theory, which I hypothesize as being one of the independent 
variables explaining domestic preference formation in Sweden. 
Environmental strategies are set along in policy for as supranational 
exchanges take place and that is a reason to ask whether communicative 
action theory does not answer some of the questions on the influence of 
discourse and deliberation on policy decisions. In spite of it, the 
constructivist absolute stress on structure and agency as ‗mutually 
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constitutive‘ is not an option for this research case30. It is Coleman (1999)31 
who extends the network approach to the international environment and 
explores different positions of networks on a broader macro scale. His 
perspective is concerned with interest groups and how their position 
depends on the power of public institutions, both on the national and 
international level. Here, I am going to privilege Coleman‘s approach of 
policy networks since I deal with the interdependencies between a peculiar 
national system and another particular multi-level system of governance 
such as the EU. Not only is this approach conducive to a better 
understanding of the new relations between interest groups and new levels 
of (supranational) government, but the emphasis on multi-layerness, 
reciprocity and complexity – inherent in Coleman‘s view – is consistent 
with an increasingly international environment where new conceptions of 
governance have come into being and new types of networks have been 
created. For instance, this is the case of national governments‘ policy 
networks engaging together on a certain issue such as environmental policy. 
For the purposes of this research, it is also useful to remind here 
John Peterson‘s (1995; 1996)32 approach concerning the appropriateness of 
theoretical models for each level of policy within the EU system. In his 
view, in the case of a multi-level polity
33
, the analysis must follow each 
stage of the decision-making process, that is, for each policy level, there are 
corresponding levels of analysis. In his view, for each level of the multi-
level MLG in which decision-making takes place, there are corresponding 
levels of analysis. For instance, for analyzing the systemic or policy-setting 
level, the best analytical tool is new institutionalism while for the policy-
shaping stage the most appropriate is policy network analysis. Nonetheless, 
the analysis is going to take into account only the meso-level inasmuch as 
the importance of ‗policy networks‘ as an analytical tool, is essential for the 
construction of environmental leadership. Hence the necessity to focus on 
this level for explaining Swedish environmental leadership. Certain of the 
fact that environmental leadership entails the use of a resources-set – also 
known as ‗ resource-dependencies‘ – as a decisive variable in winning the 
policy game, Swedish control of agenda-setting in environmental policy 
represented an asset in asserting its foreign policy interests. 
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In many ways, Richardson‘s approach is complementary to 
Peterson‘s, but, there is still a difference between them which consists in the 
separate usages of their theoretical proposals. Unlike Peterson, Jeremy 
Richardson separates the policy process into distinct stages proposing a 
particular theoretical tool for each, but both authors assume that alternative 
theories can coexist in the study of the European Union policy processes. 
For instance, by dint of Richardson‘s argument, there is possible to look to a 
varied theoretical toolkit to map the development of a piece of legislation or 
the emergence of European level policy competence in the environmental 
policy area. For the most part, Richardson‘s proposals are for the 
deployment of what he calls actor-based models (1996)
34
 in a context of 
thinking beyond politics as a purely interest-driven process. His emphasis 
on ideas and knowledge is convergent to my stress upon the key role played 
by Swedish normative power in foreign as well as environmental policy. 
Moreover, his partition of the policy process in different stages runs closer 
to my interpretation of European environmental leadership as a sum of 
similar intersecting actions of more member state leaders, among which 
Sweden has a pivotal position. 
Although it is certain that environmental leadership entails the use of 
a set of interdependent resources as a decisive variable in winning the policy 
game, the complexity and uncertainty characteristic of the EU policy 
process makes the analysis valuable if only one stage of integration is 
considered, namely the meso-level stage which is specific of environmental 
integration. That is why, from Peterson‘s triple partition, I would especially 
retain the sectoral level of analysis inasmuch it is the level where both 
welfare and environmental policies are included. However, using 
Richardson‘s model, the first phases of the policy process – namely the 
agenda-setting and the policy formulation phases – gain in viability and 
become more attractive to start with. The ‗epistemic communities‘ and the 
‗policy communities‘ are theoretical tools, which best explain the agenda-
setting and the policy formulation stages, respectively
35
. Moreover, 
centering my analysis of this process on a single member state makes 
necessary the input of actor-based models as Richardson‘s who traces along 
the whole policy process from the beginning to the end emphasizing key 
variables such as ‗actors‘ and ‗resources‘. Before accounting for the choice 
of one particular type of network for describing Swedish policy activity, I 
need to clarify the differences among them. 
John Peterson describes a policy network as ‗an arena for the 
mediation of the interests of government and interest groups‘36. So, policy 
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networks are usually understood as venues for the pooling and exchange of 
information and resources. They are the common generic term and starting 
point for what is otherwise known as policy community, issue network, 
epistemic communities or advocacy coalition. 
The distinction between them is centered on the concepts of 
affiliation, uncertainty and capital. The most widely used dichotomy is that 
between policy communities and issue networks, with policy communities 
varying on the variables of membership, integration, resources and power 
(Marsh, 1998)
37
. In addition, policy communities are the most stable form of 
policy network. Here actors are bound together in a series of relations of 
dependency and networks/communities remain largely impenetrable to 
outside actors. Membership is ongoing/constant and policy outcomes reflect 
the stability of the community. Unlike policy communities, issue networks 
are characterized by unpredictable policy outcomes and they only operate in 
certain sectors such as those related to social and research policies. In these 
sectors, policy network analysis hypothesizes that open ‗issue networks‘ are 
the norm rather than the closed policy communities. These are characterized 
by a fluidity of members and permeable boundaries. Whether policy 
communities arise is dependent on the existence of resource dependencies 
among actors and their ability to perform some sort of closure on the access 
to the network. Both issue networks and policy communities are best 
working explanations for sectoral policy analysis in the formulation phase of 
the policy process. 
Epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions bring actor-based 
analysis into the issue of agenda-setting, which is ‗the first instance of the 
policy process‘ (Lowi, 1988)38. Epistemic communities are bound together 
by shared beliefs, shared understandings of cause and effect within their 
particular domain of knowledge and shared notions of what actually 
constitutes valid knowledge. Moreover, they are contexts of action with a 
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high level of expertise and a low degree of politicization
39
. This knowledge 
not only helps to legitimize the decisions made by actors (by giving them an 
external source of ‗scientific‘ authority), but it also helps to influence the 
interests of actors and to frame coherent positions for bargaining. Even if 
the crucial decisions are made through negotiations between national 
executives, Haas‘s arguments suggest that there exist influential forms of 
non-state authority that acquire power through access to and expression of 
knowledge.) The advocacy-coalition approach looks at how aggregations of 
individuals with shared belief systems operate within policy-making. The 
epistemic community approach has in common with Sabatier‘s advocacy 
coalitions the fact that they ask the prior question about the forms of 
knowledge upon which preferences and interests are based (Paul Sabatier, 
1988)
40. Like with the epistemic communities‘ approach, it is the 
knowledge-interest relationship which lies at the core of the advocacy-
coalition framework, but, unlike the largely technocratic character of 
epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions purposefully seek policy goals. 
This is new in light of the distinction it operates when identifying a new 
form of influential non-state actor, but also because it rejects the idea that 
the influence of groups will be determined by their relative endowments of 
power. Rather, what Sabatier calls ‗policy oriented learning‘ within and 
across coalitions is important (Radaelli, 1999)
41
. Moreover, these learning 
processes are likely to occur in environments where the prestige of expertise 
is acknowledged. For instance, the receptiveness of the Commission to 
external input may provide one such venue
42
.  
It is useful reminding here the observation Peterson and Bomberg 
(1999) have brought, that is that these actor-based approaches have the 
effect of emphasizing the role of agency within the EU system, often 
deliberately at the expense of structural explanations of institutional 
development and change. Therefore, the distinction between structure and 
agency is blurred from the perspective of policy network theory, even 
though the emphasis on knowledge and ideas is central to it. It runs counter 
to some fairly formidable ontological and epistemological thresholds 
associated particularly with constructivist notions of social reality, which – 
unlike policy network theory and actor-based approaches – emphasize 
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structure in the detriment of agency
43
. Therein, structure preordains agency 
and agency influences structure. From what constitutes a circular argument, 
the idea that actors construe the world in which they operate and reality is a 
social construct whose implications are in terms of choices and constraints 
on action. Central to constructivism are discourses and ideas, which are 
cognitive institutions that shape the ‗boundaries of the possible‘ for actors. 
Even if it can fit certain situations in the European context (Jachtenfuchs, 
1997)
44
, social constructivism remains a circular reasoning, where 
independent and dependent variables are difficult to identify. However, 
sociological constructivism is precluded from playing a part into the 
analysis because of its circular reasoning according to which institutions 
reproduce themselves by recreating pre-existent rules and supplying 
interests to actors. The fact that I rely to the same extent on communicative 
action theory as much as I do on rational choice strategic bargaining does 
not jeopardize the coherence of my overall analysis. There is no danger of 
inner-contradiction whatsoever in my body-analysis because I only borrow 
that aspect of sociological institutionalism which is connected to notions of 
communicative action, that is the stress on knowledge, shared norms, ideas 
and beliefs. Both actor-based approaches and communicative action theory 
are held together by the emphasis laid upon the binding power of normative 
consensus. For the purposes of analyzing Swedish contribution to 
environmental policy development, the ideational dimension of sociological 
institutionalism – communicative action theory – is indispensable since it 
focuses upon non-hierarchical processes of informal transnational exchange. 
The need to incorporate communicative strategies in the analysis springs up 
from the key role played by ideas, interests and norms in the Swedish 
construct of European environmental policy. As I explain largely in the 
subchapter ‗Environment as a foreign policy issue‘, societal and 
constructivist approaches overlap to account for the Swedish role in 
environmental policy
45
. It is my opinion that Swedish influence was based – 
first and foremost – on normative power and secondly, on the aggregation of 
societal interests through neocorporatist practices. However, the latter 
assumption is an instance of what Moravcsik introduced as an explanation 
of European integration, that is preference formation starting from the 
domestic level and reaching international echelons by means of intra-states 
strategic bargaining. My analysis is compatible with this liberal 
intergovernmentalist point of view according to which national preferences 
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arise in the context provided by their domestic politics and national interests 
represent consequences of state-society interaction. This chimes in with my 
view that interest group strength
46
 at the national level was a key factor in 
steering the country‘s foreign policy choice whereby silencing the 
opposition inside the SAP and increasing government support for European 
integration through transnational cooperation at the European level
47
.  
In relation to the above mentioned actor-based approaches, I 
hypothesize a key role played by individual societal interests in the 
articulation of national institutional structures. The dependent variable in my 
case are the Swedish national political and institutional structures such as 
the party-system and the independent variables are represented by the 
societal interests which build up neocorporatist structures of governance. 
Following Hay‘s perspective of structure and agency48, when we analyse 
transnational networks, we should also incorporate how the behaviour of 
individual actors inside networks influences national political and 
institutional structures. Just like agency is structured by the network 
contours, agency is also influenced by the national context in which the 
actor stands. This would imply a dual perspective on the influence of 
structures on agents, looking at both networks and domestic structures. It is 
therefore my duty to underline that – when I emphasize the role of domestic 
structures and national aggregation of interests in the same time, my 
analysis is based on an intergovernmentalist view of European politics and 
International Relations. Even if an intergovernmental framework is adopted 
here, this does not preclude taking into account the role of ideas and norms, 
which also pertain to institutionalist and policy network theories, rather than 
to sociological constructivism. More precisely, my focus on interests as 
exogenous and institutions as intervening variables – formal sets of rules 
that mediate the interaction of exogenously derived interests – belongs to 
the rational choice tradition. However, this falters somehow in light of the 
increasing importance of norms and expertise in shaping decisions, as 
consistent with policy network and communicative action theory. The 
complex aggregation of interests is conform with Moravcsik‘s view that 
‗national interests emerge… through domestic political conflict as societal 
groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions 
form and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments‘. Once 
formulated at the domestic level, i.e. once the ‗demand side‘ constituted, the 
interests are bargained in an intergovernmental fashion and the supply side 
takes on. It is interesting to note Moravcsik‘s distinction between the 
demand and the supply side since it lies at the core of my empirical one case 
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study of a single country in one policy making sector – the environmental 
sector. The demand side is a highly intricate process of national preference 
formation based on complex games whose nature vary. I try to shed light on 
the nature of these games inside the Swedish polity if not only because they 
represent the ‗assumed‘ neocorporatist variables which explain electoral 
change and SAP‘s governmental strength. On the other hand, Moravcsik‘s 
supply side represents the particular bargaining environment of the EU 
about which he makes three core assumptions. Firstly, it is a non-coercieve 
situation that states enter voluntarily, particularly since the major ‗history-
making‘ decisions are made by unanimity. Second, echoing institutionalism, 
interstate bargaining in the EU takes place in an information-rich setting; 
that is, there is widespread knowledge about the technicalities of EU policy-
making and states have a clear idea of the preferences and constraints upon 
other states. Third, the transaction costs of EU bargaining are low because 
of the long timeframe of negotiations and the innumerable possibilities for 
issue linkages, trade-offs and sub-bargains
49
. 
I am going to use Moravcsik‘supply side as another independent 
variable to explain electoral change in Sweden. What for Moravcsik is a 
dependent variable, for me is another independent variable – or an 
intervenient one – which helps clarify my dependent. The reasons that thrust 
me into hypothesizing that EU policy-dynamics might also play a role in 
influencing domestic politics is the confirmed – by means of statistical data 
– division inside the SAP and the wider mass of voters. The rules of the EU 
game – whom Sweden‘s foreign policy requisites made them hard to eschew 
– are crucial for understanding policy network dynamics. However, I am 
going to challenge Moravcsik‘s second assumption inasmuch as I agree with 
policy network theory – especially with Garrett and Tsebelis‘ nested games. 
On one hand, I recognize the merits of communicative action theories in 
explaining policy networks, while, on the other hand, do not fail to take into 
account the rational choice view according to which the simple aggregation 
of national interests at the European level has influenced the way these are 
conceived
50
. 
According to Tsebelis, ‗the prevailing institutions (rules of the 
game) determine the behaviour of the actors, which in turn produces 
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political or social outcomes‘51.  
By the same token, Wessels introduces the ‗fusion hypothesis‘ 
whereby he explains integration as a by-product of the self-regarding actions 
of nation-state actors. Governments seek integration as a way of solving 
problems that they have in common. These problems emanate from both 
citizen or interest groups demands in domestic politics and the imperatives 
set by global economic interdependence or globalization. Like Moravcsik, 
Wessels links the growth of the EU to fundamental alterations in the style 
and emphasis of governance that are occurring within the member states. 
Furthermore, I would like to add that we should analyse what 
happens inside networks from another dimension, looking at the specific 
activities actors are engaged in inside the networks. This can for example be 
concerned with learning processes. Learning as activity can be carried out in 
many different ways, and will have an impact on the functioning of 
networks and their subsequent impact on outcomes. In connection, Hay 
analyzes the behavior of actors and networks from a dialectical stance, with 
the two mutually influencing each other. In his understanding, networks are 
‗strategic alliances forged around common agenda’s of mutual advantage 
through collective action‘. Agents pursue strategies, which in turn impact on 
the structures in which agency takes place. Moreover, they pursue strategies 
not in a static manner, but are involved in strategic learning, in a process of 
enhancing awareness of structures and constraints or opportunities they 
impose.  
 With these caveats in mind, it is useful to point out that the 
explanatory power of networks stretches beyond the mere description of the 
relationships between actors in the formulation stage, in a certain sector, and 
extends to explain political action and change. With policy networks as an 
important independent variable to explain processes and outcomes, it is 
demanded that we establish and characterize the variations between 
different networks in the same policy sector. For instance, the role played by 
the Swedish diplomats in the early stages of environmental agenda-setting 
and in different international fora – the UN and EU – is an example of 
differentiated networking to formulate key issues on the agenda and reach 
consensus. That is why it is important that theoretical analysis focus at the 
contours of the networks and at the integration of the members in the 
network in order to formulate policy issues. Whereas the focus on this 
dimension of networks has been rather strong (with the development of 
other concepts alongside, such as advocacy coalitions and epistemic 
communities), much less attention has been paid to what actually happens 
inside the network and how networks differ from each other here. Dowding 
(1995)
52
 points out that although networks are treated as the independent 
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variable explaining policy outcomes, in essence it is the actors inside the 
network and their behaviour that really matters.  
 
2. Research Design 
Fig. 1 Research Design about here 
   The second and third parts, which make up for the bulk of my 
thesis are divided in two chapters each. The fourth and sixth chapters of the 
first and second part, respectively, formulate the research hypotheses and 
lay down the main variables and the relationships among them. Afterwards, 
the fifth and seventh chapters proceed to testing these hypotheses by using 
statistical data and inferences on the basis of the theoretical framework 
sketched out in the literature review. In these chapters, the relationships 
between the independent and the dependent variable stated in the previous 
chapters will be tested and controlled by means of the intervenient variable, 
i.e. by introducing another variable to search for the spuriousness of the 
main causality. 
The presence of a third, intervening variable will be assessed and the 
existence – or not – of a relationship between neo-corporatist arrangements 
and SAP‘s power advantage, on one side, and between policy networks 
formation and SAP‘s dominant position in the political spectrum, on the 
other hand, verified. Since the intervening variables pertain to such 
international complex phenomena as Europeanization and globalization, 
these and their influence on the party‘s policy strategies – and on SAP‘s 
environmental policy strategy in particular – are assessed and analyzed in 
greater detail. In turn, the relationships between these global intervenient 
variables and SAP‘s ‗dominant position‘ – the dependent variable – are 
tested. The key causal variables are all assumed to pertain to internal 
domestic politics and policy styles; they are derivatives of the neo-
corporatist policy style characteristic of the Swedish societal system. 
Therefore, these ‗testing‘ chapters are dedicated to the other two dimensions 
of the research, namely the politics and policy dimensions. 
 Along the triad polity, politics and policy, my analysis primarily 
focuses on the last two, policy and politics. The area of polity occupies a 
rather marginal place in my research and mainly involves the explanation of 
certain institutional changes and adjustments happened before and after 
1995, the year of the Swedish entry in the EU. The politics dimension deals 
with the impact of certain actors (such as the other parties, the trade unions 
(right-left continuum and political game in a neo-corporatist democracy), 
the EU and the public opinion) on policy outcomes and how important 
decisions are reached within the SAP or SAP led governments. The policy 
(i.e. content of policy and different stages in the policy cycle) dimension of 
my study is relevant in so far as policy process and policy change influence 
electoral outcomes, certain political actors and processes. My focus on 
policy and politics renders policy network analysis and new institutionalism 
more plausible as theoretical choices in explaining the impact of actor 
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constellations, ideas and norms in the formulation and implementation of 
environmental and social policy. Neo-corporatism as a theoretical 
framework does share an interest in the politics dimension, but equally in 
the polity dimension, which makes it increasingly difficult to stay along the 
policy-politics dichotomy. However, since neo-corporatism best fits my 
research purposes, I would try to limit as much as possible the variation 
along its polity elements in an endeavour to simplify and reduce the number 
of independent variables, which could impact on my dependent.  
 The politics dimension will be structured along two different 
coordinates: the debates over the EU and the environment internal to the 
SAP, on one hand, and the political electoral conflict over the same issues in 
the competition with the other parties, on the other hand. The policy 
dimension analyzes the different policy initiatives undertaken by the SAP 
while in governmental office concerning social welfare and the 
environment. The policy side comes always first as it explains the politics 
part of my research wherein the dependent belongs. Therefore, the first 
chapters – chapters four and six – present the main policy aspects, formulate 
the hypotheses and describe the key overlapping points between policy and 
politics. Thereafter, the following chapters – chapters five and seven – 
proceed at testing the hypotheses formulated beforehand by locating the 
policy spillovers into the area of politics. 
 In this study, neo-corporatism has been chosen as a point of 
departure. This is only partly due to the restricted string of theoretical 
endeavours that tend to have their core competencies in my research area 
and that have the same research objectives, i.e. to explain the variance in 
SAP‘s electoral support over the years. First of all, I need to indicate the 
usefulness of neo-corporatist insights concerning this type of inquiry. 
 My choice to focus on two widely-known aspects of the Swedish 
polity, the social and the environment, has been prompted by empirical, 
theoretical and methodological grounds. Empirically, the two make for 
interesting cases. I will look at: first, one of the most successful model of 
social welfare ever in a Western democracy; second, a widely recognized 
leadership record of environmental protection and enforcement; and finally, 
the influence of these two policy indicators in the relative political 
advantage enjoyed by the SAP throughout the 20th century. The most 
important consideration for my selection of these two aspects was 
methodological. From a methodological perspective, my case has been 
selected in order to ensure variation on the dependent variable, that is to 
ascertain the effect the hypothesized independent variables have on the 
dependent in two different settings which do not influence each other, the 
social and the environment. As it will be further elaborated, this is important 
in order to avoid selection bias and to establish some degree of positive 
causality between hypothesized neo-corporatist pressures, environmental 
decision outcomes and electoral turnout or SAP political clout. 
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2.1 Research Objectives 
 The aim of this research is to make causal inferences. However, in 
order to make these, both description (collection of facts) and descriptive 
inferences (the process of using the facts we know to learn about the facts 
we do not know) are necessary. To make descriptive inferences in this study 
requires seeking to understand the degree to which certain hypothesized 
neo-corporatist practices and policy change outcomes (in the decision-
making process) reflect either typical phenomena (systemic features) or 
exceptions. Description and descriptive inference set the stage for causal 
inferences – learning about causal effects from the data observed. Causal 
effects are the difference in outcomes when hypothesized dynamics vary in 
strength
53
. 
 This study starts from a multiple causality assumption, according to 
which the same outcome can be caused by combinations of different 
factors
54
. Dessler has defined cause as any factor conducive or necessary 
(though itself insufficient) for a conjuncture of conditions that is sufficient 
for the specified outcome. A cause is thus any factor that is an insufficient 
but conducive or necessary part of a sufficient but unnecessary condition. It 
is an unnecessary condition because a combination of other conditions can 
have the same effect
55
. Strictly speaking, Dessler only talked about cause as 
a necessary factor (though itself insufficient) for a conjuncture of conditions 
that is sufficient for the specified outcome. In my view this notion of 
causality can be slightly modified by adding that it can be a necessary or 
conducive factor (though itself insufficient) for a conjuncture of conditions 
that is sufficient for the specified outcome.) This conception can capture 
phenomena produced by multiple causal sequences. In line with my 
epistemological position, causal relations are not viewed as deterministic, as 
they are in the natural sciences where causes inextricably connect entities 
and determine outcomes. Instead, in the social-political world, causes are 
conditioned and constituted by actors‘ interests, norms and identities and 
thus (merely) provide agents with direction and objectives for action, rather 
than ‗determine‘ their behaviour56. 
 There are two strands, points of view: I aim at explaining the policy-
politics causality in Sweden by analyzing it in two different settings of 
policy-making: the socio-economic and the environment. To capture the 
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nature relationships between SAF, LO and the SAP, on one hand, and the 
impact of these type of relationship on SAP‘s social policy.  
In what concerns environmental policy, my choice of it comes under 
the fact that it is a foreign policy strategy built by the SAP for reaching 
consensus domestically by means of international visibility; it is a conscious 
choice of foreign policy in order to extend the folkhemet consensus from the 
second half of the 20th century. I am interested in the foreign policy 
feedback it had among voters and how this endorsement or rejection of 
foreign policy was translated into votes for the SAP. The strategies for 
building consensus are apparent in the development and continuous 
updating of the welfare and environmental policies. The public perception 
as a response to SAP‘s policy initiatives and implementation is conceived as 
stretching along three dimensions, which are as much as three interferent 
plans: internal domestic politics, internal party politics and international 
politics. The first and the last plan of inquiry both pass through the SAP‘s 
internal party politics plan since this is both agent and structure, i.e. SAP 
proposes and enacts a policy, which is then received either positively or 
negatively by the voters. If it is perceived as negatively, then SAP adopts a 
certain type of political response and electoral strategy; if it is perceived 
positively, then SAP endorses another (different) political behaviour in view 
of elections. 
 Causal inferences are used to test my hypotheses and to ascertain the 
degree to which certain hypothesized policy changes and neo-corporatist 
systematic pressures have caused progress on the formation of common 
positions among SAP leadership and its militant circles, the development of 
long term political strategies and agreement on foreign policy issues.  
 After the glorious 1960s and 1970s when welfare was successfully 
integrated in the ‗people’s home‘, the special case of the environmental 
policy as a matter of consensus politics is tackled in this study as a 
peculiarity and contextual trait of Swedish polity. Albeit, there is not a 
Swedish uniqueness of ‗environmental issues‘. Rather, environment and its 
aspects make up now for a worldwide consensus that action is needed on 
such matters as global warming, acidification, chemical pollution, etc. 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat unusual to include such a technical matter like 
the environment into the analysis of a political party. In my case study, I 
could not do without it because of its ‗centrality‘ in Swedish politics. Not 
only was the environment a pressing citizen problem, but it has equally been 
a political construction by the SAP in an endeavour of extension of the old 
‗folkhemmet‘ consensus.  
 
2.3.1. Specification of variables 
1.3.2.1. The dependent variable  
 My dependent variable can be described as electoral outcome, 
electoral change or simply as public support for the SAP. It is not a matter 
of either policy or decision-making and therefore it belongs to the politics 
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dimension of my study. Also, it is not confined to a single political event, 
but can comprise a series of political events or developments throughout the 
period from 1970s till 2000. Since the independent variables – environment 
and policy networking, welfare and neo-corporatism – belong to the policy 
dimension, it means I hereby intend to explain politics by means of policy. 
It is not that I feel particularly indebted to follow Theodore Lowi‘s adage 
‗Policy makes politics‘, but in the SAP‘s case, I think they are especially 
relevant inasmuch as in the Swedish neo-corporatist political system, 
political decisions are originated, formulated and agreed beforehand in 
policy settings particularly geared to the social and economic sectors.  
 What is really important to underline from the very beginning 
concerning the dependent variable is that internal cleavage within the SAP 
members is going to function as a proxy for final election results; in other 
words, electoral change is the same as party members‘ changing views on 
certain policy issues inasmuch as it is a close relationship
57
 between SAP 
members and voters. In order to check if this approximation is exact or not, I 
am going to confront the final election results for the SAP with polls‘ results 
among party members on one or more policy issues. Although, it is difficult 
to account – methodologically speaking – for proxies in the structure of the 
dependent variable, I am going to perform cross-tabulations in order to 
verify the correlation strength between the two variables, i.e. the final votes 
for the SAP in Riksdag elections and the vote split within the SAP on social 
and environmental issues. 
 
1.3.2.2. Independent variables or key causal variables 
 I hypothesize that the dependent variable is caused by 4 four 
explanatory variables. These key causal variables are: neo-corporatist 
practices, interest groups (other than the SAF/Naeringslivet and the LO) and 
the political game, policy change as a form of adaptation to exogenous 
pressures (Europeanization and globalization), policy networks or 
socialization, normative behaviour or leadership in international 
settings/cultivated spillover. They are described in detail and 
operationalized below. Neo-corporatist practices or arrangements are the 
materialization of a certain type of industrial relations aspects and revolve 
around employer-employee industrial relations. 
 The notion of interest groups is autonomous from the idea and 
reality of neo-corporatism. Although neo-corporatism pressuposes the 
existence of strong interest and pressure groups, it is not synonymous with it 
inasmuch as interest groups can exist in the absence of neo-corporatism.  
 
1.3.2.3. Control variables and intervening variables 
 ‗Control‘ variables are those independent variables which are no t 
part of one‘s hypothesized key explanatory variables. ‗Intervening‘ 
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variables are those standing in a causal sequence between the cause 
(independent variable) and the final effect (dependent variable). Both 
control and intervening variables – Europeanization and globalization – 
constitute a problem here because they tend to be manifold and they are 
difficult to hold constant. Given these similarities, and since they are often 
difficult to distinguish from one another in empirical research, control 
variables and intervening variables will be dealt with together here, without 
further attempts to differentiate between these categories.  
 Important control/intervening variables for this case study are 
represented by the exogenous factors of globalization and Europeanization 
in all their forms such as 1. economic integration, 2. increased competition, 
3. change in trade flows between Sweden and its commercial partners, 4. 
public perception of SAP policy outcomes on social and environmental 
objectives or public opinion in the broad sense to be taken account of, but 
not voters‘ perception. Failure to hold the above variables constant biases 
one‘s estimate or perception of the effect of one‘s independent variables. 
However, it is impossible to control for all (or even most) intervening 
variables when selecting case studies, as a variation of such factors may 
only become obvious at a later stage. Yet, what can be done is to flag 
control/intervening variables when they occur, so that in the conclusion one 
is able to take the direction of any bias into account. For example, very fast-
moving events or those which entail very high degrees of uncertainty and 
very incomplete information are likely to increase the influence of public 
opinion/supranational institutions such as the EU, UN in the SAP‘s 
decision-making process, as national experts and decision-makers tends to 
grant them more authority in such cases. 
 Two additional control/intervening variables will be highlighted: 
first, ‗intergovernmental versus supranational decision-making‘, and 
second, ‗persistence versus termination of a policy in the event of non-
decision‘. However, these will only be acknowledged as playing a role in 
the case of environmental policy as it takes on both a national and 
supranational dimension. As for the case of welfare policy, it remains bound 
in national considerations; after all, there is only talk of the ‗Swedish model‘ 
as the greatest welfare achievement from a nation-state to date. As far as 
these variables are concerned, there is variation in my cases, which, in the 
former case, was actively thought to probe the theory in diverse settings. 
One task of this research is to ascertain the conditions under which my 
hypothesized pressures/independents are likely to be effective or rather 
ineffective.  
It is important to delimit between public opinion perception of a 
policy outcome and SAP‘s response to this public perception as a 
modification of this policy or of its political tactics or both. Before and after 
a policy outcome has been evaluated is an important timing in my analysis. I 
concentrate here more on the political game and life cycle of a policy, but, 
public opinion being such an important and inextricable matter in Swedish 
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politics, I cannot make without in my analysis. Nevertheless, I am going to 
focus on the political game and policy-making aspects while trying to 
integrate the general public opinion in the party members‘ views. 
 
1.3.2.4. Operationalisation of independent variables 
 Translating hypotheses into a form that can be tested empirically 
mainly involves the specification of indicators or referents on which causal 
variables can be observed and measured. This is complemented here, at 
times by stating the different methods and techniques used to attain 
inferences in order to render my operationalisation more concrete and 
plausible. In view of my epistemological position and especially given the 
complexity of the issues analyzed, strict positivist standards regarding 
observation and measurement are preferred but not always possible to 
adhere to. 
 Indicators for intergovernmentalist explanations of electoral change 
in Sweden based on Europeanization include a range of basic assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that preference formation takes place domestically, at the 
nation state level. Industry trade unions relationships and interest group 
dynamics are central to an account of how transformation processes take 
place. In the specific Swedish case, there is the neo-corporatist variable 
which is responsible for system regulation and plays on other interest 
groups‘ games. Second, domestic structures must determine actors‘ interests 
and strategies in such a manner that affects foreign policy choices over time. 
Third, are there other alternative solutions – than domestic preference 
formation – to foreign policy choices. If yes, then it must be showed they do 
not work in this specific case
58
.  
 In terms of exogenous pressures and consequent adaptation process 
or policy change, the specification of clear-cut indicators is even more 
difficult. For the development or pressure of an economic threat or adverse 
competition to the regional block from outside – what is commonly 
understood by Europeanization and globalization pressures, economic 
indicators such as trade balances can be drawn upon. The welfare system, 
the perceived threat of the high social and environmental were the main 
reasons for which the Swedish public distrust EU integration
59
. 
The increasing challenge of environmental changes in face of the 
limited capacities of individual member states is well noted as an emerging 
problem of governance in international agenda. An indicator of the 
governance potential of Sweden as a single nation state would be past 
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capabilities – welfare and environmental record prior to EU entry – 
conditioned by recent developments (Swedish contribution to the EU 
environmental policy shaping in terms of agenda-setting, formulation and 
decision facilitation – mobilizing and convincing procedures – in the 
Council of Ministers) compared with the growing scope of the problem.  
 However, although the above indicators give a preliminary idea of 
the general logic regarding these structural (i.e. domestic and exogenous) 
independent variables, there is an objective estimation concerning these 
referents, which are militants‘ perceptions taken as a proxy for polls‘ results 
or votes. This is to say that these variables
60
 are cognitively and socially 
constructed. Therefore, they largely have to do with the perceptions of 
decision-makers, but not only
61
.  The party militants are also a key estimator 
of the way these referents are formed. For the Swedish case, the analyst is 
rejoiced by the abundance of electoral and referenda data, which range from 
the intermediate to the final results. Therefore, the partial data from the 
party militants and sympathizers are going to be compared with the final 
electoral outcomes. The loss of dominance by the SAP is thus explained 
here inasmuch as this is the dependent variable, which measure electoral 
change. The aim is neither to make an in depth analysis of voting behavior 
in Swedish parliamentary elections and referenda past years nor to 
undertake a public opinion inquiry on how voters‘ perceptions translate into 
poll results, but to ascertain the fact that a well-informed explanation of a 
party metamorphosis should not only hinge on strict party system and 
electoral behavior analyzes. This analyzes of SAP electoral odds change 
does not take into account these aspects of politics, but mainly bases itself 
on other elements along a two dimensional structure of policy and politics. 
‗Indicators of institutional influence62 on political outcomes include 
firstly supranational institutions’ actual effect on national decision-makers 
to foster support for their endeavors’. The second and most important 
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indicator focuses on the output, rather than the input dimension of 
institutional influence. What is important here is whether the national 
decision-maker‘s interests, strategies or positions have changed towards the 
line taken by supranational institutions or vice versa. Having identified such 
change, its direction still has to be identified, i.e. if it was induced by 
supranational institutions or by national decision-makers. In the case of this 
research, there is a hypothesize direction of change from the national 
decision-makers towards the supranational institutions. Another referent 
combining elements of the first two would be the admittance on the part of 
national decision-makers and, alternatively, independent insiders involved 
in negotiations (such as the Council or UN Secretariat officials) that 
supranational preferences and positions changed towards those favored by 
national decision-makers because of the involvement of the latter. 
Again, it is hypothesized here that structural independent variables 
such as were at stake and operated this change. 
As for the operationalisation of societal interests, this key causal 
variable may appear problematic – as I have stated before the focus here is 
not on the polity dimension – in light of the neo-corporatist departing points. 
I hypothesize that the dependent variable is caused by 4 four 
explanatory variables. These key causal variables are: neo-corporatist 
practices, interest groups (other than the SAF and the LO) and the veto 
game, policy change as a form of adaptation to exogenous pressures 
(Europeanization and globalization), policy networks or socialization, 
normative behavior or leadership in international settings/cultivated 
spillover. They are described in detail and operationalized below. Neo-
corporatist practices or arrangements are the materialization of a certain type 
of industrial relations aspects and revolve around. 
The notion of interest groups is autonomous from the idea and 
reality of neo-corporatism. Although neo-corporatism presupposes the 
existence of strong interest and pressure groups, it is not synonymous with it 
inasmuch as interest groups can exist in the absence of neo-corporatism. 
That is why, this research consider interest group theory separately from 
neo-corporatism. 
In what concerns the second dimension, the ‗uploading‘ part, there 
are a number of indicators that guide it and which also represent ‗connecting 
bridges‘ towards the conceptualization of the national projection of 
environmental policy. This aspect of Europeanization can be summarized by 
the words ‗national environmental policy of a member state affects and 
contributes to the development of a common European environmental 
policy‘. These indicators are: 1. State attempts to increase national influence 
in the world; 2. State has a domestic interest to upload environmental policy 
at the supranational level; 3. State attempts to influence the environmental 
policies of other member states; 4. State uses the EU as a cover umbrella; 5. 
The externalization of national environmental policy positions the member 
state onto the EU level, which touches upon that state‘s foreign policy 
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objectives. 
Indicators of institutional influence on political outcomes include 
firstly supranational institutions‘ actual effect on national and other 
decision-makers to foster support for their endeavors. The second and most 
important indicator focuses on the output, rather than the input dimension of 
institutional influence. 
Third, the degree of socialization can also be estimated. This ideally 
involves a comparison of actors and norms at different times, in order to be 
able to distinguish whether frequent and prolonged interaction in 
supranational arenas changed the initial course of the policy proposal. 
However, the present research does not insist too much on this latter point. 
Normative influence is similar to the concept of cultivated spillover 
in neo-functionalist theory as it best captures the interference between the 
national and the supranational. 
The hypotheses developed in the sixth chapter above describe 
introductory independent variables – the Europeanization and public opinion 
pressure from the environmentalist pressure groups and public concern 
regional level, the dependent variable, the environmental governmental 
strategy over the environmental and the intervening variable the 
international variable (i.e. policy style, policy structure and policy content), 
the polity variable (i.e. trends in PO public opinion and IG interest groups) 
and the politics variable (the electoral game and the pork/barrel/log/rolling 
so/called power polity between the parties). 
In the Swedish case, because of SAP‘s longevity in power, the 
international structures and the ‗politics‘ variables overlap each other. 
Therefore, the whole discussion on the impact of the intervening variables 
becomes a discussion of internal party politics.  
 However, the difference in the 1st hypothesis compared to the 2nd 
consists in the different formulation of the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable is conceived as environmental policy shaping and 
formulation phases at the international level. The variance in the dependent 
is the transformation of the environmental issue (from a simple 
environmental concern at the local level in Sweden with acidification) to the 
status of a policy with international ramifications. The observed variance in 
the dependent is accounted as progressive accumulation of meaning in the 
policy content, its successive technicalities adding up to each successive 
stage in international debate. 
 The dependent variable – the formulation of environmental policy – 
ends with the beginning of the 1990s; it is a time dependent variable 
because it begins and it stops with time. At the end o the 1990s, the 
dependent variable has already developed and became a full-fledged aspect 
of international affairs. The acquiring of different meaning and the full-
development in the potentialities of the dependent variable enable us to 
speak about the process of the Europeanization of the environmental policy 
in Sweden in the 2nd hypothesis in the sixth chapter. 
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The change which took place is explained by a series of factors: 
Swedish national leadership in addressing the issue, international 
mobilization over the pub. Negotiation, agreement between public opinion 
(the rising and empowering of environmentalist groups) and governmental 
policy and their reciprocal influence. The golden idea is that at the time it 
existed an agreement between governmental elites and the public grassroots. 
The change which took place in the 1970s/1990s (1st phase) and it is called 
environmental conscientization. This change culminated with the Swedish 
accession to the EU and is called stepping-up. The whole environmental 
process which comprises Swedish involvement in international and 
European environmental negotiations stretches along 3 stages time 
dependent: 
1. conscientization (1970s-1990s) 
2. stepping-up (1990-1995) coinciding with the decision to entry the EU 
3. uploading (1995-     )  
Bretherton & Vogler (2005)
63
 mention-conceiving the international 
role of EU and its visibility on the international arena – 3 related conditions 
which combine in varying ways to shape the Union-s external activities: 
opportunity, presence and capability. Restraining the scope of this 
methodological framework to one country Sweden, one could easily adopt 
the same three conditions operating when considering Sweden-s 
international role as independent variable in the 1st hypothesis.  
Opportunity is represented by the sudden emergence on the 
international agenda of the environmental issue as a ‗window of 
opportunity‘, an opening for the regulation of the environment by both 
national and international bureaucrats and scientists. Presence is rep. by the 
development and final maturing of the environmental issue at the political 
EU level. Into an environmental policy at the EU level after a series of shy 
trials at the end of 1980s – SEA, etc) which brought up the foreign policy 
opportunity for Sweden to consider EU entry as a possible option.   
 
1.3.2.5. ‗Many variables‘ and ‗big-n‘ 
 In the area of international affairs researchers are facing the problem 
of having to cope with many variables, whereas one can usually only 
analyze a small number of cases. In order to make valid causal inferences 
and avoid indeterminate research results, it has been held that more 
observations are needed than independent variables, which is exactly the 
case of my research. Therefore, it is only logical – with a big-N, i.e. 
observations, and many variables – to use statistical inference and data 
analysis. It is a classical situation where there is no need to merge variables 
that exhibit an essentially similar underlying characteristic into a single 
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variable, although for simplification purposes this is always an advisable 
thing to do. Second, I have focused on ultimate outcomes rather than on 
process tracing techniques.  
 
1.4. Methodology: the crucial case method and statistical 
induction 
 The correlation between the OECD country economic data along the 
period 1960s to 1990s and the SAP political vote in the same period is 
strong as indicated by the Pierson‘s coefficient, the chi-square. The cross-
tabulations are performed for two time spans, the 1960s-1980s period and 
the 1980s-2000 period. These time series are repeated for the environmental 
hypothesis in chapters six and seven. Therewith, a comparative approach 
extends across a longer time period and across different time periods for the 
same political object, a political party.  
 For instance, the careful description and assessment (analysis from 
the point of view of principal agent theory Niskanen, 1999, i.e. government-
diplomacy- interest groups-international organization) of the UN process – 
prior to the European Community‘s signing of the 1992 Rio Declaration and 
accompanying Conventions – in the environmental field in the period 
1970s-1990s pertains to the purposes of this case study, i.e. the relationship 
between international developments, on one hand, and the change in the 
political ‗good fortunes‘ of a single party in one country, on the other hand. 
These considerations alone prompt the choice of the crucial case study 
theory as the main methodological tool of this research endeavor inasmuch 
as the case subject stays the same across different policy fields and time 
spans. 
   
1.4.1. Methodology: crucial case method and analytic induction 
 My epistemological position can be located somewhere between 
positivist and interpretative extremes, probably leaning somewhat towards 
positivism. My work aims at causal relationships, but does not seek to 
produce general findings? The following sections will generate hypotheses 
which are to be tested, aspiring validation or falsification. However, I reject 
the extreme positivist view that all social phenomena can necessarily be 
objectively observed, clearly measured and directly compared. Instead, 
interpretative understanding is viewed here as an inherent, even though not 
exclusive, part of, and step towards, causal explanation. On the other hand, I 
endorse the relativist position which argues that context is everything, and 
that eventually no matters can be compared because they are embedded in 
unique contexts, thereby not allowing for the generation of legitimate 
generalizations. I thus acknowledge the importance of interpretative and 
contextual features in establishing causal relationships and embeddedness? 
 
1.4.2. Crucial case method 
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 The method employed here is what Eckstein called ‗the intensive‘ 
study of individual macrocosmic cases of political phenomena levels‘ such 
as this inquiry into the electoral evolution of a political party over time. 
Because of the specificity of the studied national system – where ‗the party 
state‘ was the embedded norm on the basis of democratic elections and a 
wide cross-class consensus, the analysis also traces a case study of national 
policy building environmental leadership. If one was talking about the 
Swedish model and ‗welfare revolution‘, now there is talk of ‗environmental 
revolution‘. What is more, the case study method is most useful at that stage 
of theory building where ‗least value is attached to them: the stage where 
candidate theories are tested‘. This argument springs up when Eckstein 
shows the ‗virtues‘ of case studies as opposed to the ‗conventional wisdom 
in political science‘ – the comparatives paradigm. 
 Eckstein speaks out about his position on case studies in political 
theory after he exposes the two epistemological extremes in political science 
to date, namely Popper‘s falsibility approach and the ‗soft‘ constructivist 
line. His stance is situated somewhere along the continuum between the 
‗hard‘ science approach and the soft constructivist line.  
 According to Eckstein, case studies are valuable at all stages of the 
theory-building process, but most valuable at that stage of theory building 
where least value is attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories 
are ‗tested‘. Against the comparative method, he argues for case studies as a 
means for theory-building especially in regard for those phenomena which 
the subfield of comparative politics is most associated with, that is macro-
political phenomena, i.e. units of political study of considerable magnitude 
and complexity.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 1930-1960 YEARS 
A historical account of SAP‘s accession to government and its 
aftermath – the 1889-1930s and the 1930-1960 years 
1. The first years, economic depression and stage one 
keynesianism 
1.1. The first years and the first social-democratic program 
1.2. Extending electoral consensus 
1.3. New economic trends: welfare as productive investment 
1.4. SAP first accession to power 
1.5. Keynesianism and the Stockholm School 
1.5.1. Pre-keynesianism 
1.5.2. Stage one keynesianism and SAP accession to power 
1.5.3. Stage two keynesianism or the Rehn-Meidner Model 
2. A sketch of the Swedish model 
3. Neocorporatism and the SA 
3.1. The Saltsjoebaden Agreement and the beginning of 
neocorporatism 
3.2. Full-fledged neocorporatism  
3.3. The end of Swedish neocorporatism? 
 
 Before exploring the historical circumstances anterior to the 
installation into government of the SD SAP, one should bear in mind that, 
when, when studying the Swedish political system, the neutrality issue is a 
key concept. It should be well-stressed and explained as it had been the pre-
condition which made possible the country‘s independence throughout the 
previous century and the whole post-war period of the Cold War. As in the 
first two world wars, the country has maintained an equidistant position 
from the two opposing blocks during the West-East confrontation of the 
twentieth century. This independence from political and economic alliances 
served Sweden well, both in terms of evading the destructive consequences 
of a geographical location placing the nation in between the Allies and Axis 
powers during the Second World War, and again between the NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact military blocs during the Cold War. While it has benefited 
the country both from a political and economic point of view, it cannot be 
considered as a necessary and sufficient condition of welfare and prosperity. 
However, foreign policy choices influenced Swedish positioning in regional 
alliances and participation in the EU, even if they were not the only ones.  
The high trade barrier and measures of equivalent effect of ‗Fortress 
Europe‘ did not curb Swedish pursuit of free trade and competition policies, 
combined with strict environmental standards. As Whyman observed 
‗historical ambivalence‘ and the foreign policy of neutrality enabled 
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Sweden to pursue its free trade policies, unhindered by considerations of 
‗Fortress Europe‘ protective measures enacted by protectionism behind 
high tariff walls. It also provided Sweden with a degree of international 
influence out of proportion to the nation‘s size, economic or military power, 
based upon its professed identification with world development and 
environmental issues. 
It additionally provided the opportunity for social-democratic 
policies to become embedded in the national consciousness. The strong 
society has been the ideological catchword behind the Social Democratic 
project, which sought to foster both growth and security into the people‘s 
home. 
The Scandinavian social democratic parties split with the 
revolutionary left in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and 
joined the Socialist International
64
. From the 1920s, they have all, therefore, 
maintained an explicit commitment to the parliamentary, reformist route to 
socialism. With the advent of universal suffrage, the social democratic 
parties were able to increase their parliamentary representation substantially, 
and in some cases had formed short-lived minority governments before 
1930. But the real breakthrough came in the 1930s, when all five 
Scandinavian social democratic parties were able to negotiate compromise 
agreements with agrarian parties, and thus secure the parliamentary support 
necessary to allow them to form majority governments, introduce welfare 
reforms and some degree of counter-cyclical economic policy.  
The two decades after 1945 can with some justification be described 
as the ‗golden age‘ of social democracy. Throughout Scandinavia, social 
democratic parties were in government for most of this period, and were the 
artisans of a new era, of high rates of economic growth, low unemployment 
and rising living standards. In concert with other west European social 
democratic parties, by 1945, the Scandinavian socialist parties had all but 
abandoned their programmatic commitment to Marxism. While some 
scholars argue that this amounted to extreme ideological pragmatism
65
, 
others maintain that nonetheless some distinctive elements of Scandinavian 
social democratic ideology were retained. These include: commitment to 
equality and social solidarity through universal and comprehensive welfare 
benefits, and a redistributive taxation system, commitment to the mixed 
economy; toleration of a relatively large private sector, keynesian economic 
objectives such as full employment as the principal goal of economic policy 
and strong state viewed as benign and desirable in constructing ‗good 
society‘ and maximising individual freedom. 
For all three left parties, the core policy aims were therefore the 
maintenance of full employment, and the promotion of social justice and 
equality. The further development of an efficient industrial sector was a key 
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element of their implementation programmes, but the nationalisation of 
industry was never regarded as a major policy tool. In Sweden, the central 
economic policy was the so-called Rehn-Meidner model, which sought to 
promote economic efficiency and social justice by combining state 
intervention in the labour market with what is known as ‗solidaristic‘ wage 
policy and ATP measures. The most celebrated aspect of social democratic 
policy however was the further expansion of the welfare state, and the 
related concept of the ‗people’s home‘ folkhemmet, a founding concept at 
the basis of Swedish social democracy. There were clear influences from 
abroad in the development of Scandinavian welfare policy – the 1943 
Beveridge Report in the UK, for example, but the writings and researches of 
a core group of social democratic intellectuals, especially in Sweden, began 
to attract widespread international attention from the 1930s on. These 
Swedish economists and social scientists were part of the Stockholm 
School, which is discussed later on in the subsection about Keynes. 
At this point, the research begins by considering a rampant question, 
which predates the main issue problem of this research, the declining 
electoral support for the SAP after the 1990s. Before tackling it, though, one 
should ask why was social democracy so electorally dominant in post-war 
Sweden? Most political scientists have pointed to the ability of the social 
democratic parties to look beyond their ‗traditional‘ constituency – i.e. 
industrial workers – for electoral support, and to forge cross-class alliances, 
most notably with agrarian interests. Notwithstanding, that ability has not 
been the only strategy, which contributed to SAP‘s maintenance in office 
along the last century. The stress on environment and security, on one hand, 
and on growth and neutrality, on the other, were the basic ingredients for 
social democratic longevity in Sweden. 
 
1. The first years, economic depression and stage one 
Keynesianism 
1.1 The first years and the first social-democratic program 
In 1897, the first Swedish social-democratic program by the hands of 
Axel Danielsson was inspired by the 1890 Ehrfurt program of the German 
SPD. He and Hjaelmar Branting were the first advocates of a gradualist are 
evolutionary approach to achieving socialism
66
 – although in the Swedish 
debate of their time they were perceived as revolutionaries, who argued for 
a radical change of the society by dint of universal suffrage and self-
education.  
Though the beginnings were marked by innumerable hardships, the 
SAP and the LO did finally manage to win the 1932 elections by a majority 
of 41.7% and to form a coalition government with the Agrarians. However, 
were it not for its time-sealed alliance with the LO, the SAP would have 
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never achieved so stable and enduring a permanence in politics: it took more 
than a decade for the SAP to secure universal voting rights and yet another 
decade to join governmental office.  
In the beginnings, after its constitution as a party in 1889, the SAP 
took over the demand for universal franchise as its main priority since it was 
the prerequisite for the democratic control of the political life. One of the 
first and relatively effective weapons used for political pressure was the 
strike; in 1902, the SAP persuaded the LO to organize a general strike, 
involving 120,000 strikers in order to demand universal suffrage. After its 
defeat, the SAF was subsequently formed in order to offset increased labour 
movement strength and effective organization. Not even with the second 
1905 strike, was there universal suffrage conceded, but only the so-called 
‗December Compromise‘ signed in 1906. Its importance lies in the fact that 
there has been the first document which institutionalized dialogue between 
labour and industry, whereby both parties were ‗mutually accepted as 
representatives for their respective members‘67. In addition, two main 
principles lay at the basis of this compromise, the principle of collective 
bargaining and trade union recognition. These gains were not minor in that 
they paved the way for the SA and largely, for what have later been a 
characteristic of industrial relations in Sweden, precisely neo-corporatist 
arrangements. The contentious point in the document was contained in the 
paragraph 23, a clause added at the insistence of the SAF and accepted 
begrudgingly by the LO, which stipulated that employers had the right to 
‗freely appoint and dismiss employees, to assign jobs and to manage 
production‘68. In return, the LO obtained that these employers‘ prerogatives 
– paragraph 23 – be exercised within the boundaries established by 
collective agreements and secured negotiating rights which it could use to 
expand membership. It is hard to say whether these achievements were 
consistent with the SAP-LO‘s initial expectations. What it clearly goes 
without saying is that there could have hardly emerged a different 
arrangement – tipped in favour of the labour movement – given the balance 
of power pertaining at that time. For that particular moment, from SAF‘s 
point of view, the best strategy was to try to centralize unions – so that they 
can only have one interlocutor – and to formalize industrial relations.  
If the SAF believed that – with the ‗December Compromise‘ – it had 
institutionalized its ability to ‗effectively combat and control‘ organized 
labour by forcing trade unions to negotiate ‗within the existing framework of 
society‘69, then it had proved itself wrong. This false assumption – that 
conflict institutionalization would reduce industrial unrest – was infirmed 
soon afterwards, in 1908, when a third strike-wave began and the LO called 
for a general strike as a retaliation to employers‘ imposition of industry-
wide lockouts. This time, in 1909, not only was there universal suffrage still 
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absent, but the outcome was a clear defeat for the union movement. 
However, the positive aspect was that it gave the LO – the right arm of the 
SAP – the possibility to undertake a serious restructuring of the union 
movement and to facilitate cohesion over its constituent sections. It had also 
been an opportunity to consolidate the organization after consequent drops 
in membership and to reassess its further strategy: by 1911, the LO adhered 
to industrial unionism as its ‗main organizing principle‘. However, the 
foremost aim and political priority of the SAP – securing universal suffrage 
was still a beautiful dream; it would take almost another decade to convince 
the bourgeois coalition in office to give in. 
Many authors agree to the fact that it was ultimately the looming 
threat coming from the East – the Russian Revolution, which forced the 
bourgeois parties to reluctantly concede universal suffrage. In their words, 
the menace created by the events unfolding in Bolshevik Russia instilled 
enough fear in the ‗bourgeois subconscious‘ to make possible a 
reconsideration – preempted by the popularity of the Eastern Revolution and 
the increasing support for radical change amongst important sections of the 
Swedish working class, rather than the growing strength of liberal and social 
democrat parliamentary representation
70
. When they had finally granted it, 
the road to political change was set for the next half of the century: the 
social democrats held office discontinuously for 44 years. From 1936 till 
1990, there has been what certain analysts called the era of Social Democrat 
dominance over the Swedish political spectrum.  
In what concerns the long term partnership between the LO and the 
SAP – not only was it a tactful response to political isolation from the 
bourgeois coalition in government, but also an attempt to advance on the 
political scene and prepare the ground for electoral competition. To ease 
SAP‘s access to power, the LO strengthened its position as coordinator of 
union activity and as the preeminent think-tank for the labour movement.  
The introduction of proportional representation and the moderate 
extension of the franchise did enable the SAP to gradually increase its 
parliamentary representation, gaining 28.5% of the popular vote in the 1911 
general election, 36.4% in 1914 and 39.4% in 1917. 
 
1.2. Extending electoral consensus: the concept of folkhemmet 
and political consolidation 
Before coming to power with the 1932 elections, the SAP had yet to 
enlarge its electoral basis since it was clear that the working class was not a 
majority of the electorate and cross-class consensus over social-democratic 
ideas was still in the making. Using Duverger‘s paradigm, the party had to 
reach beyond its inner circles of party militants and adherents, out to its 
potential sympathizers. It did so by appealing to the concept of folkhem, 
which implied national solidarity through a fully-fledged welfare system. 
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The concept of the people‘s home (folkhemmet) was introduced into 
social democratic ideology by the party leader Per Albin Hansson in a 1928 
speech at the SAP congress. Actually, the people‘s home draws on an old 
conservative metaphor, which emphasizes a symbiotic and organic legacy of 
folk and nation. In the social democratic context, however, the notion resorts 
to a specific interpretation of national efficiency, one that stressed the 
interdependencies between economic and social advancement. The question 
of providing welfare for the Swedish people was not just a matter of social 
responsibility or solidarity; welfare was as well linked to progress and 
national development in the economic sense. Thus, the suggestion – 
according to which the concept of welfare had a strong link to the concept of 
efficiency – was clear enough.  
The idea of people‘s home as the organising metaphor of social 
democratic ideology from the 1930s onwards captured the notion that social 
democracy had a responsibility for the national interest: an interest that was 
broader and not confined to a specific working class. Folkhemmet was the 
SAP‘s attempt to broaden its ideology from fractionary class politics to 
articulations of national unity, which aimed at eliminating the dividing lines 
between citizens by the creation of universal welfare rights. According to 
social democracy, the social and economic barriers – laying at the 
foundation of society – were the source of inequality and consequently, 
were to be abolished. Moreover, the concept brought with it the indirect 
suggestion that through the expanding egalitarian institutions of the state, 
the individual could be liberated from dependency on archaic and bourgeois 
institutions such as the family, the market or the patriarchal employer 
(Traedgaardh). 
By the same token, the concept was also linked to the notion of 
samhaelle (ett samhaelle) that broadly means ‗society‘ in Swedish, but 
which is also deeply connected to the concept of folk and denying both the 
dichotomy of market and state, as well as the troika of market, state and 
civil society in favour of the idea of a home where state and citizen are 
intrinsically linked. To this extent, Lars Traedgaardh points out to the 
complete fusion between the terms of ‗nation‘, ‗state‘ and ‗society‘ which 
have the same meaning in Swedish. This has led to a peculiar understanding 
of the relationship between nation and state in a political tradition which 
considers them not only symbiotic but, to a great extent, unseparable
71
. In 
other words, Swedish national identity has come to be tightly linked to the 
welfare state, understood not simply as a set of institutions but as the 
realization of folkhemmet, the people‘s home, which unquestionably stood 
as the central organizing slogan of the Social Democrats. 
However, at the very basis of the social democratic conception lies a 
dim ambiguity – which is barely observable, but nonetheless worth 
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mentioning; the idea of folkhemmet traces back its roots to a Conservatory 
conception of the sensible role of the state in a society merely ‗inhabited‘ by 
it. On the background of the Swedish political culture and Social democratic 
permanence to government, the concept of folkhemmet gave birth to a social 
reality, which has been termed as ‗statist individualism‘72. It comes down, 
implicitly, to a unique situation, in which the ‗state is conceived as the 
liberator of the individual from the dependency ties imposed – paradoxically 
– by the civil society institutions of the family, churches and the private and 
voluntary charity organizations. The latter are not associated with 
pluralism and freedom, but with demeaning private charity, unequal 
patriarchal relations and informal (ab) uses of power‘73.  
The importance of folkhemmet for the ‗Swedish Model‘ has been 
highlighted for the first time in the work of Rothstein
74
. As later 
Traedgaardh, he claims that this model was characterized by ‗a particular 
form of statism built on a vision of a social contract between a strong and 
good state, on the one hand, and emancipated and autonomous individuals, 
on the other‘. Once again, the institutions of the state are seen as liberating 
for the individual. Furthermore, the inequalities and dependencies associated 
with the opposing civil society institutions were to be replaced by an 
egalitarian social order.  
The folkhemmet approach is important for understanding the 
electoral breakthrough of Swedish reformism, which rested on a privileged 
relationship between market and state. It introduced the idea that socialism 
could be advanced through social reforms inaugurated by the state in a 
period when the state seemed to be failing irremediably from several points 
of view (Olsen, 1992: 98). The image of national solidarity – made possible 
by the folkhemmet consensus – facilitated the coalition-building necessary 
to secure government. 
 
1.3. New 1930S-1940s Economic Trends: welfare as productive 
investment 
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However, certain steps were needed in order to prepare the ground 
before the eventual social-democratic acquisition of power. The inter-war 
conditions were not yet ripe for a reversal to socialist rule; harrowing times 
lay ahead for the SAP: the unemployment rate oscillating between soaring 
margins, with a lowest of 12.2% and a highest of 34%, the lack of a viable 
economic alternative to the prevalent laissez-faire liberalism called for a 
change. If social-democracy and economic policy of Keynesianist stem were 
to become the next ‗parole d’ordre‘ of national Swedish recovery, the 
maitrise by the SAP of the unstable political situation had yet to be grasped. 
Despite the SAP forming three minority governments between 1920 and 
1932, the ‗new economic strategy‘ was only adopted by the SAP in a 1930 
SAP Riksdag motion which stated out and loud that unemployment was a 
permanent feature of the business cycle. Till 1932 and the first social 
democrat electoral triumph – with the SAP securing for the first time a 
41.7% share of the vote, were still two years to pass in which the social-
democrats did a good job in campaigning for welfare through increased 
public spending, the new idea at the basis of economic management.  
Ernst Wigforss and Gunnar Myrdal were the economic artisans 
behind the new economics strategy and the Crisis Package. Both have 
contributed to a great extent in advancing the new economic policy whose 
main aim was to reduce unemployment and both were members of the 
Unemployment Commission. Myrdal‘s approach to social policy as 
productive investment able to boost up demand was expressed in the 
seminal article ‗Do social reforms cost money?‘ which was published in the 
functionalist journal Arkitektur och samhaelle. It fitted in well with the 
overarching ideology on the role of public expenditure and demand 
management contained in Wigforss‘s election pamphlet ‗Can we afford to 
work?‘ Their ideas completed each other to develop a political and 
economic proto-Keynesian strategy to win over the 1932 elections.  
The added value of the SAP‘s economic alternative rested on a 
unique blend of social and economically profitable policies whose founders 
were the young generation economists of the NSS New Stockholm School. 
Among them, Gunnar Myrdal was the first who coined the phrase 
‗productive‘ or ‗prophylactic‘ social policies to single out those structural 
policies with long-term effects on national efficiency. Social policy and 
welfare provision were understood as investment policies rather than as 
budget wasting, depletive policies. According to Myrdal, such a social 
policy, which would effectively solve social problems on the basis of 
structural economic engineering, should be understood as an investment, 
just like any other investment in production factors. The canny point of the 
entire theory was precisely the approach to social policy as a productive 
investment because it could be used as a disguise for the newly-envisaged 
role of welfare. Myrdal did not view his intervention as an ideological one, 
but rather as a scientific and economic one that set out a ‗rational‘ role for 
social policy in a modern, planned economy. The theoretical contrivance 
 45 
consisted in providing a discursive defence for the expanded role of social 
policy so as to endorse the idea of a need for individual security.  
One should not overlook however the peculiar situation of the 
moment – i.e. of the 1930s – in Sweden which saw acrid confrontation 
between two ideological blocs – the Liberals and the Social-democrats – and 
the radicalization of the political debate. Against this background, the 
question of public expenditure, and particularly the question of the cost of 
the new social policies had become the key point of contestation, which split 
the political spectrum. For Myrdal, the close observation of the political 
game brought about his critique of orthodox economic thinking, which 
failed to appreciate the strategic roles of public expenditure and welfare 
reform for the modernization of the economy. In his well-known essay ‗Do 
social reforms cost money?‘ he was adamantly opposed to the liberal view 
of social policy as a cost. 
Myrdal promptly replied to the liberals and mainstream economists‘ 
observation that social policy was burdensome and hard to manage in the 
long run. He retorted that social policy was not only concerned with the 
redistribution of resources, but with the actual creation of an economic 
surplus. Since the purpose of social policy was not only to create security 
but also to influence national revenues and create wealth, Myrdal argued 
that it could not be considered a cost. That is why the social democratic 
definition of social policy as a ‗productive investment‘ – as opposed to the 
liberal standing, whose counter-argument of ‗grueling social costs‘ Myrdal 
considered as irrational, unscientific and propagandistic – would be a more 
scientific argument, in line with modern economic thinking
75
.  
From the socialist standpoint, the question of whether or not social 
policy was a feasible alternative to stagnation and retraction had been wiped 
out as a reason for doubt as early as 1913 when it had been proclaimed as a 
political strategy. It was clearly the best approach not only for Myrdal or 
Wigforss, but also for the SAP‘s leaders who were actively in favour of a 
pragmatic socio-economic attitude, which drew inspiration from Austrian 
Marxism, German Katedersocialismus and English Fabianism.  
However, the doctrines of rationalization on the economic role of 
social policy – present in the socialist line – drew on a legacy of discourses 
concerned with social order and efficiency and in the same way as the 
notion of folkhemmet set roots from an elder conservative legacy of national 
unity. Without any fright of error, one might say that the link between the 
people‘s home and ‗social-democratic capitalism‘ was Gunnar Myrdal‘s 
idea of social policy as productive investment.  
                                                 
75
 For Myrdal, to reject what was scientifically a possibility out of the crisis and economic 
depression represented a reprehensible blunder inasmuch as a failure to grasp it would set 
again the path for a repetition of past mistakes like the maintenance of the poor relief 
system, which was synonymous with the destruction of social capital. According to him, 
that was too high a price to pay for and consequently, the cost incurred to society was the 
waste of social destruction. 
 46 
Against the background of postwar depression and polarization of 
the political debate, the concept of investment acquired valuable ideological 
currency in economics and politics. It was especially consistent with a 1930s 
social democratic world of ideas, which in many respects was not unlike the 
Enlightement Age of the eighteenth century where reason was advocated as 
the primary source and legitimacy for authority. In the same way now, 
investment was the new ‗catchphrase‘ with the emphasis on an overarching 
responsibility for economy and welfare inherent in the people‘s home 
(folkhem) concept; with functional socialism‘s preoccupation with 
consumption and social amelioration; and with the place of public 
consumption and demand management in the ‗new economic ideas‘ of the 
party‘s main theorists Ernst Wigforss. What is more, Myrdal‘s notion of 
productive social policies or social policy as investment fitted in well with 
the ideas of universalism formulated in Gustav Moeller‘s discussion on 
comprehensive or ‗general‘ social policies that would not stigmatize the 
working class as the poor relief system did, but provide security as a matter 
of right
76
.  
As to the relationship between Myrdal‘s productive investment and 
the subsequent development of the Swedish welfare model, Esping-
Andersen and other observers have argued that the productivism of Swedish 
social policies was an important motivating factor for the universalism of 
the Swedish welfare state. A Swedish outlook on social policy as productive 
and as part of an overall socio-economic strategy meant that social policy 
was not, as in the liberal model, restricted to the residual role of dealing with 
the worst effects of capitalism on the social sphere, but was designed as an 
institutionally redistributive strategy for de-commodification and equality.  
Swedish social-democracy can be conceived as a permanent trade-
off between growth and security, whereby the two values are targeted in the 
long term, if not simultaneously as achievable goods, at least on an 
intentional basis. Unless the two were long-term goals, society would have 
been at a loss both from a social and economic point of view. The price 
incurred to society by maintaining insecurity in the social sphere was higher 
than by paying welfare benefits. This price was paid in direct budget 
expenses for social care instead of an indirect deterioration of competitive 
labor force, which contributed to the welfare state budget
77
.  
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1.4. SAP‘s first accession to power and the forming of 
government  
 At a time when the questions of retraction or expansion were disputed 
as mutually exclusive solutions to the impasse, viable proof in favour of one 
of them became the key to electoral victory. The debate was not confined to 
the strict issue of the best strategy, but purported to reduce unemployment 
and political instability. Despite the SAP forming three minority 
governments, an electoral breakthrough was not achieved prior to 1932 
when the SAP obtained a high score of 41.7%, an increased share of votes, 
which meant the socialist block received a majority of votes for the first 
time. 
Before 1932, the shadow finance minister, Ernst Wigforss, used the 
forum of the Commission of Enquiry into Unemployment, which the 
shadow SAP government established in 1926 to develop a proto-keynesian 
strategy in conjunction with the group of young economists of ‗The 
Stockholm School‘78. The new economic strategy was publicly adopted by 
the SAP in a 1930 SAP Riksdag motion which asserted that unemployment 
was a permanent, not a temporary feature - as the classical economists and 
the bourgeois coalition held, of the business cycle
79
. 
However, when taking over with a majority of the votes, SAP was 
still in need of parliamentary support to form government because the upper 
Chamber of the Riksdag was dominated by the bourgeois parties. To 
implement its crisis programme and form government, the SAP was 
supposed to gain a parliamentary majority support in the bourgeois 
dominated Riksdag. But even before that, the SAP formed a minority 
government and appointed a new Commission on Unemployment, directed 
by the leading figures in the Stockholm School: Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil 
Ohlin and Dag Hammarskoeld. Their conclusions formed the basis of a 100 
page motion placed before the Riksdag in 1932, which contained analysis, 
calculations and practical proposals to deal with the crisis. It can be 
righteously said that the resolution was the first macroeconomic programme 
to contain the kernel of the new Keynesian economics, which was yet to 
come four years later. If it was not exactly Keynes‘s ‗General Theory of 
Interest and Money‘, then it was akin to it on many points. These points and 
SAP economic programme per se are going to be explained at length in the 
next chapter, chapter three, while chapter four is going to detail the 
specificities of the Swedish welfare model, which were not necessarily 
macroeconomic, but rather a ‗fine-tuning‘ between social policies and 
keynesian macroeconomic policies
80
.  
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In 1932, the SAP was clearly in need of a coalition partner, which 
they found in the Agrarians. The Agrarian Party did not recoil from joining 
the SAP after six months of minority government and that resulted in the 
parliamentary stalemate being broken. In return for political support, the 
Agrarian Party negotiated a $ 10 million in long term agricultural support 
and price stabilization. This political compromise between the SAP and the 
Agrarians became known as the kohandeln or ‗cow trade‘.  
The SAP fought the 1932 election on its crisis programme aimed at 
reducing unemployment, which elicited vigorous opposition from bourgeois 
politicians, including the Liberals, as well as mainstream economists and 
bankers. This program was based on keynesian economics, precisely on the 
core principle that loan-financed public works and welfare benefits increase 
demand and reduce unemployment. The successful adoption of 
Keynesianism furthermore laid the basis for continuing social democratic 
government and uprooted the mythology of Swedish social democracy as 
the savior of the nation. Thus, the crisis package was enacted by May 1933 
with only slight concessions – such as minor reductions in expenditure plans 
and no initial agreement on unemployment insurance – which did not alter 
the fundamental keynesian principle behind the measures. 
The measures consisted of state money injection in public relief jobs 
such as construction, road building and forestry. One hundred and sixty 
million kroner were dedicated to it between 1932 and 1934, representing a 
two and a half fold increase in these programmes. Central government 
expenditure almost doubled in real terms between 1930 and 1939, whilst 
revenue was planned to rise more slowly, thereby relying upon deficit 
financing to stimulate aggregate demand.  
Moreover, public works schemes began to pay market wage levels 
rather than the previous 15-25% below the going rate. The keynesian 
multiplier effect clearly had an impact because it was calculated to stimulate 
the economy to the value of 300 million SEK or kronor and create 
approximately 90 000 jobs. Bergstroem argues that this budget was ‗the first 
conscious implementation of Keynesian economic policy in the world‘ and 
that it appeared to pay off according to the unemployment figures, which 
fell from 164 000 in 1933 to 36 000 by 1936 and 18 000 in 1937, one year 
later. Therefore, the SAP ‗crisis programme‘ was clearly keynesian at its 
core. The question is whether these keynesian ideas were the key variables 
which really helped Sweden out of the post 2nd WWW depression. Was it 
not rather the export-led production high its main cause?  
 
1.5. Keynesianism and the Stockholm School (Whyman and 
Miles article) 
                                                                                                                            
because of the crisis - in Sweden, the right wing government is enacting a combination of 
inflation targeting programmes to steer the economy. 
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Before exposing the economic practice of Swedish social 
democracy, one aspect of the Swedish social democratic tradition needs to 
be clarified: the relationship between Keynes and the SS. Which one should 
be credited as being the first who launched the idea of public spending in the 
economy as productive investment? If there is a difference between practice 
and theory, then the Swedish were the ones who implemented for the first 
time Keynes‘s ideas, long before his ‗General Theory‘ had been published 
in 1936, four years after SAP first social democratic government
81
.  
Gunnar Myrdal and Ernst Wigforss belonged to the youngest 
generation of progressive economists of the Stockholm School who 
advocated for a new role of the state in economic management and saw in 
the Depression the best circumstance favouring it. It is worth mentioning 
that the ideas of the new Stockholm School on the role of public expenditure 
and demand management to achieve macroeconomic stability and a state of 
full employment preceded many of the thoughts Keynes put forward in his 
General Theory. Both Wigforss‘s and Myrdal‘s pamphlets preach ideas, 
which are in many respects akin to Keynes‘s. For instance, Wigforss‘s 
election pamphlet ‗Har vi raad att arbeta?‘82 demonstrated that it was a 
deliberate Keynesian-type reflationary strategy which established the case 
for increased public spending to offset a shortfall in private investment and 
anticipated what later became known as the ‗multiplier effect‘83. 
Because the SAP issued up the first ‗new economics‘ programme in 
1930 – five years before the theoretical justification provided by John M. 
Keynes in his newly published ‗General Theory of Unemployment, Interest 
and Money‘ – a shade of doubt is still cast over the first real authors of 
Keynesianism as universal aggregate demand theory. However, it would be 
a mistake to assume that the first the Swedish economists were unaware of 
the Webbs‘ publication of the 1909 Minority Report, which recommended 
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public works schemes to absorb the unemployed although the opposite 
might be more accurate. Besides, the first gist of governmental control of 
unemployment by fiscal leverage and public sector expansion were 
expressed as early as 1913 by the SAP leaders, Hjaelmar Branting and 
Gustav Moeller. There may not be mistaken to think that the British had the 
theoretical monopoly while the Swedish were the first who intuitively put 
into practice aggregate demand theory.  
In addition to the chicken and egg question, there is also 
disagreement among economic historians concerning the impact of the 
‗keynesian‘ 1930s crisis measures upon the Swedish economy and the 
extent they helped Sweden escape the depression. Hufford (1973) argued 
the crisis programme ‗played an important role in the recovery‘ whilst 
Trehoerning (1993) considered its impact ‗not entirely clear‘. Bergstroem 
(1992), Lindbeck (1975) and Trehoerning all believed it had had a limited 
impact compared with the export-led growth resulting from the maintenance 
of an undervalued currency throughout the 1930s. Unga (1976) argued the 
new policy was not consistently applied and that deficit-programmes were 
viewed as a necessary evil in an extraordinary situation, not as valuable in 
themselves to stimulate expansion.  
Furthermore, whilst Heclo and Madsen
84
 agreed that the SAP had 
‗some Keynesian impulses‘, they claimed that total public spending was too 
small to have a significant influence upon the economy. Central government 
budget expenditure almost doubled in real terms between 1930 and 1939, 
but as a percentage of GDP, this only represented an increase from 8% to 
12%. Over the same period, government revenue rose from 8% to 9% of 
GDP only, signifying the SAP deliberatley stimulated the economy through 
deficit financing, even though the sums were modest when spread over the 
decade. 
When evaluating the contribution the crisis package made to 
Sweden‘s recovery, however, it is important to place the policies in context. 
Deficit financing was previously unknown in modern industrial economies 
and viewed with distrust by orthodox economists as akin to debasing the 
currency or depreciating it. Four years before Keynes published his General 
Theory and gave theoretical justification to the new economics, the SAP‘s 
programme represented a considerable achievement, particularly when 
compared to the ‗ineptitude‘ of contemporary labour parties, including the 
British Labour parties in 1931. In this respect, the Swedish Social 
Democrats were fortunate to achieve power after the bourgeois parties had 
been forced off the Gold Standard and were consequently free to undertake 
economic experimentation during an acknowledged period of neo-liberal 
weakness. 
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The dispute evoked above consists in whether it was the export-
driven characteristic of the Swedish economy in that period or the new 
social democratic economic programme, which had held the key impact in 
bringing about the Swedish economic recovery. This research thesis is that 
both contributed in overcoming the depression ‗impasse‘, but the social 
democratic programme had been decisive. Although a plethora of economic 
historians have their doubts, it is nevertheless a fact that the SAP had an 
appropriate strategy in place at that point. This is in itself an achievement of 
some significance taking into account that the primary implication of the 
crisis programe was ‗the stable basis it laid for continuing social democratic 
governance‘ by legitimizing and institutionalizing active government policy 
to maintain full employment and promote welfare through the use of all 
available economic tools
85
. In this sense, it mattered more that the SAP were 
seen to assert the power of government to defeat unemployment than what 
actually happened. Prior to the success of the 1932 crisis packages, the SAP 
had been unsure itself and feared office ‗because it did not know what to do 
with it‘. Consolidating its successful crisis policies, the SAP claimed an 
‗undisputed leading position‘ in Swedish politics, thereby raising the 
standard of democracy in the process
86
.  
Furthermore, the successful adoption of keynesianism laid the basis 
for continuing social democratic government. The substantial support for the 
SAP programme resulted in a 46% share of the vote at the 1936 election and 
formation of a formal coalition government with the Agrarians. This 
provided a secure platform to develop keynesian economic policies and 
insulate its achievements from reversal after future elections. What is more, 
it gave the SAP a new ‗ideological identity and a role in the country’s 
mythology‘ as ‗the agents of Sweden’s delivery from Depression‘87. 
The overall picture of the Swedish economy at the beginning of the 
2nd WWW in Europe may be deemed as following: while full employment 
was accepted as the prime economic policy goal, public works augmented 
by an under-valued, controlled-floating krona and low interest rates were 
combined with selective tax benefits to stimulate production and 
employment. Moreover, a more progressive taxation system with tax-based 
investments funds - intended to influence the timing of investment decisions 
- were designed to reinforce counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. Under 
these policies, Sweden‘s real aggregate GDP rose by over 40% between 
1932 and 1940, whilst unemployment fell continually throughout the decade 
(Rock, 1986). Renewed prosperity ‗helped to institutionalize the legitimacy 
of both active full employment policy and social democracy itself‘88. 
The exact date between SAP´s social/welfare program, the welfare 
theories of the new Stockholm School and Keynes´s General Theory of 
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money, interest... is disputable. Some argue that the Swedish economists 
were the first to devise the theoretical underpinnings of the postwar state 
driven intervention into the economy before Keynes received public 
recognition in UK.  
 
1.5.1. Pre-keynesianism 
Before tackling the Swedish economic model and its political 
ramification in the next chapter, it is important to remind some basic ideas 
of Keynesian economics. The theoretical assumptions of what is known as 
keynesian economics are based on the IS-LM model, a positive linear 
dependence between Investment and Savings on the Demand curve and a 
negative one between Loan and Money on the Supply curve.  
Fig 1 about here 
Understanding the IS-LM model is compulsory since they represent 
the basic knowledge for any further comprehension of modern economic 
dynamics. Inflation, devaluation, the multiplier and the crowding-out 
effects, the profit squeeze and unemployment dynamics are all theoretical 
derivates, which depart from simple keynesian aggregate demand and 
supply theory. However, it was not Keynes himself which devised this 
useful ‗classroom gadget‘ to summarize the main concepts presented by 
Keynes in the ‗General Theory‘. For instance, with the help of the IS-LM 
model - invented by John R Hicks, one can figure out the differences 
between inflation and devaluation, on one hand, and between reflation and 
deflation, on the other hand. Reflation and devaluation are the same kind of 
macroeconomic policies inasmuch as they are used interchangeably with the 
same objective, that of ensuring full employment or of reducing the rate of 
unemployment. Reflation could be easily mistaken for inflation, but it is 
actually the increase in government spending G. On the other hand, 
devaluation takes place when the national currency is maintained artificially 
at a low level to help increase exports and competitiveness. Reflation is a 
collateral effect of [an increase, it occurs in the same conditions as inflation, 
but is not the same with it. Markets automatically return to full employment 
through Price adjustments, equilibrium, disequilibrium,] 
 
In the Keynesian programme the Postwar Keynesianism 
 After Keynes, Keynesian analysis was combined with neoclassical 
economics to produce what is generally termed the ‗neoclassical synthesis‘ 
which dominates mainstream macroeconomic thought. Though it was 
widely held that there was no strong automatic tendency to full employment, 
many believed that if government policy were used to ensure it, the 
economy would behave as classical or neoclassical theory predicted. 
 In the post-WWII years, Keynes‘s policy ideas were widely 
accepted. For the first time, governments prepared good quality economic 
statistics on an ongoing basis and had a theory that told them what to do. In 
this era of new liberalism and social democracy, most western 
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capitalist countries enjoyed low, stable unemployment and modest inflation. 
 As already mentioned fleetingly above, it was with John Hicks that 
Keynesian economics produced a clear model which policy-makers could 
use to attempt to understand and control economic activity. This model, the 
IS-LM model is nearly as influential as Keynes‘ original analysis in 
determining actual policy and economics education. It relates aggregate 
demand and employment to three exogenous quantities, i.e., the amount of 
money in circulation, the government budget, and the state of business 
expectations. This model was very popular with economists after WWII 
because it could be understood in terms of general equilibrium theory. This 
encouraged a much more static vision of macroeconomics than that 
described above. 
 The second main part of a Keynesian policy-maker‘s theoretical 
apparatus was the Phillips curve. This curve, which was more of an 
empirical observation than a theory, indicated that increased employment, 
and decreased unemployment, implied increased inflation. Keynes had only 
predicted that falling unemployment would cause a higher price, not a 
higher inflation rate. Thus, the economists could use the IS-LM model to 
predict, for example, that an increase in the money supply would raise 
output and employment and then use the Phillips curve to predict an 
increase in inflation.  
 Through the 1950s, moderate degrees of government demand 
leading industrial development, and use of fiscal and monetary counter-
cyclical policies continued, and reached a peak in the ‗go go‘ 1960s, where 
it seemed to many Keynesians that prosperity was now permanent. 
However, with the oil shock of 1973, and the economic problems of the 
1970s, modern liberal economics began to fall out of favor. During this 
time, many economies experienced high and rising unemployment, coupled 
with high and rising inflation, contradicting the Phillips curve‘s prediction. 
This stagflation meant that the simultaneous application of expansionary 
(anti-recession) and contractionary (anti-inflation) policies appeared to be 
necessary, a clear impossibility. This dilemma led to the end of the 
Keynesian near-consensus of the 1960s, and the rise throughout the 1970s of 
ideas based upon more classical analysis, including monetarism, supply-side 
economics and new classical economics. At the same time, Keynesian 
economists began during the period to reorganize their thinking (some 
becoming associated with New Keynesian economics); one strategy, utilized 
also as a critique of the notably high unemployment and potentially 
disappointing GNP growth rates associated with the latter two theories by 
the mid-1980s, was to emphasize low unemployment and maximal 
economic growth at the cost of somewhat higher inflation
89
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89
 Its consequences kept in check by indexing and other methods, and its overall rate kept 
lower and steadier by such potential policies as Martin Weitzman‘s share economy. 
 54 
Historical background 
 Keynes‘s macroeconomic theories were a response to mass 
unemployment in 1920s Britain and in 1930s America. In ‗The Economic 
Consequences of Peace‘, Keynes dared to break with previous held theories 
on the issue of state involvement in monetary policy. His experience with 
the Treaty of Versailles entitled him to recant the general economics on 
which the Treaty was based and to develop the idea of monetary policy as 
something separate from merely maintaining currency against a fixed peg. 
He increasingly believed that economic systems would not automatically 
direct themselves to attain ‗the optimal level of production‘. This is 
expressed in his famous quote, ‗In the long run, we are all dead‘, implying 
that it does not matter that optimal production levels are attained in the long 
run, because it would be a very long run indeed. Keynes‘s ‗recipes‘ were 
concerned with the problems plaguing the inter-war period, namely the high 
level of unemployment and the underutilization of production means.  
 Therefore, to put Keynes in context, one should pay heed to the 
political events of the late 1920s, when the world economic system began to 
break down and different answers - from the political realm - like fascism, 
nazism, communism and socialism were coming to fix it up back again. 
After the wobbly recovery that followed WWI, with the global drop in 
production, the acerbic critics of the gold standard, market self-correction, 
and production-driven paradigms of economics moved to the fore. Dozens 
of different schools contended for influence. Into this tumult stepped 
Keynes, promising not to institute revolution but to save capitalism. He 
circulated a simple thesis: there were more factories and transportation 
networks than could be used at the current ability of individuals to pay, i.e. 
that the problem was on the demand side. In the same time, with him or 
before him, the Swedish economists of the Stockholm School were trying to 
launch a new paradigm in economic thinking and policy. While Keynes 
theorized government spending, the Swedish economists actually offered to 
the Swedish Social Democrats the economic tools necessary to implement 
their political ideas
90
. 
Further, some pointed to the Soviet Union as a supposedly 
successful planned economy which had avoided the disasters of the 
capitalist world and argued for a move toward socialism. Others pointed to 
the success of fascism in Mussolini‘s Italy. 
 But many economists insisted that business confidence, not lack of 
demand, was the root of the problem, and that the correct course was to 
slash government expenditures and to cut wages to raise business 
confidence and willingness to hire unemployed workers. Yet others simply 
argued that ‗nature would make its course‘, solving the Depression 
automatically by ‗shaking out‘ unneeded productive capacity. 
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 Keynesian economics is an economic theory based on the ideas of 
twentieth-century British economist John Maynard Keynes, which were first 
exposed in the ‗The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money‘, 
published in 1936, 4 four years after the SAP first acceded to government. 
Keynesian economics seeks to provide solutions to what some consider 
failures of laissez-faire economic liberalism, which advocates that markets 
and the private sector operate best without state intervention. The state, 
according to Keynesian economics, can help maintain economic growth and 
stability in a mixed economy, in which both the public and private sectors 
play important roles. 
 In Keynes‘s view, some micro-level actions of individuals and firms 
can lead to aggregate macroeconomic outcomes in which the economy 
operates below its potential output and growth. Before him, many classical 
economists had believed in Say‘s law, that supply creates its own demand, 
so that a ‗general glut‘ would therefore be impossible91. Keynes contended 
that aggregate demand for goods might be insufficient during economic 
downturns, leading to unnecessarily high unemployment and losses of 
potential output. Keynes‘s trick consisted in suggesting that government 
policies could be used to increase aggregate demand, thus increasing 
economic activity and reducing high unemployment and deflation. He 
argued that the solution to depression was to stimulate the economy 
(‗inducement to invest‘) through some combination of two approaches: a 
reduction in interest rates and government investment in infrastructure – the 
injection of income results in more spending in the general economy, which 
in turn stimulates more production and investment involving still more 
income and spending and so forth. The initial stimulation starts a cascade of 
events, whose total increase in economic activity is a multiple of the original 
investment. 
 This latter idea lays at the basis of what is known as the ‗multiplier 
effect‘ in Keynesian economics. This effect relates interest rates to 
consumption and long term investment, which lie at the core of 
macroeconomic policy. There are two aspects of Keynes‘s model which had 
implications for policy. Firstly, there is the ‗Keynesian multiplier‘, first 
developed by Richard F. Kahn in 1931. Exogenous increases in spending, 
such as an increase in government outlays, increases total spending by a 
multiple of that increase. A government could stimulate a great deal of new 
production with a modest outlay if two conditions are met. First, the people 
who receive this money then spend most on consumption goods and save 
the rest. Second, this extra spending allows businesses to hire more people 
and pay them, which in turn allows a further increase consumer spending. 
This process continues. At each step, the increase in spending is smaller 
than in the previous step, so that the multiplier process tapers off and allows 
the attainment of in equilibrium. This story is modified and moderated if we 
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move beyond a ‗closed economy‘ and bring in the role of taxation: the rise 
in imports and tax payments at each step reduces the amount of induced 
consumer spending and the size of the multiplier effect. 
 Secondly, a key point contained in the ‗multipler‘ is the effect of the 
interest rate on investment. In the classical model, the supply of funds 
(saving) determined the amount of fixed business investment. That is, since 
all savings was placed in banks, and all business investors in need of 
borrowed funds went to banks, the amount of savings determined the 
amount that was available to invest. To Keynes, the amount of investment 
was determined independently by long-term profit expectations and, to a 
lesser extent, the interest rate. The latter opens the possibility of regulating 
the economy through money supply changes, via monetary policy. Under 
conditions such as the Great Depression, Keynes argued that this approach 
would be relatively ineffective – as argued in classical economics – 
compared to fiscal policy. But during more ‗normal‘ times, monetary 
expansion can stimulate the economy, mostly by encouraging construction 
of new housing. 
 Beside the multiplier effect, another key element of keynesian 
economic theory is the concept of full employment. A central conclusion of 
Keynesian economics is that in some situations, no strong automatic 
mechanism moves output and employment towards full employment levels. 
This conclusion conflicts with economic approaches that assume a general 
tendency towards an equilibrium. In the ‗neoclassical synthesis‘, which 
combines Keynesian macro concepts with a micro foundation, the 
conditions of general equilibrium allow for price adjustment to achieve this 
goal. The New Classical Macroeconomics movement, which began in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, criticized Keynesian theories, while ‗New 
Keynesian‘ economics have sought to base Keynes‘s idea on more rigorous 
theoretical foundations. More broadly, Keynes saw his as a general theory, 
in which utilization of resources could be high or low, whereas previous 
economics focused on the particular case of full utilization. 
 Related to the concept of full employment is the concept of 
excessive saving. To Keynes, excessive saving, i.e. saving beyond planned 
investment, was a serious problem, encouraging recession or even 
depression. Excessive saving results if investment falls, perhaps due to 
falling consumer demand, over-investment in earlier years, or pessimistic 
business expectations, and if saving does not immediately fall in step. 
 The classical economists argued that interest rates would fall due to 
the excess supply of ‗loanable funds‘. The first diagram, adapted from the 
only graph in The General Theory, shows this process. (For simplicity, other 
sources of the demand for or supply of funds are ignored here.) Assume that 
fixed investment in capital goods falls from ‗old I‘ to ‗new I‘ (step a). 
Second (step b), the resulting excess of saving causes interest-rate cuts, 
abolishing the excess supply: so again we have savings (S) equal to 
investment. The interest-rate fall prevents that of production and 
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employment. 
 Keynes had a complex argument against this laissez-faire response. 
The graph below summarizes his argument, assuming again that fixed 
investment falls. First, saving does not fall much as interest rates fall, since 
the income and substitution effects of falling rates go in conflicting 
directions. Second, since planned fixed investment in plant and equipment is 
mostly based on long-term expectations of future profitability, that spending 
does not rise much as interest rates fall. So S and I are drawn as steep 
(inelastic) in the graph. Given the inelasticity of both demand and supply, a 
large interest-rate fall is needed to close the saving/investment gap. As 
drawn, this requires a negative interest rate at equilibrium (where the new I 
line would intersect the old S line). However, this negative interest rate is 
not necessary to Keynes‘s argument. 
 Third, Keynes argued that saving and investment are not the main 
determinants of interest rates, especially in the short run. Instead, the supply 
of and the demand for the stock of money determine interest rates in the 
short run. (This is not drawn in the graph.) Neither change quickly in 
response to excessive saving to allow fast interest-rate adjustment. 
Finally, because of fear of capital losses on assets besides money, 
Keynes suggested that there may be a ‗liquidity trap‘ setting a floor under 
which interest rates cannot fall. (In this trap, bond-holders, fearing rises in 
interest rates (because rates are so low), fear capital losses on their bonds 
and thus try to sell them to attain money (liquidity).) Even economists who 
reject this liquidity trap now realize that nominal interest rates cannot fall 
below zero (or slightly higher). In the diagram, the equilibrium suggested by 
the new I line and the old S line cannot be reached, so that excess saving 
persists. Some (such as Paul Krugman, 2008 Nobel Prize in economics) see 
this latter kind of liquidity trap as prevailing in Japan in the 1990s. 
 Even if this ‗trap‘ does not exist, there is a fourth element to 
Keynes‘s critique (perhaps the most important part). Saving involves not 
spending all of one‘s income. It thus means insufficient demand for business 
output, unless it is balanced by other sources of demand, such as fixed 
investment. Thus, excessive saving corresponds to an unwanted 
accumulation of inventories, or what classical economists called a general 
glut. This pile-up of unsold goods and materials encourages businesses to 
decrease both production and employment. This in turn lowers people‘s 
incomes – and saving, causing a leftward shift in the S line in the diagram 
(step B). For Keynes, the fall in income did most of the job ending excessive 
saving and allowing the loanable funds market to attain equilibrium. Instead 
of interest-rate adjustment solving the problem, a recession does so. Thus in 
the diagram, the interest-rate change is small. 
 Whereas the classical economists assumed that the level of output 
and income was constant and given at any one time (except for short-lived 
deviations), Keynes saw this as the key variable that adjusted to equate 
saving and investment. 
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 Finally, a recession undermines the business incentive to engage in 
fixed investment. With falling incomes and demand for products, the desired 
demand for factories and equipment (not to mention housing) will fall. This 
accelerator effect would shift the 1 line to the left again, a change not shown 
in the diagram above. This recreates the problem of excessive saving and 
encourages the recession to continue. 
In sum, to Keynes there is interaction between excess supplies in 
different markets, as unemployment in labor markets encourages excessive 
saving – and vice-versa. Rather than prices adjusting to attain equilibrium, 
the main story is one of quantity adjustment allowing recessions and 
possible attainment of underemployment equilibrium. 
 It is memorable Keynes‘s article, which he wrote in his early 
twenties, about a hydro-electric project. In his opinion it would have been 
better if the rewards of the project had gone to the worker-builders rather 
than to the investors who had financed the project. This alone tells a lot 
about Keynes‘s ideas on redistribution. Precisely, Keynesians believe that 
fiscal policy should be directed towards the lower-income segment of the 
population, because that segment is more likely to spend the money, 
contributing to demand, than to save it. 
  
Keynes and the Classics 
 Keynes sought to distinguish his theories from ‗classical 
economics‘, by which he meant the economic theories of David Ricardo and 
his followers, including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, F.Y. Edgeworth, 
and A. Cecil Pigou. A central tenet of the classical view, according to which 
‗supply creates its own demand‘. Say‘s Law can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, the claim that the total value of output is equal to the sum of income 
earned in production is a result of a national income accounting identity, and 
is therefore indisputable. A second and stronger claim, however, that the 
‗costs of output are always covered in the aggregate by the sale-proceeds 
resulting from demand‘ depends on how consumption and saving are linked 
to production and investment. In particular, Keynes argued that the second, 
strong form of Say‘s Law only holds if increases in individual savings 
exactly match an increase in aggregate investment
92
.  
 Keynes sought to develop a theory that would explain determinants 
of savings, consumption, investment and production. In that theory, the 
interaction of aggregate demand and aggregate supply determines the level 
of output and employment in the economy. Because of what he considered 
the failure of the ‗Classical Theory‘ in the 1930s, Keynes firmly objects its 
main theory – adjustments in prices would automatically make demand tend 
to the full employment level. 
 Neo-classical theory supports that the two main costs that shift 
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demand and supply are labor and money. Through the distribution of the 
monetary policy, demand and supply can be adjusted. If there were more 
labor than demand for it, wages would fall until hiring began again. If there 
was too much saving, and not enough consumption, then interest rates 
would fall until people either cut their savings rate or started borrowing. 
 Keynes‘s theory suggested that active government policy could be 
effective in managing the economy. Rather than seeing unbalanced 
government budgets as wrong, Keynes advocated what has been called 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies, that is policies which acted against the tide 
of the business cycle: deficit spending when a nation‘s economy suffers 
from recession or when recovery is long-delayed and unemployment is 
persistently high – and the suppression of inflation in boom times by either 
increasing taxes or cutting back on government outlays. He argued that 
governments should solve problems in the short run rather than waiting for 
market forces to do it in the long run, because ‗in the long run, we are all 
dead‘.  
 As to active fiscal policy, Keynes‘s idea – contrary to the classical 
wisdom according, which wanted to balance government budget – was that 
it would exacerbate the underlying problem: following either policy would 
raise savings and thus lower the demand for both products and labor. For 
example, Keynesians see Herbert Hoover‘s June 1932 tax increase as 
making the Depression worse. Keynes‘s ideas influenced Franklin D. 
Roosevelt‘s view that insufficient buying-power caused the Depression. 
During his presidency, Roosevelt adopted some aspects of Keynesian 
economics, especially after 1937, when, in the depths of the Depression, the 
United States suffered from recession yet again following fiscal contraction. 
Something similar to Keynesian expansionary policies had been applied 
earlier by both social-democratic Sweden, and Nazi Germany. But to many 
the true success of Keynesian policy can be seen at the onset of WWII, 
which provided a kick to the world economy, removed uncertainty, and 
forced the rebuilding of destroyed capital. Keynesian ideas became almost 
official in social-democratic Europe after the war and in the U.S. in the 
1960s. 
 Keynes‘s theory suggested that active government policy could be 
effective in managing the economy. Rather than seeing unbalanced 
government budgets as wrong, Keynes advocated what has been called 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies, that is policies which acted against the tide 
of the business cycle: deficit spending when a nation‘s economy suffers 
from recession or when recovery is long-delayed and unemployment is 
persistently high – and the suppression of inflation in boom times by either 
increasing taxes or cutting back on government outlays. He argued that 
governments should solve problems in the short run rather than waiting for 
market forces to do it in the long run, because ‗in the long run, we are all 
dead‘.  
 This contrasted with the classical and neo-classical economic 
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analysis of fiscal policy. Fiscal stimulus (deficit spending) could actuate 
production. But to these schools, there was no reason to believe that this 
stimulation would outrun the side-effects that ‗crowd out‘ private 
investment: first, it would increase the demand for labor and raise wages, 
hurting profitability; Second, a government deficit increases the stock of 
government bonds, reducing their market price and encouraging high 
interest rates, making it more expensive for business to finance fixed 
investment. Thus, efforts to stimulate the economy would be self-defeating. 
 The Keynesian response is that such fiscal policy is only appropriate 
when unemployment is persistently high, above what is now termed the 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, or NAIRU. In that case, 
crowding out is minimal. Further, private investment can be ‗crowded in‘: 
fiscal stimulus raises the market for business output, raising cash flow and 
profitability, spurring business optimism. To Keynes, this accelerator 
effect meant that government and business could be complements rather 
than substitutes in this situation. Second, as the stimulus occurs, the 
GDP rises, raising the amount of saving, helping to finance the increase in 
fixed investment. Finally, government outlays need not always be wasteful: 
government investment in public goods that will not be provided by profit-
seekers will encourage the private sector‘s growth. That is, government 
spending on such things as basic research, public health, education, and 
infrastructure could help the long-term growth of potential output. 
 Invoking public choice theory, classical and neoclassical economists 
doubt that the government will ever be this beneficial and suggest that its 
policies will typically be dominated by special interest groups, including the 
government bureaucracy. Thus, they use their political theory to reject 
Keynes‘ economic theory. 
 A Keynesian economist might point out that classical and 
neoclassical theory does not explain why firms acting as ‗special interests‘ 
to influence government policy are assumed to produce a negative outcome, 
while those same firms acting with the same motivations outside of the 
government are supposed to produce positive outcomes. 
 In Keynes‘ theory, there must be significant slack in the labour 
market before fiscal expansion is justified. Both conservative and some 
neoliberal economists question this assumption, unless labor unions or the 
government ‗meddle‘ in the free market, creating persistent supply-side or 
classical unemployment. Their solution is to increase labor-market 
flexibility, e.g., by cutting wages, busting unions, and deregulating business. 
 
Wages and spending 
 Deficit spending is not Keynesianism. Governments had long used 
deficits to finance wars. Keynesianism recommends counter-cyclical 
policies to smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle. For example, 
raising taxes to cool the economy and to prevent inflation when there is 
abundant demand-side growth, and engaging in deficit spending on labor-
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intensive infrastructure projects to stimulate employment and stabilize 
wages during economic downturns. Classical economics, on the other hand, 
argues that one should cut taxes when there are budget surpluses, and cut 
spending – or, less likely, increase taxes – during economic downturns. 
Keynesian economists believe that adding to profits and incomes during 
boom cycles through tax cuts, and removing income and profits from the 
economy through cuts in spending and/or increased taxes during downturns, 
tends to exacerbate the negative effects of the business cycle. 
 During the Great Depression, the classical theory defined economic 
collapse as simply a lost incentive to produce. Mass unemployment was 
caused only by high and rigid real wages. 
 To Keynes, the determination of wages is more complicated. First, 
he argued that it is not real but nominal wages that are set in negotiations 
between employers and workers, as opposed to a barter relationship. First, 
nominal wage cuts would be difficult to put into effect because of laws and 
wage contracts. Even classical economists admitted that these exist; unlike 
Keynes, they advocated abolishing minimum wages, unions, and long-term 
contracts, increasing labor-market flexibility. However, to Keynes, people 
will resist nominal wage reductions, even without unions, until they see 
other wages falling and a general fall of prices. 
 He also argued that to boost employment, real wages had to go 
down: nominal wages would have to fall more than prices. However, doing 
so would reduce consumer demand, so that the aggregate demand for goods 
would drop. This would in turn reduce business sales revenues and expected 
profits. Investment in new plants and equipment – perhaps already 
discouraged by previous excesses – would then become more risky, less 
likely. Instead of raising business expectations, wage cuts could make 
matters much worse. 
 Further, if wages and prices were falling, people would start to 
expect them to fall. This could make the economy spiral downward as those 
who had money would simply wait as falling prices made it more valuable – 
rather than spending. As Irving Fisher argued in 1933, in his Debt-Deflation 
Theory of Great Depressions, deflation (falling prices) can make a 
depression deeper as falling prices and wages made pre-existing nominal 
debts more valuable in real terms. 
 
1.5.2. Stage one keynesianism 
While the ‗Cow Deal‘ was an example of SAP political 
consolidation, full employment was its main economic objective. It had 
been achieved by simple keynesian demand management and deficit 
financed reflation, all of which provided an economic policy framework 
aimed at restoring and maintaining full employment. Once in power, for the 
SAP, the crux of the problem was how to give in to Keynes‘s vocal criticism 
of economic orthodoxy, which came much tainted with the after war failure, 
and in the meantime enact economic policies which were functional. 
 62 
Politically, the SAP had sufficient strength to apply Keynesian policy and 
implement the Stockholm School‘s ideas in a manner respectful of the 
realities of the country. However, simple keynesian demand management 
was not designed to respond to unexpected inflationary pressures caused by 
excess demand in the aftermath of the 2nd WWW. Consequently, wartime 
emergency controls over foreign exchange and imports, the rationing of 
scarce commodities, together with wage and price controls were 
reintroduced in the short term to repress inflationary pressures without 
eliminating their causes. 
However, the LO rejected long term reliance upon income policy as 
unacceptable and unsustainable in the overheated post war period. The 
reason for which they opposed income policy was because it required trade 
unions to persuade their members to accept increases beneath those 
determined by market forces. Thereupon the social democratic programme 
consisted not only in the simultaneous leverages of reflation and full 
employment, but also in the consensus and consent of a powerful trade 
union movement.  
As voluntary organisations, whose stated aim is to secure the best 
possible wages and working conditions for their members, continued wage 
restraint, which may redistribute income form labour to capital, strains 
union organizational cohesion and threatens membership support. In these 
circumstances, the union dilemma is either to pursue a militant wage policy 
with inflationary consequences or lose its members‘ confidence93.  
Full employment fundamentally increases the bargaining power of 
labour. Therefore, persuading or compelling workers to refrain from 
securing an increased share of national income under such conditions is 
futile. For unions to accept unconditional responsibility for economic 
stability would destroy their organizational authority. Yet, without solving 
inflationary instability, full employment might be threatened. Indeed, 
Meidner (1987) argued that ‗there can be no strong labour movements 
unless the government guarantees full employment‘. Thus, the trade union 
movement can only ‗survive as an independent and democratic 
organization‘ whilst full employment is maintained by means compatible 
with a stable currency and free collective bargaining.  
However, economic recovery increased the difficulty of SAP‘s 
competition for power. The first measure SAP stepped up was to bridge the 
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electoral gap and to build cross-class support for the socialist ideas. As a 
second measure, were it to enlarge the masses support, the presentation of a 
new economic package to stand out as an option to liberal economics would 
be compulsory. For instance, in the quest to ensure a political survival to the 
economic campaign, SAP devised an economic plan to win over full 
employment without giving up on inflation and wage centralization
94
. 
Inflationary pressure associated with ‗bastardised‘ keynesian policy 
in action, had unintentional effects upon distribution, thereby itself causing 
tensions between different groups of wage earners and thereby threatening 
the internal cohesion of the Swedish labour movement. Thus, the long-term 
health and vitality of the labour movement depended upon the maintenance 
of full employment by means other than those which presupposed ‗having to 
discipline their own working-class base to the degree that political support 
is lost‘95. This was the basis behind the Rehn-Meidner Model developed by 
LO economists. 
To conclude, the economic deal presented by the LO-SAP alliance 
rested on the use of the tools of reflation and deflation simultaneously in 
order to ensure increased exports and high rates of employment, an 
impossibility from the view point of classical economics, which regards the 
two as mutually excludable. Stage one keynesianism consisted in shunning 
the trade off between reflation and full employment on the basis of a strong 
trade union consensus and support of the SD programme. 
The electoral competition was not to be too hard for the bourgeois 
parties in office were already tired off by the series of failures characterizing 
the beginning of the century. 
 
2. A sketch of the Swedish Model: growth and security as 
mutually enforcing 
The relationship between growth (tillvaext) and security (trygghet) 
was conceived as a positive relationship in the Swedish social-democratic 
outlook of society. It actually represented the crux of the Social Democrats‘ 
ideology, whereby it defined itself as the vehicle to achieving welfare 
through gradual reformism and the assisted transformation of the capitalist 
model. This relationship lays at the core of the later Swedish model 
inasmuch as it underlines a bi-univocal dependence between productivism 
and efficiency on one hand, and productivism and social rights, on the other.  
The concept of security was a reminiscence of the earlier 1930s 
debates on the people‘s home. It had started out as a derivative of the values 
of solidarity, respect and mutual recognition – on which the folkhemmet 
was to be built – and it took out more and more the shape of a bedrock idea 
at the basis of the social democratic edifice in the mid-1950s. Social security 
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was supposed to complete then the strong society discourse, which launched 
as a safety valve for the social engineering project of the Swedish model. 
In postwar party discourse, with its heavy emphasis on technological 
advancement, modernization and rapid economic transformations, the 
concept of security became also a reference to social democracy‘s capacity 
to accommodate individual needs in the process of change. It was actually 
an allusion to the party‘s will and ability to protect the individual from the 
harmful effects of structural transformations.  
The picture – on the centrality of the concept of security within 
SAP‘s ideology – would not be complete were it not for its close association 
to efficiency or economic growth. More precisely, security played a direct 
influence on efficiency as a precondition for change and for the successful 
creation of the industrial society. The attempt hinged on a wider strategy, 
which envisaged the continued expansion of the welfare state at the scale of 
the entire society. Everything was in close connection to the underlying 
theory of the Swedish model, which rested on a careful balance between 
social and economic objectives. Economic policy had social welfare ends 
and vice versa, welfare policy had to be devised in accordance with 
economic efficiency considerations.  
Through socio-political measures, one could intervene in production, 
protect the individual from the negative effects of market conditions and 
bring about the efficient allocation of labor resources, thereby increasing the 
quantity and quality of the workforce, facilitating the participation of 
individuals in production and increasing the demand and purchasing power 
through allowances and transfers.  
The Swedish mixed economy – with its emphasis on planning and 
rationalization – embodied the idea that economic and social progress drew 
on each other in the ineluctable way in which the modern economy needed a 
high degree of planning to create gains in efficiency for social welfare 
purposes. Economic policy had social welfare ends. The objectives and 
means of social policy were formulated in a close interaction with active 
market labour policies and contributed to what has been described as a 
supply-side orientation that focused on the labour market‘s need for labour 
(see Whyman). Sweden has been rightly regarded as a pioneer in active 
labor market policies (including measures for increasing labor mobility and 
for vocational training). These labor policies were intended to be a basis for 
attaining full employment and for a solidaristic wage policy. The economic 
achievements due to efficient management…  
The balance between economic and social objectives took the form 
of a discourse in which economic concepts such as efficiency or 
productivity were vested with social content, while the vice versa was also 
true. The concepts denoting the social sphere were also embedded in – 
sometimes too much of – an economistic approach to society. For instance, 
the expression ‗samhaellsekonomisk effektivitet‘ became the current 
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idiomatic usage to design efficiency with a double-edged meaning, i.e. in 
both the economic and social sense.  
The ideological premises of the model include a reliance on a 
vacillating mixture of elements from both capitalism and socialism. The 
propensity of the Socialists to work for the transformation of the existing 
system included a strategic plan aiming at welfare and full employment 
through stabilization policy (Lundberg) while preserving the conditions of 
an expansive free-market economy.  
There is important to stress the dependence between growth and 
security because it is illustrative of the postwar social democratic approach 
to growth: only by means of security, that is preserving intact the need for 
security as an integral element for an efficient industrial society. In this 
manner, security was articulated as not only compatible with, but necessary 
for growth.  
Likewise, there is equally important to attract attention upon the 
possibility that there perhaps was an essential connection between growth 
and security, which lay the foundation for the subsequent evolution of the 
Swedish system into a typical neocorporatist economy. What is more, 
neocorporatist relations characterized the actual configuration of the 
Swedish Model as it was enacted by the Social Democrats.  
The Social Democrats‘ long term strategy was based on a policy mix 
issued out from Myrdal‘s ideas on productive social policies, i.e. policies 
which are supposed to have had an impact on the security of the productive 
workers. This articulation of growth and security as ends in harmony can be 
considered as a central element in the hegemonic position of the SAP and of 
social-democratic ideology in Sweden in the postwar period. 
 
3. Neocorporatism and the Saltsjoebaden Agreement 
3.1. The Saltsjoebaden Agreement and the beginning of 
neocorporatism 
 
The recent SAP coming to power and winning elections made 
headway for the signing of an important document, which is to be 
remembered throughout the century as the formalization of labour-industry 
relations in a democratic neo-corporatist environment. As one recalls from 
the early strike series of the 1905-1909 years, the ‗December Compromise‘ 
consisted in legalizing trade unions participation in the workplace decisions, 
along with the SAF. Moreover, consolidation of SAP executive power and 
two decades of uninterrupted trade union membership growth reduced 
labour‘s relative power resource disadvantage versus capital. However, it 
additionally provided an alternative means for trade unions to seek a more 
egalitarian distribution of income rather than through the strike weapon. The 
pursuit of wage militancy had already made Sweden the country most prone 
to industrial conflict in the years up to the mid- 1930s, and yet the unions 
 66 
knew that their gains were subject to the maintenance of union strength 
which could dramatically diminish if mass unemployment returned. Thus, 
the new political and economic environment had created conditions 
favourable to the agreement of a new class compromise. 
LO recognition that SAP control of the executive could ensure 
sustained full employment and transfer the distributional struggle into the 
fiscal system made it willing to discipline its own constituent unions to 
prevent industrial action undermining the SAP Keynesian full employment 
programme. Thus, the LO accepted the principle of wage moderation to 
enhance international competitiveness if accompanied by SAP economic 
and social reforms; in effect to put ‗society first‘ rather than promoting 
sectional interests. Likewise, the SAP required the continuation of economic 
success in order to maintain its electoral support. This relied upon a stable 
labor market and minimal industrial disruption to secure its ability to 
manage the economy effectively and deliver the jobs that would determine 
its ultimate political future. 
Domestically-oriented capital was equally prepared to cooperate 
with labor if it produced wage moderation, a stable labor market and higher 
profitability due to Keynesian reflation
96
. The LO‘s new moderation and 
‗society first‘/security strategy strengthened the position of the SAF‘s new 
leadership, who released the dangers inherent to the continuation of their 
militant opposition to social democratic government. The threat that a 
hostile social democratic government could pose to organized capital caused 
the SAF leadership to prudently adopt political neutrality in order to avoid 
unwelcome government intervention in the labor market. Thus, all actors 
recognized their mutual interest in avoiding zero-sum conflicts in favor of 
increased welfare through enhanced productivity and economic growth.  
The precise form of the labor market cooperation was established by 
the 1935 SAP-appointed Mammoth Commission Mammutredningen Report, 
which economic performance and material welfare. With the SAF and the 
LO preferring to avoid government intervention in industrial relations, they 
forged a formal framework for rule-based collective negotiations, the 1938 
Saltsjoebaden ‗basic agreement‘ or Huvudavtal. 
Despite its symbolic importance, the document was ‗surprisingly 
modest‘ since it largely codified existing labor market practices, establishing 
rules and procedures for negotiations and regulating strikes and lockouts. 
The SAF accepted negotiations over a greater range of issues as long as the 
LO did not utilize its political influence to achieve by legislation what it 
could not get through bargaining, thereby confirming the primacy of 
negotiation. 
The new class compromise resulted from a decrease in the power 
differential between capital and labor primarily due to the retrenchment of 
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the SAP in government. It relied upon both sides being ‗willing and able to 
assume responsibility for developments on the labor market‘97. However, it 
not only institutionalized conflict resolution but also recognized the 
advantage in avoiding zero-sum conflicts in favor of increased welfare 
through economic growth. 
Centralization of wage bargaining empowered the LO relative to its 
constituent unions and made ‗the strike weapon an instrument of the labor 
movement as a whole‘98. Moreover, workers, through association, could 
negotiate about wages and working conditions. However, management 
retained the right to mange and Keynesianism favored capital by providing 
conditions for investment and expansion of production. Thus, the class 
compromise was founded upon an assumed ‗stable division of economic 
power between opposing classes‘ whereby capital institutionalized its power 
superiority so that any challenge to it would be difficult within the 
Saltsjoebaden system
99
. 
 
3.2. Full-fledged neo-corporatism 
Even if the beginnings of Swedish corporatism can be traced to the 
feudal ‗bruks‘, neo-corporatism in Sweden at the end of the last century is 
less the product of cultural-historical specificities than the by-product of the 
Swedish political and party system as well as of the peculiar economic 
circumstances. Swedish neo-corporatism was working at its best in the 
period between 1960 and 1980, during the wage earner solidarity model
100
. 
As I will show in the next chapter, this model was based on a plan for the 
reformulation of economic policy, which embodied a combination of 
measures.  
                                                 
97
 Korpi, W. 1981. ‗Sweden: Conflict, Power and Politics in Industrial Relations‘ in 
Doeringer, P. B. ed. Industrial relations. London: Macmillan, p 195. 
98
 Gourevitch et al, ed. 1984. Unions and economic crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden. London: George Allen, p 199. 
     Swenson, P. 1999. Fair Shares: unions, pay and politics in Sweden and West Germany. 
Ithaca: Cornell, p 51. 
99
 Korpi, W. 1983. The democratic class struggle. London: Routledge, p 47, p 48. 
100
 Colin Crouch describes the general outline of the Swedish Model as follows: The central 
feature was ‗solidaristic wage policy‘. The unions accepted the central determination of 
increases in wages, aimed at something between what the most and the least efficient firms 
could afford to pay. The intended effect of this was to squeeze the less profitable so that 
they either improved productivity or went out of business. At the same time surplus profits 
would accumulate in the efficient firms, enabling them to increase investment and expand 
capacity. The transfer of labour form the less to the more profitable sectors was not left to 
the market but was assisted by the government through a range of active manpower 
changes directly aided efficiency, making investment in industry attractive to capital and 
leading to an increase in employment which was additionally guaranteed and encouraged in 
specific sectors by the state. The government also adopted further interventionist policies, 
such as the investment reserve fund, which ensured a stable flow of funds to sectors 
important to national economic strategy. Such a combination of policies made possible 
further cooperation by the unions to generate a virtuous spiral of investment and labor 
cooperation (Crouch, 2002, p 125). 
 68 
Therefore, solidaristic wage policy lay at the basis of Swedish 
neocorporatism and it was its very spine. The LO adhered to it and adopted 
solidaristic wage bargaining because it embodied the trade unionistic aim, 
that of lowering wage differentials between workers. Its complement was 
‗the active labour market policy‘. Additionally, labour-owners relations 
were based on the national wage contract, which, in turn was to be based on 
stronger more profitable industries. The major vehicle for its 
implementation was the AMS (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen), a corporatist 
institution composed of employer representatives, trade union and public 
representatives.  
Although it is not possible to determine exactly what role the Rehn-
Meidner model played, it is nevertheless certain that Sweden experienced 
unprecedented economic growth during the period the model was being 
enacted. As predicted in the model, the most efficient companies made 
tremendous profits
101
, as the solidaristic age policy prevented workers from 
maximizing their wage demands in these industries.  However, this ‗ideal‘ 
neo-corporatist model began to weaken in the late 1960s and was clearly 
failing around 1970. The growth rate and productivity increase rate began to 
fall behind the OECD average, partly as a result of trying to pursue 
economic growth and equality simultaneously
102
. 
 
3.3. The end of Swedish neo-corporatism? 
The Swedish corporatist structure avoided total collapse, although it 
was severely shaken by the strikes and crises of the 1970s and 80s, and it is 
much more fragmented and chaotic than during the ‗golden‘ 1960s. As 
already mentioned, both employer and union solidarity are highly developed 
in Sweden. The SAF or the Swedish Employer Federation fines member 
companies for paying rises in excess of agreements and was largely 
responsible for causing the unions to organize into disciplined organizations, 
rather than vice versa. Special features of the Swedish system of industrial 
relations were employer solidarity, four decades of Social Democrat rule 
and the strength of a highly rationalized trade union movement committed 
to the principle of industrial unionism. 
 Esping-Andersen
103
 notes that ‗...Not surprisingly, the Social 
Democratic Party soon after abandoned its ‘little people’ rhetoric and 
began to label itself the ‘wage earners’ party‘. The observation is pertinent 
for what the sap had become, a catch-all party rather than a social democrat 
party (see chapter seven). Moreover, Esping-Andersen considers that as a 
catalyst for the welfare state transformation, i.e. notions of equality were 
                                                 
101
 These profits were also known as ‗excess profits‘ in the union vocabulary. 
102
 The trade-off between growth and security or between growth and equality is dealt with 
at the beginning of this chapter and it underlines the idea that the two goals are indelible 
features of the Swedish social democratic society. 
103
 Esping Andersen, G. 1990. Three worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: polity, p 
10. 
 69 
surrendered for the new cross-class solidarity
104
.  
 The abandonment of redistribution for universalism based on middle 
class standards caused social expenditures grow very rapidly in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In addition, the end-result was also a massive expansion of 
public employment, but the advantage is that ‗a genuinely universalistic 
middle class welfare state would crowd out the private welfare market‘, 
lessening both ‗powerful pressure on the government to grant tax privileges 
to private welfare plans... and middle class exit form the welfare state...‘105. 
 
4. The Rehn-Meidner Model or stage two Keynesianism 
In hindsight, doubt has emerged regarding the long term effects of 
the Swedish model and its likelihood to last, but nobody has yet disputed its 
inspiring range. The core of the model lies in its neo-corporatist functioning 
and in the model within the model, i.e. the Rehn-Meidner model. The latter 
one consisted of a mix of solidarity wage and selective labour market 
policies on the background of neo-corporatist labour-patronage industrial 
relations.  
Next, I am going to detail the RM model and assess its advantages 
and disadvantages in the long run for the Swedish Social Democrats and the 
society as a whole. The combination of full employment strategies with 
demand policies was uniquely targeted with the RM model by means of 
labour market instruments. All of them worked in the context of wage 
centralization agreements, the foundation of Swedish neo-corporatism. 
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1.1.3.2. Manpower policies and globalization 
1.1.3.3. Scientific conclusions on labour market efficiency 
1.1.4. Solidarity wages policy SWP 
1.1.5. Increased public savings and investment or collective 
savings policy  
1.2. The Rehn-Meidner Plan Implementation - an overview 
1.2.1. The Rehn Meidner Model in action - the facts 
1.2.1.1. Labour Market policy 
1.2.1.2. Solidarity wage policy 
1.2.1.3. Investment and public savings 
1.2.1.4. Investment funds 
1.2.2. The macroeconomic stance 
2. Swenson‘s trilemma: neocorporatism and the RM model 
3. Stage three keynesianism: WEF and economic democracy 
4. Crisis Keynesianism and Neo-monetarism  
 
 Last chapter exposed the economic, social transformations brought 
about by keynesianism in Sweden. I have explained at length the 
differences, the peculiarities and the difficulties met when applying 
keynesian economic policies in Sweden. The Stockholm School was 
struggling at it throughout the period 1930-1960s and it has managed to put 
into practice what has been known since as ‗the Swedish model‘. The 
combination of aggregate demand management – Keynesian style – and a 
competitive exchange rate proved successful in reducing Sweden‘s 
unemployment rate when implemented during a period of international 
recession.
106
 However, this was only the first stage keynesianism for the 
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Swedish economy and ‗the hardest‘ phase of the economic engineering 
process was yet to come. The so-called ‗Rehn-Meidner model‘ was actually 
stage two keynesianism, a phase where economic development did not 
depend any longer on boosting demand and ensuring full employment, but, 
rather meant the ‗fine-tuning‘ of labour and investment policies together.  
 In parallel, I am treating the main economic developments 
accompanying the SD political programming during the two periods which 
form the Golden Age of the Swedish Model, i.e. the Early Golden Age and 
the Late Golden Age of economic prosperity. In addition to explaining the 
key economic variables, a general hypothesis summarizing the crux of the 
model is offered below and then demonstrated.  
 Hypothesis 1 The Swedish Model consisted of 3 three different 
stages, the first stage keynesianism, the first stage and the second stage of 
the Rehn-Meidner model. All these periods were characterized by a ‗fine-
tuned‘ policy mix between labor and monetary policies, which stimulated, 
on one hand, innovation and competitiveness – sustainable growth – in the 
industrial sector, and, on the other hand, full employment and welfare on the 
market. 
 
1.1. The Rehn-Meidner Model  
 As soon as the long-lasting problem of full-employment – that brought 
the Social Democrats in power – was surpassed, the Swedish economy had 
yet to lift off with regard to the new problems created by an economy 
already at or near full employment. International examples of institutional 
reform intended to accommodate the new pressures have included income 
policies and wage bargaining coordination, industrial policies and the 
socialization of investment through public ownership. 
 At any rate, in none of the above cases did institutional reform go as 
far as in Sweden where, at the initiative of the trade union movement, the 
first attempt was made to devise a truly ‗post-Keynesian‘solution.  
 Thus, whilst maintaining full employment as the over-riding goal of 
public policy, and endorsing the need for a sufficient level of aggregate 
demand to prevent involuntary unemployment, the burden placed upon 
simple demand management was mitigated by the introduction of a range of 
additional policy instruments, which concentrated on the double objective of 
maintaining a low inflation rate and high employment levels. The new 
policy approach was a combination of labour and wage policies with long 
term investment policies, which was to be tackled as a ‗self-reinforcing new 
strategy‘. It forms the basis of what it has been termed as ‗the Swedish 
Model‘ outside Sweden. This economic-industrial strategy has been 
designated as ‗the Rehn Meidner Model‘ after its two principal architects 
Goesta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, two Swedish economists of the 
Stockholm School. 
 For full employment to be maintained, the inflationary instability had 
to be contained. Therefore, despite full employment being a goal in itself 
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and the main pillar of the Swedish model, its preservation was difficult to 
achieve unless simultaneous with a stable currency and free collective 
bargaining – even if centralized. Meidner argued that ‗there can be no 
strong labor movement unless the government guarantees full 
employment‘107. The long-term health and vitality of the labor movement 
depended upon the maintenance of full employment by means other than 
those which presupposed ‗having to discipline their own working-class base 
to the degree that political support is lost‘108. These ideas formed the socio-
economic base of the Rehn-Meidner model as developed by the LO 
economists, Goesta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. The danger was not to 
expose the cohesion of the Swedish labor movement to tensions created by 
the distribution effects of inflationary growth. 
  
1.1.1. The theoretical elements of the model 
 The fact that Rehn-Meidner model was devised during a period 
characterized by an over-heated economy, helped to determine its 
fundamental tendencies. What Rehn and Meidner argued was that 
maintaining full employment requires a different combination of policies 
than the policy mix required by ‗simple‘ Keynesian demand management to 
end mass unemployment.
109
  
 The Rehn-Meidner model contains four essential components: 1. 
restrictive aggregate demand which squeezes profits, 2. selective labour 
market policy promoting structural adjustment, 3. solidarity wage policy 
favouring the competitive sector, 4. increased public savings compensating 
for the profits squeeze. These instruments are intended to be complementary 
in terms of their ability to secure social democratic goals of full 
employment, compatible with low rates of inflation and inequality and all 
contributing towards enhancing economic growth. 
 
1.1.2. Restrictive Demand Policy 
 Restrictive demand policy – unlike simple aggregate demand or 
classical keynesian policy – is meant to reduce pockets of excessive demand 
in combination with selective measures such as demand management, 
inflation targeting and ‗profit squeeze‘. That is so because limited short-term 
mobility and bottlenecks in labor and product supply imply that 
maintenance of full employment solely by demand management results in 
inflationary pressures and ‗unavoidable‘ wage explosions. The unintended 
effect of maintaining full employment at all costs in an economy is excess 
demand for labor in highly profitable activities. Sufficient aggregate demand 
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in the least profitable sectors and full employment in the most efficient 
sectors are incompatible with full employment over the whole economy. 
 Restrictive aggregate demand was intended to squeeze profits to 
prevent inflationary wage increases triggered by over-tight labour markets 
or distributional concerns
110
. The two most important variables in the 
deductive diagram wages – labor – unemployment – growth are the 
companies‘ profits and wage demand as low average profits encourage 
employers to resist inflationary wage demands. Since the scope for price 
rises is small, restrictive demand prevents excessive competition for scarce 
labour. Likewise, past profits ‗increase worker demands for pay rises 
regardless of other economic circumstances‘ 111  
 Bargaining theory – of which Olsson is the outmost representative – 
predicts that trade unions will seek to share economic rents accruing to their 
company, and which would otherwise be declared as high profits and part 
distributed to shareholders. Thus, higher profits may encourage higher union 
wage claims
112
. Therefore, in the medium and long run, it is essential that 
profits be constrained in order to exert continual restrictive pressure on 
inflationary tendencies
113
. This was the conclusion reached by the SS 
economists led by Goesta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. However, in the 
absence of wage formation in the interests of society, this may still prove 
insufficient to ensure non-inflationary wage growth.
114
 
 In addition, the profit squeeze is crucial in macroeconomic 
management as it was intended to enhance industrial rationalisation and 
provide the incentive for companies to innovate, in terms of product and 
work organisation, in order to reduce possible inefficiencies and thereby 
maintain competitiveness. The profit squeeze would, therefore, contribute 
towards structural change in the economy and hence towards higher and 
higher levels of economic growth.  
 Hence, restrictive demand management has a double-edged effect that 
of creating the need to use active labour market policy in order to reduce 
pockets of unemployment and also contributeing towards its success by 
enhancing structural transformation.  
 It is important to point that neither Rehn nor Meidner did not rule out 
the eventual adoption of a traditional, counter-cyclical Keynesian response 
to periods of prolonged recession in spite of their envisaging of restrictive 
demand strategy as best solution to the economic stalemate after stage one 
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keynesianism. Moreover, the Rehn-Meidner strategy viewed labour market 
policy as a useful tool around the output margin, but it was still the place of 
the Finance Minister to ensure a sufficient level of demand in the economy 
just short of the full employment level. Therefore, given these 
circumstances, the more targeted, restrictive demand policy – Rehn and 
Meidner had in mind – should prove a more efficient tool in restraining 
inflation both during economic boom or recession periods.  
 In macroeconomic theory, especially in the classical keynesian 
demand management, it is well known that long-term investment is 
dependent upon future expectations and consequently upon the general 
orientation of macroeconomic policies. Since, the correlation between long-
term investment and long-run growth is obvious, the question remains as to 
the relationship among these three distinct variables: restrictive demand 
policy, purchasing power and unemployment. As Goesta Rehn used to 
remark, ‗Purchasing power should be pumped away so that the demand 
surface sinks. The islands of unemployment which then must appear must 
not be flooded over again by re-raising the demand-surface’.115  
  
1.1.3. The Labour Market policy mix 
 By labour market policies, one should acknowledge the existence of 
both demand and supply side measures
116
. The former reinforce counter-
cyclical stabilisation, whilst the latter ease market adjustment by achieving a 
higher employment level at a given rate of inflation and promote structural 
change by reducing structural rigidities, search and transaction costs.
117
   
 By contrast, supply-side measures ease the market adjustment process 
by achieving a higher employment level at a given rate of inflation, whilst 
simultaneously accommodating structural change. These measures consist 
of reducing the transaction costs associated with lack of comprehensive 
information in the labour market competition, alleviating the job search 
process through an efficient labour exchange service, providing incentives 
for workers who transfer to activities or localities where they are most 
required and providing extensive training and retraining services to 
facilitate voluntary movement to new activities. 
 
1.1.3.1. Criticism of manpower policies 
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 The dynamic nature of the labour market effects into constantly 
changing stocks and flows of vacancies and workers, whilst adjustment 
measures are lessened by job heterogeneity and segmentation of the labor 
market.  
 In the meantime, criticisms of manpower policies focus upon 
displacement and dead-weight effects. It is argued that employment creation 
measures misplace labour elsewhere in the economy or substitute for other 
workers in the same firm or sector. There is of course an inherent 
assumption contained in this criticisms, that that demand for labour is 
limited.
118
 
 An additional criticism of manpower measures claims that they are 
inflationary since they prevent the open unemployment necessary to reduce 
wage costs
119
. Such studies indicate that, at very low levels of 
unemployment, labour market policies may empower ‗insiders‘ by lowering 
the threat of unemployment and thereby tolerate more wage pressure than a 
rise in open unemployment
120
. 
 
1.1.3.2. Employment policies and globalization 
 I hereby leap forward to briefly introduce an issue which is going to 
make the subject of the fifth chapter, the chapter on the economic 
consequences of globalization on the Swedish model and ultimately on the 
SAP. Katzenstein (1985)
121
 argues that small open economies need greater 
flexibility to international market changes than larger nations. 
 What is more important, these small open economies need a flexible 
structure, which counteracts international economic shocks or disruptions in 
the demand-supply market equilibria. Moreover, uncertainty and cost 
dispersion in the economy should be contained as they undermine the very 
possibility of brushing off recessions or economic lows. Reducing 
uncertainty and socializing costs borne by those affected by changing 
employment patterns diminishes opposition to modernization
122
. According 
to the 1963 OECD Report (1963: 20),
123
 active labour market policy is a 
‗necessary element of an economic policy that aims at full employment, 
stable money and a higher standard of living.’  The role of trade unions 
comes up not as a supplement, but as a necessary ingredient into the general 
economic policy by actively promoting modernization to increase 
productivity and hence maintaining full employment and rising living 
standards. 
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1.1.3.3. Scientific conclusions on labour market efficiency 
 Labour market policies increase flexibility, facilitating adaptation to 
structural and industrial change. Without attentive promotion of structural 
mobility, commitment to preserve jobs at all costs could result in economic 
stagnation, which would impede adjustments necessary to maintain 
international competitiveness. The explanation lies in the fact that labour 
mobility moderates the wage rises otherwise necessary to attract scarce 
labour to sectors experiencing high demand and bottlenecks in the supply of 
skilled labour. Therefore, labour market policy should lead to an inflation-
dampening effect.  
 However, as labour market policy stops unemployment from rising, it 
may thereby limit wage reductions during recession. The overall impact of 
labour market policy upon inflation is, therefore, unclear and depends upon 
which one of these two effects predominates in practice
124
. 
  
1.1.4. Solidarity wages policy SWP 
 Solidarity wages policy has been an old idea in Sweden; it was first 
launched at the 1936 LO Congress as one possible proposal for achieving 
the ultimate goal of the labour movement, ‗equal pay for equal work‘ 
irrespective of the employing firm‘s ability to pay125. Based upon the 
assumption that an unjust distribution is inherently unstable, rational wage 
policy requires unions to internalize a generally acceptable range of 
differentials according to skill, hardship or training
126
. This has been the aim 
of the 1936 LO Report whereby equality in earnings was the main goal of 
the labor movement all other things equal. In Sweden, it coincided with the 
policies and instruments employed by the Stockholm School economists to 
achieve long-run growth. 
 Down to real business, formulating a ‗just‘ distribution of wages 
proved far too difficult for the Swedish trade union movement, especially 
when including professional and white-collar income differentials. In its 
absence, the solidarity wages policy promoted preferential treatment for low 
paid workers who, ‗almost by definition‘, cannot benefit from decentralised 
bargaining. 
 Economic theorists appreciate that solidarity wage policy is a positive 
tool, which can promote economic efficiency in three ways. The first way 
whereby solidarity wage policy can contribute to economic stability, 
pertains to its positive effect when trying to reach the right trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment along the Laffer‘s curve. Bjoerklund 
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(1988)
127
 argues that a comprehensive union organisation, capable of 
influencing the entire economy, has a greater vested interest in achieving 
efficient wage settlements. Unlike a fragmented wage bargaining framework 
containing multiple small unions, each only bargaining for a small 
proportion of the industry or craft-skill base, a monopoly union organisation 
cannot ignore the impact on jobs and inflation resulting from its wage 
bargaining demands. That is why centralised wage bargaining is more likely 
to be associated with a superior trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.
128
  
 The second way in which SWP reinforces active labour market policy 
is by promoting structural change and labour market mobility. Elimination 
of ‗wage dumping‘ means inefficient firms are not subsidized by paying 
lower wages to their employees for equivalent work to higher-waged posts 
in other firms in the industry.
129
 Moreover, moderate wage-cost pressure 
increases the substitution of capital for labour, accelerating business 
restructuring and rapid introduction of new technology,
130
 thereby 
stimulating greater labour and capital productivity.
131
  
 It is interesting to note Rehn‘s view on SW, especially his opinion on 
narrow wage differentials as an impulse to labour mobility. He explains that 
leveled wages aid mobility policies by minimizing the loss of earning when 
workers decide to transfer from a high to a low wage sector. 
 Last but not least, the third way whereby SW favours the Laffer 
curve‘s trade-off betwen inflation and unemployment is by creating a less 
inflationary economic environment. Basically, SWP is less inflationary than 
the available alternative, namely a reliance upon wage differentials to 
encourage labour to transfer to areas of skill shortage. The Rehn-Meidner‘s 
endorsement of SWP rested on their belief that the development of ‗fair 
wages‘ would minimise the inflationary wage spirals that often arise given 
big wage differentials.  
 Inertia in job preferences and time lags involved in training programs 
contribute to make wage differentials already large so that they can 
successfully attract employees from other sectors of production or to re-join 
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the labour market from education, childcare and retirement. However, such 
large differentials would anyway cause greater social inequality and hence 
may create additional inflationary pressures due to the resultant 
distributional conflict between groups of workers. 
 To conclude, SWP should be a constraint upon inflation. 
  
1.1.5. Increased public savings and investment or collective 
savings policy  
 The rapid modernization of Swedish industry envisaged by the Rehn-
Meidner model depended upon an enhanced supply of risk capital to 
compensate for lower self-financing caused by the profits squeeze. 
Government ineffectiveness in altering private savings patterns and the high 
levels of tax required to fund labour market policies and welfare state 
expansion mean that household savings are unlikely to fill this gap
132
.   
 Rehn even suggested a fund creation that incorporates a 
supplementary pension scheme to finance housing and stimulate economic 
growth since the increase in the national wealth must only be the result of 
collective saving done by the masses through high wages and high taxes. 
According to him, this is the only way to achieve a healthy non-inflationary 
growth, i.e. to avoid inflationary wage increases. After all, he suggests that 
‗the membership of trade unions cannot be expected to accept private 
capitalists as the owners of all new capital’.133   
 Bosworth and Rivlin
134
 calculated that reliance upon collective saving 
to finance productive investment, warranted a 4% budget surplus to ensure 
adequate growth in long-run Swedish capital stock investment. Thus, the 
Rehn-Meidner strategy required a mechanism to steer investment allocation 
‗as part of the role of accumulation would be transferred to public 
agencies‘.  
 The precise form of collective capital formation was the subject of 
debate in the following years. To this respect, Rehn advocated a 
supplementary pension scheme, whose funds were to finance housing 
construction and productive material investment and thereby contribute to 
the stimulation of economic growth. 
 Alternative forms of collective capital formation were advocated, by 
Meidner, at subsequent LO Congresses, but it was not until the late 1960s 
that the issue became a significant feature of macroeconomic debate
135
. 
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1.2. The Rehn-Meidner Plan Implementation - an overview 
 An important event – which cannot be looked over – is the reverse 
from decentralised wage bargaining to centralised wage bargaining. It 
happened as the SAF progressively forced a reluctant LO into central 
negotiations
136
. The decentralisation of wage bargaining soon after the 
signing of the Saltsjoebaden was not favourable to the implementation of 
the new strategy. That was the crucial event which facilitated the application 
of the new Rehn-Meidner strategy – the centralization of wage bargaining – 
prompted also by a change in the mode of industrial relations. Before, the 
conditions were not yet ripe for the Rehn-Meidner to be implemented 
according to the initial time table.
137
  
 In addition, the Minister of Finance – Per Edvin Skoeld – strongly 
opposed the program
138
 and the Agrarians withdrew their support from the 
parliamentary coalition which sustained the government. Therefore, the 
implementation of stage two keynesianism was delayed for some time.
139
  
 The return to decentralised wage bargaining after wartime regulation 
was marked by large wage demands and increased instability as repressed 
labour frustration was worsened by the international inflationary pressures 
of the 1950s. Therefore, centralised bargaining, for employers, presented the 
best available method of achieving moderate wage demands and ensuring a 
low level of industrial conflict. It also interfered less with ‗managerial 
prerogative at the point of production‘ than workplace negotiation140.  
 Centralized bargaining, however, additionally provided the LO‘s 
leadership with the opportunity to implement its solidarity wage policy, 
demanded by the low paid unions, strengthening the centre against shop 
floor organizations and reinforcing the ‗primacy of the «external» over the 
«internal» union‘. 
 Moreover, central negotiations, undertaken on behalf of all affiliated 
unions, enabled the LO to embody a shared collectivity, enhancing electoral 
support for the SAP from a psychological point of view
141
. Bargaining 
coordination also reduced the risk of unforeseen wage explosions 
undermining the SAP‘s stabilisation measures. Accordingly, from the 1958-
1959 wage round onwards, a degree of solidarity in wage increases was 
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secured in return for a degree of moderation. Through these agreements, the 
LO enhanced its reputation amongst its members, the employers stabilised 
the labour market through one agreement and the government benefited 
from the removal of labour market uncertainty. 
 Securing the political consensus needed for the adoption of the Rehn-
Meidner model required the extension of the SAP electoral support to 
enable the party to govern without the continuation of the coalition with the 
Agrarian Party. The latter remained very critical of the expansion of public 
spending and ‗big government‘ associated with the keynesian approach to 
macroeconomic management.
142
 
 Stung by rising criticism, the decline of the rural vote and 
haemorrhaging electoral support, the Agrarian Party sought a new policy 
profile. Whilst the SAP wanted to attract sufficient white-collar support to 
facilitate implementation of a distinctive range of policies, the Agrarian 
Party sought radical change and was even ready for an ideological upturn. 
Thus, both coalition partners concluded that they were damaged by their 
close association
143
. As a consequence, following the Agrarians withdrawal 
from the coalition in 1957, the SAP responded aggressively by pursuing an 
electoral strategy which sought to create a wage earners front (loentagare) 
around second stage keynesianism, together with a series of social reforms 
aimed to appeal at white-collar workers
144
. 
 The main issue which facilitated a major increase in SAP support 
concerned the struggle for comprehensive earnings-related pensions. Fifteen 
years of government commissions, a referendum and a deadlocked 
parliament was only narrowly overcome to introduce the National Pension 
Fund System (Allmaenna pensionsfondens or ATP). The support for the 
ATP by the white-collar trade union confederation TCO, proved crucial and 
a majority of both lower and middle-level white collar voters supported the 
SAP in the 1960 election, which proved a resounding success for the party. 
It received 48% of the vote and a one-seat majority over the bourgeois 
block, enabling the party to govern with the acquiescence of the VPK. 
 LO pressure and a strengthened electoral base empowered the SAP 
and, due to the gradual conversion of Prime Minister Tage Erlander, these 
factors facilitated the implementation of the Rehn-Meidner model.
145
 
 
1.2.1. The Rehn Meidner Model in action – the facts 
 The recession of 1957-8 provided the opportunity for the SAP to 
expand labour market programmes rather than providing a general boost to 
aggregate demand as in ‗bastard‘ keynesian manangement. This policy 
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switch was also facilitated by the newly appointed Director General of the 
National Labour Market Board, Bertil Ohlsson, who strongly favoured an 
expansion of active labour market policies to target temporary increases in 
unemployment, rather than an indiscriminate increase in the overall level of 
aggregate demand
146
.  
 
1.2.1.1. Labour Market policy 
 Public works schemes lie at the core of labour market policy and are 
its main tool of implementation. Consequently, they were expanded times 
eight and certain targeted programmes for training and life-long learning 
times four
147
. Thus, it is clear the importance borne by targeted manpower 
programmes, which proved that the reorientation in macroeconomic policy 
was unambiguous. During the period 1961-73, the share of labor financed 
measures as GNP and government spending continued to expand 
progressively.   
 On the other hand, on the supply side, various programmes were 
steadily developed to include marginalized social categories in the labor 
force such as women and disadvantaged groups especially. By dint of these 
programmes, Sweden achieved the highest labour force participation in the 
world
148
. In the same vein, labor mobility was encouraged through a series 
of grants – also known as the ‗moving van policy‘, a policy which sought to 
persuade people to relocate to profitable, efficient companies.  
 Thus, as I have stressed before, full employment in the most efficient 
sectors but less than full employment over the whole economy was pursued 
as a desirable end in economic policy. These kind of active measures helped 
to curb structural problems in the Swedish economy, whilst increasing the 
range of labor opportunities for the traditionally passive.  
 Criticism of labour market policies consisted of two main remarks. 
The first was of a macroeconomic nature and stipulated that devaluation 
combined with the expansion of public sector employment has a stronger 
effect in maintaining full employment in Sweden than labour market 
policies. However, this is only a general – if not truistic – statement because 
it is accurate irrespective of circumstances. For instance, in the Swedish 
case, it somewhat misunderstands that labour market policy was intended to 
supplement, not displace, macroeconomic strategy. Nevertheless, according 
to some authors, devaluation and expanding public sector employment were 
the most significant factors in fostering full employment in Sweden.  
 The second criticism holds that manpower measures cause inflation 
because they prevent the open unemployment, which inevitably reduces 
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wage costs. However, this criticism implies that unemployment should be 
increased to reduce inflation which is at odds with the full employment goal 
upon which the Rehn-Meidner model is based.  
 Since full employment lay at the core of Swedish governmental 
policy, the question was whether the RM model efficiently achieves it in 
concert with rapid economic growth and low inflation.  
 It is therefore at least probable that Sweden‘s adaptation to economic 
change was facilitated by manpower policy, preventing mass unemployment 
and labour market rigidity undergone by other European countries
149
. 
Moreover, the efficacy of these policies was indiscutable since the money 
amount spent on active and passive measures was no higher than the 
European average. 
 For instance, Meidner
150
 pointed out that labor market policies played 
a key role in reducing unemployment over the economy as a whole despite 
the limited volume of labour force accommodation of only 3-4%, 
particularly during periods of recession. Hence, insistence upon manpower 
measures would inevitably reduce their effectiveness
151
. Nevertheless, even 
so, labour market policies contributed towards the avoidance of long-term 
unemployment and thereby prevented the process of hysteresis from 
maintaining high levels of unemployment, together with ultimate exclusion 
from the labour market.  
 
1.2.1.2. Solidarity wage policy 
 The expansion of labour market measures activated the necessary 
conditions for the LO to pursue a solidaristic wage policy during repeated 
negotiations with the SAF. Proponents of the solidarity wages policy 
advocated that by reconciling ‗divergent interests within the labour 
movement‘, LO could exercise voluntary wage restraint without incurring 
organisational disintegration
152
. This strategy offered a degree of wage 
moderation and labour market stability in return. 
 The attitude of the main two trade unions, TCO and LO, towards the 
solidaristic wage policy was similar and constructive. Solidaristic wages 
became an ‗integral part of LO’s entire strategy of conflict, a rallying 
principle‘ and increased efforts were made to improve the relative wages of 
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low-paid workers
153
. Likewise, TCO bargaining cartels typically followed 
LO‘s lead on this issue because most trade union leaders shared ‗a deep 
ideological commitment to equality‘154.  
 The three arguments used in the Swedish case to respond to the critics 
of solidarity wage formation rely upon the idea according to which wages 
not necessarily depend on local and skill differences. Conversely, the critics 
argue that relative wages are distorted by not reflecting these conditions, 
thereby hampering economic efficiency and labour mobility. However, this 
can be rejected on three main grounds. First, Sweden‘s inter-industry wage 
structure replicates neo-classical norms more closely than the decentralised, 
largely non-bargaining, labour market of the USA. Secondly, labour 
mobility is enhanced ‗precisely because the wage structure had become so 
compressed‘since firms benefit from relatively cheap skilled workers. 
Thirdly, because real wage flexibility is synonymous with the degree of 
centralisation in wage bargaining. 
 The pioneering study by Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
155
 found that 
high – as well as low-centralised structures adapted more flexibly to market 
conditions, leading to a superior inflation-employment trade off. This result 
was largely confirmed by 
156
Amoroso and Jespersen and 
157
Calmfors and 
Nymoen. However, a number of other studies suggested a more linear 
relationship, with higher levels of corporatism, centralised and coordinated 
wage bargaining internalizing negative externalities, reducing social conflict 
and assisting economic performance.
158
 A subsequent study undertaken by 
Iversen (1999)
159
 claimed that the macroeconomic impact of the degree of 
coordination of wage bargaining depended upon its interaction with the 
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extent to which the national monetary authority pursued an accommodating 
or non-accommodating policy stance.  
 Sweden‘s wage bargaining system kept real wage increases close to 
productivity gains, achieving the lowest level of Western industrial conflict 
outside Switzerland, and enhanced a superior inflation-unemployment trade-
off.
160
  
 
1.2.1.3. The relationship between investment and public savings 
 The state earnings-related pensions system
161
 included three buffer 
stock ‗AP-funds‘ which initially fulfilled collective savings requirements. 
They accounted for a majority of equity capital and long term credit, and for 
35% of the total credit at their peak between 1970 and 1973.
162
 The public 
sector‘s share of total savings increased faster than in any other OECD 
country between 1962 and 1972, rising from 35% to 44%.
163
 However, as 
pension payments grew, the significance of the funds declined. Moreover, 
the legal restriction to funds‘ use only in the bond market prevented them 
being used as instruments of industrial policy and investment steering. 
Rigorous foreign exchange controls were likewise employed to secure that 
excess profits and savings were reinvested in the Swedish economy rather 
than seeking higher returns in other countries.
164
 Nevertheless, by definition, 
restrictions are a blunt instrument when seeking affirmative action. 
 
1.2.1.4. Investment funds 
 A 1955 SAP achievement was to completely overhaul and reform the 
tax-exempt investment funds, which Wigforss introduced in 1938. 
According to this measure, corporations could deposit up to 40% of their 
annual profits in these funds, 40% of which remained in a blocked, interest 
free account of the Central Bank in order to lower liquidity during boom 
periods. Since depreciation allowances were narrow, investment funds 
became the most efficient way for tax avoidance. Therefore, considerable 
corporate funds became deposited within this system.  
 Between 1956 and 1965, the number of firms with investment funds 
rose from 640 to 2566, whilst their total volume increased from 2.5 bn krona 
to 3.3 bn krona. Moreover, investment funds were extremely favourable for 
capital, reducing effective corporate tax rate considerably below the 
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statutory rate. Whilst total taxes set by local and central government rose 
from 26% of GDP in 1955 to 41% in 1970 and 52% in 1979, taxes levied 
upon corporate profits fell from 11% in 1955 to 3% in 1970 and 1979. If 
corporations managed to reinvest their profits, then they were favored with 
regard to taxation and mostly exempted from the harsh taxation regime for 
the amount reinvested.  
 Investment funds were released during the recessions of 1957-8, 1962-
3 and 1967-8, for counter-cyclical stabilization. Even if the first release was 
delayed until the recovery had already begun, Pontusson
165
 admitted that 
during the 1960s the investment fund system ‗appears to have been effective 
as an instrument of macroeconomic management‘. 
  In addition, Henning
166
 found that a majority of Swedish corporations 
informally and surreptitiously negotiated with the government for special 
releases of investment funds. For instance, in 1968, the releases from 
investment funds constituted only 25% from total industrial investment. 
Also, invesment funds were not an efficient tool for steering investment and 
stimulating the overall economy view that they represented only 12% of 
gross capital formation. As Pontusson
167
 once remarked, these funds were 
never used as such by the government, i.e. for their original purposes of 
regional and industrial investment. Their usage and their effectiveness was 
limited by their dependence upon voluntary business participation.  
 
1.2.2. The Macroeconomic stance 
 Compared to other industrialized economies, the general configuration 
of the Swedish economy was good throughout the first two decades of the 
RM model, with a high productivity growth of the manufacturing 
industry.
168
 Two important indicators proved that Swedish economy was 
doing well: manufacturing productivity averaged 7.5% per annum between 
1964-9 and its value-added rose by over 5%
169
. Also, structural change in 
Swedish manufacturing was remarkably rapid during the 1960s and the first 
half of the 1970s, especially when compared to the larger industrialised 
economies
170
. 
 Clearly, the performance was incredible with GDP per capita steadily 
increasing and reaching the second place in Europe after Switzerland during 
the first period of the RM model. The export coefficient claimed an 
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increasing proportion of world trade, which was highly disproportionate to 
Sweden‘s population size. In 1970, calculated in terms of PPP purchasing 
power parities, Sweden‘s GDP per capita ranked third amongst OECD 
nations, 8% above the average. 
 Sweden‘s performance became the subject of praiseworthy articles in 
The Economist where it was said that Sweden had achieved ‘one of the best 
trade-offs between unemployment and inflation of any industrial economy’. 
Unemployment remained low, whilst inflation rates were certainly no worse 
than the average for EU countries. 
 The goal of stage two keynesian policy or RM model was to achieve 
sustainable full employment while preserving labour movement coherence. 
This scope was clearly attained in that economic success reinforced 
continuous SAP government and LO membership expansion. It also 
provided the labour movement with a coherent approach to economic 
management and established the LO‘s ‗pivotal role‘ within the ‗success of 
labour reformism in Sweden‘.171 At the high point of stage two policy, the 
SAP received 50% of the vote in the 1969 election.
172
 Thus, the link 
between economic performance and SAP electoral score in the hypothesis is 
now proved as the Swedish model contributed towards the maintenance of 
the political support essential for the furtherance of its social democratic 
goals. 
 Despite its economic success, the Rehn-Meidner second stage 
keynesian strategy was not duly implemented. This was mainly due to the 
fact that the SAP found it more difficult to enforce fiscal restraint than to 
expand welfare and public services
173
. Tax increases were often wrongly 
timed, not applied sufficiently early in economic upswings and occasionally 
accompanied by a trace of ‗vulgar keynesianism‘174. 
 According to Erixon
175
, the deflationary effects of macroeconomic 
policy happened during the 1966-8 and 1970-2 mini-recessions were rather 
indebted to the ‗difficulties of implementing keynesian fine-tuning‘ than to 
the reliance upon the restrictive aggregate demand portion of the Rehn-
Meidner model.  
 The profit squeeze demanded by the Rehn-Meidner strategy was not 
respected and the necessary decrease in general profit levels was due more 
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to an increase in international competition rather than by a careful 
observance of the Rehn-Meidner strategy
176
. Moreover, Rehn
177
 stated 
labour market policy suffered from ‗ideological lags‘ and that insufficient 
consideration was taken to design programmes to be ‗effective instruments 
against inflation‘. 
 
2. Swenson‘s trilemma: neocorporatism and the RM model 
 There was quite a long time that Swedish economists wondered 
whether things went along smoothly or whether there weren‘t any 
improvements to be operated within the model. For instance, was it 
necessary to strengthen or to reduce neocorporatism? To tighten or to loose 
the Rehn-Meidner model‘s parameters? The first and most obvious solution 
to the problems facing the Swedish economy during the early 1970s would 
have been to implement the Rehn-Meidner model in its entirety. Till 
example, inflationary pressures would have been more easily to control if 
the restrictive aggregate demand management policy had been fully 
operational. A tighter fiscal and monetary policy would have accelerated the 
profits squeeze and thereby removed one main cause of the inflationary 
pressures.  
 Thus, negotiations over wage rises would have had more modest 
results and the tax-based incomes strategy would not have imposed so large 
an increase in the non-wage costs experienced by the Swedish industry. In 
other words, the full implementation of the Rehn-Meidner strategy would 
have prevented many of the worst problems facing the Swedish economy. 
 However, the solution to the other significant macroeconomic 
problem, namely the insufficient level of domestic risk capital and 
productive investment necessary for the preservation of full employment, 
should not have proved so easy to attain.  
 Indeed, in neo-classical theory, the argument for relaxing the profits 
squeeze relied on the supposition that accumulated profits provide a 
considerable proportion of the source of finance for industrial investment. 
Therefore, profits should be allowed flexibility in order to rise to stimulate 
entrepreneurs to invest, thereby removing the structural shortfall. However, 
this ran the risk of reintroducing inflationary pressures and tensions in the 
system of wage formation. 
 An interesting fact to be addressed here is the Swenson‘s trilemma – 
also known as the LO trilemma, because it highlights the importance of 
trade union militancy and solidarity wage strategy upon employment 
growth. By dint of a combination of policy instruments, wage share 
maximization is maintained and inter-union wage compression is achieved.  
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 Employee militancy during a period of declining investment provided 
the LO with what Swenson (1989)
178
 describes as a ‗trilemma‘. This puzzle 
or ‗neocorporatist trilemma‘ is about how to pursue egalitarian objectives of 
wage levelling and a larger wage-share of national income without 
endanagering full employment, the chief objective. Under normal economic 
circumstances, only two of the three objectives can be pursued 
simultaneously through wage regulation alone.  
 On the other hand, solidarity wage strategy could reduce differentials 
within the LO‘s sphere of influence whilst facilitating macroeconomic 
employment policy. However, that could only happen only as long as the 
government maintained a profit squeeze and thereby ensured a high wage 
share of national income. Failure to withstand this element of the Rehn-
Meidner model - solidarity wage policy - in the early 1970s had weakened 
grassroots acceptance of the solidaristic strategy.  
 Increasing inter-union competition meant that, unless the LO extended 
the scope of its pay bargaining to include the increasingly assertive white-
collar unions, the solidarity strategy would result in wider differentials 
between skilled LO members and white-collar workers. White-collar union 
membership growth reduced the LO‘s relative importance from 81.5% of all 
organized employees in 1950 to 78% in 1960, 71% in 1970 and 64% by 
1980
179
. The problem in following the solidarity tactics consisted in the fact 
that it was impossible to abandon either internal wage levelling or support 
for employment generation to achieve inter-union wage compression. With 
the trilemma unresolved, the LO‘s wage strategy oscillated uneasily 
between solidarity and wage militancy throughout the mid 1970s
180
. 
 Organized labor is in a ‗prisoners’ dilemma‘ due to the extent that, 
asymmetry of information and ‗noise‘ can lead to sub-optimal solutions. 
Thus, whilst unions can squeeze profits until the point where investment 
declines, they cannot guarantee that wage moderation leads to increased 
investment
181. Lancaster (1973) called this the ‗dynamic efficiency of 
capitalism‘.182 
 If unions increase immediate consumption, future consumption is 
automatically reduced in the long run and investment levels may be too low 
to sustain full employment. If, however, the vice versa happens and they 
restrain immediate consumption to free greater resources for productive 
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investment, they cannot ensure these will not be used for capitalist 
consumption and not necessarily for growth through full employment
183
.  
 Otherwise, a similar dilemma is created when capitalistic consumption 
reduces future growth, but the additional wealth thus created by the 
capitalists – through increased investment – may be claimed by workers as a 
right. Thus, a paradox looms at large: that according to which workers can 
be powerful and yet powerless simultaneously; controlling political power 
and determining present consumption, yet remaining powerless whilst 
capitalists retain power to determine investment. This highlights the 
asymmetry of union power. 
 Two optimizing solutions are available for labor; firstly, to collaborate 
with capital to achieve sufficient investment in return for a restricted wage 
share or secondly to take control over investment.
184
 The alternative is 
inflationary pressure resulting from wage misunderstanding between labor 
and capital.
185
  
 Increased labor power resources and the SAF‘s unwillingness to 
concede a further class compromise, which moved beyond Saltsjoebaden, 
forced the LO to demand government action to achieve the redistribution of 
wealth and power it could not secure through labor market bargaining. 
 The Rehn-Meidner model represented an evolution or adaptation of 
Keynesian theory and strategy. In so far as it was ever fully implemented, 
the objective of the Rehn-Meidner approach was to use a wider range of 
instruments in order to target interventions on the supply side which resulted 
in frequent bottlenecks. That objective added to a second objective inherent 
in the model, the demand management intended to maintain a high, but not 
quite full, level of employment, consistent with a low rate of inflation and 
the maintenance of international competitiveness. 
 The tensions in the model were popping up within an environment 
where contributing factors were present. These factors were mainly three 
and they were democratic, macroeconomic and egalitarian. The democratic 
factors were related to demand for workplace influence, which weakened 
the Saltsjoebaden approach and its impact on labor stability. The 
macroeconomic factor meant that insufficient industrial investment to 
sustain full employment in the long term, combined with insufficient 
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restraint upon inflation, entailed constrained investment and limits to 
redistribution. 
 Rationalization, high occupational and geographical mobility, together 
with an intensification of work, imposed unanticipated ‗substantial burdens‘ 
on many workers and fuelled demands for improved working conditions.
186
 
Second stage Keynesianism had secured ‗substantial gains‘ for employees 
but ‗at a high cost to workers themselves‘.187 Employees were increasingly 
frustrated with the limitations placed upon their influence over their 
working lives within their immediate working environment, due to their 
continued acceptance of the terms of the 1930s class compromise and the 
centralization of bargaining in the hands of a remote union bureaucracy
188
. 
Affluence and sustained full employment empowered labor and hence 
encouraged demands for an improved working environment and greater 
work fulfilment.  
 Discontent was dramatically manifested by a wave of wildcat strikes 
which swept over Sweden in 1970, with 250 recorded disputes causing 155 
000 lost working days compared to only 35 thirty five in 1967. Unionists‘ 
dissatisfaction was articulated during the dispute by perceptions of a distant 
and unresposive union bureaucracy.  
 The two specific demands made by the strikers, namely for higher 
wages (in order to narrow differentials with white-collar workers) and 
increasing employee influence within the workplace, both created problems 
for a union movement content to operate within the Saltsjoebaden class 
compromise. This held that managers had the right to manage at local level, 
restrained only by the increasing scope of negotiated agreements.  
 On the occasion of the strike, the essential point was that LO unions 
were incapable of ensuring a narrowing of differentials with white-collar 
workers without demanding substantial wage rises for the highest paid blue 
collar workers. Were that strategy to be pursued, it would have been 
untenable because it undermined the solidarity wages policy by increasing 
inequality within the LO sphere.
189
 
 
3. Stage three keynesianism: WEF and economic democracy 
 There were four principal types of WEF; firm-centred, regional or 
industry-based, competing and centralized funds. Each fulfilled different 
propensities: to stimulate labor productivity, enhance factor mobility, 
increase employee tolerance to profitability, minimize risk and maximize 
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democratic influence, respectively.
190
 Later, the Meidner Report sought to 
secure what it considered to be an optimum mix. The WEF institutional 
architecture was composed of a central clearing comprehensive fund, which 
administered and allocated dividend income. Its membership was drawn 
from national union nominees and representatives of the public interest to 
enhance social solidarity. 
 The initial 20% of corporate influence accruing through WEF 
ownership was delegated to local unions, supported by sector funds to 
which additional voting rights would be transferred thereby avoiding over-
centralization. The central fund is therefore a largely powerless body, 
administering assets which can never be realized and distributing dividends 
according to the democratic wishes of concerned employees. Membership 
plurality reduces group egotism and narrows group self-interest whilst the 
central fund provides the necessary coordination for the efficient operation 
of the fund system. 
 Tensions within the second stage Keynesianism, grassroots demands 
for increased workplace influence as well as an egalitarian distribution of 
income and wealth forced the LO to promote an active investment policy in 
order to increase productive investment without regressive distributional 
consequences. This strategy was different from the traditional solution of 
increasing profits to raise investment because it would only worsen 
inequality.  
 Thus, socialization of investment through the WEF scheme appeared 
as the right solution to achieve economic democracy, especially since 
organized labor‘s power resources had grown enough to challenge core 
capitalist prerogatives.
191
 
 Economic democracy can be distinguished from industrial democracy 
since the former seeks to achieve control over the productive sector for labor 
and/or the community whilst the latter attempts to increase employee 
influence over their immediate work process. Whereas industrial democracy 
involves expanding microeconomic restrictions upon management‘s right to 
manage arbitrarily, economic democracy seeks macroeconomic influence 
over the productive sphere through collective ownership. Economic 
democracy therefore complements and supplements industrial democracy.  
 The LO sought to achieve economic democracy through two principal 
means. Firstly, they demanded that the ATP funds be freed to invest in 
equity which would increase the supply of risk capital, lowering its cost, 
thereby creating favorable conditions for raising investment without 
increasing inequality.  
 Opposition from the SAF led to a compromise solution with the 
establishment of a fourth pension fund in January 1974, which could 
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purchase equity up to 5% of total pension fund capital. However, despite 
delegating a maximum 60% of its voting rights to local union 
representatives, this reform proved insufficient to satisfy trade union 
democratic objectives. Consequently, the LO decided to develop its own 
strategy to achieve economic democracy. The WEF wage earner funds 
constituted one method of its attainment. 
 A series of factors greatly challenged the Swedish labor movement at 
the begining of the 1980s. Among them, there were the macroeconomic 
problems stemming from the implementation of the Rehn-Meidner model 
together with the political necessity to intensify redistributive policy 
objectives, imposed by the SAP endurance in government office and by its 
political objectives. The increasingly vehement demands made by 
employees for greater participation in work related matters at the local 
workplace faced the LO with an ambiguous dilemma .  
 However, reluctance to fully implement the Rehn-Meidner model had 
partially unravelled the initial combination of institutions and policy 
instruments. Consequently, a new initiative was required. 
 The expected response came no lather than the decision taken at the 
1971 LO Congress to establish an ‗expert‘ group, chaired by the former 
Head of the LO‘s Economics Division, Rudolph Meidner. He was in charge 
with investigating the possibility of reinforcing the solidarity wage policy 
through collective capital formation, via pension funds or an alternative 
approach. This working group came to be later known as the Meidner 
Group. Following its conclusions, the working group was mandated to 
prepare a technical feasibility report for the 1976 SAP Congress.  
 
4. Crisis Keynesianism and Neo-monetarism  
 In addition to SAF‘s opposition to the WEF scheme, TCO neutrality 
with respect to WEF is another case in point, which is illustrative of the 
tensioned relationship between trade unions and the SAP. The fact that the 
SAP had lost the 1976 general election by the narrowest of margins was a 
shock to the entire Swedish political system. The SAP became a tautologous 
reality in Sweden: it had been in office for 44 years and their values had 
become almost synonymous with bedrock perceptions of Swedish society. 
Despite changes in the Swedish constitution had weakened the dominance 
of the largest political party by increasing the proportionality of the electoral 
system, the SAP defeat was still largely unexpected. 
 The bourgeois coalition that replaced it in government comprised the 
Liberal, Centre and Moderate parties – the latter being the conservative 
party in Sweden. This coalition was led by Thorbjoern Faelldin, the ex-
farmer leader of the Centre Party whose popularity owed much to his 
principled stance against Sweden‘s continuation of nuclear power 
generation, a crucial issue in Swedish politics which triggered an important 
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cleavage, the environmental one.
192
 This issue is important because it 
proved problematic for the SAP and affected its electoral score. The SD 
Social Democrats‘support for economic growth, to facilitate full 
employment and finance welfare programmes, became associated by many 
as forming a ‗cosy‘ relationship with Sweden‘s large and powerful 
corporations. 
 The change of government, however, led to an inexperienced coalition 
government taking office at a time of international economic crisis. The raw 
material supply shock to the international economy, caused by a sharp rise 
in oil prices, destabilized the Swedish economy and caused a wage-cost 
eruption between 1974 and 1976.
193
 This weakened the coherence of the 
wage bargaining system and presented a difficult choice for the Rehn-
Meidner strategy. The dilemma consisted in having to intensify ‗the profit 
squeeze‘ or in having to stimulate profit margins to facilitate a higher level 
of investment necessary to mantain full employment and international 
competitiveness in the long term.  
 By the time the bourgeois government had actually assumed office, 
the Swedish economy had experienced a downturn and, consequently, the 
increases in non-wage tax costs implemented by the previous government 
had contributed to a profitability crisis, which lasted for several years and 
had a severe impact on exports, production and investment. Moreover, in 
the aftermath of the sharp deterioration in international competitiveness 
caused by the sudden increase in wage-cost push inflation, the Swedish 
crown became grossly overvalued. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE WELFARE STATE IN SWEDEN – A 
SHORT DESCRIPTION 
 
1. Reflections on the Swedish welfare system 
2. Family policy 
2.1. Family facilities and welfare 
2.2. Parental benefits 
2.3. Child allowance  
2.4. Housing subsidies 
2.5. The school system 
3. Social insurance – sickness benefits, health insurance and 
unemployment insurance 
4. Pensions 
5. Social care in transition 
5.1. Political trends in social care management 
5.2. Transformation in the Swedish welfare system 
5.3. Tecniques of welfare reduction 
6. Social care in transition 
6.1. Changes in unemployment insurance 
6.2. Changes in sickness insurance 
6.3. Changes in the old age pension system 
7. Organizational issues of welfare reform system 
 
1. Reflections on the Swedish welfare system 
 The Erlander years (1946-68) encompassed sweeping reforms in 
education, health care, housing, pensions, and taxation, to cite only the most 
prominent examples. In all of these spheres the Social Democrats 
manifested their commitment to expanding individual welfare and freedom 
through collective action
194
. 
 If one attempts to summarize social policy developments in the 
Erlander-Palme era, five tendencies stand out. First, universal services of a 
high standard as a basic right (and unrelated to social class) remained the 
norm, in education, health care, pensions, child benefit; indeed the norm 
found more consistent application than ever before. Second, poor relief 
declined sharply as a constitutive element of welfare policy; increasingly it 
came to be seen as an indicator of failures in the insurance schemes rather 
than the first line of defence. Third, the system moved away from the 
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provision of a minimum standard to an effort to secure existing standards of 
living. The inkomstbortfallprincip in pensions and sickness insurance sought 
to guarantee against a decline in living standards. From one perspective this 
approach simply perpetuated existing inequalities; from a more charitable 
view it limited the range of inequality, which in itself had been narrowed 
substantially by economic growth and solidaristic wage policy. Fourth, the 
system increasingly became an integrated whole. Fifth, the system enjoyed 
wide public acceptance. Benefits were visible and substantial; they seemed a 
reasonable return on an unusually high rate of taxation. 
 The expansion of state activity in the spheres of education, health 
care, housing, pensions, and taxation focused Swedish political debate on 
the legitimacy of the welfare state. The use of the state as an instrument of 
popular purposes raised three central and persisting questions, questions 
which the Erlander-Palme argumentation only partially answers. First, how 
democratic is the state – does it in fact represent the wishes of its citizens? 
Second, is there any way to delineate the proper bounds of the public and 
the private spheres? Third (a related but distinct issue), what is the optimal 
mix of ‗politics‘ and ‗markets‘? 
 For Erlander and for Palme, as for the vast majority of the Social 
Democratic party, it was axiomatic that the state (including local 
government operating according to national standards) was the prime 
instrument of popular purposes. Unlike Wigforss, they showed little 
enthusiasm for the syndicalist and localist currents within the socialist 
tradition. Central government action or regulation avoided the regional 
variations and inequities that might result from more decentralized control – 
this was the operative assumption of Swedish Social Democracy well into 
the 1970s. The state, having been democratized at the close of the First 
World War, could serve as the transmission belt of popular wishes, by 
which they increasingly meant the wishes of the population at large rather 
than the working class or even the Social Democratic movement alone. 
Essentially untroubled by concerns about the quality of representation, 
‗government failure‘, or the difficulty of policy ‗implementation‘195, they 
wielded the state as the fundamental democratic tool. 
 None the less the extension of the public sphere raised anew the 
questions of democratic control. Increasingly the catch-all rubric of 
‗corporatism‘ appeared in the discussion. Disturbingly negative in its 
connotations because of its previous application to Fascist structures and 
breathtakingly vague in its empirical denotation, the term did little to clarify 
debate, but it did draw attention to genuine problems of democratic 
governance. In the new welfare statist dispensation interest organizations 
increasingly penetrated and exercised public authority
196
.  This new role for 
organizations posed two fundamental issues: could these organizations 
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represent society at large and did the leadership of these organizations 
accurately reflect the wishes or interests of their members? 
 In the late 1930s Wigforss had proposed regular co-operation and 
consultation between government and industry, but the war quashed this 
scheme, although it simultaneously stimulated the formation of 
commissions with representation from government and major interest 
groups. The great debate over economic planning in the late 1940s delayed 
corporatist development, but in the 1950s there arose the co-operation 
among business, labour, and government that for a time gave Sweden the 
reputation of a harmonious society where consultation, compromise, and 
tranquillity prevailed. Following the 1948 election Erlander helped organize 
the so-called ‗Thursday Club‘ in which representatives of the major 
economic interest organizations (including agriculture and both blue and 
white-collar unions) discussed political and economic issues. These 
fortnightly meetings died out in the mid-1950s to be replaced from 1955 to 
1964 by a series of conferences at Harpsund, the country estate of the 
Swedish prime minister. Erlander insisted that these meetings represented a 
form of ‗consultative democracy‘ in which extensive discussion but no 
decision-making took place. Nevertheless, these assemblies provoked 
criticism from both right and left. In the early 1960s Bertil Ohlin, the leader 
of the Liberal party and Erlander‘s chief rival, coined the term ‗Harpsund 
democracy‘ and sharply criticized the government for bypassing the 
parliament and ignoring the duly-elected opposition: ‗Is it possible that we 
shall gradually get a new corporatist chamber that meets at Harpsund? For 
liberalism it is urgent to work to prevent the mixing together of democratic 
popular representation and the activity of large organizations.‘197  
 Shortly thereafter the emerging Swedish ‗new left‘ assailed the 
Harpsund gatherings as a capitulation by Social Democrats to the power of 
finance and the central bureaucracy. These criticisms certainly contributed 
to the demise of the Harpsund consultations in 1964, but the issue they 
raised remains. In the economic planning council (from 1962) and an 
increasing variety of other settings the influence of interest organizations 
ramified within the state apparatus
198
. 
 As organizations‘ power expanded, the question as to how well their 
leaders reflected the wishes of their members grew in importance and 
prominence. A useful debate, centring on the classic issues raised by 
Michels and G. D. H. Cole
199
. In an investigation of the legitimacy of LO‘s 
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leadership, Leif Lewin pointed to substantial congruence between the views 
of the rank-and-file and the leaders
200
. The direction in which influence 
flowed remained less certain; LO complemented its enormous educational 
efforts with attempts to gauge members‘ views through consultative circles 
(rådslag). The new left‘s celebration of participatory democracy also made 
an impact on the Swedish discussion. In a series of newspaper articles Sten 
Johansson, a prominent Social Democratic sociologist, contended that 
consonance between public opinion and public policy was an inadequate 
criterion for democratic governance
201
. Such agreement could be forced 
rather than autonomously generated. An adequate theory of democracy must 
stipulate popular participation in the formation of opinion and policy. The 
level of living surveys in the late 1960s suggested that such participation 
was far from universal. Finally, the Centre party‘s critique of the ‗concrete 
society‘, urban, bureaucratic, and anomic, and their celebration of rural and 
small town local communities called centralization into question. The 
Centre and the Liberals pushed experiments with greater autonomy for local 
governments and gradually the Social Democrats, too, undertook initiatives 
with more local self-government in towns like Örebro. 
 The course of Social Democratic reform raised another puzzling 
issue, which can best be illustrated by an example. In the debate over 
supplementary pensions prior to the programme‘s passage the Social 
Democrats lacked a majority in public opinion polls and in the national 
referendum. In the 1960 election, however, when the Conservatives strongly 
opposed the programme, they suffered a severe defeat and the Social 
Democrats did well. This series of events complicates questions about the 
legitimacy of social reform. Must a majority approve reforms before 
passage or is subsequent ratification adequate? The later debates over wage-
earner funds proved that this issue is not purely academic; the Social 
Democrats persisted with their plan in the face of quite substantial 
opposition, modifying it extensively, but have yet to obtain a majority for it 
in public opinion polls. Whether this opposition will fade in the light of 
experience remains to be seen, but once again the conflict between 
plebescitarian and parliamentary interpretations of democracy surfaces and 
the tenuousness of the concept of ‗representation‘ appears. 
 If issues of democracy and representation pose the first test for 
Erlander‘s and Palme‘s views, the question of where to draw the bounds of 
the public and private spheres is the second. Critics of the Swedish welfare 
state like Roland Huntford
202
 who proceed from classic liberal assumptions 
deplore what they regard as the over-extension and intrusion of the public 
sphere into what they consider ought to be an inviolable private realm. 
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Erlander himself was explicitly vague, terming the issue a practical one 
rather than one of principle, at least in a democratic society: 
  
 Isn’t there then a boundary for society’s efforts that ought not to be 
overstepped? Certainly in each particular stage of development there is a 
point which represents the best possible balance between private and public 
activities. The essential point, however, is not to allow this limit to be 
determined by theoretical discussions about static chalk lines [kritstreck] 
(where, for example, one seeks to bind the public sector to a certain 
percentage of the national income) or by a starting-point within a dogmatic 
social conception of a bourgeois sort. It can only be determined by practical 
experience under the guidance of people’s wishes in a rapidly changing 
society and by the method we choose to solve the new problems that will 
meet us in the future which we have such difficulty foreseeing. 
203
 
 
 In short, Erlander minimized the problem. A supporter of civil 
liberties, he simply did not see difficulties with extending public authority 
so long as it was democratically grounded. He rejected rigid limits on the 
scope of the public sector and otherwise simply refused to become obsessed 
with this classical problem of liberal political theory. The issue was the 
democratic character of the public sector, not the proper limits of that sector; 
these two issues fused – a result that seems less naive if one reflects upon 
historical changes in the concepts of the ‗public‘ and the ‗private‘. 
 When the public sector expands, society still must decide how to 
organize it – and that is the third question one must put to the Erlander-
Palme scheme. This question received relatively little attention between 
1946 and 1976. The Social Democrats left the greater part of the economy to 
operate according to market principles; education, health care, social 
insurance, social assistance, and day care they organized, with trivial 
exceptions, as public monopolies. Indeed there was a concerted effort to 
reduce the role of philanthropy, volunteerism, and private provisions as 
demeaning and erratic in their impact. In areas like agriculture and housing 
the Social Democrats came closest to their more ambitious conceptions of 
economic planning and steered the market, particularly on the supply side. 
These hybrids indicate clearly that ‗politics‘ and ‗markets‘ are not the only 
two choices
204
, pace Lindblom (1977), as does the general use of 
‗framework‘ legislation and economic policy. As indicated in Chapter 9, the 
real genius of Swedish Social Democracy lies not merely in using ‗politics 
against markets‘205, but also in using politics to make markets work ‗better‘; 
that is, more to the advantage of the less well off. 
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 The emergent neo-liberal critique of public provision and especially 
of public monopoly made little headway in the Sweden of the 1950s and 
1960s. Economic growth provided the financing for expanding social 
insurance and social service programmes. Housing policy, though 
controversial because of the difficulty in fully meeting demand, recorded 
substantial successes in providing high-quality housing through equitable 
financing. Day care, not yet so firmly regarded as a social right, expanded 
rapidly from an international perspective, even if lower-income recipients 
seem to have had greater difficulty in obtaining scarce places. Opposition 
complaints centred on the incapacity of Social Democrats to eliminate the 
‗queue society‘; they seldom attacked the basic principles of the welfare 
state. In the 1970s and early 1980s the increasing difficulties of financing 
high-quality public services and the rapid burgeoning of public debt 
provoked a reaction. At the same time inflation was skewing the impact of 
public housing assistance radically in favour of the well-to-do. The clamour 
for day care places and for more rapid treatment for ‗elective surgery‘ 
(cataracts, for example) stimulated modest and controversial initiatives in 
private health care and day care. Inept public relations (as when the head of 
the municipal worker‘s union suggested that day care workers knew better 
than parents themselves how to care for their children) fanned the flames. 
The possibility of increasing use of market mechanisms within the public 
sector and of tolerating or even encouraging private not-for-profit agencies 
had remained a heretical notion well into the 1970s. One might cite the 
relatively high efficiency of the Swedish civil service or the supposedly less 
complex social problems of the 1950s and 1960s in addition to the factors 
already cited as explanations for the lack of discussion of public sector 
organization. The fact remains, however, that while Social Democrats had 
accepted the value of the market in the private sector and had endorsed the 
mixed economy, the idea of markets or competition in the public sector 
remained a foreign notion until the 1980s. 
 Erlander and Palme steered the construction of the welfare state and 
celebrated its achievements as Social Democratic triumphs. They argued for 
the expansion of the public sector as a democratic means of eliminating 
misery, breaking down class barriers, and meeting ‗the discontent of rising 
expectations‘ that came with growing affluence. Erlander, at least, was able 
to structure reforms, particularly the supplementary pension reform, to 
attract growing numbers of white-collar voters, a necessity if the party were 
not to decline as the percentage of industrial workers in the work-force 
declined. Both political conditions and their own understanding of Social 
Democracy led Erlander and Palme to play down notions of public 
ownership or redistribution of the national wealth and to base their practical 
policies on an expanding public sector and their theoretical arguments on 
the notion of property as a bundle of rights. This approach engendered 
debates on the nature of democracy, the proper balance of public and private 
spheres, and the relative roles of politics and markets. Even before 1968 a 
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reaction to this conception of Social Democracy was brewing, one that 
would eventually reassert the traditional socialist themes of industrial 
democracy and socialization. 
 
2. Family policy 
2.1. Family facilities and welfare  
 During the ‗Golden Age‘ of the welfare state, different aspects of the 
Swedish family policy had been developed to a degree that the Swedish 
welfare state was internationally recognized as the one which offered the 
most generous entitlements to families
206
. By different kinds of supportive 
measures, the Social Democrats pursued two major goals: first, they 
provided equal opportunities for children from all social classes to make a 
career, independently of their parents‘ income; second, they enabled women 
to enter the labour market. Different aspects of family policy programs 
provided enough benefits and services to families to ensure that young 
couples would not hesitate to combine a career with having children. With 
one caveat in mind, precisely that family policy was largely saved from the 
1990s retrenchments, it must be said that, the economic crisis also impacted 
on different programs of family policy. Since the crisis also changed the 
level of all welfare entitlements, the family facilities – provided by the 
welfare programs – was also relatively diminished, but to a lesser extent. 
 The broad support for the family policy arrangements was crucial 
because these programs themselves were crucial inasmuch as they could 
support those families whose breadwinners (whether women or men) were 
victims to market failures. As family benefits are generally of two different 
types – either in relation to birth or maternity, or for the care of young 
children, this section would cover both aspects, which contain key elements 
such as parental leave, housing subsidies and child allowances. The declared 
aim was to support the breadwinner, that is that family member whose 
wages supply its livelihood.  
 
2.2. Parental benefits 
 In the 1990s, extending policy arrangements to facilitate parental 
leave has been top priority and identifiable in the policy trends of many 
European countries
207
. Sweden was once again in the lead position in this 
aspect. By increasing the duration of leave through parental insurance in 
1990 to 15 months, Sweden has developed its policies on parental leave 
more generously than other OECD countries. Since 1995, at least one month 
of parental leave had to be taken by the parent who does not take primary 
responsibility for childcare. This policy is regarded as a measure to 
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encourage fathers to stay at home with their young children. So parental 
leave in Sweden – and other Scandinavian countries – has not only been 
treated as paid leave, but its duration has been increased to over one year in 
the present
208
. The reasons of this progressive increase are to be sought for 
in the governmental programs of aid to families in difficulty during 
economic crises. 
 However, at the beginning of the 1990s – when the welfare cuts 
started being enacted, the parental leave benefits have also been negatively 
affected because of the concomitant decrease in wage replacement levels. 
Precisely, there is a general trend which is confirmed by a direct 
relationship, i.e. with a decrease in wage and work force replacement, there 
is a decrease in welfare benefits. For example, in the 1980s, the value of 
transfers was increased with the replacement rates for absence due to the 
care of a sick child, which went up to a 100 percent wage replacement rate.  
 However, in the 1990s, this trend was reversed. Not only were 
waiting days for sickness and unemployment benefits reintroduced and 
labor-market criteria ceased to qualify on their own for disability benefits, 
but also replacement rates into all social insurance schemes were reduced to 
75 percent since 1996 (after which they increased again to 80 percent after 
1998). Replacement rates for parental insurance were the latest benefits to 
be cut. Nevertheless, these specific replacement rates for parental insurance 
were the latest benefits to be cut. Moreover, the two main political blocks 
were both determined to avoid cuts in family policy, but it was realized that 
differences in the level of benefits would encourage abuse of the system. 
For instance, parents who were ill themselves preferred to claim parental 
leave in order to care for their sick child because more profitable in 
economic terms. By doing so, they were left in receipt of their full wage, 
rather than with only the sickness benefit. That is partly why the parental 
leave replacement rate was reduced from 90 percent to 80 percent and then 
in 1996 to 75 percent - again increasing to 80 percent in an attempt to 
harmonize this level with other benefits.   
 Further ahead, in 1996, the replacement rates in all social insurance 
schemes were reduced to a uniform level, i.e. 75 percent
209
. Despite this 
deterioration in replacement rates in all Scandinavian countries
210
 they still 
have the highest rates among OECD countries. 
 
2.3. Child allowance 
 The general child allowances – the other key element of family 
policy – have increased marginally during the 1990s. The amount of child 
benefits, which increased slowly during the difficult years of the early 
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1990s, was raised suddenly towards the end of the 1990s as a result of the 
temporary economic upswing
211
.  
 For families with children, the generous norms in the social 
assistance field have been of great importance. This was so because a 
significant part of households were unable to obtain a reasonable living 
standard on grounds of their low revenues. In other words, their after-tax 
earnings from work were below the social assistance, which entitled them to 
different kinds of allowances. This fact triggered the tax reform of 1991 
whereby an increase in child allowance was addressed as an instrument 
which would compensate the abolition of the redistributive effects partly 
abolished by the tax reform
212
. 
 Child and housing allowances in particular were decisive 
allowances, which ensured that household incomes would reach the social 
assistance norm
213
. In the austere years of the 1990s, nearly one third of the 
households in the lower social strata increased their incomes to above the 
norm because of these allowances. The rest had to be covered by the social 
assistance benefits administered by local authorities
214
. But, because of the 
generosity of the system and precisely due to it, certain measures have been 
devised to prevent misuse and abuse. For instance, families who applied for 
child allowances had to realize their accumulative savings before accessing 
social allowances
215
. 
 In 1993, the average duration of social assistance was 4.5 months 
and 7.5 per cent of the population received cash assistance at least once 
during the year
216
. Until 1997, the design, the content and the levels of 
support were decided by the municipalities, which gave discretion to local 
authorities to adapt these levels to local circumstances. A survey made in 
1994 shows that politicians at the local level tend to reduce the rate of social 
assistance, when there is a need for budget savings in the municipalities, 
thereby ignoring the norms decided by the Riksdag
217
. As a result, around 
75 per cent of local municipalities ignored the centrally-provided norms and 
adopted lower levels. In 1997, by imposing a nation-wide norm on most 
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components of the support system, the central government has restricted the 
room for local discretion and thereby prevented income loss for households. 
 Thus, the total financial support to families has actually decreased as 
a result of limited savings in all the social assistance programmes despite the 
fact that their structures have remained unchanged throughout the 1990s
218
. 
The only programmes which have shown an increase in total costs, were 
those related to parental leave expenditures
219
. Childcare services, which, 
together with elderly care services, form the core of social care services, 
were improved considerably during the 1990s. For instance, between 1990 
and 1997, the rate of children aged 1-2 years with access to child care 
services increased from 44 to 57 per cent. For children aged 3 to 6, the rate 
increased from 64 to 76 per cent. Despite that, the municipalities were not 
successful in providing schooling for all children aged 1 to 12 years. 
 Overall, the family policy area has experienced smaller changes than 
other policy areas. The most notable change was in the level of child 
allowances, which decreased from 750 to 640 crowns in 1996 and then 
increased again to 750 in 1998 soon after the financial recovery. The change 
was significant because it was the first time in the history of the Swedish 
welfare system that the nominal value of child allowances decreased. 
Together with child allowances, parental insurances were another family 
benefit, which was saved from retrenchment up to 1996. It seems that the 
main objective of family policy was to save different kinds of allowances 
and benefits, which were addressed to families, from retrenchment. In 
consequence, benefits would ensure that the economic differences between 
families with children and other families would remain constant and, if 
possible, even decrease.  
 Moreover, family policy enabled - to an increasing extent - both 
parents to combine a working career with parenting. Despite this deliberate 
policy of preventing the deterioration of families‘ economic situation, the 
welfare of families with children underwent great changes during the 
1990s
220
. However, after 1997, the process of deterioration rather held off 
and, consequently, the living standards of families started to improve again. 
In the recent years, increased employment and diminishing taxes have 
compensated families with children for obvious deterioration of their living 
standard. Also, changes were made in the rules relating to family 
allowances, hereby favoring the worse off
221
. 
 Among the Swedish political parties, there is widespread consensus 
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about keeping family policy save from seasonal changes. Across the whole 
political spectrum, there is the perception that family policy should not be 
understood as an insurance system, but supported no matter what transient 
economic indicators show. Even the two bourgeois parties stressed on 
keeping welfare benefits for families with children. As the pensions‘ case 
revealed, there was a real consensus over family and elderly policy. Esping 
Andersen (2001)
222
 observed that with the existing low fertility rate in 
Sweden, there are strong reasons to believe that some of the benefits be 
extended.  
 
2.4. Housing subsidies 
 Housing has been one of the more controversial areas of Swedish 
welfare policy. For years Sweden suffered from a severe housing shortage 
despite one of the highest rates of construction in the world. The Social 
Democrats attributed their defeat in the 1966 local elections to 
dissatisfaction with the housing situation and promptly embarked on a 
programme to build a million dwelling units (most in-the form of massive 
apartment complexes) over the following decade – an extraordinary 
undertaking for a nation of eight million. Since 1948 state-subsidized long-
term and low-interest loans have been a major instrument for promoting 
housing construction, albeit one of decreasing importance. In addition, the 
government subsidizes housing costs through interest subsidies, tax credits 
for owner-occupiers, and housing allowances for low-income households. 
Social Democratic governments have supported public planning of land use, 
the provision of collective amenities, and relatively classless residential 
patterns, but in the 1980s there has been a growing sense of policy failure. 
Middle- and upper-income owner-occupiers now benefit disproportionately 
and stronger class-related differences in accommodations are threatening to 
emerge. 
 Another important element of family policy is housing, not least 
because the aim of a generous welfare policy is to provide high quality 
housing by subsidizing rent costs. In 1988, Sweden was ranked second – 
after the Netherlands – in subsidizing housing. At that time, housing 
subsidies had increased housing demand by all income groups but 
particularly by low-income families. As a result, the number of households 
who were living in overcrowded conditions decreased substantially
223
.  
 Even in this field, the system kept its universalist features. By interest 
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subsidies, the system has also favored high-income families who normally 
own more expensive houses and therefore gain more concerning interest 
subsidies. During the 1990s, housing support to families with low incomes 
remained quite intact. For high-income families, interest subsidies were 
reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent. However, a series of changes were 
introduced in housing subsidies, which led to a tightening up of both levels 
of benefit and the area covered by them.  
 As stressed in the balance sheet of the Welfare Commission
224
, during 
the economic crisis of the 1990s, housing subsidies had been given the 
character of a family policy measure in order to reduce the financial 
pressure on the social groups affected. For instance, while, in 1995, the 
number of households drawing housing subsidies was 328 000, the rate of 
unemployment was at the highest level
225
. 
 Perhaps the most significant innovations in welfare policy came in the 
area of housing. Like agriculture, housing became a sphere of the economy 
where notions of economic planning were applied. The state did not 
nationalize the construction industry, but it planned, organized, and 
subsidized the provision of housing to the point that in 1982 public-sector 
housing accounted for 20 per cent of the total housing stock and co-
operative housing for another 14 per cent
226
. The Social Democrats felt 
compelled to intervene powerfully because private enterprise had failed to 
solve Sweden‘s acute housing shortage. Just before the Second World War 
54 per cent of all apartments in Stockholm consisted of one room and a 
kitchen; in Gothenburg the figure was close to 58 per cent, in Malmö 48 per 
cent, and in the other cities with a population over 30,000 or 55 per cent. 
Over half of these housed more than two people. One hundred and sixty 
thousand apartments still lacked running water and sewage. Under these 
circumstances, Möller argued, Sweden required a new ‗social housing‘ 
policy that placed social considerations – and here he clearly envisioned a 
person‘s right to decent housing – above the economic considerations of the 
market-place and the scope it allowed for property speculation and a 
building industry biased against the poor. 
 Simply making housing a matter of public policy – conceiving of it as 
the right of citizens and the business of government – was a novel departure. 
In the 1930s the measures taken were, as in other fields, relatively modest 
but important beginnings. In 1933 the government initiated subsidies and 
loans for improvements to rural workers‘ housing. More important measures 
followed in 1935. The state established rental allowances for urban families 
with three or more children and began to support the activities of municipal 
housing corporations through special loans to provide new and modern 
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rental housing. In 1938 similar benefits were extended to owner-occupied 
housing. Subsidies for pensioners‘ homes and special loan arrangements 
also originated in the 1930s. 
 Modern Swedish ‗social housing policy‘ however, dates from 1946 – 
7. It set ambitious targets for new housing construction and improved 
standards, especially for the poor and families with children. It sought to 
restrain housing costs. As with pensions and health care, the responsibility 
for administering housing policy fell largely to local authorities. No longer, 
Möller wrote, would it be left to chance as to whether an area had adequate 
housing or not
227
. Municipal housing corporations and cooperatives would 
assume a much larger role in the provision and ownership of housing. 
Rather than underwrite private speculation Social Democratic policy would 
encourage public ownership of land. It would discriminate in favour of not-
for-profit public and co-operative housing firms through special loans and 
subsidies that would reduce the cost of public housing relative to private 
housing. 
 In 1945 public-sector housing rental units numbered 30,000 or about 4 
per cent of the housing stock; by 1975 the number of units had risen to 
700,000, about 20 per cent of the total
228
. Lennart Lundqvist describes the 
success of Swedish housing policy this way: 
 
 ‘In many countries, public housing is a problem child. Low standards, 
lack of amenities, negative selection of tenants leading to segregation, poor 
surroundings and chronic financial crisis are all familiar problems. In most 
of these respects, Swedish public housing has a remarkably favourable 
record. Except for space, dwellings in public housing have a standard equal 
to the rest of the housing stock. During the record production years from 
1965 to 1974, 370,000 new dwellings were added to public housing. Since 
then, there has been a continuous effort to improve the surroundings and 
provide more and better facilities. Since there is no means-test to obtain a 
public dwelling from the start, neither stigma nor segregation was built 
in’.229 
 
 At present the financial difficulties of public-sector housing, squeezed 
between the budgetary stringency of the state and the political clout of 
tenants who oppose rent increases, are serious, but the improvement in the 
quantity and quality of Swedish housing has been enormous. Social housing 
policy has also sought to ensure the affordability of public-sector housing. 
The special subsidies and loans for lowering the original cost of public-
sector housing accomplished part of this task. In addition means-tested 
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housing allowances paid to individuals were adjusted upwards and extended 
more broadly. In combination these measures created a sphere of the 
economy where not-for-profit corporations hired private contractors to fulfil 
public objectives, established a high standard of public-sector housing 
provision that strictly private-sector housing had to match, and subsidized 
housing costs in a way that made decent housing a basic right. 
 
2.5. Education 
 The school system Social Democrats inherited divided students at an 
early age into those pursuing university education and those pursuing 
vocational education. The gymnasium catered to a narrow upper-class élite; 
the realskola to the vast majority. The 1946 School Commission, which 
issued its final report in 1948, laid out the plans for a unitary, 
comprehensive school system. In 1950 the nation launched a ten-year 
experiment with nine years of compulsory schooling. In 1962 the Riksdag 
took the final decision to introduce a nine-year comprehensive school for all 
children aged 7-16. In the mid-1960s the gymnasium and the realskola were 
merged into an integrated high school. Along with the effort to break down 
class barriers within the school system, the government greatly expanded 
spending on education. The average number of years of schooling rose from 
seven in the late 1950s to eleven in the early 1970s. 
 In the 1930s, as the result of the Myrdals‘ popularization of the 
population question, the Social Democrats had legislated modest assistance 
to families with children. Families with three or more children received rent 
allowances, modest payments were made to mothers at childbirth, virtually 
free delivery was provided as well as preventive pre- and postnatal care. 
After the Second World War the recommendations of the Population 
Commission received more serious attention. Möller proclaimed the more 
ambitious goal of ensuring that families with children would suffer no 
decline in living standards relative to childless families or, in other words, 
that the choice to rear children would not impose economic burdens
230
. In 
place of the previous tax deduction for children (the benefits of which varied 
from 31 crowns for a family with a taxable income of 2,000 crowns to 435 
crowns for family with an income of 50,000!) Möller instituted children‘s 
allowances of 200 crowns per child. In addition such ‗in-kind‘ benefits as 
free school meals and means-tested housing allowances and vacations 
became public policy. 
 
3. Sickness benefits and health insurance 
 Sweden introduced compulsory health insurance in 1955 after a 
lengthy period of discussion and debate. Care was provided in county-run 
hospitals. The goal of universal access, always important, was further 
underlined in 1969 with the passage of the ‗seven-crown reform‘, the 
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establishment of a low, uniform fee for outpatient care. In 1974 dental 
insurance, previously limited to young children and new and expectant 
mothers, was expanded to cover the entire population. The 1955 reform also 
established a compulsory sickness insurance scheme, replacing the previous 
voluntary system administered by local friendly societies. In 1963 payments 
became earnings-related rather than flat-rate. After improvements in 1967 
and 1974, benefits covered 90 per cent of earnings, starting with the first 
day of illness. The costs of the health care system rose rapidly, but access by 
the poor, life expectancy, and infant mortality statistics all improved as 
well
231
. 
 Sickness insurance has always been one of the key targets of the 
neo-liberals who believe that the generosity of the system decreases the 
incentive to work. The deterioration – in the early 1990s – of the Swedish 
welfare system and of the Swedish economy as such provided critics with a 
rational for demanding changes in the social security system. Sickness 
insurance was the first among the welfare benefits to be targeted because the 
first change neo-liberal policy undertakes, touches upon the reduction in 
universal health expenditure, which is considered too costly and 
unnecessary.  
 As late as 1987, a generous system of sickness benefit had been in 
operation for almost 40 forty years
232
. The Social Democratic government 
abolished the qualifying day and introduced a benefit system based on 90 
percent and in some cases 100 percent of previous incomes or even more. 
After this reform, the cost of sickness benefits rose dramatically from 23 
billion krona in 1987 to 35 billion in 1990 and the average figure of absence 
from work increased from 20 days per year in 1987 to 24.4 in 1989
233
. This 
situation could not be sustained in the long run, reason for which the Social 
Democratic government – in an attempt to reduce the cost of health 
insurance and absence from work – reduced the compensation levels for the 
three first days of sickness from 90 to 75 percent in 1990. This modification 
aside, the 90 percent level was applied as before from the fourth day of 
illness until the end of the second week
234
. As a result, after a year, the costs 
of health insurance were reduced by 10 percent.  
 On its second coming to power, the right-wing government pursued 
budget savings and reintroduced the qualifying day. As a result, the costs of 
the health insurance system decreased by one third between 1991 and 
1993
235
. Even after the change of government in 1994, the Social Democrats 
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continued the same policy. Another reform in sickness benefits was to give 
the task of administration of the first fourteen days of sickness benefits to 
employers, which should be regarded as an attempt of tightening eligibility 
and progressive elimination. According to the bourgeois coalition, 
employers‘ involvement would increase their interest in ensuring that 
employees remain healthy and also lead to closer monitoring of absence 
from work (OECD, 1994:95). For the remaining period, as long as certain 
medical criteria were satisfied, sickness benefits were paid by social 
insurance without any upper limit. Long-term benefit was fixed at 80 
percent of the level of previous earnings. However, for most employees, this 
is topped up by 10 percent for a period of up to 90 days by contributions 
from the employer. After that, the level decreases to 80 percent until the end 
of the first year when it is further reduced to 70 percent
236
. 
 The growth of social insurance expenditure, which was strikingly 
high between 1987-1991, seems to have been the main reason for cuts in 
sickness benefits. According to the government budget bill 
(Budgetpropositionen, 1988-2000), between 1990 and 1993 the costs of 
social insurance declined by 25 percent. In other words, there is a strong 
relation between generous compensation levels and use of insurance 
resources. As a result of this reduction in compensation levels during 
sickness periods, the average figure for absenteeism has again declined 
significantly, from 25.7 days/year in 1989 to 18.5 in 1994. As in the case of 
unemployment insurance, the replacement rate and number of waiting days 
applying to sickness benefits had had an obvious impact on the effective 
labour supply via absence from work. In Sweden, this kind of absence – 
including children‘s sickness – had historically been around 15 percent of 
the total labour force.  
 As a result of decreasing compensation levels and a tougher 
insurance policy, which led to a decrease in the absentee rate, the public‘s 
health seems to have suffered considerably. Many people who were 
suffering from illness chose not to stay at home because of considerable 
reductions in their income. However, they seem to have increasingly 
suffered from illness in the next decade and, consequently, the absentee rate 
increased sharply in 1999. For those who were sick for more than 30 days, 
the average figure of absenteeism almost doubled between 1997 and 2000. 
Moreover, the number of those taking early retirement increased by 30 
percent during the first half of 2000. According to analysts, the tightening of 
eligibility rules has created a situation in which many people who 
experience long-term illness are waiting to be classified as early retirees in 
the coming years. 
 Overall, at the beginning of the period, as a consequence of the 
economic crisis, the generosity of sickness benefits has sharply diminished. 
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The rate of sickness benefits has decreased to 80 percent of income and a 
waiting day has been reintroduced. The changes caused a remarkable 
reduction of health insurance costs in the middle of the period, but as 
economic conditions have improved, the severity of eligibility criteria for 
health insurance has been reduced and the number of persons sick for 
periods of more than 30 days has increased. Moreover, the number of early 
retirees has increased considerably. 
 In his 1928 brochure Möller had treated the question of compulsory 
or voluntary sickness insurance as a matter for further study (1928: 213). By 
1946 he was committed to an obligatory basic minimum with the possibility 
of voluntary supplements. He favoured a strict application of Beveridge‘s 
principle of flat-rate contributions and benefits, reserving the possibility for 
people with higher wages or higher living expenses to purchase additional 
insurance. Employees would draw benefits from the fourth day of illness; 
the self-employed, from the fourth week. This difference Möller justified on 
the ground of the employee‘s greater dependence on his wage – and lower 
premiums for the self-employed. A waiting period worked no real hardship, 
he reckoned, because only longer illnesses created real financial distress. 
 Möller eventually lost his battle for flat-rate sickness insurance as 
the party decided for an income-related scheme. The essential shape of the 
health care system, however, took the form that he recommended. In order 
to achieve administrative simplicity, economy, and classless provision 
Möller replaced a complicated insurance system based on the sickness 
benefit societies with a provision for direct state payment of hospital care 
and of the major portion of drug costs. Ernst Michanek describes the 
intentions of the constructors of the health system well when he writes (of 
social assistance reform in general)
237
. 
 It was vital, in our opinion, to do away once and for all with the idea 
– widespread in the days of the old poor relief – that social assistance was 
something shameful, something of a personal disgrace to the recipient. So 
we tried to tie the special benefits [for low-income recipients] to certain 
objective criteria in the same way as under the social insurance system: a 
certain age, certain dwelling standards, a certain number of children or a 
certain income gave the right to a certain benefit. We tried to restrict to a 
minimum any discretion in the assessment of the individual‘s need for help 
and also to lessen the room for arbitrariness on the part of the public 
authorities concerned. We tried to do away with stinginess in the aid 
measures, to provide what might be termed as ‗help towards self-help‘, and 
to restrict to a minimum the necessary control. We tried to get rid of the 
discrimination against needy persons that had created an animosity towards 
society among her less fortunate children, and which had made both public 
and private welfare activities despised by many of those who depended 
thereon. ‗Help‘ and ‗subsistence aid‘ were replaced by words such as 
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‗benefit‘ or ‗allowance‘238. 
 Health care, like a secure old age, thus became a basic right, 
provided outside the market by the public sector. 
 
4. Pensions 
 Pensions in Sweden as elsewhere constitute one of the pillars of the 
welfare state. In 1948 the government tripled the value of the previous 
national pension. It maintained the principle of universal-ism; all citizens, 
not merely employees, would be eligible. Means-tested elements were 
eliminated, although income-tested housing allowances for pensioners were 
introduced in 1954. The great change in pension provision came in 1959 
with the beginnings of the supplementary pension system (ATP), a 
compulsory, earnings-related addition to the basic national pension. ATP 
was controversial. It sought to extend to blue-collar workers the same kind 
of pension protection that white-collar workers enjoyed. It rested on a 
funded system that amassed great quantities of capital in public hands. In an 
effort to lure white-collar supporters to SAP, ATP treated them generously 
in the calculation of benefits. Services to pensioners have become 
increasingly important. The government provides geriatric homes, 
pensioners‘ apartment blocks, and home help services. Most elderly Swedes 
live in ordinary housing. Home help services (cooking, cleaning, etc.) assist 
over a quarter of the aged living at home. The objective is to allow 
pensioners to live in their accustomed fashion rather than warehouse them in 
nursing homes. 
 The proliferation of social policy programmes and the expansion of 
existing ones naturally entailed an enormous increase in public expenditure. 
The increased costs of public policy required regular tax increases in 
addition to the growth in public receipts produced by the rapid economic 
advances of the 1950s and 1960s. The income tax became an inadequate 
source and leading Social Democrats faced up to the need for new sources 
of revenue. They determined that programmes with broad benefits would 
require broad financing. They decided on a turnover tax (oms, later a value 
added tax, moms) and on employer contributions rather than taxes on 
corporate earnings. The new taxes were roughly proportional and on top of 
them the progressive income tax (at least in theory) rested. These changes 
had the effect of charging the bulk of taxpayers with the costs of the welfare 
state and to some extent reducing the ‗visibility‘ of taxation by including it 
in the price of goods. 
 Möller‘s primary objective in pension reform was to secure the 
elderly sufficient resources so that they would not have to resort to means-
tested public welfare. This goal mandated setting the basic pension sum at a 
generous level, a strategy calculated to increase substantially the costs of 
what was already the most expensive social welfare programme. The Social 
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Welfare committee had presented three different possible levels of funding 
in its report in 1945. Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson and Finance 
Minister Ernst Wigforss leaned towards a lower basic pension and means-
tested supplements, but the parliamentary party supported Möller, who 
argued that means-testing would discourage the elderly from working, that it 
would encourage dishonest in the reporting of resources, and above all that 
‗old age pensions ought to be changed to a citizen’s right rather than a 
charitable gift from society‘239. 
 Even the basic pension would not ensure a minimum standard in all 
cases. To compensate for regional variations in the cost of living special 
supplements were added for high-cost areas like Stockholm. Pensioners 
could obtain means-tested housing allowance if necessary. New provisions 
for widows, wives, and sickness benefits were included. Special provisions 
were made for the blind and for invalids. Administration was decentralized 
so that local offices made fundamental decisions and pensioners gained a 
right of appeal to the Social Department in case of problems. 
 
5. Social care in transition 
5.1. Political trends in social care management 
 Regarding the direction of the welfare system, during the 1990s, the 
ideal type of the Nordic model, the Swedish model, experienced two reverse 
trends. At the beginning of the decade (1990-1993), there was a shift from 
public services to transfers with pensions and other benefits being increased. 
Apparently, one major reason for the change had been the need for budget 
savings on the part of the local authorities, which took over the 
responsibility for social care services for the elderly after the 1992 
‗Aedelreform‘. The second half of the period saw expenditure on services 
increase faster than expenditure on transfers and cash benefits. In other 
words, the welfare system focused once again on public services. These two 
trends clearly show the difference between the bourgeois parties and the 
Social Democrats‘ ideology. While the former aimed at reducing the size of 
the public sector by emphasizing ‗freedom of choice‘, the latter were 
concerned to keep the public service as a strong institution. According to 
those in the labor movement, the worse-off would lose from the 
privatization of care services. 
 Thus, the development of elderly care has moved away from the 
traditional model in which home help and other similar services set the 
Nordic model apart from the rest of Europe. By heavy increases in user fees, 
the access to services of the people in the lowest income strata decreased. 
This fact is surely an indication that services in Sweden lost their original 
character as the epitome of the caring state. As Kautto and Szebehely 
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stress
240
, the degree of universalism in the pension and elderly care has 
decreased as a result of these changes.  
 
5.2. Transformation in the Swedish welfare system 
 I will focus here on the changes in social policy, which took place in 
social policy. Since social policy constitutes the major part of the public 
budget, governments looked to make savings here in order to balance the 
budget. There are, however, different ways of cutting welfare. Some 
techniques, such as indexation, are difficult for the public to detect, and 
therefore they are preferred by governments for political reasons, but when 
the need for cuts becomes urgent, then reductions in cash benefits are 
considered to be the most efficient way to reduce spending. As the major 
part of reductions occurred through cuts in cash benefits, the second part of 
this chapter focuses on changes in cash transfers and their pattern of 
occurrence during the period from 1990s on.  
 The argument is that - as long as the Social Democrats were in office 
and economic conditions were appropriate, the Swedish welfare system not 
only remained intact but gradually expanded. Retrenchments of the benefit 
system in the 1990s started when employment rose dramatically and the 
budget deficit increased considerably as a result.  
 
5.3. Techniques of welfare reduction 
 Reducing welfare spending is not an easy task for governments
241
. 
Welfare cuts are always unpopular and, regardless of the areas in which 
governments chose to make cuts, they risk losing the support of groups who 
would be negatively affected by retrenchment. Moreover, if the need for 
saving is large, the number of recipients affected is also large. Reducing 
benefit levels by a limited amount is therefore preferable, even though this 
would affect the entire population and therefore be generally unpopular. 
Targeted saving, which directs the resources from the existing programme 
to groups in greater need, is another technique for welfare reduction which 
normally favours families and the young unemployed. 
 Social policy analysts use different methods to measure changes in 
welfare spending. Some studies mainly focus on changes in welfare 
expenditure
242
 while others like Daly
243
 examine changes in cash benefits 
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over time or examine other approaches to welfare reduction
244
. 
 Modifying the indexation of welfare programs means that the social 
security index, which previously varied with the cost of the living index, no 
longer followed this pattern, but changed at a slower pace. Most households, 
but particularly full-time welfare recipients such as old-age and invalidity 
pensioners as well as certain groups of the long term sick, lost a certain 
amount of their income. On the other hand, slower indexation is perceived 
as the fairest approach to welfare cuts because it distributes the cuts across 
social groups and across most benefits. Moreover, it has reasonable saving 
effects and also neutral effects on basic welfare principles
245
. 
 Income-tests, or means tests, are a technique, which allocates public 
benefits only to those in need. In other words, the better off are deemed not 
to need benefits and therefore, by introducing selective policies, the welfare 
system will, for the same amount of public spending, contribute a more 
equal distribution of income
246
. The income-test technique has traditionally 
been understood as a shift from universal towards selective welfare
247
. 
 Increased service fees and decreased subsidies are other techniques, 
which have been used to moderate public spending. These techniques have 
particularly been used in the health system, in which individual fees for 
medical services have increased while subsidies – in particular 
pharmaceuticals, AIDS and handicapped appliances‘ subsidies – have 
decreased
248
. 
 The fourth technique involves freezing benefit levels, which means 
that governments and other central bodies avoid the increase of welfare 
spending through delaying decisions about increases in areas in which the 
level of benefits are adjusted annually. Housing and family policies are 
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among those areas
249
. 
 Reduced compensation level is the fifth technique for governments 
to save welfare expenditure. This method is the most direct and obvious way 
– meaning that is easier to spot by the average voter – of saving because the 
level of earnings‘ replacement decreases or payment is delayed for a certain 
amount of time. This method has mainly affected the health insurance 
system, but has also been used in other systems such as unemployment 
benefits systems and pre-pensions systems. However, this method does not 
normally affect the majority of the citizenry because, in the case of sick 
leave, for example, the average number of days is low. On the other hand, 
many groups in the labour market are protected by different kinds of 
negotiated insurance. The system has also adopted measures to protect those 
people who are often or chronically sick. 
 Unlike other social scientists who inquired about the nature and 
structure of welfare systems, these researchers
250
 have focused on one or 
more program areas like old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, family 
policies and benefits to children, provisions for caring for the handicapped 
and the elderly, sickness benefits and means-tested social assistance 
benefits. It is of the outmost importance to focus on the changes in cash 
benefits along a longer time-span because it better captures the level of 
generosity of the system. According to Daly (1997), one of the main 
advantages to sift through the cash benefits system is its power to reveal the 
nature and quality of social rights. Daly (1997) also holds that the broader 
referents of change have been the boundaries between the state and the 
market on the one hand, and the family on the other. In the Swedish case, it 
is better to focus on the boundaries between the state and the market in order 
to explain decreasing welfare expenditure. 
 
 
6. Changes in the welfare system 
6.1. Changes in unemployment insurance 
 Unemployment benefits in Sweden are divided into two major parts; 
one concerns investment in activation measures through subsidisation of 
employment and vocational training of the unemployed and, the second 
concerns cash benefits.  
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 At the beginning of the 1990s, the dramatic rise in unemployment 
led to an equally dramatic rise in public expenditure. Consequently, the 
government decided to reduce the level of unemployment benefit, which 
formed the major component of the state budget. As late as 1989, when 
unemployment was still at its lowest level and the state budget was still in 
surplus, the Social Democratic government extended welfare measures for 
the unemployed
251
. The Social Democratic Party, supported by the labour 
movement, promised that with victory in the September 1994 election, it 
would return to the old system and the compensation level would increase to 
the same level as before. However, in practice, the compensation level was 
reduced to 75 percent. The government‘s main argument was that 
continuing financial problems made change impossible
252
. 
 As it has been illustrated, in fighting the rapid increase in 
unemployment, Social Democratic governments used the old weapon of 
activating and training the unemployed rather than simply paying cash 
benefits. While these measures expanded at almost the same pace as 
unemployment rose, cash benefits were reduced in two steps by a sum of 15 
percent. Despite suggestions from the employers and the bourgeois parties 
to further cut cash benefits, the Social Democrats avoided further decreases. 
These measures received support from the representatives in the unions who 
advocated continuity of the generous system but there were critics in the 
labour movement who blamed the party for changes in its traditional policy. 
The former chairman of the LO was one of the critics, who at the turn of the 
1990s, criticised the Social Democratic government for overestimating the 
threats caused by exogenous factors like globalisation, thereby rejecting the 
traditional labour policy. 
 There is no doubt that at the turn of the 1990s the SAP was in the 
middle of an ideological crisis because essential elements of the traditional 
welfare system were targeted for reform. The traditional active labour policy 
was one of the areas which received most attention by the advocates of 
change. Some of the modernisers in the Party were openly criticizing low 
efficiency levels in the public sector and thereby advocating ‗downsizing‘ 
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the public sector. They regarded redundancies in the public sector as 
necessary because the production of services in the sector had to be as 
efficient as in the private sector.  
 Despite the ideological changes, the Social Democrats did not 
initiate the process of redundancies in the Swedish labour market. The 
process had been initiated by private sector firms during the government 
period of the bourgeois coalition. When the SAP undertook large scale 
redundancies in the public sector, the economic crisis was already 
widespread and the party could blame the bourgeois government for the 
enormous budget deficits it had left behind. That forced the Social 
Democrats into large scale savings. However, as one left coalition party 
leader stated, ‗the large scale redundancies in the public sector and 
subsequent deterioration in unemployment insurance, were the major 
factors that caused anger and resentment among the traditional supporters 
of the SAP.‘ Persistence among supporters forced the party to reconsider its 
position and made the social democratic leaders avoid further retrenchments 
with a view to reestablish traditional labour policy. For instance, by 
announcing a goal of reducing the unemployment rate to 4 percent by the 
year 2000, the social democrats tried to convince the labour movement that 
the traditional full employment policy had been readopted. 
 As stated thus far, it is possible to conclude that the rate of 
employment was the only area, which was mainly affected by global 
pressures. In the other three areas of pensions, health and sickness insurance 
and family policy, changes were not due to crucial transformations resulting 
directly from globalisation but as a consequence of the high budget deficit 
caused by unemployment. Therefore one can conclude that the globalization 
had an indirect effect on most of the changes in different welfare 
programmes. In the case of pensions, an area where change has definitely 
occurred, of course, pessimistic prognoses about long term crisis were the 
main reason for reform. Changes in the demographic trends are regarded as 
the major reason, which made changes in the pension system inevitable. 
 
6.2. Changes in sickness insurance policy 
 During the 1990s, the sickness benefit was a subject for change at 
least eight times
253
. Moreover, it was the first target for retrenchment by the 
right coalition. As soon as there was a need for cuts in social expenditure, 
the governments addressed either parts of the sickness insurance scheme for 
savings. Among the areas that have been affected in various ways, there 
were the compensation levels, the rules governing income on which benefit 
entitlement was based and the qualification requirements. Among other 
changes were the reintroduction of an initial unpaid waiting day and a 
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change in introducing the two-week employer period
254
. 
 While the generous benefits system compensated more than 90 
percent of the employees‘ income when they were sick, one could 
understand why the absenteeism rate due to sickness increased so rapidly. It 
resulted in the various criticisms suggesting that the generous benefits only 
encouraged widespread abuse of the system. The number of sick leave cases 
fell sharply by around 20 percent between 1990 and 1995. Hence, the costs 
of the sickness insurance also decreased enormously.  
 However, when the economic crisis of the early 1990s recovered and 
the widespread anxiety over unemployment disappeared, the absentee rate 
increased dramatically again and without any considerable improvement has 
been made in the sickness benefits. Between 1995 and 1999, the number of 
sick leave cases increased by almost 60 percent. These two trends appear to 
indicate that – while in a poor economic situation, the deterioration in 
sickness benefits compels the sick people not to stay at home but to go to 
work. Consequently, the amount of absenteeism due to sickness decreases, 
while in a more secure economic condition, the decreasing benefit levels 
cannot prevent the sick people from staying at home. In other words, it is 
not the level of sickness benefits, which has crucial impacts on the level of 
leave due to sickness, but the increasing threat of becoming unemployed in 
a time of economic woe. 
 The high amount of absenteeism due to sickness has also increased 
the concern about this trend and, at the beginning of the 2000, the problem 
received great attention
255
. Among the interviewees representing the 
political parties, there have been 3 three major approaches. Firstly, those 
who rejected further cuts in the sickness insurance, stressed instead the 
importance of a more effective rehabilitation programme in order to 
incentive the sick to return to the labour market. Secondly, those who 
advocated a real reduction in the benefits suggested instead a minimal 
protection – a basic insurance system. Thirdly, those who wanted to keep 
the existing benefit system based on compensation of the income loss but 
suggested further reduction in replacement rates. 
 The SD S D and its supporting party in the Parliament (the Left 
Party) advocated the first approach. These parties – exactly like the trade 
unions – seemed to believe that the increasing rate of poor health had to do 
with the severe conditions caused by the economic crisis of the early 1990s. 
Therefore, it should not be handled by a deterioration in benefits. They were 
not interested in further cuts in entitlements. On the contrary, these parties 
advocated further reforms. One of the most debated issues was the increase 
in the level of the social insurance ceiling, i.e. the maximum amount of 
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income on which a sickness benefit may be assessed
256
. For a long period of 
time, the ceiling has remained stable, at 7.5 times the base amount, which 
was only adjusted with consumer prices
257
. Therefore, the number of 
employees with an income higher than the ceiling increased rapidly while 
the real wages increased more than consumer prices during the 1990s. 
 An interesting and rather controversial point is that all left-wing 
parties – including the Left Party – demanded an increase of the ceiling, 
which would increase the compensation level for those with high incomes. 
The concern of the Left Party and of the SAP S D in increasing the level of 
this ceiling has to do with the increasing volume of private insurances. As a 
consequence of being paid less compensation in the event of illness, 
increasing numbers of wage earners with thigh incomes in the private sector 
made agreement-linked insurance in order to compensate their loss of 
income. Between 1990 and 1999, the number of individual health insurance 
policies rose from 170.000 to 395.000 in four major companies in the 
private insurance sector. The Center Party and the Green Party, which only 
advocated a basic insurance system, suggested no increase in the ceilings or 
in the levels of benefits. Conversely, these parties ask for efficiency in the 
treatment of sick people and a more efficient rehabilitation program. 
 The SAF experts point to the high level of costs for sickness 
insurance as the single largest cost for the enterprises in Sweden. In this 
respect, it has also been argued that, by involving high levels of taxation, the 
welfare state erodes the very incentive to work, save and invest, which cause 
market distortion in the long run. At the time of the reform, the 
Confederation suggested not only a reduction of the benefit levels, but also a 
tightening up on the definitions of sickness. 
 The third approach has been launched by the Conservatives and - to 
some extent – even by the liberals who suggest a second waiting day, before 
which the benefit could be claimed. According to this perspective, the 
existing system is too generous and the level of excess insurance too small. 
The end argument is that such generosity reduces the incentive to work. The 
loss of income has to be greater for the individual because otherwise, the 
level of absenteeism would remain too high. 
 Despite the resistance from the Social Democrats to avoid changes in 
the basic principles of the sickness insurance system, it seems that the 
mounting financial challenges would finally force them to make some minor 
changes into the system. The cost of sickness insurance, especially for those 
cases of at least 30 days‘ duration, has increased consistently since the end 
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of the 1990s
258
. Apart from reducing the level of sickness benefits, which  
can always be an option for governments in the era of spending cuts, another 
measure could be the role of the employers in the task of administration of 
sickness benefit increases from 14 days, which has been the case until the 
start of the 2003, to 4 four weeks. Such a requirement could increase the 
pressure on the companies to tighten the eligibility. 
 
6.3. Changes in the old age pension system 
 Since the pension reform of 1958 and the development of the ATP 
system – in addition to demographic trends towards an elder population and 
some major changes in the Swedish economy, have caused serious financial 
problems for the system
259
, the high inflation and reduced economic growth, 
which characterized the 1970s and 1980s, together with high unemployment 
in the 1990s, have prevented a rapid income progression in Sweden. 
Knowing that in the pay-as-you-go system PAYG, pensions are financed by 
the succeeding generation, such economic problems would have 
consequences for the financing of pensions. 
 The aging population seemed to have been the major threat for the 
financial stability of the system
260
. When ATP was introduced, the number 
of old-age and early retirement pensioners was quite low. Therefore, the 
working population was able to finance the costs of the pension system. As 
noted in chapter five, demographic changes have dramatically changed the 
ratio between the number of people in the working population and the 
number of old age and early-retired pensioners. In 1990 the ratio was 2.38, 
but in 2005 this ratio dwindled to 1.78, which meant that each member of 
the working population had to finance more than half of one pension
261
. 
 Furthermore, after three decades of the ATP, other weaknesses had 
been identified. These were summarized by Staahlberg into five major 
points. First, in the ATP system, pensioners‘ standards of living did not 
follow the changes in those of the working population. When, as a result of 
economic growth, the living standards of the working population increased, 
pensioners‘ standards declined. Viceversa, when the living standards of the 
working population declined, those of the pensioners increased. Second, the 
principle of compensation for loss of income, which was an essential 
element when the system was constructed, had been eroded. Third, the ratio 
between the amounts a person paid into the system and what she/he got back 
in the form of pension was rather weak. This might have had a negative 
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impact on the people‘ incentive to work. The pattern of income distribution 
had become, as a result of the pensions‘ regulations, more unsystematic. 
This is in sheer contrast to the purpose of the traditional income distribution 
policy. Finally, in the PAYG system, the incentive to save has decreased, 
because, with the existing generous public pension system, there is no need 
for contribution to private pension funds. It seems that in a funded system – 
as opposed to the PAYG system, as a result of more savings, the 
contribution to investment and economic growth would also increase.  
 Moreover, the rate of pension in the ATP system was determined by 
an individuals‘ previous income. It was related to the ‗base amount‘ (about 
20 percent of the average industrial wage) and therefore, protected against 
inflation. In other words, changes in real wages in the labour market or in 
the productivity of the economy did not affect the rate of pensions. The rate 
of growth in productivity, however, had a decisive impact on the pension 
levy, paid by the working population. As long as there was reasonable 
economic growth and real wages rose, then the total wage sum, out of which 
the pension was to be paid, increased, and as a result, the pension levy 
remained low. However, low real wage growth meant that the working 
population had to pay larger amounts in contributions. As shown in the table 
below, predictions about the future demonstrated that if the average annual 
growth rate was 1 percent, pension levies for the national basic pension and 
ATP would amount to nearly 33 percent in 2015, and if there were no 
growth at all, the levy would have to be 48 percent of total wages. 
 The end result of the Swedish pension system – under Social 
Democratic governments, was that the living standards of pensioners was 
above the level of welfare benefits, even for those who did not receive 
benefits from the supplementary ATP pension. Furthermore, the generosity 
of the national ‗basic pension‘, which is paid to all who have been residents 
in the country for at least five years time, has ensured that the risk of 
poverty is virtually non-existent for pensioners, compared to systems in 
which public pensions are related to previous income. According to
262
, as a 
result of this policy, the average risk of poverty was 5.3 percent in Sweden, 
whereas in eight other OECD countries the average percentage was 9.7; 
however, financial problems in the pension system, mainly caused by the 
PAYG arrangement, have made reform inevitable. A central budgetary issue 
was the large tax wedge associated with the 40 year old system of 
government provision
263
. 
 At the end of the 1980s, renewal was in the air regarding what 
seemed as inevitable: a long-awaited reform of the pension system. In the 
early stages, the political discussion on the possible scenarios for changes 
differed radically between the two political blocs. While the bourgeois 
parties suggested systemic changes in order to harmonize the pension 
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system to the neo-liberal model, which stressed funded pensions, the social-
democrats defended the essence of the PAYG system mainly because it 
would retain the redistributive elements of the system
264
. In the initial 
debates, the Social Democrats maintained a defensive policy, which 
intended to keep the existing system and focused its efforts on trying to find 
new financing sources for the famous ATP system.  
 Despite the 1990s globalization crisis and welfare cuts in the 
benefits, the levels of Swedish retiring scheme, public services and family 
facilities remained the highest in the world. The level of Swedish pensions 
has been generous when compared with other countries. Internationally, the 
Nordic welfare states are exceptional for their unique scope of publicly 
provided services as some commentators stress
265
. For instance, in 1997, the 
share of social and health services from total social expenditure was 41 
percent in Sweden, which means that services took up a significant portion 
of GDP. Compared to other welfare states, services in the Nordic model 
have been of high quality, run by professional staff and have catered to the 
needs of those resident in the country. However, care services for the 
elderly, which form the core of social care services together with childcare 
services, have increased since 1993. Following considerable reductions 
between 1991 and 1993, in 1993, expenditures related to old age increased 
continuously in Sweden. According to the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, the share of services to the elderly was 22 percent of the total old-
age expenditures
266
. 
 In the particular Swedish case, the higher levels of expenditure for the 
elderly explain the high care workers‘ wage and staff ratio. Therefore, one 
should stress that a great deal of the elderly care services‘ expenditure are 
personnel costs
267
. Between 1990 and 1998, these costs have decreased 
because the number of personnel in the elderly care, care for the 
handicapped and the health care sectors were reduced by 94 000 people
268
. 
As a result of this downsizing, Sweden‘s favorable position in providing 
elderly care services diminished relative to other welfare states
269
. 
 In the figure, the number of personnel in the health and elderly care 
sector has decreased by 15 percent in the same period. Meanwhile, the 
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number of old people who needed more services increased by 17 percent 
between 1990 and 1998. Consequently, the care services were reduced to 
the groups who were in greater need. Further, the services to elderly 
changed their scope, from being destined for the elderly in need of support 
in their everyday life to being geared for those who are in urgent need of 
sophisticated medical services
270
. 
 
7. Organizational issues of welfare reform  
 The organization of this enormous expansion of state activities posed 
a gigantic problem of public administration. Novel undertakings, for which 
the existing state apparatus was unprepared, had to be set in motion. As the 
current literature in political science on ‗implementation‘ demonstrates, the 
best intentions go for naught unless they can be transformed into workable 
institutions. Successful social welfare policy requires not only financing, but 
skilful administration. 
 Per Nyström and Bo Rothstein have emphasized Möller‘s 
contribution in devising effective administrative arrangements outside the 
hierarchical national bureaucracy. Both regard Möller as a critic of 
traditional bureaucratic structures. Nyström, who worked with Möller, cites 
his ‗marked distrust of the old administrative apparatus‘. Consequently, 
Nyström argues, Möller built the administration of the welfare state on local 
government and a series of new district authorities. He relied upon local 
politicians rather than traditional bureaucrats and the district 
landshövdingar. The hospitals, pensioners‘ homes, children‘s clinics, and 
housing agencies were built up and administered locally; through state 
grants the government in Stockholm got local government to yield its 
traditional parsimoniousness. New district organs for labour market policy, 
housing, agriculture, and maternal assistance bypassed the existing 
structures of-district organization. Recruitment to these new positions 
proceeded outside traditional civil service procedures. Trade union officials, 
for example, were recruited to the labour employment and retraining offices 
on the theory that prospective clients would feel more comfortable dealing 
with them, a view borne out by West German difficulties in gaining 
acceptance for similar programmes staffed by traditional civil servants. It 
was this emphasis on local administration and on central-local co-operation 
that inspired Möller, in Nyström‘s view; he wanted authority ‗where the 
shoe pinches more directly than when the pain is mediated through 
bureaucratic channels‘271. 
 Rothstein‘s case builds largely on Nyström‘s. He argues that Möller 
developed five different administrative strategies: universal rather than 
means-tested policies; trusting local and popularly established organizations 
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with public administrative tasks; reducing the power of the judicial state 
apparatus by making the Ministry of Social Affairs the channel of appeal; 
closing down old and building up new state apparatuses, for example, 
closing the old Unemployment Commission and establishing the Labour 
Market Board; recruiting union cadres as ‗street level‘ bureaucrats for the 
new ‗reform bureaucracies‘272. By pushing power down to the local level, 
Rothstein argues, even where it was not in Social Democratic hands, Möller 
co-opted his enemies by investing them with a stake in the welfare state‘s 
success
273
.  
The arguments of Nyström and Rothstein do show Möller‘s 
penchant for decentralized solutions, but they tend to ignore the strong 
central direction which Möller retained. If Möller could find the expertise he 
needed within the bureaucracy, he was prepared to use it; if not, then he 
created a structure with the skill required. Once new structures were 
established, Möller ran them largely on Weberian lines – and, as Rothstein 
points out, his successors altered his work in more centralist directions. Nor 
did Möller wholly abolish means-testing. Housing allowances in particular, 
but other smaller programmes as well, retained this feature. The Swedish 
welfare state contains much universal provision of a high standard, for 
which Möller among others deserves great credit, but the system still 
contains means-testing. 
 Gustav Möller never saw the socialization he theorized about in his 
early writings, but through his own work in social welfare policy he helped 
create ‗security for Sweden’s people‘. Retrospectively, he traced three stages 
in the development of social policy – first, traditional poor law arrangements 
with their humiliating means tests; then the phase of social insurance with 
its general rules retaining some element of means-testing (here he seems to 
have had in mind the early pension and sickness insurance schemes with 
their inadequate benefits); and finally the period of social benefits as general 
citizen rights. He proudly cited pensions, child benefit, school meals and 
books, hospital care, and sickness insurance as notable examples of such 
rights. During his tenure as Minister of Social Affairs, the concept of 
citizenship had broadened remarkably and, true to his Social Democratic 
convictions, Möller hoped for further extensions. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE WITHERING WELFARE SYSTEM: 
NEOCORPORATISM AND EUROPEANIZATION 
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the ‗nanny-state‘  
 
 
1. The independent variables explaining welfare state decline 
1.1. Europeanization and globalization  
 Globalization was the main intervenient factor which triggered the 
changes in welfare benefits because the welfare system became 
economically unsustainable and prone to frequent abuse. In the meantime, 
the neocorporatist system of labour industrial relations disintegrated 
simultaneously with the cuts in welfare benefits. The parallelism should be 
understood as a tendency of replacement of national corporatism by 
corporatism at the supranational levels of power, a tendency recently 
documented in political research. However, Europeanization is the symptom 
of globalization, not its immediate effect
274
. 
 In the era of globalization, the ‗Keynesian consensus‘, which 
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prevented any trade-off between social security and economic growth, could 
not resist the pressure from the globalization of the world economy. The 
decline in industrial employment created a situation in which – in Nordic 
countries like Sweden – full employment could only be attained via 
services. The consensus became fragile when the left began to criticize 
welfare states because of their lack of efficiency and the right attacked the 
expansion of public sector costs, which was held to undermine economic 
growth. In this respect, neo-liberals argued that by involving high levels of 
taxation, the welfare state erodes incentives to work, save and invest, which 
caused ‗market distortion‘275. Moreover, by pulling human and capital 
resources away from industries and into the public sector, it ‗crowded out‘ 
private sector alternatives. In other words, there existed a new and 
fundamental trade-off between egalitarianism and employment. 
 
1.2. The neocorporatist factor in Europe and in Sweden  
 Some contemporary political scientists use the term neo-corporatism 
to describe a process of bargaining between labor, capital, and government 
identified as occurring in some small, open economies (particularly in 
Europe) as a means of distinguishing their observations from popular 
pejorative usage and to highlight ties to classical theories. In the recent 
literature of social science, corporatism (or neo-corporatism) lacks negative 
connotation. In the writings of Philippe Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch, and 
their followers, ‗neo-corporatism‘ refers to social arrangements dominated 
by tri-partite bargaining between unions, the private sector (capital), and 
government. Such bargaining is oriented toward (a) dividing the 
productivity gains created in the economy ‗fairly‘ among the social partners 
and (b) gaining wage restraint in recessionary or inflationary periods. 
 Most political economists believe that such neo-corporatist 
arrangements are only possible in societies in which labor is highly 
organized and various labor unions are hierarchically organized in a single 
labor federation. Such ‗encompassing‘ unions bargain on behalf of all 
workers, and they have a strong incentive to balance the employment cost of 
high wages against the real income consequences of small wage gains. 
Many of the small, open European economies, such as Finland, Sweden, 
Austria, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands fit this classification. In the 
work of some scholars, such as Peter J. Katzenstein, neo-corporatist 
arrangements enable small open economies to effectively manage their 
relationship with the global economy. The adjustment to trade shocks occurs 
through a bargaining process in which the costs of adjustment are 
distributed evenly (‗fairly‘) among the social partners. 
 From all, Sweden and Austria are the ‗purest‘ forms of neo-corporatist 
societies and exhibit the characteristics of tripartite neo-corporatist 
arrangements where state, business and labor negotiate every single aspect 
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of the economic reality, thereby instituting a form of private interest 
government
276
. According to the author, ‗neocorporatism is government by 
the private interests in agreement with the labor interests‘. In the peculiar 
Swedish case, neocorporatism was based on voluntary central collective 
bargaining, well-coordinated labor market and income policies. The SA S A 
was reached between the SAF and the LO under the threat of legislation, 
thereby restricting the independence of collective bargaining. However, 
after a general strike in 1980, the system of centralized bargaining between 
the SAF and the LO broke down. 
 Most theorists agree that traditional neo-corporatism is undergoing a 
crisis
277
. In many classically corporatist countries, traditional bargaining is 
on the retreat. This crisis is often attributed to globalization, with increasing 
labour mobility and competition from developing countries
278
. 
  
1.3. The Constitutional Factor  
 Some of the questions left unanswered by Olson require, I believe, 
                                                 
276
 Schmitter, P. 1983. ‗Democratic Theory and Neocorporatist Practice‘, European 
University Institute Working Paper No. 74.  Also published as ‗Democratic Theory and 
Neo-Corporatist Practice‘ in Social Research. 50(4): 885-928; Schmitter, P. 1985. Ed. 
(with Wolfgang Streeck). Private Interest Government and Public Policy. London: Sage; 
Schmitter, P. 1988. ‗Five Reflections on the Future of the Welfare State‘ in Politics & 
Society. (16) 4: p 503-515 
277
 Corporatism is also used to describe a condition of corporate-dominated globalization. 
Points enumerated by users of the term in this sense include the prevalence of very large, 
multinational corporations that freely move operations around the world in response to 
corporate, rather than public, needs; the push by the corporate world to introduce legislation 
and treaties which would restrict the abilities of individual nations to restrict corporate 
activity; and similar measures to allow corporations to sue nations over ‗restrictive‘ 
policies, such as a nation‘s environmental regulations that would restrict corporate 
activities. For instance, in the United States, corporations representing many different 
sectors are involved in attempts to influence legislation through lobbying including many 
non-business groups, unions, membership organizations, and non-profits. While these 
groups have no official membership in any legislative body, they can often wield 
considerable power over law-makers. In recent times, the profusion of lobby groups and the 
increase in campaign contributions has led to widespread controversy and the McCain-
Feingold Act. Many critics of free market theories, such as George Orwell, have argued that 
corporatism (in the sense of an economic system dominated by massive corporations) is the 
natural result of free market capitalism. Critics of capitalism often argue that any form of 
capitalism would eventually devolve into corporatism, due to the concentration of wealth in 
fewer and fewer hands. A permutation of this term is corporate globalism. John Ralston 
Saul argues that most Western societies are best described as corporatist states, run by a 
small elite of professional and interest groups, that exclude political participation from the 
citizenry. Other critics say that they are pro-capitalist, but anti-corporatist. They support 
capitalism but only when corporate power is separated from state power. These critics can 
be from both the right and the left. Other critics, namely Mancur Olson in ‗The Logic of 
Collective Action‘, argue that corporatist arrangements exclude some groups, notably the 
unemployed, and are thus responsible for high unemployment; Olson, M. 1965. The logic 
of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard UP 
278
 This is a common phenomenon associated with globalization also known as outsourcing. 
 128 
some constitutional facts to be taken into account. Sweden has a 
parliamentary constitution with proportional representation. This determines 
the character of the political parties and therefore, as we shall see, is also 
relevant for the problems discussed here. 
 Parliamentarism is a method for appointing the executive, according to 
which the people first elect the legislature, which in turn appoints the 
executive. The legislature and the executive are thus, in a sense, appointed 
in the same popular elections. In a pure parliamentary system, the executive 
can furthermore remain in office only as long as it enjoys the confidence of 
a majority in the legislature, and this requirement is therefore often referred 
to as the parliamentary principle. The other main system is the presidential 
one, which uses separate popular elections for appointing a president and 
thereby also the rest of the executive.  
 A parliamentary system depends, for its functioning, on the existence 
of stable, centralized, and disciplined political parties in a way that a 
presidential system does not. The reason is that the parliament‘s confidence 
in the executive, in order to be reliable and lasting, cannot be ad hoc, 
accidental, or anonymous. The confidence expressed by a transient majority 
of individual members of the legislature cannot, it is easy to realize, have 
much value. The confidence has to be expressed by one or a few stable and 
identifiable actors, which, in effect, means consolidated political parties, A 
parliamentary system however is not dependent only on such parties; 
conversely, I submit, it also gives strong incentives for the formation of that 
kind of parties; and sometimes also for forming big parties. The reason is 
that centralized leadership, stability, and discipline enhance a negotiating 
party‘s credibility and reliability and thereby its chances of becoming a 
member of the executive, a membership that often is quite attractive, or even 
lucrative. 
 The proportional electoral system with multi-member constituencies 
can be compared with a plurality system with single-member constituencies 
(first past the post). The choice here affects the parties in two ways. First, 
the plurality system has a strong tendency to reduce the number of parties, 
in the extreme to two parties, whereas there are no such reductive forces 
operating in the proportional system. Second, in contrast to the plurality 
system, the proportional system puts strong means for enhancing discipline, 
and thus for the creation of stable and cohesive parties, in the hands of the 
party leaderships. The main factor here is that the candidates for the 
legislature are largely dependent on the party leadership, both for 
nomination and for campaigning. 
 Now, I submit, these mechanisms can be used for explaining the 
character of the Swedish party system. There are seven parties, which on the 
whole are disciplined, stable, and cohesive. There are no strong forces 
reducing the number of parties. The Social Democratic party is quite big. 
The incentives to discipline come from the parliamentarism, and the means 
from the proportionalism. As a contrasting example, we one think about the 
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United States with a mix of presidentialism and plurality. There, as we 
should expect, we find two main parties with low discipline.  
 These matters affect the distribution of power. In the Swedish system 
the consolidated and disciplined parties can, as an approximation, be 
considered as unitary actors. The power is concentrated to the hierarchical 
summits of the parties. This does not mean, of course, that individuals are 
not important. It does however mean that the individuals almost exclusively 
play their roles within the parties. The individuals have a say in determining 
the party positions, and more so the higher up they are in the party 
hierarchy. When it comes to dealings with actors outside the party, for 
example with other parties, or with the electorate in campaigns, or with 
lobbying organizations, it is however usually the party as such, or the party 
leadership, that acts. Furthermore, during the current election period, the 
governmental power is held by the very few parties belonging to the 
executive or to the parliamentary majority supporting the executive. The US 
pattern is quite different. There, the party restrictions on the behavior of the 
president, and on the members of the Congress, are very weak indeed. All 
these individuals – several hundred – can therefore be considered as fairly 
independent actors. The power is spread out not only between the president 
and the Congress, but also among all the members of the Congress. These 
different patterns should be of great importance. It thus seems likely that the 
transaction costs of political processes depend critically on the number of 
independent actors taking part. The number of independent actors is likely 
to affect the possibilities of building decisive majorities or blocking 
minorities, the character of the lobbying processes, and the expediency of 
various strategies in the political competition.  
 One particular aspect likely to be affected by the patterns described is 
the relation between voters (the principals) and the political main actors (the 
agents), whether these are parties or individuals. Two types of such relation 
are particularly interesting: the one may be called delegation, the other 
instruction.  
 Delegation is, in a way, the simpler of the two and many people are 
familiar with it from experiences in ordinary clubs and the like. When 
people in such associations elect presidents, secretaries, and so on, they 
usually do not require more than that they have confidence in the persons 
elected. They just want to be able to rely on them to act in accordance with 
common sense in the interests of the club. Feeling such confidence, they are 
happy to delegate the decision-making to the people elected. For the most 
part such a system works well, but if, for some reason, a delegate starts to 
act in ways of which the members disapprove, there are usually provisions 
in the club‘s charter for displacing the functionary. This rather simple kind 
of relation occurs not only in clubs, but also in politics.  
 Instruction, on the other hand, prevails when the voters do not limit 
themselves to picking representatives in which they have confidence, but 
also require that they shall execute a certain program, which may be worked 
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out in a rather detailed way. Therefore, at the same time as people are 
elected, a program that those elected are obliged to implement is, in fact, 
adopted. The program may very well be, and often is, formulated by the 
candidates who want to get elected. Different candidates for political 
positions thus offer to carry through different programs if they are elected. 
This, however, is fully consistent with the view that, once a candidate is 
elected, the program can be considered as an instruction from the voters to 
the elected. 
  It is easy to see that in reality, mixtures of delegation and instruction 
often occur. This, however, does not preclude the fact that sometimes the 
element of delegation dominates and sometimes the element of instruction. 
My hypothesis is that the Swedish system has a tendency towards 
instruction, whereas the US system has a tendency towards delegation.  
 The reason is simple. In a parliamentary system a campaigner, which 
in that case is a party, will be able to fulfill its promises if its electoral 
success is big enough. If, for example, a party alone gets more than 50 
percent of the seats in the legislature, it can, by itself, form an executive and 
implement all its promises immediately. A presidential system is, in this 
respect, different. Imagine a person running for the presidency, or for a seat 
in the Congress. In both cases everybody knows that the person, after the 
election, and however great the electoral success, will not, without further 
cumbersome and yet uncertain negotiations, be in a position to deliver on 
his or her campaign proposals. Exactly for that reason, it would not be 
particularly clever, and perhaps even a bit ridiculous, to let detailed 
proposals, or instructions, dominate the campaign. It seems more expedient 
for the candidate to emphasize his or her own personal qualities, thereby 
indicating a capacity for prudent action in various future situations which, at 
the moment of the election, are impossible to foresee. That, on the whole, is 
what such candidates seem to do, and their resulting relation to the voters, 
therefore, is primarily one of delegation.  
 
2. The relationship between neo-corporatism and the welfare 
state 
2.1. Early Swedish neo-corporatism and the impact of interest 
groups on the welfare system 
 So far, it has been suggested that the corporate structure of the 
Swedish political system has undergone structural problems. Neo-
corporatism‘s great impact on interest groups‘ active involvement in the 
formation of social welfare policy is considered to have been triggered by 
the organizational strength of trade unions and the close ties between the 
Social Democrats‘ party government and the LO. It has also been suggested 
that the only part of the neo-corporatist structure which independently 
wanted to break with the neo-corporatist tradition was the SAF, which was 
determined to take advantage of the globalization phenomenon. The labor 
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unions were weakened and the employers were tempted to take advantage of 
such changing power balance.  
 In other words, the neo-corporatist institutions of the Harpsund 
democracy was no longer as secure as before
279
. Since the start of the 
turbulence in the Swedish economy and the ensuing changes in the relations 
among the 3 three major pillars of the system, the broad consensus on the 
reliability of the system corporate structure has been eroded. Many 
observers have recently questioned the consistency of the system corporate 
structure and claimed that an irreversible process of de-corporatizing the 
Swedish polity has started. Conversely, Hoefer (1996)
280
 rejects the idea that 
the Swedish system is irrevocably on the descending path of de-
corporatization.  
 In the 1991, for a short time span, the neoliberals (the coalition of 
right wing parties) came back to power. It followed a tense period of 
difficult financing and neoliberal policies. The major argument concerning 
the de-corporatization of the system is that the balance between organized 
interests and the state, which characterized the Swedish model of neo-
corporatism, is considered to be a thing of the past
281
. This conclusion is 
based on Micheletti‘s definition of neo-corporatism as ‗an integral 
relationship for decision-making and implementation between state and 
encompassing interest organizations. Encompassing interest organizations 
represent the greater part of the collective which they can organize as 
members (1991: 148). Micheletti adds some other characteristics to the 
Swedish experience of neo-corporatism, i.e. ‘the incorporation of 
antagonistic, encompassing interests in the state policy making.‘ 
 According to Schmitter (1989)
282
, globalization and Europeanization 
seem to have caused the weakness of neo-corporatist arrangements, which 
has led to the decreasing importance of the national state. As Sweden joined 
the EU, many decisions, which had been taken by the national state, became 
the responsibility of the European community. Consequently, as the space 
for national policy determination has decreased, the interest groups have 
found the space for influencing the process of decision-making increasingly 
deteriorating. Changes in labor legislation, mainly in the collective 
agreements, were the main conditions for the SAF to enter into negotiations 
with the LO. Jonsson referred to the obvious unwillingness of the SAF to 
join bilateral negotiations with the LO. Accordingly, it seems that neo-
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corporatist cooperation, which has been an integral part of a rational strategy 
to protect prior policies in the labor market, has lost its importance for the 
employers. 
 As a result of increasing globalization, the existing integration among 
the three major actors in the neo-corporatist system has decreased 
considerably. As the Swedish companies – In the newly deregulated 
financial market – have moved their capital abroad, the power relation 
between the Swedish Confederation of Employers SAF and the trade union 
federation LO and the government, on one hand, and the trade union 
federation LO and the government, on the other hand, has dwindled 
considerably. There is now less need for the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises – the former SAF – to join negotiations with its neo-corporatist 
counterparts to reach agreements on regulations concerning the labor 
market, wages, etc. Bertil Jonsson, the former LO chairman, said that 
‘...since the beginning of the 1980s, the LO had had a weaker position in 
relation to the SAF. Capital has got a stronger position in relation to labor. 
This circumstance made the SAF reluctant to cooperate with the LO. The 
SAF seemed to believe that the ‘season of harvests’ has begun for them in 
which they would have the best opportunity to carry on a policy based on 
their ideological ground. During the 1990s, the frosty relationship between 
the SAF and the LO encouraged the SAF to dictate its conditions to the 
labor movement‘283. After the establishment of welfare-statism, the labor 
movement saw itself in such a strong position that it demanded greater 
industrial and economic democracy. Politically, the LO demanded trade 
unions‘ rights to co-determination in company management. Since the LO 
and SAF failed to reach an agreement on the extension of industrial 
democracy, the LO used its influence on the party and put pressure on the 
government to pass a law, the Codetermination Act of 1976. This law gave 
trade unions the right to take part in company decision-making. In the same 
way, the LO put forward the proposal for the creation of wage-earner funds. 
According to the original design, all enterprises of a certain size would pay 
20 percent of their profits to these funds, which were controlled by trade 
unions and would gradually increase their stakes in the firms. These 
measures have been understood by employers and non-socialist parties as a 
move from capitalism towards democratic socialism. Not only did the idea 
of wage earner funds deteriorate relations between the SAF and the LO, but 
also united the forces of the center-right in Swedish politics. Consequently, 
as Aylott
284
 emphasizes, ‗Swedish employers considered that the labor 
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movement had breached the terms of the country’s class compromise. 
Centralized, peak-level wage bargaining began to lose its beneficial impact, 
that of keeping wages in check.‘ 
 Thirdly, the move towards the privatization of social services 
accelerated during the 1990s. As it is widely known, the Swedish SAP SD 
have traditionally emphasized the notion that social services for common 
human needs should be provided on a non-profit-based administration
285
. 
However, some private services were, to a limited degree, permitted in 
medical and child-care services. By the same token, the size of government 
became a target for change and the bourgeois parties and the federation of 
employers called for the partial decentralization of the public sector. As 
Rothstein (1988)
286
 emphasizes, as far back as the 1980s, the SAF had no 
active policy for decreasing the size of governmental programs, which had 
consistently been raising the budget for social welfare services. Such a 
policy had to be understood as part of the neo-corporatist arrangement in 
Swedish politics, which resulted in widespread consensus between the SAF 
and the social democratic governments.  
 However, during the 1980s the policy of decentralization initiated by 
the SD governments, suggested an obvious change in the ideology of 
welfare statism. The removal of regulations in social services, health care 
and planning, on one hand, and the provision of greater autonomy for 
municipalities to control the finance and the organization of services on the 
other, were among the crucial changes made in that direction
287
. As Sven 
Hort stresses, such a move has weakened the position of the ‗strong state‘ 
on which the SD welfare model was based. By contrast, Sven Hort like 
other commentators, such as Hoefer (1996) and Rothstein (1998), rejects the 
conclusion according to which neocorporatism is dead in Sweden. He 
criticizes those authors who generalize ‗a few minor changes to the whole 
neo-corporatist system‘ and who – without any behavioral or empirical 
testing of neo-corporatist theories, claim that neo-corporatism in Sweden 
has ended. According to Hoefer, ‘... if Sweden becomes less corporatist, one 
should expect to see changes in certain behavior exhibited by government 
and interest groups. These changes are not happening to the degree one 
would expect if the literature on the neo-corporatist system in Sweden were 
correct‘288. 
 Hoefer (1996) examines the level of neo-corporatism in Sweden by 
analyzing the information collected from a survey about the Swedish 
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interest groups‘ participation in the process of policy-making – mainly in 
social welfare issues – in 1986 and 1994. The study confirmed that the use 
of compromise and consensus in policy making did not decline. Likewise, 
the role of encompassing organizations did not diminish. Interest group-
government relations are still strong and the conflict and competition among 
interest groups is not increasing. Further, the group leaders‘ influence in the 
process of law-making is almost the same as it was before. 
 Hoefer‘s finding in his empirical study is that there were few, if any, 
grounds supporting the suggestion that a process of demise of neo-
corporatism in Sweden is occurring. His study presents interesting findings, 
although it may be too optimistic to assume that this process does not 
happen in Sweden. As pointed out by the former LO chairman, Bertil 
Jonsson, ‘the worsening of the relationship between the LO and SAF is a 
fact which had had widespread effects on labor market relations’. One of 
the consequences of such a trend is that fragmented bargaining, which was 
suggested and initiated by employers had had an impact on wage rates in 
general and on the public sector in particular. Apart from it, despite 
initiatives by trade unions to cooperate with employers, capital mobility 
from Sweden has increased considerably
289
. 
 In opposition to the political elite, which adhered to the ‗consensus‘ by 
keeping to the major course of welfare strategy, there has been an obvious 
split in the labor market. The neo-corporartist system is undoubtedly 
experiencing its deepest crisis since the 1930s and ‗de-corporatization‘ is 
likely to have an impact on the nature of the welfare regime. Nevertheless, 
the essential impact is that the climate of mutual understanding, which was 
crucial for the introduction of progressive tax policy, had vanished. 
Likewise, the building up of the modern Swedish welfare state depended on 
the trade-off between growth policies and economic security designs. 
 The commitment to full employment, which was also crucial for the 
expansion of a successful universalist welfare state, could also suffer from 
the lack of consensus between key actors in the labor market. Although the 
crisis of the neo-corporatist system has weakened the underpinnings of the 
regime, it has not yet destroyed it.  
 
2.2. The corporatist system in crisis (lobbying perspectives) 
  Olson‘s lack of detailed ideas about how lobbying organizations 
influence government is, as I see it, a salient deficiency in his argument. In 
order to highlight this lacuna, we can consider a society with no lobbying 
organizations at all. From one point of view, such a society may be thought 
of as an extremely flexible and effective market economy, suffering from no 
sclerosis whatsoever. It is, however, also possible to think about all the 
individuals in the society as an equal number of organizations, which, then, 
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are as narrow, and thereby as irresponsible, as they could possibly be. From 
this point of view, the society would be sclerotic in the extreme. This latter 
position is, of course, absurd, for the very simple reason that the individuals, 
considered as organizations, could not hope to influence the politicians. In 
spite of this, there is hardly anything in Olson‘s works that excludes this last 
position, since they do not contain, or refer to, any theory of influence. If, 
however, we take the constitutional setting into account, the outlines of such 
a theory become visible. I am thinking about two points in particular.  
 First, the obvious targets for the lobbyists are the centers of political 
power, which, in a parliamentary system, means the party leaderships. The 
lobbying will thus be concentrated at the summits of the political 
hierarchies. In a presidential system, on the contrary, the lobbyists will 
approach individual members of the legislature, or perhaps small occasional 
groups of such members. Thus, in a parliamentary system the lobbyists‘ 
counterparts are few and powerful, whereas in a presidential system they are 
numerous and, individually, much less powerful.  
 Second, the lobbyists are likely to ask for what they can get. In the 
parliamentary setting, with its inclination towards instruction, the lobbyists 
are therefore, to a large extent, likely to ask for various new reforms. Such 
demands are, without any value attached to the words, constructive or 
creative. In the presidential situation, with its tendency towards delegation, 
the demands will have a different tendency. Since the mechanism of 
instruction works badly, the lobbyists are more likely to play a negative, or a 
blocking, role. They will probably find it difficult to induce the politicians to 
bring in specified new reforms, but will find it easy to tell the politicians 
what not to do, and the politicians are likely to find that information 
valuable.  
 These ideas may be related to the widespread opinion that lobbying is 
a characteristic trait of the political life in the United States, and that 
lobbying there is more developed, and more influential, than in other 
democracies. This, I think, is wrong. Rather, I think that lobbying in the 
United States, where the targets are so many and so dispersed, cannot be 
restricted to a few closed rooms as in a parliamentary system, but 
unavoidably becomes open and visible to everybody. It is also, for the same 
reasons, less effective, and requires more resources, than lobbying in 
parliamentary countries. This view is compatible not only with the well 
known, and well published, lobbying activities on Capitol Hill, but also with 
the relatively slow development of the public expenditures in the USA, and 
the country‘s good long-term economic growth.  
 
2.3. Withering neo-corporatism 
 Political stability in Sweden still remains intact and political support 
to the existing welfare arrangements is still very extensive. The second 
feature of the Swedish system has been the stability of the labor market 
resulting from the so-called ‗historic compromise‘ reached in 1938 among 
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the 3 three neo-corporatist institutions: the business alliance, trade unions 
and government. While the SAP Social Democrats Party cushioned the 
continuity of welfare policies through its moderation in the political arena, 
the labor unions safeguarded the stability of the labor market by reaching an 
agreement with the employer‘s central organization. Not only did this 
agreement cover a range of economic and labor market issues, but also 
produced a climate of mutual understanding on which other strategic issues 
concerning the introduction of progressive taxation – as well as the 
establishment of the modern Swedish welfare state – could be provided and 
supported by the major interest groups representing both labor and 
capital
290
.  
 In the labor market, the changes seem to have been more extensive. 
The major change occurred when the rate of unemployment experienced an 
unprecedented rise in the early 1990s. For many analysts, the commitment 
to full employment and a relatively high tax level were the two main pre-
conditions of establishing universal welfare states
291
. The very low 
unemployment rate and high labor force participation had a double-edged 
effect: on one hand, it reduced the costs for unemployment compensation, 
but, on the other hand, it increased the state revenue. As a result, the 
government was able to pay generous benefits and subsidize services to all 
citizens. On the other hand, by advocating high tax levels, the state could 
develop measures to achieve the political-industrial structure, which could 
secure an active labor market policy, rather than income replacement for 
those displaced in the labor market. The rise in unemployment in a labor 
market which, since the WWII, has not faced such high unemployment, is a 
clear signal proving that industrial relations in Sweden are under threat. It 
appeared as if the era of ‗historic compromise‘ had come to an end and that 
major social changes loomed to the horizon as a consequence of the labor 
market mutations brought about by alterations in neo-corporatist 
arrangements. 
 The other condition, which made the neo-corporatist system working 
in Sweden was the strength of the 3 three institutional parts forming the 
golden triangle. Each of these three bodies had strong support in both 
society and the labor market. The Social Democratic Party won more than 
40 percent of the votes in all elections between 1932 and 1976. In some 
elections, public support was around 50 percent. In the labor market, the 
federation of employers, the SAF, included some of the world‘s best-known 
multinational companies – VOLVO, SAAB, Electrolux, and Ericsson. On 
the other hand, the LO, the federation of manual trade unions, organised 
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more than 90 percent of all blue-collar workers while the affiliation of the 
LO members to SAP was compulsory. By the same token, 80 percent of the 
white-collar workers was also unionized
292
. The strength of these three 
institutions provided exceptional conditions for successful centralized 
negotiations. Not only could representatives of the labor market 
organizations deal with the level of wages and the conditions in the labor 
market, but also play a major role in the decisions concerning the 
government‘s social and economic policies. 
 These conditions have gradually changed since the early 1980s. The 
major change was related to the power balance between the three main 
parties, which has altered. First, support for the Social Democrats decreased 
to 36-38 percent. Second, as a result of the decreasing share of blue-collars 
in manufacturing, the number of LO members declined considerably. Third, 
the internationalization of the economy determined Swedish companies 
‗outsourcing‘ and moving abroad since Swedish employers too lost their 
domestic market share to inward investors. During the 1990s, the 3 three 
components of the Swedish neo-corporatist system have weakened and the 
era of their incontestable dominance in the Swedish labor market became 
gradually blurred.  
 Despite the changes, there was still strong public support for the 
universal welfare state; also, the trade unions still retained a strong grip over 
white-collar workers and blue-collar workers undergirded LO. Even though 
manufacturing employment has decreased, the number of workers in the 
service sector steadily increased and is the new base of trade union support. 
Compared to the other labor movements, the Swedish trade union 
association is still the strongest and continues to influence the political 
process despite the fact that the Swedish neocorporate system is now weaker 
than in the early 1980s. The strength of the labor unions is explained by 3 
three main factors, the high membership percentage, the union‘s crucial 
impact on industrial relations and the close relationship with the Social 
Democratic Party. 
 Other authors such as Pontusson (1992), Pestoff (1991), Stephens 
(1996)
293
 identify the weakening of the various elements of the national 
labor market and the structural changes as causes of the Swedish labor 
movement influence. They seem to have had an impact on the attitude of 
employer‘s organization towards negotiations at the national level. These 
authors emphasize the internationalization of the Swedish economy, which 
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increased the volume of trade, of financial transactions, prompted the ‗multi-
nationalization‘ of enterprises and successively undermined the old 
distributive strategy. As a result, the Swedish industry, which since the 
1970s had become increasingly multinational and export oriented, also 
became less interested in a compromise with labor unions at the domestic 
level. Several commentators have pointed out the changing character of the 
Swedish business, which was brought about by the increasing strength of 
capital and transformation of its interests. 
 During the 1990s, Swedish business and bourgeois parties intensified 
their criticism of the Swedish public sector and welfare state expenditure by 
advocating privatization, deregulation and tax cuts as best methods for 
containing state spending. According to Bertil Jonsson, the former chairman 
of the union (1993-2000), the SAF terminated central bargaining in the mid 
1990s and weakened the position of the trade unions. 
 In a further move, the SAF withdrew the representatives from the 
boards of all state agencies in 1991. The employers were so enabled to avoid 
the compression of wages between low and high paid work and give in to 
LO requirements. Also, they have managed to completely ignore the 
solidaristic wage policy and to obtain the introduction of wage 
‗dispersion‘294. The SAF explained its new standpoint by arguing that 
solidaristic wage policy had led to a wage drift which threatened business 
competitiveness
295
. The experts in the SAF Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises do not hesitate to point out their intention to weaken the strong 
neo-corporatist agreement in the Swedish polity. They motivated their 
intention by economic reasons, suggesting that an end to central bargaining 
would favor expansive sectors, which in turn would provide a good future 
for the Swedish economy. There were a number of trends in the 
international economy which aggravated the situation: the collapse of fixed 
but flexible exchange rates, the oil crisis and the increase in oil prices, the 
deficit spending and the increased international interest rates
296
. What is 
more, the deregulation of financial markets reduced the government‘s ability 
to control economic development at the national level.  
 However, these changes had a negative impact on employers because 
the end of centralized wage-bargaining made wage restraint more difficult, 
which disadvantaged Swedish enterprises. Several commentators
297
 have 
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indicated that the real reason for ending wage-bargaining was that 
employers wanted to weaken the LO, both economically and politically. The 
unions‘ attempts to extend economic democracy during the 1970s and 1980s 
– through the Rehn-Meidner plans – seemed to be the key motive which 
sparkled SAF‘s measures against them298. Meidner believes the changes 
made in the Swedish welfare regimes have been largely enough to mean that 
the basic pillars of the ‗folkhemmet‘ policy are now changed (not what they 
were anymore in the past). The initial system and the Swedish model has 
experienced a kind of ‗system shift‘. 
 The enterprise flexibility in Sweden – which depended on wage 
flexibility – has not led to the expected degree of decentralization in wage 
bargaining. According to the OECD report
299
, only a small number of 
companies had opted for a decentralized wage settlement. As a result of 
these changes in Sweden‘s neo-corporatist structure, which was mainly the 
result of a ‗counter offensive‘ by SAF and the employers against welfare 
capitalism, the domino pieces/card started to fall and certain changes started 
to set off. For instance, one of the most important measures against the 
universalist welfare system was the expansion of occupational and private 
provisions. As Kangas & Palme (1993)
300
 have pointed out, company and 
private pension schemes grew considerably at the upper end of the labor 
market. Occupational and private provision could not threaten the universal 
welfare system in the short term, but it could lower the demand for state 
provision and therefore reduce the public willingness to fund it. Moreover, 
occupational provision would mean a shift to ‗enterprise welfare‘, which 
could effect into binding individuals to their companies rather than to the 
universalist provision. The changes suggested by the advocates of the 
federation of employers refer to replacing state provisions by the private 
sector but also indicate a new design for welfare arrangements with new 
priorities from the present system which stress a high level of benefits to 
another system in which replacement rates (in welfare benefits) should be 
lowered and, instead, the welfare system should mainly focus on services to 
groups who are in need. 
 During the 1990s, although the employers were determined to ignore 
the solidaristic wage policy, the labor movement did not change its attitude 
towards cooperation in the labor market. While the end of centralized wage 
bargaining would make wage restraint more difficult, it would be at the 
disadvantage of the employers. Therefore, the trade unions avoided conflict 
in the labor market by not demanding a wage growth higher than that to 
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which the employers would agree. Hence, unions followed the traditional 
pattern in favoring the national interest in a period of economic crisis. 
 By this strategy, the LO could survive the increasing pressure from 
employers and gain political support from the Social Democratic 
governments. Apart from the consensus strategy advocated by the LO, the 
fact that the union could keep itself united, determined the employers to try 
to fragment the union. However, the employers‘ move against the unions 
proved to be unsuccessful. Although the SAF initiated wage flexibility and 
advocated decentralized wage bargaining, there were only a few companies 
who decided to undertake a decentralized wage settlement. The federation 
of employers seem to have realized that long-term ‗cooperation‘ with the 
unions in wage bargaining was a crucial factor for keeping the relationship 
with labor stable. Therefore, despite the ideological reasons for advocating a 
decentralized wage bargain, there was implicitly accepted that wage 
settlement take place at central level. For this reason, employers and unions 
in the industrial sector agreed to set up a private mediation institute, which 
worked as a voluntary substitute for income policy
301
. Such ‗cooperation‘ 
would prevent – on a voluntary basis – the intervention of the state in labor 
market relations.  
 
3. Possible explanations to welfare state legitimacy 
3.1. The Emergence of Encompassing Organizations  
 We can now return to the mechanisms behind the encompassing 
Swedish lobbying organizations, and the rise of the welfare state. In doing 
so I will at first emphasize that these things, obviously, cannot be given an 
exclusively constitutional explanation: other factors, such as people‘s ideas, 
certainly matter as well. But even if the constitution is not a sufficient 
condition for the encompassing organizations, it may nonetheless be a 
necessary one for the welfare state. I find it difficult to imagine Swedish 
society in another constitutional setting.   
 As for the issue of encompassedness, it may first be noted that some of 
the Swedish organizations are closely linked with political parties. In 
particular, the blue-collar workers‘ national confederation of trade unions, in 
Swedish Landsorganisationen or just ‗LO,‘ is closely related to the Social 
Democratic Party, not only ideologically, but also in a technical and 
organizational sense. In fact, it is common to talk about the unions and the 
party as the two branches of the labor movement. Similar, though not 
equally close, relations exist between the farmers‘ national organization and 
the Center Party, which is strong in the countryside. These close 
relationships presuppose that both parties are reasonably consolidated, and 
that they have lasting and clear identities. It is difficult to imagine similar 
relations between a consolidated organization such as the Swedish LO and 
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loose conglomerates such as the Democratic and Republican Parties in the 
United States. Thus, there is a constitutional background here.   
 The unions engage in two important activities: bargaining for wages 
and other conditions of employment, and lobbying the governmental power 
(which often means the Social Democratic Party) on a wide range of societal 
issues, including legislation for the labor market. It seems likely that the 
unions, in their roles as bargainers, have a wish to control the labor markets 
and the supply of labor, and that these goals are more easily satisfied the 
more encompassing, and the more centralized, the union movement is. 
Consequently the unions are also likely to lobby for laws facilitating the 
fulfillment of these ambitions. The Social Democratic Party, in turn, is 
likely to welcome encompassing unions able to provide campaign funds and 
mobilize voters. In Sweden, with its prevailing political ideas and its 
constitution tuned for ‗instruction,‘ the emergence of encompassing 
organizations should therefore not come as a surprise. This tendency toward 
encompassedness, however, is also likely to have been stimulated by the 
Labor Movement‘s socialism. Certainly a socialist movement, with its 
inclination toward centralism and planning, will build encompassing 
organizations rather than narrow ones when able to do so.  
 
3.2. The nature of the political debate on the Swedish welfare 
system: retaining the universalistic system 
 The takeover of the bourgeois coalition in 1991 meant that the 
advocates of private arrangements – the liberals, represented by the Liberal 
Party, and the neocons, represented by the Moderate Party, had the 
opportunity to establish a system shift intended to gradually replace the 
PAYG system, which was supported and introduced by the Social 
Democrats. 
 Apart from the consensual and neocorporatist tradition in the Swedish 
political system, there were a couple of factors, which led the bourgeois 
government to prefer an all-party agreement. Firstly, the structure of welfare 
arrangements was the major obstacle to this kind of agreement because it 
prevented far-reaching changes to the existing arrangements. The pension 
system was a typical arrangement in which previous institutional choices 
limited the space for decision-makers to adopt such far-reaching changes
302
. 
 The initiative to establish an all-party working group was partly due to 
the need of sharing the responsibilities of retrenchment, a burden for both 
political blocks. Apart from this, the Swedish political establishment had, 
over a long period of time, developed a consensual mode of decision-
making which had resulted in a welfare system and which was supported by 
virtually all political actors. In this vein, the policy of retrenchment should 
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not endanger programs, which would cause the protest of large groups 
within society, within particular target groups such as the middle class, the 
age groups and the pensioners. In the case of pension reform, it should not 
threaten the interests of those who already were of pensionable age or would 
reach the pension age in the near future
303
. Drastic changes in the benefit 
system, for instance in the pension system, would make the powerful 
interest organizations such as the PRO Pensionaerernas Riks Organisationen 
Central Retirees Organizations. With the support of hundreds of thousands 
of pensioners who were dependent on public pensions, the organization was 
in a position to position to stop every attempt, which would jeopardize the 
existing universal pension program. 
 Apart from the consensual tradition in the Swedish political system, 
there were other factors, which were crucial to the bourgeois government‘s 
ambition for an all-party agreement. Firstly, the structure of welfare 
arrangements was the major obstacle because it would prevent far-reaching 
changes to the existing arrangements. The pension system was a typical 
arrangement in which previous institutional choices limited the space for 
decision makers to adopt such far-reaching changes. As old-age pension was 
based on a PAYG system in which current employees‘ contribution financed 
the previous generation‘s pensions, the political establishment would have 
limited options for making essential changes to the system. Therefore, every 
one-sided attempt by the bourgeois parties to shift from public funded to 
privately-funded arrangements were bound to face institutional problems.  
 Apart from those areas of the Swedish welfare system which this 
study has explored, other studies, which comprehensively examined the 
development of the Swedish welfare system also came to the conclusion that 
despite some changes in different arrangements the essential parts of the 
system are still intact. However, the study stressed that the living conditions 
in Sweden have experienced some crucial changes and that the share of 
people who suffer from different kinds of misfortune resulting from the 
changes in the economic conditions, has increased
304
. Rapid increases in the 
unemployment rate are considered to be the major root of the problems
305
. 
Beyond that, the deterioration of conditions for the labor force meant 
growing mental stresses caused by the decrease in labor market security. 
More people were wrestling with economic problems and lower income 
levels, which increased their long-term dependency on social allowances
306
. 
 The balance sheet has also pointed to some improvements, some of 
which occurred during the 1990s. The most important one is the rapid 
increase in wage levels, which rose faster than in the earlier decades
307
. 
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Among other improvements were increasing literacy rates and decreasing 
mortality – especially infant mortality. In other significant areas, such as the 
population‘s disposable income, the figure rose to the same level as it was in 
1990. Differences in class and gender were another issue, which has not 
changed particularly during the period. However, by widening wage 
differences between the public and private sector, one could argue that the 
economic situation for women, who were over-represented in the public 
sector, worsened. According to the balance sheet, as the number of 
redundancies in the public sector increased, so the number of employees in 
the public services had to be increased. 
 Three groups are pointed out as the major victims of the economic 
crisis of the 1990s. Single mothers – who were increasingly dependent on 
different kinds of social contributions, non-Nordic ethnic minorities and 
young people had great difficulties entering into the labor market
308
. Apart 
from these three groups, the balance sheet put the emphasis on children and 
families as other victims of the 1990s who needed some additional support 
from the welfare system to avoid the property trap. Despite the fact that, 
during the 1990s, long-term poverty has increased, in Sweden, the measures 
taken by the strong welfare system in supporting these vulnerable groups 
saved them from declining further into poverty. 
 Futhermore, the balance sheet emphasizes on the resilience 
characteristic of different benefits, which decreased when the economic 
conditions deteriorated and went up when the crisis was overcome – 
although not to the same level at which they had previously stood. In other 
aspects, the sheet also stresses some changes in the institution of welfare, 
which diverged from the historical pattern. At the beginning of the period, a 
process of decentralization in the provision of welfare services started, but it 
did not last. In the second half of the period, once again, the state‘s role was 
increased by certain initiatives, which aimed at adjusting the increasing 
differences among the municipalities. The second significant divergence in 
welfare institutions was a tendency towards privatization in the delivery of 
services within a framework of public financing
309
. Although, during the 
period, private initiatives increased in most of service areas, the changes 
have been modest and by the end of the 1990s, the majority of the services 
were still provided by the public sector. 
 Overall, the balance sheet stressed some structural changes, which 
have occurred in the Swedish society, which are likely to have a crucial 
impact on the future of the welfare system. The first change is the 
demographic change, which is caused by both falling patterns of fertility and 
the ageing of the population, has markedly changed the composition of the 
population in Sweden. The second change is the labor market change, which 
entailed the emergence of new forms of production, mainly in high-
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technology areas, which are in the process of replacing more traditional 
industries
310
. This transformation is clearly in the direction of de-
industrialization since the companies have called for greater deregulation in 
the economy to facilitate the mobility of both capital and parts of 
production. Apart from the two major structural changes, which are a 
resource of both endogenous and exogenous factors, the verdict of the senior 
members of the Committee, which provided ‗the balance sheet for Swedish 
welfare during the 1990s‘ was that, despite the crisis of the 1990s, the 
Swedish welfare system remains intact regardless of contrary tendencies. 
The judgement about the high standard of the system was based on some 
important features. The first feature is that unemployment and sickness 
insurance are still high despite the decrease in different benefits replacement 
rates. The duration of eligibility in the above mentioned benefits makes the 
Swedish system so distinct since most other countries have only upper 
limits. However, while 80 percent income replacement seems still high, 
these benefits are taxable
311
. Secondly, as a result of the extensive use of 
income-supplement programs, the coverage of the main social protection 
programs among the working-age population is much higher than in most 
other OECD countries. Thirdly, the Swedish labor market is workforce-
friendly because rigid employment protection and industrial relations 
legislation. The system has also a double safety net because it secures both 
income and jobs. However, the generosity of the social system, in the matter 
of job security, had had a negative impact on the flexibility of Swedish 
multinational enterprises and on their international competitiveness.  
 According to OECD
312
, while reforms to the insurance system 
undertaken during the 1990s have rendered it more sustainable, the 
eligibility criteria for different benefits are still very generous, which 
confers instability and disincentive effects to the system in the long run. The 
social insurance system in Sweden is institutional as it belongs to the 
category of ‗universal welfare model‘ according to Esping Andersen welfare 
typology
313
. Therefore, regardless of the citizens‘ contribution, they are all 
eligible for some of the major benefits (health, education), which leads to 
the impossibility for the government to rise social expenditure without 
increasing tax levels. Even in the case of unemployment insurance 
premiums, which are paid by the workers, the mechanism is based on a 
given level of unemployment.  
  However, any changes from a certain level have to be financed by the 
government. Therefore, OECD economists
314
 believe that a stronger link 
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between social insurance expenditure, employee and employers contribution 
has to be established. These having been said, the question is whether the 
alterations to the system purport that the Swedish welfare regime has indeed 
changed to a less institutionalized version of the post-war welfare system or 
whether it is simply left unchanged, ‗frozen‘ in its traditional post-war form. 
Analysts
315
 noticed that the level of cash benefits has decreased and that 
there have been cuts in most of the welfare services. Also, there have been 
some serious attempts towards decentralization and privatization of welfare 
services. However, comparing the actual changes that occurred during the 
period with the amount of pressure generated by economic problems, one 
could conclude that the system has remained largely intact. According to 
Esping-Andersen (2001)
316
, if the Swedish crisis had occurred in central 
European countries, the outcome would have been harrowing. By contrast, 
the Swedish social-economic system is constituted by strong institutions, 
which can resist pressure caused by both economic crisis and other changes 
that threaten its foundations. Despite a weakening base of political support 
for the system through the weak support to the SAP Social Democratic Party 
in the elections in 1991 and 1998 elections, the weakening base of organized 
labor, welfare institutions have yet survived relatively intact
317
. 
 Analysis of the changes in Swedish welfare arrangements in the 1990s 
implies they had a programmatic rather than a systemic character - meaning 
that the level of benefits were subject to changes, rather than the nature of 
benefits themselves. The only exception is the pension system, which 
experienced far-reaching changes. Also, in the case of services, the 
qualitative change of service provision – such as the liberalization and 
privatization in the delivery of services – was quite limited and the 
framework of public financing has never been questioned. Moreover, the 
distributive characteristics of the welfare system and its legitimacy are still 
strong
318
. While the means to achieve the goals of the welfare system have 
changed in certain respects, these goals, as an institution, remain intact. 
Further, the impact of globalization has been less marked than might have 
been imagined. Strong political commitment and strong civil society, with 
social movements as their major agents, prevented radical changes in both 
replacement rates and provision of services. 
 As the welfare state is mainly a social democratic project, historically 
supported by social democratic and political movements (trade unions, 
social democratic parties and acquiescent businesses), its future is equally 
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mainly dependent on the strength and support of the existing power 
resources such as the public and political establishment and the labor 
movement. Therefore, the existing attitudes of the key social and political 
groups towards the functioning and development of the universalistic 
welfare state should be mapped out in order to explain its demise. 
 Contemporary debates about the Swedish welfare system are clearly 
related to the key challenges, which have threatened its universal character. 
In this regard, internal factors such as demographic challenges and external 
factors - caused by the process of economic globalization, have received 
most attention. However, it is important to treat the structural and 
institutional threats to the continuity of the system. These challenges come 
mainly from rising uncertainty among certain social and political actors 
who, in the era of welfare state expansion, supported the process, but who, 
in an era of crisis, harbor doubts about the system‘s capacity to survive and 
advocate structural changes to the system.  
 Apart from cuts in general welfare spending and different kinds of 
benefits, the advocates of structural change suggest far-reaching changes in 
the delivery of public services, which involve far-reaching privatizations. 
Bearing in mind that in the Social Democratic welfare system, public 
delivery of services was the bedrock foundation of the system, the 
privatization issue had had a crucial impact on the system‘s future. 
However, despite some privatization initiatives, changes in this area have 
been modest and the major part of service provision continues to be in the 
hands of the public sector.  
 The strong political consensus between the Social Democrats and the 
non-socialist parties about the foundation of the generous welfare system 
has become fragile. Likewise, the historical compromise between the labor 
movement and the federation of employers has been virtually forgotten. 
Furthermore, among scholars, most Swedish economists have seriously 
questioned the inexorably rising welfare expenditure without paying 
attention to the importance of the system‘s legitimacy. In discussing the 
future of the welfare state, the economists tend to emphasize economic 
rather than social factors. On the contrary, some authors argue the real 
threats against the universal welfare model seem to come from changing 
attitudes towards the redistributive welfare system rather than from 
economic problems or demographic changes. 
 However, despite rising criticisms of welfare universalism by leading 
economists, which led to growing uncertainty among political and academic 
elites, other factors have favored continuity. Public support for the generous 
welfare system remained quite strong throughout the decade of crisis. In the 
political sphere, despite frequent calls for changes from the neo-liberal 
intelligentsia and some doubts voiced by the Social Democratic 
‗modernizers‘, the leftist bloc retained the necessary strength in the political 
arena to continue its universal welfare policy. Moreover, the strong 
institutions, which have been created by the welfare system, came to its aid. 
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The system has effectively resisted any attempts to change made by the non-
socialist governments such as the far-reaching privatization of public 
services.  
 There are four main crucial issues which are likely to influence the 
future of the Swedish welfare regime: first, the state of the political support 
for the SAP Social Democratic Party as the architects of the universalist 
welfare model; second, the future of the ‗neo-corporatist‘ arrangements and 
the strength of the labor movement and unions; third, the legitimacy of the 
welfare state and the public support of the welfare state; fourth, the impact 
of the entrance of private competition into service delivery on the role of the 
public sector. During the expansion of the welfare system and subsequently 
during the ‗Golden Age‘, political stability, the stability of the labor market 
and the stability of central and local institutions in administering social 
policy and delivering services were crucial. For as long as the essential 
characteristics of these institutions are still the same as before, the system – 
from an institutional point of view – will survive. 
   
3.3. The wavering political support for the welfare state - within 
wide public and within the SAP 
 The stable political situation maintained by the long-standing political 
domination of the Social Democrats is probably the major characteristic of 
the Swedish welfare system. Apart from the presence of a strong labor party 
in power, the consistency of Swedish politics had to do with the consensus, 
which was established among political parties about the crucial elements of 
social policy. As a result, all political parties have shown loyalty to the 
introduction of progressive income taxation, which made it possible to 
introduce social legislation. One of the reasons behind such political 
consensus was the Swedish election system, which is a pluralistic system 
and did not allow for one-party governmental dominance but for 
governmental coalition
319
. Since almost all Social Democratic governments 
were in minority and needed compromise to get support from some ‗middle‘ 
parties (either the Centre or the Liberal Party), they were compelled to 
compromise about each policy to win a parliamentary majority
320
. 
Accordingly, a kind of consensus has been developed, which covered tax 
policy and tax-financed social protection through redistributive social 
policy.  
 However, the need for compromise has not stopped the Social 
Democrats from expanding the redistributive welfare system, but it provided 
a base on which they could reach sustainable agreements with the middle 
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parties about a range of economic and labor market issues. As a result of 
such sustainable compromises, the Swedish welfare state was marked by 
considerable stability.  
 Concerning political support for the welfare state, it must be said that 
electoral apathy is absent in Sweden. Participation in elections has remained 
high and stable even during the recession. Comparatively, on a European 
comparative scale, the swedes‘ attitudes towards their welfare system is 
highly positive. In a 1983 survey among Western European nations, 62 
percent of the young Swedes answered they took pride in their country‘s 
social welfare system as compared to 42 percent in the UK, 31 percent in 
Germany and 23 percent in Switzerland.  
 Characteristic for all the reported time-series on welfare attitudes, i.e. 
opinion polls on welfare attitudes, is that people seem to be slightly less 
satisfied with the workings of the welfare state in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. However, the election survey emphasize that the waiting days in 
sickness insurance were crucial for the Social Democratic victory in 1982. 
Overall, the relative stability in opinions expressed over the years is 
palpable. Although not the only aspect of such a far-reaching concept, this 
might indicate that the crisis of legitimacy either does not exist or is not a 
new phenomenon. 
 In mapping out the future direction of the Swedish welfare system, 
one should focus on the political parties‘ perception about the future 
development of the political system. One of the most striking features of the 
Swedish social democracy is that the party, i.e. the SAP, has been successful 
in keeping the unity among different sections and groups within the Social 
Democratic movement. On one hand, there has been a strong labor union 
with advanced redistributive demands and on the other hand, a large middle 
class with various interests. The Social Democratic Party, which for this 
reason should be regarded as a ‗political front‘ consisting of groups with 
conflicting demands, could survive the past two decades of political changes 
with relatively limited internal conflicts. However, the two major factions 
responded differently to the process of change.  
 While the traditionalists have had a more defensive approach to calls 
for change, the modernizers seemed to have had the role of ‗new thinkers‘ 
who have intended to design both the ideological shift in the perception of 
the ‗strong welfare state‘ and also to design the adaptation of the welfare 
state to the new social and political order. 
 
3.4. Public attitudes towards the welfare system 
 Although the problems caused by endogenous and exogenous factors 
tended to erode the support of the employers for the welfare state, the 
support of the other actors – such as the trade unions and political parties in 
the left-wing bloc to the welfare system, is still intact. This leads to the 
conclusion that democratic institutions, which are highly anxious about the 
public opinion, cannot deviate from the dominating standpoints among the 
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public concerning the welfare state. Democratic wisdom seems to suggest 
that short-term changes – caused, among others, by economic crises – may 
legitimize periodic retrenchments. However, suggestions for profound 
institutional changes are likely to be rejected by those who benefit from the 
system. In other words, the long-term trends in public opinion, which occur 
over decades and are in favor of the welfare state, are critical
321
. The more 
social groups are dependent on the benefits and services provided by the 
system, the more widespread the reactions to the changes will be
322
. 
 Public opinion is not united in supporting the welfare state. Different 
social groups hold different views about social policy arrangements. 
Although the labor movement was the major driving force of the welfare 
system and initially defended the interest of the people who suffered most 
from the risks connected to the market economy, it soon realized that the 
continuity of the system needed a broader support. The advocates of welfare 
in Nordic countries were therefore keen to develop a system based on far-
reaching consensus among the key political forces. Apart from social 
classes, the Nordic welfare states – by initiating women-friendly policies, 
which increasingly integrated women in the labor market and thereby 
provided full citizenship status for Scandinavian women – also widened 
social support for welfare to the maximum
323
.  
 Therefore, the Swedish welfare state has, since its formation, aimed to 
provide a broadly accepted and legitimate framework for the extension of 
social justice. For the Social Democratic Party and labor unions – as the 
main architects of the system, only the institutionalization of the welfare 
system could secure a considerable degree of ‗social justice‘. This is 
because, from the very beginning, these bodies pursued the 
institutionalization of welfare reforms.   The real aims of the institutional 
parameters were security, decommodification, labor training, mobilization 
and redistribution of resources. 
 Citizen welfare has been provided by certain key features of the 
system such as high replacement rates for most transfers, liberal qualifying 
conditions for benefits, the broad scope of citizenship rights, 
comprehensiveness and service intensity. Because of the emphasis on 
‗decommodification‘, the basis for entitlements to income or publicly 
provided goods in the Swedish welfare system has been citizenship status 
rather than market participation or market position. These measures 
constitute the system‘s source of legitimacy because they have been viewed 
as the central means of achieving the essential goal of the welfare system – 
distributive justice. Considering that such a goal has been achieved by the 
state‘s active intervention in the distribution of social and economic welfare, 
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state interference has also been legitimized as the guarantor of continuity in 
welfare provision
324
. 
 
3.5. Legitimacy concerns over high spending and taxing levels in 
the ‗nanny-state‘  
 Based on long-term development of welfare state legitimacy, the 
argument is that the support of the public opinion to the system has been 
crucial to the continuity of the system. As long as support for the institutions 
of the system remains strong, the political actors avoid undertaking efforts 
of retrenchment lest they might clash with the will of the public. One of the 
major issues in the recent debates about the crisis of the Swedish welfare 
state has been the erosion of public support for the system. Ever since the 
late 1970s, critics of the system have argued that ambitious welfare policies 
and increased state expenditure will inevitably evoke resistance to the high-
taxing, high-spending state and thereby undermine support for a public 
welfare state
325
. Later in the 1990s, with increasing debates about ‗post-
modernism‘, others stressed the growth of middle-class life-styles – 
alongside increasing individualism – as the factors which tended to erode 
the support for the welfare state. Such resistance would cause a crisis of 
public legitimacy for the welfare system and change political priorities 
among the public. According to Musgrave (1990), Ingelhart (1990)
326
, along 
the post-materialism wave, the changing attitudes have clearly been 
recognized in the wave of tax reforms, which have swept over many western 
welfare states in the 1980s.  
 By contrast, this view was rejected by the advocates of the 
institutional approach
327
 who pointed out that the changing attitudes have 
occurred in residual welfare states, but not in universal welfare states such 
as the Scandinavian states, which are de-commodified because almost 
anybody had potentially the right to benefit from these welfare 
arrangements
328
. It is widely known that in Nordic universal welfare states – 
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including Sweden, public skepticism to taxes, which attain the highest level 
in the OECD, is lower than in countries with lower tax levels, which are not 
necessarily welfare states. However, after the 1980s, support for the welfare 
system decreased even in Sweden. There is not necessarily a connection 
between high taxes and decreasing support for the welfare state, but there 
undeniably is a relationship between economic competitiveness and high 
taxes. 
 One of the reasons for the decreasing support for state-based welfare 
was the negative effect of high social spending on the economy in the long 
run. Critics claim that welfare states based on an egalitarian ideology and 
financed by taxes collected by the state lead to decreased economic 
competitiveness and distortion in labor-market relations with negative 
effects such as low work incentives, hidden unemployment and weakened 
entrepreneurship
329
.  
 A second reason concerns the expansion of the welfare state and the 
conviction that the system has reached its ‗rational‘ limits. Likewise, it has 
been argued that the welfare state has succeeded in solving the problems it 
was originally created to deal with and therefore there is no immediate need 
for further expansion. Critics also focused on the financial aspects of the 
system and on high taxation. Prosperous middle class social groups with 
less obvious needs for welfare services, have experienced ambitious welfare 
policies as a heavy burden. Such dissatisfaction with such a costly system 
explains the trend of increasing discontent with taxation in Sweden. Several 
economists
330
 have described the growing tax burden – incurred by a huge 
public sector labor market rather than by the cash transfers of the welfare 
state as in other welfare cases – as the Achilles‘ heel of the system. In many 
Western welfare states, direct visible taxes, along with high-spending public 
services, have become the main targets of criticism for the growing anti-tax 
movement.  
 In the Swedish case, there is no empirical data based on popular 
attitudes towards taxation, which would prove the thesis that discontent with 
taxation in Sweden has risen. Nationally representative surveys conducted in 
Sweden between 1981 and 1997 show that, as Edlund (2000: 58) stated, ‗a 
long-term trend of increased dissatisfaction with taxation cannot be 
detected‘331. On the contrary, as Stenberg and Svallfors (1992)332 concluded 
during the 1980s, a majority of Swedes believed that taxes were not too high 
if balanced against the public benefits provided by the government. Between 
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1981 and 1991, the percentage of people who believed that the general level 
of taxes in Sweden was too high decreased from 82 to 59 percent. By the 
same token, the percentage of people who believed that marginal taxes were 
far too high decreased from 82 to 59 percent. Accordingly, one can conclude 
that discontent with taxation decreased considerably during this period. A 
survey of the late 1990s
333
 showed that tax discontent gradually increased 
thereafter, particularly between 1996 and 1997. The survey also revealed 
that increased discontent during the 1990s was related to changes in tax and 
welfare policy. Increasing tax levels in the second half of the 1990s, 
combined with cutbacks in welfare programs, aggravated the perception 
that, while public sector expenditures increased, public benefits provided by 
the government decreased
334
. 
 The Gini coefficient – the ratio which measures the distribution of the 
socio-economic inequalities for income or wealth – in Sweden is the lowest 
in the world, i.e. 0.23 within the interval from 0 to 1 [0,1], which represents 
the mean difference between two distinct households‘ income selected 
randomly from Sweden‘s population of roughly 9 million inhabitants. 
However, one should refrain from interpreting the value of the Gini 
coefficient as an effective measure of egalitarianism since the Gini 
coefficient, which measures wealth distribution is significantly higher in 
Sweden, with only 5% of the Swedish households holding 77% of the total 
share value owned by all the Swedish households. By the same token, in 
Sweden, there is an important difference between MNC multinational 
companies‘ economic performance and the small and medium enterprises. 
In the words of one Swedish politician, ‗What is good for Volvo is also good 
for Sweden‘.  
 The Social Democrats who, through the tax reform of 1989, won the 
support of professionals, managers and other high-income earners – after 
returning to power in 1994, increased the marginal tax rate for high-income 
earners believing this measure was the most efficient way to balance the 
budget. An additional 5 percent extra tax on income, which was added on 
top of the marginal income tax rate, was implemented. In addition, some 
changes in social spending were implemented to bring down budget costs. 
Cutbacks in replacement levels, stricter qualifying conditions and reduced 
social services were among such measures
335
. Apparently, these measures 
had an unsatisfactory impact on both high-income earners and low-status 
social strata. Whereas both groups were similar in their demands for lesser 
taxes, they differed in their concern over the distribution of taxes and tax 
progression. Not surprisingly, the working classes were better disposed 
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towards a progressive distribution of taxes. Knowing that both the working 
class and the middle class have benefited from welfare policies such as 
universalist social services, income-related policies and the commitment to 
full employment, their support for the progressive tax system is 
understandable. 
 Nevertheless, some scholars
336
 reject the notion that class divisions 
continue to have a decisive impact on the creation of identities and interests, 
particularly in view of the emerging process of post-industrialization and 
globalization. Accordingly, attitudes to taxation manifested themselves in 
patterns of consumption and value-commitments. It follows that identities 
and interests are no longer structurally determined either. Others
337
 take a 
different view and argue that attitudes towards tax increases and cutbacks in 
the welfare programs continue to be determined by class.  
 Compared with the lower social strata, higher income earners - such as 
high-level salaried employees and the self-employed, disapprove of 
progressive taxation more strongly. Nevertheless, the eroding support for 
the welfare state seems to have been a result of increased dissatisfaction 
with the level of benefits and the quality of services received for the taxes 
paid
338
. The stress on the inefficient allocation and organization of social 
services by right-wing parties seemed to have had a particular impact on the 
growing discontentment about tax levels. Despite the fact that Sweden has 
the highest tax rates in the world, which go mostly for financing the public 
health sector, the aid to unemployment, labor reinsertion training and life-
long learning programs, the provision of these services in the country has 
been heavily criticized
339
. Another major criticism launched by the right was 
concerned with the negative impact of taxation on unemployment. In a 
situation of continuing high unemployment, the argument that reduced taxes 
would provide new jobs could gain a degree of support among citizens
340
. 
 Despite the emphasis on an increasing public discontentment with 
high taxation and growing critical views about the social services provided 
by the welfare system, the reduced level of benefits, several scholars
341
 
reject the suggestion that public support for the welfare state has declined. 
On the contrary, they emphasize the strong support for the welfare state in 
terms of service delivery, financing and social spending during the 1990s, 
which not only decreased, but in some instances has slightly increased.  
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 Meanwhile, it is certain that support for the system has decreased 
among high-income earners. Suggestions also stress that if further cutbacks 
in the welfare state transform the system towards a less ambitious and less 
universalistic welfare model, the public support for the system would 
decrease among larger groups of citizens. To continue to retain strong public 
support for the welfare state, the architects of the welfare system need to 
convince middle class voters to continue their support. The leaders of the 
two main left parties
342
 declared that by keeping the universal characteristics 
of the Swedish system, they intended to encourage the middle class to 
continue to support the generous welfare arrangements
343
. Even the liberal 
leader, Lars Lejonborg defended the universal welfare policy and generous 
replacement rates. The only major difference with the Social Democrats was 
the Liberals‘ greater concern to introduce the private insurance system as a 
complement to the existing welfare arrangements
344
. 
 Summarizing, recent studies have not found any ‗declining long term 
trend in support for the welfare system‘ (in the Nordic countries)345. 
Although the willingness of the growing affluent middle-class to finance 
social spending might have lessened, this loss of support has also been 
observed in countries with residual welfare states in which only the poorer 
groups are the beneficiaries. While the Nordic systems provide benefits to 
everyone, protests at high tax rates are far lower in these countries than in 
the ‗liberal‘ regimes. In Sweden, criticism of the welfare system seems 
mainly to have been a result of increased dissatisfaction with the level of 
benefits and quality of the services received for the taxes paid. As a result, 
in the early 1990s, the right-wing government started a process of 
privatization in the delivery of services, which was crucial for the future of 
the universal welfare model. 
 In the beginning of the 1990s, municipalities and county councils have 
contracted out a part of the provision of public services to private 
companies. Education and care were the two main areas, which were 
affected by the new policy. For the bourgeois coalition who designed the 
privatization of public service production, the change had an ideological 
basis, in addition to being the proposed solution to the strained economic 
circumstances. However, provision of public welfare by providers other 
than the public sector was by no means a new phenomenon in Sweden. The 
informal care of children and other dependants, unions‘ administration of 
unemployment insurance, the recreational and educational services, the 
voluntary organizations supported by public money – to help women, 
children, refuges and other social groups – have been among such 
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initiatives. Housing is another example which, ‗more than any other 
provider sector suggested that a ‘mixed economy’ prevailed, albeit heavily 
regulated and subsidized by the state‘346.   
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1. Introduction.  
1.1. The environment and national private interest aggregation 
(Hypotheses formulation) 
1.2. The environment as a foreign policy issue 
1.3. Neo-corporatism and policy networks 
1.4. The (foreign) policy effects of neocorporatism. Implications 
for Swedish diplomacy  
 
1.1. The environment and national private interest aggregation 
(Hypotheses formulation) 
   Hypothesis 2 The SAP and the SAP-led government triggered 
Swedish environmental activism and leadership by promoting ever higher 
environmental standards in the UN and EU
347
 as the best way to increase the 
international competitiveness of the Swedish industry in accordance with 
corporate interests. The business or corporate interests were only interested 
into securing the competitiveness of their industries abroad (i.e. in 
international trade) as well as into Swedish participation in the SEM and 
EMU. The ‘other interests‘ were not opposed but sympathetic towards high 
environmental standards, supporting both the business and the government; 
they simply followed, but they were not active since the beginning. 
However, these ‗other‘ interests were always locked in neocorporatist 
practices at home. What I try to prove in this chapter is that business 
agreement on high environmental standards firstly endorsed by the SD 
government has been the modality through which they – the business – 
managed to secure international competitiveness, Swedish accession to the 
EU and subsequent participation to the SEM. 
   The ‗interest‘ variable is maybe the most conspicuous indicator of 
neofunctionalism as it is a theoretical approach which relies upon 
conceptualizing the interests of participating actors through the idea of 
functional, political and cultivated ‗spillover‘348. Moreover, what 
neofunctionalism implies is that spillover is largely promoted by 
supranational elites and interest groups. In the Swedish case, ‗interests‘ 
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represent the backbone of Swedish neo-corporatist democracy and they lie 
at the basis of any attempt to study ‗private interest government‘. Therefore 
there is no accident that, in the Swedish case, several authors have outlined 
the potential of neofunctionalism
349
 since it best captures the pre-accession 
dynamics whereby the national interests at stake were pushing ahead with 
the integration process. However, before proceeding to analyze the role of 
private interests in the Swedish environmental buildup, some distinctions 
need to be made.   
   First, there are mainly two periods of environmental developments 
which characterize Swedish involvement in shaping the environmental 
agenda: the UN period, i.e. the period before EU accession, and the EU 
period, from 1995 on. The UN period is marked by incrementalism and 
progressive adaptation to the political and economic demands of a rapidly 
changing world environment
350
.  The Swedish diplomacy reacted promptly 
at the acid rain threat and set the UN acidification agenda accordingly. The 
novelty and ‗incidentality‘ of the situation triggered the unilateral initiative 
of the government and its outward tool of conflict resolution - diplomacy
351
. 
However, later in the UN stage, ‗corporate‘ gradually acquired a ‗voice‘ and 
a weighty one in the process, too. At the end of the UN stage, the ‗entente 
cordiale‘ or the golden environmental triangle functioned at a double level: 
on one hand, between the Industriefoerbundet and the socialist government, 
and on the other hand, between Industriefoerbundet and labour
352
.     
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   Secondly, the distinction between ‗interests‘ is paramount and it must 
be highlighted in a way which does not leave any unnecessary 
misapprehensions. The ‗other‘ interests, namely the labor and the public 
interests were
353
 instrumental in creating consensus over the right 
environmental strategies to adopt. The impact of the labor interests was 
mitigated because of the chasm created within the trade union bloc between 
LO and the TCO-SACO, the employees‘ union, over the issue of EU 
integration and the subsequent lowering of Swedish environmental 
standards. What was certain and there were enough warnings – in the 
political debates – was the fact that environmental issues triggered non-
negligeable economic side-effects such as readjustment and unemployment.  
   Thirdly, the distinction between the different environmental issues is 
paramount in order to identify the linkages between EU integration, SEM 
and EMU, on one hand, and welfare issues, on the other hand. In the next 
chapter, I am going to treat at length the relationship between environment 
and welfare state, on one hand, and between environment and the SAP, on 
the other. This chapter is focused on the relationship between corporate 
interests and governmental environmental policies. The triangle 
government-environment-corporate is analyzed from the point of view of 
their political implications for the welfare system, the backbone of the social 
democrat ‗folkhemmet‘. 
   All these actors (comprising the business Industriefoerbundet, the 
media, the public, the ENGO environmental non-governmental 
organizations, etc.) shaped the internal policy forum and were paramount in 
funneling ‗enabling conditions‘354, that is the consensus behind Swedish 
environmental actions. The reasons for the unanimity behind the 
environmental cause pertain entirely to the economic neocorporatism which 
functioned in Sweden till the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, the environmental 
‗variable‘, when it first appeared at the beginning of the 1970s with the acid 
rains in Northern Europe, immediately triggered governmental responses. 
The role of the ‗other‘ interests and of the corporate interests, is still unclear 
at the debut of the whole environmental ‗affair‘. What is certain is that 
environmental pollution triggered the immediate response of the Swedish 
government and the organization of an international conference. By 
consequence, at the beginning, there were only the governmental interest 
and the national interest, which reacted to the environmental challenge, a 
fact which makes difficult to claim that Swedish environmental leadership is 
a case which can be proved only by neofunctionalism. However, while it is 
true that early Swedish UN environmental leadership is a classic example of 
intergovernmentalism, it is equally true that this initial governmental 
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leadership becomes a sort of neofunctionalist ‗spillover‘ with Swedish EU 
membership. 
 Apparently, at the beginning of the UN period, there was only 
governmental action and diplomatic representation in the UN fora in a truly 
intergovernmental manner. However, in the long-run, 20 twenty years after, 
the business interests became more and more prominent to the extent that 
‗business‘ played a pivotal role in the second period, the EU period. It is 
certain that ‗business‘ has always enjoyed a privileged relationship with the 
government in the sense that business‘ priorities  
 Thereupon, given the increased public environmental support in the 
Swedish society, it is not surprising that the government adopted a pro-
active environmental attitude at both domestic and international levels, 
which finally built into environmental leadership. But, how can the national 
interest decompose itself into a plurality of autonomous interests activated 
by different groups, apparently aloof from each other? How could there one 
explain an aggregation of opposing interests in a neo-corporatist state? Can 
these interests be aggregated into one coherent national interest? Which 
would be the role of the party system – particularly the social democratic 
one – in the aggregation of such interests? These are the questions this 
research attempts to answer. If welfare provision (environmental 
prioritizing) through neo-corporatism and EPL environmental policy 
leadership was the adequate answer and if it was an ex-nihilo social 
democratic tactics and initiative (it only belongs to the Swedish Social 
Democrats), then further research is needed into the Swedish electoral 
‗market‘ and its possible outcomes.  
 In articulating the thesis of the national interest as a function of the 
corporatist interest – as opposed to grassroots‘ interest, I partially base 
myself on the study undertaken by Crepaz Markus M.L.
355
 He successfully 
launches an explanation of environmental performance as a function of 
corporatist institutions. Crepaz (2006) argues that, independently of the 
policy field, it is the specific institutional arrangement of corporatism which 
explains the success of corporatist policy making. The goal oriented 
character of corporatism, combined with its accommodative policy style and 
the encompassing manner in which interests are activated – through peak 
associations – are the ingredients which explain the successes of neo-
corporatism in the macroeconomic field in the 1970s and 1980s. Crepaz 
asks why should that same institutional structure not be able to score similar 
successes in the field of environmental politics? Given the fact that 
environmental issues are ultimately economic problems, why should the 
tremendous expertise which corporatist countries have accumulated in 
guiding the economy, not be applied into backing environmental problems? 
 Crepaz gives precisely a generic definition of corporatism and 
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139-168. 
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underlines the fact that corporatist policy making cannot happen 
independently of the particular policy field. What Crepaz left out of his 
analysis, the comparative analysis among different policy fields, is 
addressed here at large comparing environmental policy with trade policy. 
Does then Crepaz‘s theoretical argument still apply for the particular case of 
environmental policy? I argue that it does since SEPL climax is based on a 
careful neo-corporatist settlement between business and government in a 
way which does not leave out ‗labor interests’. Since the aim of this 
research is to explain the transformation of a political party structure as a 
result of a change in the national interest – that is the overlapping of the 
domestic and international spheres (Putnam) in the particular case of 
addressing international environmental issues within the framework of 
national environmental policy
356
. 
 The EU period subsequently analyzed here (i.e. the period which 
followed the first UNCHD Conference on Environment) is, unlike the UN 
period, marked by the 1990s acceleration of environmental threats yielded 
by carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and other noxious pollutants. If the UN 
period can be characterized as mainly intergovernmental, the EU period is 
marked by both accrued intergovernmentalism – through inter-governmental 
bargaining – and neofunctionalism – at the Commission level via interest 
group lobbying. 
 
1.2. The environment as a foreign policy issue  
 SEPL Swedish Environmental Policy Leadership defines Swedish 
active role in the international and regional environmental cooperation 
based on governmental and societal (i.e. neocorporatist in this particular 
case) practices and initiatives to coarse other countries - the international 
community – into taking environmental problems seriously by adopting 
similar legislation – i.e. on the power of the own example by constant 
engagement in international issues which had become a kind of Swedish 
foreign policy style. SEPL is synonymous with ‗soft power‘357 used as a 
strategy to influence more powerful actors on the world stage. In other 
words, this ‗power‘ represents the ability to persuade other states to trust its 
analysis, valuation and causal interpretation of an issue or threat. This type 
of ‗ability‘ has subsequently developed into a kind of Swedish ‗soft power‘ 
characteristic whereby Sweden is able to exert a perhaps disproportional 
                                                 
356
 When treating one particular case of a national state policy, it is important to define what 
the national interest is and to what extent does it affect the national environmental behavior 
over particular issues such as GCC Climate Change, chemical pollution and air policy – 
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strategy in foreign policy as a leader of environmental causes and advocate of the 
‗peaceful‘ resolution of conflicts. 
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amount of influence and persuade other actors to trust its analysis, valuation 
and causal interpretation of an issue or threat. 
 Alternatively, SEPL as ‗soft power‘ can be defined as a measure of the 
expectations the international community has regarding the type of policy 
the Swedish diplomacy would advocate or support. Soft power designates 
‗power‘ as ‗normative influence‘ based on norm creation and ideas 
propagation
358
. As noted by Kronsell
359
, Sweden‘s success in international 
environmental negotiations is a result of norm-based supremacy through 
four main channels or avenues of influence: forecasting the expectations of 
other states regarding the type of policy Sweden will advocate, knowledge 
of environmental processes (scientifically and implementation wise), 
expertise with environmental management at the national level
360
. These 
factors of normative influence cannot be disentangled from domestic policy 
experiences and repertoires like there is not possible to discard the state and 
societal level of analysis from an explanation of SEPL. That is why 
Putnam‘s two-level analysis is going to provide the effective theoretical 
basis for a systemic characterization of SEPL.  
 Echoes of neo-institutionalism and sociological constructivism 
reverberate when considering Swedish avenues of normative influence. In 
other words, Sweden‘s power of influence in environmental affairs stems 
out of the deliberate efforts to directly or indirectly improve and enhance the 
norms of the international community. While attempting to directly 
influence the norms of the larger world community is one route to follow, 
the potential for Sweden‘s global influence is enhanced once the larger 
international - EU and UN - community adopts a Swedish policy input or a 
compromise policy based on Swedish national laws. To exemplify, in 
international debates on environment, Sweden is frequently able to exert 
enough influence drawing upon its progressive record in the environmental 
domain, which is fostered by its domestic implementation efficiency
361
. 
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Barkdull and Harris (2002) propose a framework typology that highlights a variety of 
potentially important variables in the shaping of foreign policies in particular circumstances 
related to addressing international environmental issues. The authors note that most 
theoretical approaches to foreign policy are of three major types based on the explanatory 
forces they emphasize: systemic, societal or state-centric. Systemic approaches argue that 
foreign policy stems from the role, identity or interests given to the state by systemic 
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 They direct our attention to the structural characteristics of 
international relations, showing that states may ‘arrive at their roles, 
identities, and national interests as a consequence of the regional or global 
configurations of power or as a consequence of ideas. Systemic theory is 
distinct in that it does not attribute outcomes to factors such as domestic 
politics and institutions’362. Consequently, this type of approach to EFP 
would divert the focus away from bureaucracy, public opinion and interest 
groups, pointing instead to, for example, ‗environmental hegemons‘ like the 
US in largely determining environmental policy, even in Europe. 
 Societal theories point to the preferences of domestic actors, which 
are translated into policies adopted and implemented by the government. 
From this perspective, explanations for foreign policy ‘are found in the 
ongoing struggle for influence among domestic societal forces or political 
groups’363. This aproach might suggest that governments do not 
independently decide EFP; they are instead neutral or passive arbiters of 
policy struggles, or perhaps merely fragmented arenas for bargaining over 
policy. The international arena might be viewed as merely a venue for the 
expression of policies determined by society. Societal theories suggest that 
the forces shaping Europe‘s environmental policies are found within 
European societies – among elites, interest groups, social movements and 
public sentiments – not within the government of a member state or in 
international distributions of power
364
. 
 Alternatively, state-centric approaches suggest that foreign policy is 
shaped by the structure of government and the individuals and agencies that 
promulgate and implement foreign policies on its behalf, often with an 
emphasis ‘on the goal-oriented behavior of politicians and civil servants as 
they respond to internal and external constraints in an effort to manipulate 
policy outcomes in accordance with their preferences’365. State-centric 
approaches often discount the importance of societal actors and forces in 
shaping foreign policy, instead placing a premium on the influence of 
institutions or the focus of top policy-makers on promoting the national 
interest. ‗The general message of this perspective‘366, ‗is that the state can 
act independently of societal interests‘, and ‘foreign policy outcomes cannot 
be read off from the structure of the international system, however defined’. 
Alternatively, the structure of the state, such as the distribution of power 
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between executive and legislative branches of government, or the workings 
and influence of bureaucratic agencies, largely determine foreign policy. 
Thus, one might say that European policies – and especially European 
environmental policy – derive not from public pressure or international 
forces but instead from perceptions of threats to national interests by 
leaders, pressure from legislatures on policy-makers, or the degree to which 
environmental issues are important to bureaucratic actors. In the latter case, 
the influence of environmental and foreign ministries, and the European 
Commission, deserve attention. 
 However, norms are limited even if they have a qualitative character 
and reflect beliefs, understandings and perceptions. In the Barkdull&Harris 
framework typology
367
, the systemic and state-centric approaches combine 
to underline the role of norms and ideas in a manner that emphasizes the 
Swedish actors‘ knowledge of the environmental processes and the expertise 
of environmental management at the national and regional level
368
. To 
exemplify, Kronsell‘s normative factors can be geared to fit the state-centric 
approach since these factors were present in all the environmental lobbying 
instances where Sweden was successful – with the only exception of the 
GCC. The systemic approach only helps in combination with the state 
approach when analyzing the impact of norms and ideas in EFP. The 
systemic approach privileges ‗power‘ in the old neo-realist perspective and 
treats the relationship between SEPL - understood as ‗power‘ – and norms 
and ideas from a structuralist point of view, i.e. showing that states may 
‗arrive at their roles, identities and national interests as a consequence of 
the regional configuration of power or as a consequence of ideas‘369. 
 In this sense, ideas are reified to contribute to the ‗social construction 
of EFP‘. Ideas can direct international actors toward new ways to pursue 
their ‗interests‘ whether unilaterally or multilaterally. From this 
‗constructivist‘ perspective, material interests and power may have limited 
influence compared to even more influential identities that the international 
system generates for global actors. If Swedish foreign policy and 
international agreements are socially construed, then material interests and 
power may have limited influence compared to even more influential 
identities that the international system generates for global actors
370
.  
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 No single or even type of theory is necessarily best for explaining and 
understanding SEPL in all circumstances. Indeed, approaches might suitably 
be combined to arrive at the richest explanation for policy. Rather, for an 
understanding of the Swedish state‘s actions in response to societal 
pressures, one must turn to the state level of analysis, which explores the 
way in which states and state agencies act to protect a multitude of 
perceived interests. Environmental protection – as a normative goal and part 
of the national interest – and sovereignty concerns are the two main 
channels whereby SEPL is achieved. The state evaluates international 
environmental cooperation by focusing on ‗interactions among domestic 
political preferences and positions‘ governments take in international 
negotiations – as a measure of the domestic stimuli, of the balancing 
between economic growth and popular demands for development with 
foreign pressures to join environmental regimes and the rivalries and 
alliances between foreign policy agencies and the individuals working in 
them – as the epitome of the state approach, which emphasizes the role of 
the political state structure in deciding over environmental outcomes.  
 The changes in the structures of Swedish environmental policy are 
obvious in the Riksdag involvement in EU affairs. The standing committee 
dealing with environment and agriculture from the Advisory Committee on 
EU affairs in questions of EU legislation has been created simultaneously 
with the EU entry. Previously, this standing group did not exist and nobody 
did intervene to add new topics to the EU agenda. The Swedish ministries 
most affected by EU integration - apart from the Foreign Ministry – are the 
ministries which operate in shared competence, communitized areas such as 
the Environment Ministry, the Health Ministry, the Finance Ministry and 
the Agriculture Ministry.  
 Environmental policy has not been an autonomous policy option since 
the beginnings, but, on the contrary, it has developed gradually from its 
initial economics-related status into – as I will argue – a fully-fledged 
foreign policy issue entailing supranational legislation. If, in the 1970s, 
environmental policy was ‗defined‘ as trade policy and seen as a ‗by-
product‘ of economic integration, it has acquired full status by 1987 with 
the SEA Single Act, fifteen years after the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The 
motor of this policy‘s progressive integration in the package of political 
priorities worldwide was the result of certain states‘ lobby at the 
international level, amongst which Sweden secured a front place early on.  
 In order to explain SEPL Swedish Environmental Policy Leadership in 
relation to foreign policy, one has to combine Putnam‘s two-level analysis 
with Barkdull & Harris framework typology. It is expedient to do so 
because SEP is situated within the wider picture of national and 
                                                                                                                            
represents ‗the chicken-egg question‘ in the structure-agent scientific issue of institutional 
norm creation. The discussion here on norms creation ‗at the helm of Swedish governmental 
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international dynamics – level II and level I, respectively, according to 
Putnam. The interaction between international and domestic influences in 
Swedish environmental policy making is clarified by dint of Putnam‘s 
concepts of ‗two-level games‘ and ‗double-edged diplomacy‘371. Putnam and 
others have argued that ‗double-edged diplomacy‘ requires national political 
leaders to conduct foreign policy by simultaneously managing contending 
political pressures and constraints in the international – level I – and 
national – level II – environments. 
 The concepts on which this research is based – neocorporatism, policy 
networks and economic structural interdependencies – provide a 
supplementary explanatory conceptual framework, reinforcing the general 
trends within the existing literature towards the usage of two-level games 
and the conclusion drawn recently by Lantis and Queen
372
 (1998) that a 
greater focus on the interaction between external bargaining strategies - 
level I - and internal constraints – level II – is essential and help explain a 
great deal of SAP’s neocorporatist decline. In my research, the variables 
‗fragmented party politics‘ and ‗declining neocorporatism‘ pertain to 
Putnam‘s internal level while the other two variables ‗economic 
interdependencies‘ and ‗environmental threats‘ belong to Putnam‘s level I, 
the external level. Because the first two variables – neocorporatism and 
policy networks - both refer to the national internal dynamics, they will be 
present in the next chapter, chapter 7, which discusses internal Swedish 
politics. However, the variable ‘neocorporatism’ is also used when 
discussing Sweden’s international profile and environmental leadership 
inasmuch as it is suggested here that ‘neocorporatism’ at home had much 
influenced Swedish record and behavior outside
373
. 
 Barkdull & Harris provide the link between the national interests in 
society and foreign environmental policy. The societal approach emphasizes 
elements which stress the role of social movements and public opinion, 
factors whose importance is evidenced below in the 1979 national 
referendum on nuclear power
374
. However, it would be wrong to assume the 
view of the state as a neutral arbiter or arena, as many societal views of the 
state do
375
. Rather, for an understanding of the Swedish state‘s action in 
response to societal pressures, we must turn to the state level of analysis, 
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which explores the way in which states and state agencies act to protect a 
multitude of perceived interests. The state – even the Swedish state – has 
interests beyond environmental protection. Namely, the state wishes to 
protect itself. Environmental protection may be one way in which state 
survival is assured, but this is not the only way.  
 In the Swedish case, the strength of the conceptual framework lies in 
its ability to elucidate the factors impinging on Putnam‘s level I and level II 
negotiations, which lately defined the political end-games in Sweden. EU 
membership, EMU and nuclear power are just some of the factors which 
drastically contributed to the final countdown of social democratic power. 
The problem is to clarify which factor belonged to which level and their 
effect on the dependent variable at stake. Moreover, concerning the 
relationship between international and domestic politics in articulating EFP, 
it must be underscored that the structures and actors – which can impact on 
responses to environmental issues – play a crucial role. For instance, power 
in the international system is seldom going to adequately explain 
environmental policy by itself. Only by combining ‗power‘ and ‗state‘ 
together is there possible to fathom the intensity and extensivity of the 
SEPL concept.  
 No single theory, or even type of theory, is necessarily best for 
explaining and understanding the EFP Environmental Foreign Policy of all 
states in all circumstances. Indeed, approaches might suitably be combined 
to arrive at the richest explanations for policy. For example, power in the 
international system is seldom going to adequately explain environmental 
policy. Certainly, the distribution of ‗environmental power‘ of the US and 
China matters greatly and Europe‘s ‗power‘ in this respect is on the rise and 
of increasing utility. However, Sweden‘s power in this context does not rely 
on the state only, but it is largely wielded due to society-based factors. 
 Alternatively, principled ideas, such as the obligations of the EU to 
take on action in many environmental issue areas, have influenced policy 
framing in this respect, but power configurations among European and other 
states, as well as assessments of national interests in this context, mean that 
influence of those ideas in shaping environmental policy are substantially 
reduced. In any case ascertaining how those ideas are influential requires 
looking at potential interactions and feedback loops at all levels of analysis. 
For instance, the case of GCC represents the only situation where the state-
centric and systemic approaches can explain Swedish environmental 
diplomacy performance over climate change negotiations and policy 
framing
376
. 
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 Interests and ideas - as well as identities - do not exist exogenously to 
a context of interaction between structure and agents; rather, they become 
embedded through processes of CA communicative action within the 
institutional structure. Although agents may make structures, they are also 
subject to the behavioral modifications that are imposed by those structures. 
It is to suggest that institutions are shapers of behavior and perhaps 
cognition, thereby exhibiting a ‗structuralist bias‘. The search by CA 
theorists for conditions where ideas and discourses stabilize creates an 
affinity with the policy network literature discussed below. 
 In the Swedish case of environmental leadership, the domestic agenda 
has helped at building the international policy networks necessary to 
advance the national interest on acidification and chemical regulation. The 
intergovernmentalist approach lies at the core of the theoretical design 
underpinning both the societal – in this chapter – and statal hypothesis – in 
the next chapter, but it does not lay the basis for a holistic analytical attempt 
of the domestic – external dynamics. Neo-institutionalist interpretations add 
to the analysis the idea that policy networks facilitate bargaining and 
exchange in international negotiations, which is a central theme in the 
analysis of environmental policy leadership. In the words of Lee Miles, the 
combination of neo-institutionalist elements with the intergovernmentalist 
approach – which forms the crux of this research method – is a 
‗supplementary explanatory conceptual framework, reinforcing the general 
trends within the existing literature towards the usage of two-level games 
and the conclusion drawn recently by Lantis and Queen (1998) that a 
greater focus on the interaction between external bargaining strategies 
(Level I) and internal constraints (Level II) is essential‘. Anyway, in order 
to simultaneously follow both the domestic and international developments 
of one country, it is not possible to make out the meaning of Swedish EFP 
without addressing the factors impinging on Putnam‘s level I and level II 
negotiations. 
 Viewing environmental policy as directly related to foreign policy, 
Swedish EFP can be analyzed through Barkdull & Harris‘s societal and 
governmental frameworks while keeping in mind Moravcsik‘s 
intergovernmentalism. However, particular attention is going to be paid to 
norms and ideas - in the detriment of ‗power‘ – since this is the manner by 
which Sweden traditionally engages in international environmental 
diplomacy. Environmental prioritizing has been a constant of the Swedish 
diplomacy ever since the 1972 UNHCD Stockholm Conference. This type 
of ‗strategy‘ has subsequently developed into a kind of ‗soft power‘ 
whereby Sweden is able to exert a perhaps disproportional amount of 
influence and persuade other states to trust its analysis, valuation and causal 
interpretation of an issue-threat. Likewise, this is a measure of the 
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the societal approach is best suited to treat these two 2 environmental successes in the EFP. 
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expectations the international community has regarding the type of policy 
the Swedish diplomacy would advocate or support. Applying the B&D 
typology to the Swedish case, the power variable actually becomes the 
‗dependent‘ variable which defines the Swedish EFP strategy.  
 Since it is extremely helpful in accounting for the leadership position 
of a single actor on the international arena, I would rely here on 
environmental policy analysis or EPA as developed by Harris et al. 
(2007)
377
. His analytical approach underlines the crossover and interaction 
between domestic and international politics with the aim of examining 
environmental issues on multiple levels. That is, Swedish environmental 
leadership cannot be fully understood by looking solely at domestic policy 
making, on one hand, or by examining international politics and diplomacy, 
on the other.  
 As EPA pays attention to the crossover between these levels of 
analysis, and indeed includes each of them, it is a potentially productive way 
to of viewing the problem, its causes and potential solutions accounting for 
Putnam’s dual game. One way of assessing the impact of the 
‗environmental leadership‘ variable is to frame the environment issue in 
terms of environmental foreign policy and to look in some detail at the 
actors and processes of foreign policy that, by definition, operate in the 
analytical space that crosses over between the domestic and the 
international.  
 Exemplifying, SEPA and Chem are the two Swedish technical 
agencies which function beside the Environment Ministry and are 
responsible for overseeing the implementation and adaptation of EU 
legislation. They supplied the need for expertise and offered it 
interchangeably to the civil servants in the ministries. This phenomenon is 
an example of the overlapping between the domestic and international 
spheres inasmuch as the Environment Ministry has become overloaded with 
EU negotiations and the requirements ensuing from them. As Kronsell 
(2004)
378
 notes, ‗The Swedish national policy style has become more 
legalized and less negotiated‘, a phenomenon concurrent with the 
simultaneous process of declining neo-corporatism. Meanwhile, ‗interests, 
ideas and norms‘ represent the independent variables which help explain 
Swedish EFP at the domestic and international levels. However, they might 
be influenced by antecedent variables such as globalization. In this sense, 
EU membership is only a symptom of globalization.  
 These three broad approaches to understanding foreign policy – 
focusing on the international system, domestic society or the state – can be 
refined by simultaneously considering, in each case, the role of power, 
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interests and ideas
379
. In brief, there are: the ‗realist‘ approach, the ‗liberal 
institutionalism‘ approach and the ‗constructivist‘ method. According to the 
first approach – a power-based approach and often characterized as 
‗realism‘, the countries join international regimes due to hegemonic or 
oligopoly distribution of power in the international system. Hegemons or 
small groups of leading powers create regimes that serve their interests, and 
then force them upon their countries. Alternatively, interest-based theories – 
often associated with liberal institutionalism – posit that international 
cooperation stems from the desires of states to promote their interests in a 
given issue area. According to this perspective, hegemonic power is not 
essential because rational state actors will cooperate to achieve joint gains.  
 Therefore, I have introduced the argument according to which the 
society approach in EFP environmental foreign policy is not entirely 
appropriate to analyze the whole gamut of environmental policy concerns, 
but only certain aspects of it, such as air quality development and chemical 
regulation. In what regards the GCC aspect of environmental policy, the 
Swedish diplomacy formulated answers which were not in accordance to 
this approach, but rather pertained to the state level theoretical framework. 
 Sweden actively sold its interests as norms to be agreed upon, 
advanced, but never imposed at the international level as a tool of normative 
persuasion. The inter-governmentalist view according to which the 
international agreements are based on member states‘ domestic interests – 
through bargaining and negotiation – proves its validity in the Swedish case. 
Conversely, by following the neofunctionalist logic, the dichotomy between 
national and international interests fades in front of what Putnam calls the 
two-level game
380
 which overlaps the two levels interchangeably to explain 
SEPL and power. This research independent variable – one state 
environmental leadership - focuses on the crossover between the domestic 
and international arenas of politics and policy-making using Putnam two-
level analysis.  
 In point of fact, EU membership, EMU and nuclear power are 
intervenient variables in the research design while concepts such as 
‗neocorporatism‘, ‗economic interdependencies‘ and ‗environmental 
threats‘ are indicators of the independent variables ‗interests‘, ‗norms‘ and 
‗ideas‘. These indicators are operationalized on the basis of the independent 
variables, which are the explanatory key of the whole theoretical design, but 
they are based on the CSD and MDG frameworks, the two UN 
environmental agendas, launched in Rio in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002, 
                                                 
379
 Barkdull and Harris, see footnote 16 above; Hassenclever et al. 1997. Theories of 
International Regimes. Cambridge, CUP, p 15 
380
 Robert D. Putnam. ‗Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games‘ 
in International Organization. 42(Summer 1988): p 450 
 171 
respectively
381
. 
 When analyzing foreign policy at the state level, the governmental 
interest is highlighted and the intergovernmental approach is inherent. 
Foreign policy is not only a set of rules that constrain state behaviour – as in 
the classic neo-realist theory of international relations, but also a set of 
policies which bridge the policy gap between domestic and foreign issues 
and aim at pulling up domestic interests onto the international arena - as in 
Barkdull and Harris framework typology of EFP Environmental Foreign 
Policy. Their portrayal of foreign policy dynamics restates the same logic as 
Putnam‘s two level games inasmuch as it links member states‘ policy 
behavior at the international level to their domestic – political and economic 
– dynamics382. 
  
1.3. Neocorporatism and policy networks  
 Furthermore, ‗economic interdependence – and environmental 
pressures  (a.n.) – multiply the opportunities for altering domestic coalitions 
(and thus policy outcomes)‘ and thus neocorporatist practices – so called 
synergistic linkage
383
. According to Putnam, political leaders must manage 
the pressures of the level I, international environment – which have a greater 
impact when they touch upon compelling economic interdependence and 
environmental threats. Any friction between these two factors – 
environmental issues and economic linkages – is internalized by Swedish 
EU membership with successive governments following a ‗mixed‘ approach 
on EU integration questions (Lindahl 1996a: 43). With some simplification, 
the economic linkages promote the idea of Swedish involvement in 
supranational EU-based policies in environmental matters, whilst declining 
neocorporatism at home restricts it, emphasizing intergovernmental 
tendencies
384
. 
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‗Liberal international relations theory a scientific assessment‘ in Colin Elman and Miriam 
Fendius Elman, eds. 2003. Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the 
Field. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, p 163-175 
383
 Robert D. Putnam. ‗Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games‘ 
in International Organization. 42(Summer 1988): p 447 
384
 In any case, the two points – economic interdependence and environmental pressures – 
are complementary in defining parties‘ record and strategies on environmental policy, for, 
in the Swedish case, environment is a priority at both the grassroots and elite levels. 
Moreover, in the Swedish political spectrum, environment has always represented a 
polarizing issue inasmuch as the Green and Left parties have been opposed to EU 
membership precisely due to environmental ‗decalage‘ between the EU and Sweden. 
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 It is important to clarify the contrasting nature of the external and 
internal factors even if their influence reverberates upon each other. For 
instance, the external aspects pertaining to Putnam‘s level I include EU 
membership and EMU or, in other words, environmental pressures and 
economic interdependence. Whether Swedish EU membership was 
coincidental or contingent upon previous UN activity in the field of the 
environment or just a continuation of it, is the main question at stake
385
. 
 By the same token, the political support of the system – the ‗neo-
corporatist‘ entente among Social Democrats and trade unions, on one hand, 
and the bourgeois coalition and the SAF, on the other hand – is examined 
since the Swedish negotiated style – which laid the basis of neocorporatism 
in the very beginning – has somewhat changed in the last decade. 
 By contrast, neocorporatism is present at both the external and internal 
level. At the external level, it is forging alliances in the UN and EU, which 
is the methodological novelty of this research. From the usual domestic 
neocorporatism, it extrapolates into a sort of so called international 
neocorporatism through epistemic communities. Aspects of domestic 
neocorporatism are dispelled with in the next chapter, which addresses 
SAP‘s constraints at the internal level.  
 First of all, two 2 main distinctions need to be stressed before treating 
the relationship between policy networks and neocorporatism. One 
distinction is between neocorporatism at the internal level – the embedded 
relationships between political institutions and interest groups – and 
between neocorporatism at the international level. The former type of 
neocorporatism makes the object of this subchapter while the former is 
treated at length in the next subchapter. First of all, a historical presentation 
of environmental policy in Sweden is cast off here since an in-depth 
summary of Swedish environmental achievements is already laid out when 
discussing Swedish activity in the UN and EU fora. Therefore, I‘ll try to 
highlight the key moments of interference between national and 
supranational levels when environmental decisions were formulated and 
implemented.  
 In order to identify whether ‗business‘ interests played a fundamental 
role in the neo-corporatist settlement of the national priorities and whether 
the distinction between ‗business‘ and ‗labor‘ is sufficient to explain 
environmental prioritizing and leadership, one has to consider an additional 
research level, that between ‗external‘ and ‗internal‘ levels of constraint.       
 Internal neo-corporatism means is based on the theoretical continuum 
‗policy communities-policy networks-issue networks‘ which is applied to 
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 Which was the role of the SAP in relation to these notable externalities (Ostrom, Elinor. 
1990. Governing the commons. Cambridge, CUP, p11) and which was its position to the 
declining neocorporatism of the ‗fragmented Swedish democracy‘ are questions pertaining 
to the next chapter inasmuch as they deal with the internal dynamics between the SAP and 
interest groups, on one hand, and between the different currents within the party. 
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explain early Swedish environmental policy-making
386
. In particular, 
environmental policy has been characterized by steady policy communities 
and networks at the formulation stage where agenda issues are formulated 
and ‗processed‘ into technical and workable legislative EU proposals, 
especially in such a technical area of ‗low politics‘ as the environment.387 I 
argue that environmental policy – in addition to being highly pluralistic, it 
also exhibits neo-corporatist tendencies at both the internal and international 
level.  
 The ‗policy community‘ approach is suited to analyze the negotiation 
stage in environmental policy-making because it highlights the long-term 
stability of the relationships between policy actors. As Heclo
388
 once 
remarked, ‗if policy actors could be brought together in a long-term and 
stable relationship which presented the prospect of an exchange 
relationship, then this was most likely at the sub-sectoral and micro-level‘. 
Therefore, in the case of the environmental policy, the pattern exhibits 
stable relationships among actors, but also the concomitant increase in the 
number of public stakeholders (ENVNGOs, QUANGOs, etc.) having as an 
aim to influence environmental decisions. However, stability does not mean 
a lack of dynamics; on the contrary, as proliferating groups have claimed a 
stake and clamored for a place in the policy process, they have helped 
diffuse the focus of administrative and political leadership. Therefore, 
‗policy networks‘ represent the link between the ‗business‘ and the ‗other‘ 
stakeholders‘ interests in Swedish environmental policy.  
 By trying to identify networks of policy actors, the analysis focuses on 
what are the stakeholders in Swedish environmental policy. This process of 
identification is necessary since it clarifies the range of actors involved and 
the nature of their involvement. Given that there are a multitude of 
stakeholders in multilevel government structures typical international 
organizations structures, policy networks are supposed to accommodate and 
incorporate these stakeholders‘ groups. Hence, the use of policy networks as 
theoretical categories able to characterize the whole range of actors and 
stakeholders, their ‗nested games‘, bargaining tools and strategies, 
preferences, resources, and last but not least, their ideas and beliefs. The 
basis of the relationship between these different actors is threefold. First, 
                                                 
386
 According to Rhodes (1990: 304), policy communities and issue networks are part of a 
continuum – and therefore ‗policy networks‘ should be used as a generic term – is a 
sensible reminder that there is no one model of policy-making. He draws on Benson‘s 1982 
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 Lowi, T. 1986. The Welfare state, the new regulation and the rule of law. Aldershot, 
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 Heclo, H. 1979. Issue networks and the executive establishment. in. A. King (Ed.), The 
new American political system. Washington, DC: AEI, p 67. 
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there is the recognition of each other as legitimate stakeholders in the policy 
area; second, recognition that collaboration is the best means of achieving 
policy gains; third, there is a desire to achieve negotiated and stable policy 
environments in preference to instability and uncertainty. In other words, 
cooperation within various types of policy networks may be the best 
strategy in a policy game in which there are many veto points; there are 
mutual gains to be had via cooperation. This is rather different from direct 
resource dependency or a shared direct involvement in service delivery or 
shared values. Focusing on networks of stakeholders may, therefore, help us 
to analyze the detailed process by which new knowledge and policy ideas 
are translated into specific policy proposals. The ‗stakeholder meetings‘ at 
the Commission level in the EU were preceded at the domestic level in 
Sweden by negotiated neo-corporatist settlements. 
 The second distinction is that between policy networks as such. In 
short, there are two different kinds of policy networks: policy communities 
and issue networks. At the left end of the continuum, as already pondered 
above, ‗policy communities‘ characterize the second stage of environmental 
policy – the formulation stage – and apply to actors who are bound by 
common interests. At the opposite end of the continuum, ‗environmental 
issue networks‘ define the specific problems on the agenda and tie together 
what would otherwise be the contradictory tendencies of, on one hand, more 
widespread organizational participation in environmental policy and, on the 
other, narrower technocratic specialization specific to this type of policy. 
Moreover, an ‗issue network‘ is a shared knowledge group having to do 
with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public 
policy
389
. 
 If ‗nested games‘ and bargaining strategies only pertain to the 
intergovernmentalist approach, the ‗policy networks‘ approach can be used 
both from an intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist point of view since 
it is mostly a sociological-constructivist notion, which does not conflict with 
the other two. In addition, it does not leave out notions as ‗norms‘, ‗ideas‘ 
and ‗beliefs‘ as the other two approaches (the neo-functionalist and the 
inter-governmentalist approaches) do. ‗Policy networks‘ designs a generic 
term which incorporates ‗issue networks‘, ‗epistemic communities‘ and 
‗policy communities‘. The difference consists in the fact that, unlike ‗policy 
networks‘, ‗issue networks‘ take into account actors‘ or stakeholders‘ 
common ideas and beliefs. An issue network is better defined than an 
interest group; it is at the final stage of the policy process and its actors are 
tied mostly by ideas and beliefs. While ‗policy communities‘ are closer to 
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 It is better well-defined than a shared-attention group or ‗public‘; those in the networks 
are likely to have a common base of information and understanding of how one knows 
about policy and identifies its problems. But knowledge does not necessarily produce 
agreement. An issue network may or may not, therefore, be mobilized into a shared-action 
group (creating a coalition) or a shared-belief group (becoming a conventional interest 
organization) (Heclo, 1979: p 103, see above) 
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ideas and beliefs, ‗epistemic communities‘ are only about ideas and beliefs; 
they are based on ideas and beliefs of a closely neat group of researchers. 
Issue networks have common interests and common strategies with the 
‗epistemic communities‘, but they differ on the fact that issue networks are 
made up of actors which are more loosely inter-connected than the actors 
populating ‗epistemic communities‘, who are closely knitted to each other. 
Swedish international action abroad in the environmental field is an example 
of the capacity to build ‗epistemic communities‘ in the UN and establish 
stable ‗issue networks‘ within the EU390. 
 The relationship state-interest groups-government is illustrative of the 
Swedish neo-corporatist practices at the domestic level. Private interest 
government in Sweden is based on a cooperation and consensus model, 
which relies on the inclusion of a broad range of organized interests in 
planning and decision-making. It was characterized by carefully negotiated 
pacts between unions and businesses with governmental supervision. 
Generally, interest organizations have been recognized as legitimate 
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 Mainstream organization theory has the shortcoming of not adopting a political concept 
of interest, but continuing to use the old concept of ‗voluntary organizations‘ from the 
pluralist tradition (David B. Truman. 1993. The Governmental Process: Political Interests 
and Public Opinion. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies). Private interest 
governments or neo-corporatist intermediaries in addition to being mechanisms of policy 
implementation are also in a very specific sense producers of group interests within policy 
networks. Contrary to their dominant image as ‗voluntary organizations‘, they are much 
more than passive recipients of preferences put forward by their constituents and clients. 
Empirical observations of neo-corporatist practice, as well as theoretical reasoning, show 
that organized group interests are not given but emerge as a result of a multi-faceted 
interaction between social and organizational structure – whereby the substance of the 
collective interest depends at least as much on the way it is organized, as does the structure 
of the organization on the interest it is to represent. This interactive relationship is only 
partly described as one of organizational goal formation; at the same time, it is one of 
collective identity formation shaped and constrained by established, licensed, oligopolistic 
organizational structures. Oligarchic staff interests are undoubtedly one of the factors that 
affect the outcome, but more important seem to be the properties of an association as such – 
its domain, structure, resources – which determine the institutional context within which 
group interests and identities are defined and continuously revised. This essentially political 
view of organizational structure goes beyond traditional concepts of organization centering 
on the notion of efficiency and effectiveness, just as it transcends objectivistic concepts of 
interest which postulate their existence outside and apart from their organization. The 
empirical phenomenon of private governance, just as it requires political science to take 
more seriously the notion of organized interests, seems to require organizational analysis to 
come to better terms with the politics of interests. The phenomenon of PIG private interest 
government exhibits three main characteristics: genetic, functional and structural. Since the 
genesis of private interest government can in an important sense be conceived of as a 
process of organizational change, the first part of the discussion will be devoted to the 
possible contribution of organization theory to an improved understanding of an associative 
social order. Secondly, in functional terms, the sense – in which PIG contributes to the 
functioning and, hence, compensate for the deficiencies of community action, market 
competition and state intervention – is outlined. Finally, concerning the structure of private 
interest government, the role played within private interest government by elements of 
spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition and hierarchical control.  
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participants in the decision-making process. They are involved in the formal 
policy process through a system of referrals (remissfoerfarandet), but there 
are also less formal aspects of their involvement. A drawback to this 
involvement is often that ‘it can make the consensus-seeking processes - in 
which legislation is formed - more time consuming’)391. 
 What associations in a neo-corporative order strive for is something 
more prosaic, but quite rational given the structural complexity and 
informational overload of modern society, namely satisfying interests. In 
Sweden, interests are satisfied mainly through negotiation and expertise. 
Due to the unswerving belief in expertise, interest representation in Sweden 
has not started as a grassroots movement, but has mainly included well-
established organizations such as labor unions, the employers‘ and farmers‘ 
union. The number of organizations has increased over the years not only 
because of the addition of ‗new‘ social movements – such as the 
environmentalist, feminist and peace movements, but also because of the 
growth within existing organizations. As a consequence, it has been difficult 
to decide whom to include in the decision-making process without making it 
more cumbersome and tedious. In any case, the broad Swedish population 
has never had the privilege of deciding which organizations to involve. Such 
choices have been limited to the governmental and administrative levels. 
‗While the corporatist tradition has enabled more traditional and 
established organizational interests to participate in environmental policy 
planning, environmental NGOs have been far more marginalized’392. 
 Exemplifying, the hearings of the Franchise Board, which are limited 
to the affected parties, stipulated that ‘only those who own private property 
that can be damaged through a polluting activity can participate’. ‗There 
has been no provision for environmental litigation and thus individuals or 
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 The motives of cohesion in neo-corporatist societies is what motivates a subordinate to 
conform to associationally negotiated pacts is lesser uncertainty about aggregate outcomes 
and higher assurance of receiving a proportionally more equitable share of whatever is 
disputed. If one adds to these the probability that certain conditions of macro-societal 
performance (inflation, unemployment and health benefits, strike rates or wage bargaining) 
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Europeanization of Swedish Politics‘. Sweden and the European Union Evaluated. Ed. Lee 
Miles. London: Continuum, 2000, p 99) 
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 By deliberate mutual adjustment and repeated interaction, these comprehensive, 
monopolistically privileged actors avoid the temptation to exploit momentary advantages to 
the maximum and the pitfall of landing in the worst possible situation. In short, they avoid 
the prisoner‘s dilemma through inter-organizational trust backed by ‗private interest 
government‘. In Sweden, the price paid for a lengthy deliberation process and a series of 
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unions and the welfare state ‗mechanisms‘. Ericsson, L. 1985. Ett sturt regn kommer att 
falla – Naturen, myndigheterna och allmaenheten. Lund, Bokbox Foerlag, p 65; Lundquist, 
L. J. 1981. The hare and the Tortoise, Clean Air Policies in the US and Sweden. AnnArbor, 
Michigan Press, p 13 
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NGOs cannot call for the enforcement of environmental legislation in order 
to protect the public interest’ 393. However, the role of organized interests in 
the Swedish policy process has tended to reduce conflicts by including 
rather than excluding the critics and opponents of policy proposals and by 
tying them closely to the administrative and governmental apparatus. On the 
other hand, since not all groups, but only representatives from certain 
groups, have been included, the interests and criticism of the strongest and 
best organized groups have been firstly and mainly heard. 
 In Sweden, the genesis of PIG private interest government and neo-
corporatism is indebted to SAP‘s rejection of the Marxist class-struggle. 
Ideology has been ‗sacrificed‘ to competitiveness and the market; welfare 
arrangements have been introduced to offset the inequities of the market 
economy. The widely accepted antinomy of state versus market appears to 
be insufficiently complex for the argument made here of a relationship 
between neo-corporatism and SEPL through policy networks
394
. Also, an 
elaborate intermediary associational structure seems to have enlarged 
Sweden‘s repertoire of available policy alternatives – its ‗requisite variety‘ – 
and this may enable such countries to respond to new environmental threats 
without having to undergo dramatic internal realignments.  
 From the viewpoint of public policy, neo-corporatism amounts to an 
attempt to assign to interest associations (business, labor and public 
interests) a distinct role between the state and ‗civil society‘ so as to put to 
public purposes the type of social order that associations can generate and 
embody. In Swedish policy-making, there is a long tradition of seeking 
consensus between opposing groups and interests through negotiations. In 
this process, mutual trust is built. This is how it is possible to let industry 
control its own emission levels. Licenses and emission levels granted to 
polluting industries by either the Franchise Board or the county 
administrations are followed up mainly through self-control. This does not 
mean that the relationship between the economic sector of society and those 
representing environmental interests has been harmonious or devoid of 
conflict, or that industry can be trusted not to cheat on emission targets. It 
only illustrates the tradition of meeting, discussing and seeking agreement 
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 The swing of the pendulum of environmental public policy seems to be different in 
different countries, with some countries being much less torn between the two extremes 
than others. As it happens, these countries tend to be those that have strong neo-corporatist 
institutions, associational and inter-associational conflict regulation like Sweden. 
Institutions of this kind, in addition to mediating between the state and the market, seem to 
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other‘s expense. In this way, they seem to inject an element of stability in their respective 
polities which makes them less subject to changing political fashions. 
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among organized interests
395
. 
 An alternative to direct state intervention and regulation, the public 
use of private organized interests takes the form of the establishment, under 
state licence and assistance, of ‗private interest governments‘ with devolved 
public responsibilities – of agencies of ‗regulated self-regulation‘ of social 
groups with special interests which are made subservient to general interests 
by appropriately designed rules within neo-corporatist institutions. The 
specificity of this strategy lies, above all, in the kind of interests on which it 
is based and in the way in which they are treated. For instance, to increase 
the legitimacy of the previous decision models, which have been elitist and 
top-down, the Swedish government has passed legislation related to 
planning for the municipal level in the form of negotiations with the 
spontaneous involvement of concerned or interested actors rather than only 
predetermined or well-established interests. Legitimizing negotiations – as a 
decision process – has to be understood as part of the general tendency 
towards decentralization, which has given the municipalities more power to 
decide, for example, over physical planning. However, large projects still 
remain under state jurisdiction. The major concern expressed about 
negotiation as a method of deciding physical planning was related to the 
problems of democratic accountability and transparency. In many 
municipalities, the interdependence between the private sector and the 
administration was asymmetric and leverage was often on the side of 
industry and business leading to unwanted compromises on environmental 
concerns. In other words, the municipal administration often did not have 
sufficient power and resources to secure the implementation of 
environmental regulation and often had too much to lose since industry and 
business provide revenue and employment. This aspect was becoming 
increasingly important in light of the more recent tendency to delegate more 
responsibility to the local level. This can be said generally about the 
cooperation and consensus process of decision-making where compromises 
can be reached and mutual trust developed between actors with conflicting 
interests so that hostile conflicts leading to stalemates can be avoided. On 
the other hand, if environmental issues were essential to individual and 
societal survival, as environmentalists argue, then compromises of the kind 
might be detrimental. 
 The compatibility between ‗categorical goods‘ and ‗collective goods‘ 
lies in very few cases such as the peculiar case of Swedish neo-corporatism 
where it is in the interest of an organized group to strive for a ‗categorical 
good‘ which is partially compatible or identical with a ‗collective good‘ for 
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the society as a whole
396
. 
 According to Coen&Dannreuther (2003), Grote&Lang
397
 the behavior 
of interest groups vary depending on both national and international politics. 
The industrial interests are represented largely by the Swedish Employer 
Confederation SAF or Naeringslivet which consists of 39 employer 
associations with 43 000 companies and the Federation of Swedish 
Industries (Industrifoerbundet) which is a cooperative organization for 7000 
industries. The analysis of the labor interest primarily focuses on the 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation LO, which has 16 affiliates 
representing 1.9 million blue-collar workers and the Swedish Confederation 
of Professional Employees TCO, which has 18 associations with 1.3 million 
white-collar workers. In addition, there is the Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations SACO, which consists of 26 associations 
embracing 550 000 members (mainly with university degrees). It should 
also be noted that in general terms, the employers‘ organizations have long 
supported liberal trade as a prerequisite for economic welfare and thus 
supported Swedish participation in the SEM Single European Market 
project and Swedish full membership of the then EC European Community 
since the early 1980s. However, such internationalization was more 
discernible in industrial as opposed to labor organizations. 
 It is impossible to assess whether interest group competition in 
Swedish domestic politics led to ‗declining neo-corporatism‘ or rather – 
whether the global economic pressures determined a loss of competitiveness 
of the Swedish industry. The permanence of this latter situation is usually 
what entails interest group competition. Unlike political parties, competition 
between interest groups does not take place within a party system designed 
to cater for explicit competition for the electorate‘s support, which finds an 
explicit voice through votes. Undeniably, the ‗economic interdependencies‘ 
such as globalization, EMU and EU integration played an important part in 
the internal competition between interest groups and parties. What changes 
in the Swedish case is the fact that Swedish governments tried to promote 
national coordination and consultation with neo-corporatism. The 
government recognized that such activities, involving opposing political 
parties and interest groups in general, are one possible way of enhancing 
domestic solidarity and support for governmental positions. That is because 
promoting national coordination and consultation with interested parties 
should give such governments greater freedom of manoeuvre and a larger 
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‗win set‘ when negotiating at an international level. 
 Such interaction between the government and Swedish interest groups 
takes place at many levels, formally and informally. On a formal level, 
analysts have highlighted that some traditional mechanisms of Swedish 
decision-making where interest group representation is incorporated have 
not been used as frequently in relation to EU questions. In particular, the 
establishing of independent Royal Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the 
merits on important policy change has not been used frequently as regards 
national EU policy. It has been confined only to major issues such as EMU 
and the IGCs. 
 Many interest groups have participated in consultations with the 
government through the so-called reference groups, which were established 
during the accession negotiations to bring the perspectives of the interest 
groups to the attention of Swedish policy-makers. After accession, these 
reference groups were simply connected to the working groups of the 
government. In addition, the interest groups have also been involved in the 
three-party committees established by many national ministries which 
include representation from the respective ministry, the employers‘ 
organizations and the labor movement. 
 The ‗report‘ culture in Swedish politics is indebted to neo-corporatist 
relations between government and groups; most of these three party 
committees were created as a response to lobbying by the major trade 
unions. Such committees were established within the Ministries of Labor, 
Social Affairs and Finance in 1995 after pressure from both the LO and 
TCO. To some extent, this represents merely an extension of an institutional 
logic to national EU policy prevalent within Swedish decision making for a 
very long time. All sides perceive there to be an advantage in consultative 
mechanisms between government and the major interest groups. In theory – 
and often in practice – they facilitate the comprehensive preparation of 
Swedish policy at the UN and EU, common positions between the 
government and the groups representing the Swedish economy and enhance 
the likelihood of the effective implementation of EU decisions in Sweden. 
 However, as Karlsson
398
 argues, this should not be construed as 
simply meaning the extension of Swedish neo-corporatism to national EU 
policy per se. There are notable differences, not least in the fact that these 
committees are purely consultative and largely concentrate on providing a 
forum for the exchange of information and views. Unlike some other 
domestic arrangements, they are not recognized as arenas for formal 
negotiations with the government in Swedish positions. Ultimately, they 
have ‗no authority to make compromises or decisions with respect to 
Swedish EU policy‘.399 Yet the Swedish employers‘ organizations have 
hardly been attracted with such national and corporatist arrangements in any 
                                                 
398
 See following footnote 
399
 Karlsson, S. 2007. Allocating responsibilities in multi-level governance for sustainable 
development. International Journal of Social Economics. 34(1/2), p 103 
 181 
case. Since the early 1990s the SAF has been a strong advocate of 
decorporatizing Sweden
400
.  
 Firstly, most of the ‗labor‘ or ‗employee‘ interest groups – including 
their leaderships and their grassroots members – associate globalization and 
EU membership with a wider process of liberalization and deregulation 
which was a common theme of governmental economic policy during the 
1990s. EU membership has been continually portrayed by Sweden‘s interest 
group actors as a partial antidote to the severe recession that engulfed 
Sweden in the early 1990s. In addition, the 1990s were the decade when 
many purchases of flagship Swedish national champions by foreign 
companies. The internationalization of Swedish business accelerated 
dramatically alongside the debate over the fragility of Swedish 
competitiveness. On the one hand, then, the employers‘ organization were 
enthusiasts with integration and more because – from the business 
community point of view – that would help liberalize Sweden401. 
 Secondly, and linked to this liberalization, EU debates were associated 
with those relating to the future of the Swedish model per se. For example, 
the SAF became more assertive in trying to shape the political discourse on 
the organization of the Swedish economy
402
 in which liberalization and 
integration were central themes. The employers organization also withdrew 
from most of the institutional fora associated with collective agreements 
(and thus the Swedish model itself from 1990 onwards). Hence relations 
between the employers‘ organizations and the labor movement were 
strained throughout most of the decade. A common interest group approach 
towards EU membership and now the single currency was thus out of the 
question.  
 Third, the country has seen notable changes in its economic structure 
over the past decade as Sweden moves further towards being an essentially 
post-industrial liberal democracy. The workforce continues to change from 
being a largely blue-collar to white-collar one. As regards the trade union 
movement, thus has implied a decline in the size of LO membership, largely 
blue-collars workers and a rise in the prominence of SACO and TCO 
(white-collar workers). Hence there has been greater competition for 
members and a slight shifting in the balance of power between the 
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congresses in the labor movement. In short, the LO has been on the 
defensive, faced with a more assertive SAF, growing competition from 
SACO and TCO as the voice of Swedish labor and increased tension with its 
sister political party, the SAP over Swedish economic policy during most of 
the 1990s. 
 Whilst not in themselves determining the EU stances of the interest 
groups, these background factors helped to shape the attitudes of their 
grassroots membership. The uncertainties surrounding changing corporatism 
in Sweden are not to be ignored since ‗declining neo-corporatism‘ shows 
how societal interests influenced the policy debate and the politics 
configuration.  
  
1.4. The foreign policy effects of neocorporatism. Implications 
for Swedish diplomacy  
 Policy networks and economic linkages are salient at Putnam‘s level I, 
the international level. Indeed, it is widely recognized that external variables 
and ‗shocks‘ are often vital to the process of foreign policy change. In the 
Swedish case, I argue, foreign policy change took the form of the 
substitution of the neutrality objective with the environmental leadership 
objective
403
. Economic and environmental issues have held onto the 
banisters of the Swedish political debate since the end of the 1980s. The 
question of whether the FP change was the result of internal or external 
pressures lies at the core of this research undertaking inasmuch as it 
explores the relationship between environmental policy and EU 
integration
404
. Internally, it could have been the result of an inspiring 
strategy for domestic politics or the reaction to the economic 
interdependencies brought by globalization. However, it is certain that 
Swedish negotiations in international settings and the ensuing commitments 
– which triggered internal conflicts – were the decisive variables which 
influenced SAP electoral scores
405
.  
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 Maybe the most relevant piece of work on ‗epistemic communities‘ is 
Peter Haas‘s (1992). Perceiving the environmental policy process as 
centrally concerned with ideas, knowledge and their use is both helpful and 
consistent with concern for actor-based models of the policy process, which 
best suits the Swedish case
406
. The crux of his theoretical undertaking is 
based on the idea that ‗acting rationally in situations of very high 
uncertainty and in the absence of crucial information about the policy 
positions and behavior of other stakeholders is difficult.‘ Indeed, because 
actors may be totally unaware of other key stakeholders in the process, of 
their policy preferences and strategies and because there is difficult to talk 
of a ‗policy community‘ model in the international environmental policy 
process - since there are too many players with too many diverse interests 
and competing policy frames, the ‗epistemic communities‘ approach is more 
appropriate to use here. Neo-corporatism at the international level is based 
on the concept of ‗expertise and epistemic communities‘. This concept is 
best suited for the agenda-setting stage where agenda issues are settled into 
policy formulation. For instance, Sweden has initiated framework laws at 
the EU level and conferences at the UN level to disseminate normative ideas 
and scientific knowledge with regard to environmental threats. Swedish 
stakeholders and interest groups were rather outspoken about the 
opportunity to shape key environmental issues such as acidification, 
eutrophication and energy issues. In the beginning, during the UN period, 
when international environmental cooperation began in the 1970s, 
environmental issues were considered low on the agenda and were thus left 
to experts in the interest groups and governmental agencies
407
. 
 The relationship between uncertainty and power is of the outmost 
importance for the two do go hand in hand as uncertainty presents 
opportunities for power to be exercised if individuals or institutions are 
sufficiently alert to these opportunities. The interplay between knowledge 
and power is certainly emphasized during environmental negotiations when 
the combination of the two is crucial in influencing outcomes. Alongside 
uncertainty in the policy process, there are opportunities for mutual learning 
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and joint problem-solving – especially when issues involve technical 
uncertainties in such an area as environmental affairs bearing scientific and 
economic information. During the UN period, environmental issues were 
rarely politicized, which has facilitated cooperation between actors who 
would otherwise have had great difficulty in cooperating on other more 
politicized issues. Increasingly, it has been shown that what at first appeared 
to be of a scientific nature has had important political consequences not 
apparent until conventions had been implemented at the national level. 
Experts from the Ministry of the Environment and SEPA, having had the 
mandate to negotiate international environmental agreements, have trodden 
on forbidden territory reaching far beyond the environmental sphere. This 
was the case, for example, with the agreement on the discharge levels of 
chlorinated organic substances into water. Here, the Swedish representatives 
agreed to, and signed, a convention with a far more radical position than the 
Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Finance and the important pulp 
industry would have accepted.  
 Swedish normative power has to be understood within the changing 
context of ‗power‘ relationships at the international level. Ever since the end 
of the 1980s, the notion of ‗power‘ has altered at the international level. 
Existing conceptions of power and control were not well-suited to the 
‗loose-jointed‘ power play of influence that was emerging. However, in 
Swedish environmental decision-making, in addition to the importance 
played by business and public interests, ministers do reflect the power of 
national networks in the manner suggested by Putnam (see above), but they 
do not follow slavishly their national business interest groups. Swedish 
ministers do follow them according to neo-corporatist rules. For instance, 
when Sweden‘s first Environment Minister, Birgitta Dahl, was appointed, 
interest group experts - especially those business interest-connected - were 
present in the administrative structures at all levels and were best at solving 
social problems and have been commonly used in Sweden with increasing 
frequency since the 1960s.   
 It is the knowledge-based (or at least perceived knowledge-based) 
nature of epistemic communities that provides these networks of actors with 
the potential to influence the policy process. The key role of epistemic 
communities in this process relates directly to the principle that policy-
makers are operating under conditions of uncertainty
408
.  
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 State actors are ‗uncertainty reducers‘ as well as power and wealth 
pursuers. In conditions of high uncertainty, it becomes difficult for national 
governments to define clearly just what the national interest is. They are not 
only engaged on a two-level game as suggested by Putnam, they are also 
involved in a multi-dimensional international game where strategies 
consistent with the national interest in one sector may be inconsistent with 
the national interest being pursued in another sector. It is not surprising that 
state actors look for ways of reducing uncertainty. They are not only 
engaged on a two-level game as suggested by Putnam, they are also 
involved in a multi-dimensional international game where strategies are 
consistent with the national interest being pursued in another sector. It is not 
surprising that state actors look for ways of reducing uncertainty. They 
recognize that changing the world is going to be very difficult and that they 
may have to settle, therefore, minimizing their surprises. Again, this is 
consistent with what is already known about national policy-making – many 
policy-makers are risk-averse and one way of reducing risk to them is to 
share it. 
 Members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state 
interests either by directly identifying them for decision-makers or by 
illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision 
makers may then deduce their interests. The decision-makers in one state 
may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other states, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international 
policy coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences 
of the epistemic community. Similarly, epistemic communities may 
contribute to the creation and maintenance of social institutions that guide 
international behavior. As a consequence of the continued influence of these 
institutions, established patterns of cooperation in a given issue-area may 
persist even though systematic power concentrations may no longer be 
sufficient to compel countries to coordinate their behavior. For instance, 
with the second UN period, environmental issues became more and more 
politicized and involve an even larger set of actors. At the same time, 
environmental problems were perceived as more and more complex and 
thus demand the input of more expertise. The politicization of 
environmental issues has increased and the number of conventions, 
organizations and conferences had risen. The national organizations 
responsible for environmental foreign policy have expanded as a result of 
this. Therefore, it has been difficult to establish a clear division of 
responsibilities. The foreign policy dimension of environmental issues 
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involves, to a great extent, the same organizations as in national 
environmental policy. This is true particularly if the international work is of 
a technical or highly specific nature. When environmental policy-making 
started to involve other sectorised interests as well, a larger number of actor 
had to be consulted prior to the development of a Swedish position. The 
organizations responsible for the development and implementation of 
national and regional environmental legislation and regulation were also 
involved when it came to international environmental issues, i.e. the 
Ministry of the Environment, SEPA and the National Chemicals 
Inspectorate. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various 
departments within this Ministry were involved
409
. 
 The influence of epistemic communities is over the form of policy 
choices – ‘the extent to which state behavior reflects the preferences of these 
networks remains strongly conditioned by the distribution of power 
internationally’. As Farrell & Heritier argue, epistemic communities 
sometimes lead to an acceleration of regional integration and sometimes not. 
They too see power and bargaining as very important, although also 
conclude that epistemic factors are a key negotiating resource in many 
contexts. Thus, epistemic communities ‘may fundamentally reshape the 
parameters within which political actors bargain – and do this while 
bargaining is taking place’410. As Haas also argues, ‘knowledge can speak 
volumes to power... epistemic communities are transmission belts by which 
new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-makers’411. 
Environmental policy choices in the UN were directly influenced by 
environmental leader member states and indirectly influenced by 
transnational associations of interest groups, especially business interest 
associations. Sweden was an environmental leader state during the period 
1960-1980 whose scientific expertise has been particularly prominent, a 
factor which helped into leading and establishing epistemic communities in 
the environmental field at the international level.  
 In the case of Sweden, in addition to factors of a strictly 
environmental nature, economic considerations also play a structural role in 
EU international environmental policy. Firstly, Sweden‘s environmental 
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policies are among the most advanced in the world and its standards of 
environmental protection among the most stringent. European standards 
therefore often, as is the case for car manufacture standards, benchmark 
global standards. This gives a distinctive advantage to Swedish businesses 
when exporting goods and significantly contributes to the creation of a level 
playing field for Swedish firms in the EU. There is also a growing global 
market for green businesses, a domain in which some Swedish companies, 
for example in the areas of water or renewable energies are highly 
competitive. 
 Secondly, Sweden used to be increasingly dependent on resources 
imported from the rest of the world. Decoupling resource use from 
economic growth and moving away from unsustainable patterns of 
consumption and production are first and foremost on the agenda of the 
Swedish government and companies. The only question is where are the 
labor interest groups left into these changing patterns of consumption and 
which are the measures adopted in view of the declining competitiveness of 
the Swedish industry.  
 
2. Early environmental concern: the UN period (1970s-1990s)  
 To start with, Sweden and the other EU member states are the largest 
donors to the UNEP United Nations Environment Program through the 
UNEP‘s Environment Fund. Sweden was the early promoter, launched and 
contributed to fund the so-called ‗Rio-Conventions‘, which address 
desertification, climate and biodiversity
412
. It is also a major contributor to 
other multilateral environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol 
Fund as well as to the UN Forum on Forests. 
 Finally, the involvement of the EU in the GEF Global Environment 
Facility, an innovative form of international financing, is also worth 
mentioning, since Sweden, together with other EU countries, did not only 
largely contribute to it, but has also played a central role in its creation. 
Beside France and Germany, Sweden also took the lead in setting up an 
experimental GEF in 1991. At the time, the GEF was inspired by new 
developments during discussions on the protection of the ozone layer. In the 
field of CFC poisonous effect on the ozone layer, it was difficult for 
developed countries to convince their counterparts from the South to limit 
CFCs, the substances responsible for the depletion of the ozone layer. 
Protecting the ozone layer was largely perceived as a Northern Agenda, 
mostly caused by the developed countries, which first and foremost benefit 
from their early use
413
. 
 The 1992 Rio Summit was the climax of the Swedish environmental 
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concern in the UN framework. As momentum built towards the Rio 
Summit, the debate widened and discussions began on the need for similar 
mechanisms in other sectors of the environment: an experimental Global 
Environment Facility GEF was set up in 1991. After its formal creation in 
1994, GEF has become the largest source of funding for the global 
environment. It has been allocated 5 billion dollars in direct grants and 
leverages 16 billion dollars through co-financing. It assists developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition to fund projects and 
programs in six areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, 
land degradation, the ozone layer and persistent organic pollutants and 
serves as the de facto financing mechanism for several multilateral 
environmental conventions. The GEF has three implementing agencies: the 
World Bank, UNEP and the UNDP UN Development Program. 
 At Rio, the most remarkable achievement was the Agenda 21 
initiative. Sweden was the country which launched the program and 
implemented it at the local level in every regional district relying on 
individuals as the primary agents of change. The Agenda 21 in Sweden 
meant that environmental regulation and action took place in a local context, 
i.e. in the municipal administration, in schools and at the level of consumers 
and grassroots organizations. The activities are based on education, 
information, agreements and voluntary action rather than on legislation. 
With Agenda 21, environmental policy increasingly moved to the market 
outside the legislative context and environmental politics became very 
personal and part of the daily life of the Swedish population. 
 
2.1. Normative influence and communicative action in the UN 
framework: building policy networks 
2.1.1. Sweden and environment coalition building in the UN  
 The Swedish contribution to the environmental issue-building in the 
UN framework and then the EU represents a unique case of issue 
formulation in international agenda-setting and coalition-building by a 
nation state around a precise matter of contention, the overuse of ecological 
resources, which emerged onto the international agenda at the beginning of 
the 1970s. Environmental consensus was difficult to reach and the early 
efforts were burdened with the usual hurdles concerning lack certainty, 
verifiable of scientific data, assessment and expertise. The formulation stage 
and agenda-setting early formation need to be interpreted from the point of 
view of the policy network approach whereby policies are the outputs of 
actors‘ socialization. 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many scholars and thinkers 
observed that continual economic growth was causing environmental 
decline, and argued that it could not be sustained forever. Among them, the 
Swedish scientist Bert Bolin, former chairman of the IPCC and of the first 
GARP meeting – was actively involved in the coordination process behind 
the first UN Conference on the Human Environment organized in 
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Stockholm in 1972. His role as a scientific expert in the preparatory 
committee work prior to the organization of the first serious studies of 
public and political impact points out to the importance of the epistemic 
communities of transnational groups of scientific experts in shaping the 
global political agenda. That is why the policy network approach best 
accounts for the development of the environmental debate and its 
subsequent spillovers into the political decision process. 
 First of all, the early formation of the environmental policy and its 
agenda-setting represent the fundamental stages to analyze the 
environmental policy process and its implications onto the policy 
framework in the national states. The Swedish case represents epitomizes a 
peculiar circumstance where a national state input an issue onto the global 
political agenda out of an internal environmental concern. For instance, the 
UN 1972 Stockholm Conference was largely organized out of a Swedish 
early concern with the acidification problem. The early series of the reports 
and scientific assessments were carried out in collaboration by groups of 
scientific experts the US, Sweden and Norway. This is the proof supporting 
the theoretical approach access to which environmental policy formulation 
is dependent on densely populated networks of scientific experts from key 
national state with a heavy national interest in the issue at stake. For 
instance, the UNEP was an initiative of the Nordic Group in the UN. 
Actually the whole coordination process (before and after the coming 
gaining into visibility of the EC and of the EU later) in the UN has 
developed out of the early consultation process within the Nordic Group. 
 More stress is necessary to be laid on the cooperation and 
coordination process in the UN across two different time spans: from the 
1970s till the 1990s and from the 1990s on, respectively. The importance of 
laying down and comparing two different time spaces with the international 
framework is illustrative of the dependent variable under concern: the 
internal politics dynamics within a MS member state which was at first very 
active in one international framework, the UN, and then become equally 
active in two international arenas, the EU and the UN. What did it change 
for the internal policy spectrum and the internal policy party structure? 
What about the party system and the chances of the SAP in engendering 
societal consensus and reaping electoral benefits?  
 The link between the international and national arena is difficult to 
establish even for one single case, – such as Sweden – let alone for a wider 
number of countries and to support a metatheory governance on interest 
groups, governmental actors and party structure. However, no previous 
work on institutional coordination at the hands of one single state, i.e. on the 
leadership of a single state and the early coordination in the UN on 
environmental issue has yet been undertaken. Conversely, issues of policy 
convergence over environmental issues have already been addressed by 
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Oberthur & Gehring (2004).
414
 
 This research aims to fill the gap by addressing the role of one 
particular state, Sweden, in forging environmental consensus in the UN and 
organizing the early assessments, while providing assistance and mustering 
efforts to globally address this pressing issue. Briefly, it is sustained here 
that Sweden has strongly contributed – by its prominent role in the UN 
discussions – to the building of the so called environmental diplomacy. For 
the sake of parsimony, the early EU environmental process concomitant 
with the Swedish – and with the US-Norway activities – in the UN over the 
same goal – environmental awareness and regulation – is not covered here. 
The early European environmental regulations (the 100 Article, the Seveso 
Directive, etc.) and the subsequent developments with the 1986 SEA – when 
environmental regulation began to tighten in Europe – will be briefly 
mentioned, but would not be given extensive heed.  
 The bulk of this article is dedicated to the analysis of two different 
periods of environmental regulation in two different international fora – the 
UN and the EU, with its complex decision-making process – by 
emphasizing the role of one particular state, Sweden in reaching 
environmental consensus. 
 In the first time space, in the UN period, concepts such as 
communicative action and strategic bargaining are used to analyze an 
essentially intergovernmental process of consensus building over a 
particular issue, the environmental threat. The research addresses the 
problem of the choice of these concepts in relation to the policy network 
theory, which is the dominant theoretical tool. It also explains why the first 
UN period is characterized as intergovernmental while the 2nd 
environmental EU period is considered as supranational. Broadly, this has to 
do with the prevailing methods of negotiations: the dominance of the 
intergovernmental method in the UN and the dominance of the institutional 
procedure of co-decision in the environmental policy in the EU. 
 The presence of policy networks - together with communicative action 
and strategic bargaining - in the 1st phase (of building environmental 
consensus) is often highlighted in the specialized literature when focusing 
on the importance of actors building bridges in reaching a policy decision.
415
 
As opposed to other sets of sectoral policies, environmental decisions are 
not only based on extended epistemic communities, but are also based 
calculations of interest in the context of politics. In the case of the Swedish 
contribution to environmental policy-making in the UN and EU, this 
analytical concept – the policy network approach – has the advantage of 
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clearly emphasizing actors (e.g. Swedish government, Swedish diplomats, 
Swedish ministers, supranational bureaucrats, etc.) from their interests, but 
it is not intended to explain the broader policy process after the agenda-
setting phase when the final intergovernmental decision making (in the 
Council of Ministers) takes place. By the same token policy network 
approach faces the difficulty of cleanly differentiating actor interests from 
ideas and institutions. However, I would try to fill this gap by using the 
explanatory power of Barkdull & Harris EFP typology. Precisely, I will try 
not differentiate between norms and ideas, on one hand, and particular 
actors and interests, on the other hand, but to combine them together in 
order to explain Swedish environmental leadership along across three 
issues: air regulation, chemical policy and GCC global climate change. 
 The specific domestic factors pertain to the interest part of the 
Barkdull & Harris‘s typology416. This includes the PO public opinion, IG 
(interest groups), corporate and trade unions‘ voice and stakes, which are 
channeled into the Swedish polity and which help define Swedish national 
interest. I will further try to aggregate these plethora of interests into the 
final NS national state interest, which asserts itself in international 
negotiations through diplomatic channels. That is so party because the 
interests Sweden is able to represent and the norms the Sweden is able to 
‗sell‘ at the international level , they all have an intimate relationship with 
domestic policy processes. For example, Kronsell‘s factors of normative 
influence
417
 all draw heavily on national policy experiences or repertoires. 
Both state and society share these experiences and repertoires. In the case of 
Sweden, with its tradition of corporatist politics, it is particularly difficult to 
disentangle the state from society. Therefore, insights from both levels of 
analysis are needed to make sense of politics at the systemic or international 
level. Therefore, I will try using mostly societal and systemic theoretical 
approaches when analyzing the Swedish Social Democratic case of political 
supremacy combined with environmental leadership at both domestic and 
international levels. 
 I will further argue that this was due equally to social democratic 
ideology and policy and to neo-corporatist factors specific to the Swedish 
polity. The explanation lies into the preferences of the domestic actors, 
which are translated into policies adopted and implemented by the 
government. This is the view of societal theories, which suggest that the 
forces shaping Europe‘s environmental policies are found with European 
societies – among elites, IG interest groups, social movements and public 
sentiments – not with the governments of MS or in international distribution 
of power. I will argue this is precisely true for the Swedish case, but 
however I will not discard the influence of the bureaucracies and 
diplomacies belonging with the governments. 
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2.1.2. The Stockholm Declaration  
 The first time long-term chemical pollution was officially addressed at 
a high level was during the 1972 UNCHE in Stockholm, where chemical 
pollution was recognized as an issue of global concern in the Stockholm 
Declaration. At the conference, a number of guiding principles for the 
protection of the environment were adopted. These have been crucial in the 
aftermath of the UNCHE Conference when other instruments had to be 
successively developed. The 1972
418
 Stockholm Conference Report 
disclosed the same conclusion over GCC, namely that there was not a 
scientific basis for considering an anthropocenic change of the global 
climate as an imminent threat, although a LT long term change was not 
excluded. The Report emphasized the need for more efficient ways of 
reaching decisions on global issues (such as GCC), foresaw that perhaps not 
even the sum of all prudent decisions would be sufficient to avoid a major 
GCC and suggested that human global interdependence in this regard was 
beginning to require a new capacity for global decisions. Ward and Dubos 
were indeed right in light of the following events: the Report of the UNCED 
UN Commission on Environment and Development put forward the need 
for a well coordinated overview of available data and information.   
 For the first time, the Stockholm Declaration created a right to the 
environment, thereby introducing the ‗human rights‘ principle in 
environmental law. It stated that ‗both aspects of man’s environment, the 
natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the 
enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself.‘ Also, 
principle 1 of the declaration mentions that ‗man has the fundamental right 
to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of a 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations‘.  
 Likewise, the Stockholm Declaration addressed – for the first time at a 
high level – long-term chemical pollution, which was recognized as an issue 
of global concern.  
  
2.1.3. The 1987 Brundtland Declaration and sustainable 
development 
 One year after the 1983 WCED Declaration, also known as the 
Brundtland Commission, the IPCCC was formed in an attempt to create a 
forum for interaction between science and politics. The new diplomacy 
required knowledge about the environment and development, which was 
also the objective when creating the IPCC, in 1988. Later, the UNFCCC 
was produced at Rio, four years after creating the IPCCC and five years 
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after the Brundtland Declaration. While the WCED Declaration preceded 
the Brundtland Report, it was created to address growing concern ‗about the 
accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources 
and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social 
development‘. In establishing the commission, the UN General Assembly 
recognized that environmental problems were global in nature and 
determined that it was in the common interest of all nations to establish 
policies for sustainable development. 
 In addition to mobilizing efforts‘ coordination for overview and 
research, the 1987 Brundtland Report, ‗Our Common Future‘, launched the 
concept of ‗sustainable development‘. The Report defined sustainable 
development as ‗development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs‘. In 
the foreword to the report, Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of 
Norway at that time, said that ‗What is needed now is a new era of economic 
growth - growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and 
environmentally sustainable‘419. This call for economic growth was made in 
the name of the developing countries, but the notion that affluent nations 
might reduce their own growth to make room for the growth of poorer 
nations was not entertained. Jim MacNeill,
420
 secretary-general to the 
Brundtland Commission, argued that: ‗...the most urgent imperative of the 
next few decades is further rapid growth. A fivefold to tenfold increase in 
economic activity would be required over the next fifty 50 years in order to 
meet the needs and aspirations of a burgeoning world population, as well as 
to begin to reduce mass poverty. If such poverty is not reduced significantly 
and soon, there really is no way to stop the accelerating decline in the 
planet’s stocks of basic capital: its forests, soils, species, fisheries, waters 
and atmosphere‘.  
 At the end of the 1980s, the Brundtland Report rejuvenated the term 
‗sustainability‘, which had been previously launched in the 1970s to refer to 
systems in equilibrium. They argued that exponential growth was not 
sustainable in the sense that it could not be continued forever because the 
planet and its resources were finite. In contrast, sustainable development 
sought ways to make economic growth sustainable, mainly through 
technological change. In 1982, the British government began using the term 
‗sustainability‘ to refer to sustainable economic expansion rather than 
sustainable use of natural resources. 
 Although the Brundtland definition of sustainable development is the 
one that is most often quoted, there are many other definitions of sustainable 
development and while it has been argued that interest groups define 
sustainable development to suit their own goals, they are nearly all premised 
on the assumed compatibility of economic growth and environmental 
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protection. Sustainable development aims at achieving economic growth by 
increasing productivity without increasing natural resource use too much. 
The key to this is technological change. 
  
2.2. Purposive action in the UN  
 Within the UN framework, Sweden is clearly a middle power 
diplomacy since it belongs to the group of countries known as the Nordic 
countries, which, together with Canada, Australia, Netherlands and New 
Zealand, are strategic actors and enjoy a great deal of credibility. Non-
Western middle powers include countries such as Brazil and India. Within 
UN politics, middle power diplomacy is defined as a mode of statecraft 
rather than a particular ideological or philosophical position in world 
politics. Cooper et al. focus on a particular behavioural definition of middle 
power multilateralism that was first championed by John Holmes
421
. A 
prominent characteristic of middle powers is their commitment to 
strengthening the global institutional order that provides them – and others – 
with greater common security. In Verlin‘s words (2007),422 ‗middle power 
diplomacy is understood as a method of interaction rather than as a 
position in the international distribution of power’. 
 A more stringent definition for inclusion into the middle power club, 
and one that is consistent with the traditional understanding of middle power 
diplomacy, would require actively supporting multilateralism across a broad 
range of UN activities. As a consequence, only a handful of European states 
qualify for inclusion into this club of ‗like-minded‘ states: the Netherlands 
and the Nordic countries are foremost among the so-called good guys club. 
Sweden – as an important representative of this Nordic group – has been an 
activist at the UN in brokering compromise, seeking consensus, and 
supporting UN efforts across the full range of UN policies: from 
peacekeeping operations and assistance to development in third world 
countries to sustainable development and human rights protection
423
. 
 That Sweden has been deeply committed to the success of multilateral 
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cooperation on the global level is clear even to the most casual observer of 
the UN
424
. In all of the areas of middle power diplomacy, Sweden has a high 
profile. Precisely, Sweden is among the most prominent contributors to the 
specialized agencies and programmes.  
 As such, Swedish activity in the UN epitomized its attachment to what 
Knud Erik Joergensen
425
 called ‗the normative orientation of middle power 
diplomacies‘, that is to a commonality of ‗fundamental values‘, which 
characterize foreign policy records. Sweden belongs to the community of 
UN-EU states whose foreign policy is an externalization of the values that 
have developed in the European integration process. Although these values 
are not the result of the balancing of interests in the sense of ‗realpolitik‘ 
among member states, but an expression of the fundamental values such as 
the rule of law, democracy and human rights, open market economy, social 
solidarity, environmental and economic sustainability, and respect for 
cultural diversity, Sweden proved that its active advocacy over 
environmental desiderata was based on long term economic calculations. 
This value orientation is consistent with Swedish ‗normative power and 
influence‘ as highlighted by Kronsell who rejects the use of coercive foreign 
policy instruments while trying to escape domestic deadlocks by 
purposefully stirring international consensus. That is why it is interesting to 
note that early Swedish actions in the UN environmental framework were 
purposive actions meant to build agreement among peers over issues which 
were domestically invasive and divisive such as acidification, eutrophication 
and chemical pollution. One might argue that the very character of these 
issues – which are transnational by nature – demanded an international 
effort. However, the gist of my theory upon Swedish and social democratic 
policy over the environment lays on the argument that these actions 
concealed political interests at the domestic level in the Swedish polity. 
Precisely, as I have already mentioned in the introduction, the hypothesis of 
this research builds upon the observation according to which environmental 
issues, in addition to being internationally viable, also represented a political 
tool for attracting votes by the Social Democrats in an attempt to revive the 
lost ‗welfare‘ consensus at the domestic level.  
 
3. Prior and post EU accession 
3.1. Mitigated leadership: Sweden and environmental policy-
making in the EU 
3.2. From middle power diplomacy to strategic bargaining in the 
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EU  
3.3. Extending the coalition partners: from the EEA to the EU 
 
3.1. Mitigated leadership: Sweden and environmental policy-
making in the EU  
 A. Kronsell (2001; 2002)
426
 identifies 4 specific ways in which 
Sweden participated to the UN/EU environmental agenda. These ways are a 
result of norms-based influence and they help to explain the Swedish 
success on the world stage: 1. expectation of other states regarding the type 
of policy it will advocate (mainly, the developing states foster broad hopes 
for a line and direction in relation to their development agenda and its poss. 
repercussions); 2. knowledge of environmental process; 3. expertise with 
environmental at the national level (Agenda 21); 4. an ability to present a 
unified national position based on a shared understanding of the national 
interest among all Swedish government representatives. 
 The construction of the Swedish normative power and influence in 
international affairs can be analyzed through social constructivist 
methodological insights. An analysis of the Swedish view on the 
development issue in the UN can be evocative of this wielded normative 
power. Also, what Kronsell‘s four domestic normative factors amount to is 
Sweden‘s ability to event a perhaps disproportional amount of influence and 
persuade other states to trust its analysis and assume its valuation and causal 
interpretation of the issue; this is, essentially, a type of ‗soft power‘, or the 
ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want; it is the 
ability to get desired outcomes because other want what you want; it is the 
ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than 
coercion
427
. 
 The promulgation of norms is a key of soft power; Sweden‘s power 
and efficacy result from its ability to influence the norms of the larger 
community. While attempting to directly influence the norms of the larger 
world community, the potential for Sweden‘s global influence is enhanced 
once the larger EU community adopts a Swedish policy or a compromise 
policy. In this scenario, adoption of the common EU policy position, 
essentially magnifies the Swedish position, projecting it forcefully beyond 
Europe
428
. 
 Normative power or influence is heavily reliant on ideas, turning our 
attention to the role of ideas in foreign policy. It is helpful to view norms as 
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principled meanings that guide, rationalize, justify or express expectations 
about actions or events.
429
 Understanding norms as ‗meanings that guide‘ 
fits the dynamic process of normative influence because of the stress placed 
on self-reflection and, thereby, the potential for internationalization. Ruggie 
also argues that norms are causal beliefs without the actual power of 
causality
430
. This is precisely applicable in the area of environmental issues, 
where scientific approaches and uncertainty frequently create conflicts. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, norms can be conceptualized as descriptive 
and cause-laden stories that states use to persuade one another. Thus, norms 
condition the larger context of interstate influence through their descriptive 
and causal power. 
 Finlayson and Zacher argue that the importance of norms comes from 
‗the importance [that] most influential members [in a regime or system] 
attach to them‘431. That is why in international environmental policy 
debates, Sweden is frequently able to exercise enough influence, that is, by 
drawing upon its recognized leadership in the environmental domain which 
is fed by its domestic normative strength. There are the same avenues of 
normative influence (Kronsell, 1997)
432
 which used to sway more 
traditionally powerful actors such as the US and the EU democracies as well 
as China and India.
433
 For instance, to this account, Mitchell suggests that 
within a given system, norm dominance may come as a result of a response 
to specific pressures: economic, issue political or ecological. All these 3 
three types of pressures have the potential to push the EU toward 
harmonized environmental action and, to a larger extent, to push the 
international environmental agreements onto the world stage. 
 The factors which allow Sweden to act as a successful actor on the EU 
environmental stage, employing normative persuasion, also predispose 
Sweden to favorably act on the world stage. Sweden‘s interests, of course, 
serve to link the role of power and the role of ideas together in a catalytic 
symbiosis of normative influence. For it is the content of these ideas, which 
represent Swedish interests – those interests deemed salient by the national 
public and expedient by political actors – which are then sold to other 
political actors – this time international – in a process that empowers 
Sweden. 
 
3.2. From middle power diplomacy to strategic bargaining in the 
EU 
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 After the 1960s, Sweden was already a pioneer concerning nature 
conservation and chemical control policies. However, its actions at the 
international level in the UN were not yet perceptible. Only after 1972, the 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had a strong position in 
international environmental cooperation because it has been responsible for 
relations with international organizations and the UN system. It has also 
attached considerable importance to this undertaking.  
 Until 1991, very little use had been made of the diplomatic missions in 
regard to environmental cooperation. The competence and the qualifications 
at the embassies had been low regarding environmental issues. To solve this 
problem, the position as an environmental attache was instated in 1991 for 
the Swedish EU delegation in Brussels and for the Embassy in Bonn. In 
February 1996, the Swedish Permanent Representation in Brussels had two 
environmental attaches. 
 Within the Swedish Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources, there was a specialized, small, international secretariat. This unit 
was much smaller than the one devoted to international environmental 
issues at the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Because of its size, the international secretariat has not been to act as a 
coordination centre of international activities. Instead, the different divisions 
within the Ministry of the Environment have taken the responsibility for the 
coordination of the international dimension or aspects of their activities. The 
large number of departments and actors involved has led to some problems 
with the coordination of positions and issues.  
 However, the Swedish government is rather small relative to the size 
of other countries‘ governments so that within the field of international 
environmental cooperation, the individuals may have come from different 
countries, but they have worked with the specific issue for a long time, have 
built the structure and were therefore familiar with it. Even though 
complaints can be made about the possibilities of planning activities with 
the current system, the people involved know each other and the system 
very well and can communicate informally across departments and 
divisions. 
 In response to EU membership, the Ministry of the Environment has 
set up fourteen EU ‗preparatory committees‘ dealing with different 
environmental issues and including representatives from the different 
ministries and SEPA. A reference group with representatives from interest 
organizations, business and administrative authorities is attached to each 
committee. These preparatory committees are responsible for the working 
out of the Swedish opinions and suggestions related to EU Commission 
proposals. Their function is also to deliver a Swedish opinion to the 
environmental attaches attending the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives‘ (COREPER‘s) working groups as well as assisting the 
Swedish Minister of the Environment in the Council. The most important 
strategies were aimed at working towards a consensus for the Swedish 
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position, to be well prepared and to have this position well grounded within 
the agency and the ministry. It is still undecided whether the positions 
coming out of these preparatory committees should be subject to review 
(remissfoerfarandet) by a number of agencies and organized interests as has 
been the tradition. In their effort to reach consensus and be well prepared, 
the committees have relied less and less on this principle. However, in a 
governmental publication, it was stated that all Commission proposals 
aimed at COREPER and Council deliberations would, upon receipt, be sent 
out for review by all concerned parties in Sweden. 
 The environmental principles, i.e. the precautionary principle, the 
substitution principle, the polluter pays principle, the risk assessment 
principle, were released in relation with the UN Rio Conventions in the 
1990s where Swedish representatives lobbied for their introduction. For 
instance, the principle of substitution expressed in Swedish environmental 
law does not seem to be applicable to products under harmonization 
directives since no similar principle exists at the EU level
434
.  
 
3.3. Extending the coalition partners: from the EEA to the EU 
 In addition to being a matter of contention, Swedish accession to the 
EU was also an issue of coordination, of setting priorities and strategies 
between the national political-administrative level and the EU context of 
policy making and implementation. The Swedish Permanent Representation 
in Brussels, the government and the Riksdag tried different arrangements 
with the aim of acting efficiently and remaining democratically accountable 
in the new, EU policy arena.   
 The conclusion reached by a couple of authors researching on the 
Europeanization of Sweden has to do with the transformation of national 
administrations as a consequence of membership of the EEA and EU. The 
polity has not been free to adapt at will but that did not mean that state 
administrations have been totally disciplined by the demands of the EU. The 
transformation process contained elements of both change and continuity, 
which are highly relevant when considering the policy content, style and 
structure of the environmental sector in Sweden. EU environmental 
legislation posed a particular challenge to national policy structures as well 
as to the overall style of national policy-making when misfits arise between 
Swedish traditions and those pursued by the EU.  
 In spite of its reputation as a reluctant member state, experience to 
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date indicates that Sweden has behaved conscientiously. Like the UK, 
Sweden ranks high in relation to compliance with EU legislation
435
. This 
can be partly explained by the existence of the EEA agreement of 1992 that 
preceded EU membership. This gave Sweden a considerable head start in 
adjusting to Europeanization, by forcing it to transpose the requirements of 
the acquis communautaire prior to EU membership. Perhaps even more 
important was the fact that domestic environmental legislation had already 
been significantly developed prior to EU membership. In broad terms, the 
EU was not expected to lead to many domestic adaptations because national 
legislation already provided for similar, and often stricter, levels of 
environmental protection.  
 Most EU environmental legislation takes the form of minimum 
directives. These directives require member states to achieve a basic level of 
protection via the means of their choice while allowing any state to go 
beyond this minimum level if it so desires. Although Sweden often appears 
to have smoothly adjusted to EU membership on a general level, the exact 
degree of adjustment does vary quite considerably across policy sectors. 
Hence, in the particular case of environment, it varies in the sense that 
Sweden was ahead of the EU norm as an environmental forerunner who had 
a well-developed policy in place at the time of membership
436
.  
 The Swedish experience of Europeanization has been dominated by 
the uploading of high standards to the EU level. This can be explained by 
the fact that Sweden already had an advanced content of national 
environmental policy at the time of membership. On the whole, Sweden‘s 
efforts to upload to the EU have been successful in many areas, especially 
acidification and, in some cases, also chemicals. The chemicals field has 
been particular important as a lack of success in this area presented the 
politically controversial possibility of having to accept the long-forbidden 
chemicals to be sold again on the Swedish market. This constituted a 
setback for Sweden‘s environmental ambitions and caused great political 
embarrassment.  
 Nevertheless, there have been occasions when slight misfits have 
arisen in the transposition process and Swedish policy had to be adopted to 
fit EU requirements. In such cases, Sweden tried selectively to implement 
EU requirements. Two examples illustrate how this approach works in 
practice. The first relates to the use of Environmental Quality Norms or 
Objectives EQO and the other to Environmental Impact Assessment EIA. 
Prior to the EEA agreement, Swedish legislation mainly used binding 
emission limit values and non-binding guide levels. Furthermore, the limits 
were normally set for a polluting industrial business or agricultural activity, 
not for a geographical area requiring environmental protection. EU quality 
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norms have become part of the Swedish Environmental Code, which is a 
comprehensive legislative framework covering the entire environmental 
field. According to many EU directives, such norms are binding and non-
negotiable. However, when quality norms have been transposed in the 
Environmental Code, which is in the form of framework legislation, the 
decisions on more specific norms have been delegated to the SEPA Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency. Thus, local officials can deviate from a 
quality norm if it places unreasonable costs on the polluter or if it is not 
technologically feasible. EU directives appear stricter because they require 
authorities to test according to quality norms, whereas in Sweden the 
traditional practice has been to test only when there is a health danger or if a 
quality norm is likely to be breached. This example reveals how a traditional 
Swedish policy style has influenced the way EU policy is translated into 
Swedish law, i.e. in a way which allows more flexibility to work with the 
polluter than the EU law seems to suggest. 
 Unlike EQOs, the EIAs are not controversial per se, as they have been 
an integral part of environmental legislation in Sweden since the late 1980s. 
The EIA Directive
437
 was fully transposed into the Environmental Code. 
Much more controversial was the way in which impact assessments were to 
be carried out under the directive. Here important misfits between EU 
requirements and Swedish traditional practices soon emerged. Previously, 
permission for environmentally hazardous activities was granted by the 
Franchise Board, set up in conjunction with the Environmental Protection 
Act of 1969. The Franchise Board held hearings on a particular type of 
industrial enterprise. Typically, the board weighed economic issues, 
employment prospects and technical feasibility concerns against 
environmental issues. This practice was consistent with the Swedish style of 
cooperation and consensus building in national decision-making processes. 
The EU EIA Directive, on the other hand, requires that assessment be done 
according to strict, legal procedures. Hence, an Environmental Court has 
replaced the Franchise Board. Furthermore, the EU directive called for 
active participation by different interests in society. Although the Swedish 
political system ensures the engagement of different societal actors in the 
policy process, it has not traditionally been a legal requirement, but has been 
based on negotiation as well as political and administrative decisions. This 
had to change when the EIA Directive was transposed into the 
Environmental Code, which now includes a legal right of participation. 
However, in the transposition, Sweden limited the right to be heard in court 
to organizations with more than 2000 members and which had been active 
for at least 3 three years. While this interpretation assures that established 
organizations can voice their opinion concerning a project, it does not give 
litigation rights to small groups or groups that are temporarily mobilized. 
This unwillingness to adapt to EU requirements is evidence that Swedish 
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policy makers do not wish to forgo the traditional Swedish policy style. 
Although the national style tries to bring societal groups and interests into 
the policy process, it has traditionally privileged the bigger and better-
established groups. 
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4. VEAs Voluntary Environmental Agreements and 
environmental leadership in the EU  
4.1. Building environmental leadership: from communicative 
action to inter-governmentalism 
 Three main factors help explain why Sweden became an 
environmental leader state. First, Sweden, which is one of Western Europe‘s 
largest countries, suffers from relatively high ‗ecological vulnerability‘. The 
country is adversely affected by acid rain in particular as a result of strong 
prevailing winds and its geographical location but also as a result of the 
relatively low ‗buffer capacity‘ of its soils against acidifying substances, i.e. 
mainly sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Because much air pollution is 
imported from other states, the effectiveness of domestic pollution 
abatement measures crucially depends on action taken in neighboring states 
and on the international level.  
 Second, as in a number of other policy fields, Sweden has traditionally 
presented its domestic environmental policy solutions as a model for others 
to follow
438
. The concept of ‗ecological modernization‘ closely resembles 
certain aspects of the concept of ‗sustainable development‘, which was 
popularized by the 1987 Brundtland Report and has played a central role in 
Swedish environmental policy even before EU membership. 
 Third, prior to the economic crises of the 1990s, there was a 
relatively broad consensus amongst Swedish policy-makers that stringent 
domestic environmental standards could help both to protect the 
environment and improve economic competitiveness. Put simply, this 
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concept of ‗ecological modernization‘439 presumes that stringent 
‗environmental policy pays‘, at least when a long-term perspective is taken. 
This is for two main reasons: first, preventative action is often less costly 
than curative or clean up measures; second, progressive domestic 
environmental measures may give indigenous corporate actors a ‗first mover 
advantage‘ vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. This is because such actors 
often manufacture products (for which there is domestic demand) at an 
earlier stage compared to those countries which adopt stringent 
environmental standards only after a certain time lag. 
 
4.2. Coalition building in the EU 
 According to Miles (2005),
440
 Swedish governments are generally 
driven by the priority of making a positive impact on the Union‘s future 
development. In practice, Swedish governments have selected various issues 
as being of primary importance and have duly championed these issues 
throughout the EU policy making process. Data show that the first important 
item is related to Swedish outspoken desires to improve the democratic 
credentials of the Union such as greater EU openness and transparency. The 
second issue of outmost importance for the Swedish in the EU institutions 
has to do with what might be named ‗the social-environmental-economic 
obsession‘, which covers those policy areas where the Swedes are perceived 
to be market leaders such as in the environmental and social policy spheres. 
This ‗obsession‘ extends from environmental to social policies, but it can 
also involve internal market policies, especially if the envisaged strategy for 
uploading the respective national policy to the EU is that of a forerunner
441
. 
A third area – where Sweden is actively participating – includes those 
aspects of the EU external relations portfolio that Swedish policy-makers 
believe (if developed) will reinforce existing foreign policy priorities such 
as the Baltic Sea region and European crisis management.  
 In terms of policy priorities, it could be argued that these are largely 
defensive priorities, aimed at bringing or ‗uploading‘ the Union to Swedish 
standards or at least, are recognised by Swedish governments as policy 
opportunities where the Union can be shaped along Swedish lines. 
Nevertheless, in these areas the Swedes are proactive and they usually 
support the development of EU supranational policies and arrangements in 
the specific area of environmental policy. Sweden has always been a pusher 
by example or a constructive pusher according to Veenman & Liefferink 
terminology (2007)
442
 meaning that Sweden has either uploaded its national 
position or gradually developed the environmental policies at the EU level 
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as part of a domestic process. Swedish behavior in the EU policy-making 
can be characterized – according to the type of the Swedish policy initiatives 
– as that of a ‗pusher‘ because Swedish representatives in the Council 
deliberately sought to influence EU environmental policy directly. Unlike 
other member states whose impact on EU environmental policy works 
mainly via internal market policies, Sweden has always emphasized the 
importance of international and EU cooperation
443
. 
 The conceptualisation of championed policy priorities could also be 
labelled as examples of pace-setting which involves actively pushing 
policies at the EU level that largely reflect domestic policy preferences and 
represents, in most instances, ‗the exporting of domestic policies to the 
European level‘444. However, such pace-setting not only assumes 
established domestic policies, but it also assumes that governments have a 
positive and realistic assessment of their capacity to push them through the 
EU negotiating process. This could be done by Swedish governments and 
agencies offering expertise and information to the European Commission 
when drafting policy proposals or at the implementation stage as part of 
comitology. These are all central features of fusing national and EU 
competencies to deliver common norms or, rather, the Swedish adaptation 
of their previous normative influence strategy via foreign policy to the EU 
level. 
 The pusher-forerunner model – originally developed by Liefferink and 
Andersen (1998)
445
 – was based on the ‗strategies‘ used by environmental 
‗leaders‘446 to influence the EU policy process. This core idea was 
subsequently developed by Veenman and Liefferink (2007)
447
 to integrate 
the different ‗roles‘ and ‗positions‘ of green member states, upon which 
their final strategies are based. Building upon the two dimensions – national 
and supranational, the authors identify 4 four national positions towards EU 
legislation in the environmental field: pusher-by-example, constructive 
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pusher, defensive forerunner and opter-out
448
. 
 
4.3. The Swedish 2001 Council Presidency: prioritizing 
environmental policy 
 The EU Council Presidency represented a remarkable opportunity for 
the Persson government. As Bjurulf (2003)
449
 comments, the Swedish 
Presidency ‗was the single most important European event since accession‘. 
Not only would the Swedes represent the EU collective interest, but they 
could also ‗add a Swedish accent‘450 to the Union‘s agenda for six months. 
Hence, the government formulated a set of inner championed policy 
priorities to streamline their presidency. All three – universally known as 
the three Es (Environment, Employment and Enlargement) – were 
extensions of championed policy priorities from previous periods. Yet these 
areas were also part of the Union‘s longer term structured agenda where 
progress was essential in early 2001 and the three Es would have been, to 
some extent, championed policy priorities regardless of which country 
would have held the Council Presidency at that time. Therefore, from a 
domestic politics perspective, it is thus debatable whether the movement 
towards a more offensive-orientated Swedish strategy continued during the 
Presidency since the governing social democrats were, by this time, 
confident that the country was ready for a prominent role in European 
integration. 
 In order to examine the Swedish Presidency from the point of view of 
its environmental leadership, it is necessary to look closer at how the 
Presidency handled key issues on the EU environment agenda such as the 
chemical regulation, the air and climate change regulation. 
 The challenge facing the Swedish Presidency was far from easy since, 
as Bjurulf
451
 comments, the Presidency was involved in a three-level game. 
The first level covered Swedish governmental relations with domestic 
public opinion. The second level represented the meetings and discussions 
with the candidate countries. The third level was the problematic EU level, 
meaning that the Presidency had to balance the divisions between the 
environmental ‗leaders‘ and ‗laggards‘ and also between them and the EU 
institutions.  
 The Presidency terms of dialogue also illustrated the limitations of the 
Swedish influence and the structural difficulties that any Presidency faces, 
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particularly when held by a small EU country. In the championed flagship 
three Es, Swedish attempts at more ambitious progress was curtailed by the 
larger states. Regarding the environment, US President Bush‘s refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto protocol in early 2001 compromised negotiations on EU 
policy towards climate change and the Swedish Presidency did not achieve 
their aim of gaining agreement on firm environmental targets on sustainable 
development either
452
. 
 The Swedish emphasis on technocracy and consensus-building also 
proved to be a benefit as regards the Presidency term. Firstly, the Swedish 
government was committed to consensus-building on key policy issues 
beyond what is usually regarded as the anglo-continental norm. Not only are 
Swedish policy-makers actual believers in this form of decision-making, 
they are also pretty adept at it since such behaviour has been a norm in 
domestic politics. Yet this can also be seen in the way the Presidency 
scheduled environment meetings, the legislative regulation timetable and 
conducted EU business. In addition, such consensus building techniques 
enabled the Presidency, albeit to a limited extent to overcome German, 
French and English governmental concerns that the 2004 target for 
completing the proposed chemical regulation for REACH was too 
ambitious. Equally, there were fears the commitments to tighter 
environmental standards by the 10 ten CEECs candidate countries would 
not be respected. 
 The Swedes worked extremely hard on environmental questions and 
fostered a very good working relationship with the Commission. Also, 
Swedish ministers appeared regularly at the European Parliament. This was 
especially important in the environment area since the Commission and 
Parliament have key roles in the codecision process and procedure to which 
environmental policy is liable. For instance, Bjurulf (2003: 149)
453
 argues 
that although the Swedish presidency could not rely on a Swedish identity in 
the EP, it could call upon a party political identity, the Social democrat 
political family in the European institutions and especially in the European 
Parliament. For instance, the governing Swedish Social Democrats did 
consult with their equivalent parliamentary delegations in the EP. Equally, 
the Presidency presented an opportunity to accelerate the acquaintance of 
lower level Swedish servants with the intricacies of the higher level 
workings of the EU institutions.
454
 
 Following the 2004 accession of the CEECs to the EU, the voting 
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weights in the CM Council Ministers and the total number of commissioners 
per state are adjusted in light of enlargement, Sweden may lose some of its 
institutional power with respect to environmental politics. Particular 
institutional positions have been vehicles through which Sweden advanced 
its environmental goals in the past. For example, from 1999 to 2004, the EU 
Commissioner for the environment was a Swede, Margot Wallstroem. In 
2005, Wallstroem became one of several vice presidents in an enlarged 
European Commission, removing the environmental portfolio from her 
direct purview. In her 2005 position as Vice President of Institutional 
Relations and Communication, she may continue to advocate for 
environmentally friendly policies, but her primary duties will not include 
this. Thus, Sweden and Swedes may be able to ascend up the institutional 
hierarchy of the EU, but only at the cost of giving up control over particular 
issue areas. However, enlargement also brings a greater number of small 
states to the table, so the possibilities for alliances, tradeoffs and ‗small state 
solidarity‘ may be enhanced, though important difference will, of course, 
remain. 
 Relations with the Commission and consensus building with other EU 
governments on policy issues was facilitated by the Swedish diplomatic 
elite‘s high level of preparation for the Presidency prior to taking it over. 
The Swedish diplomatic elite recognised early in the years of full 
membership that the presentation of well-prepared drafts and assessments in 
the early Commission-Council working groups, i.e. at the early stages of the 
EU policy process enhances levels of Swedish influence substantially.  
 Sweden‘s reputation for being well-prepared and efficient managers of 
the Presidency was also built on the success of governmental arrangements 
in coordinating information between Stockholm, Brussels and the other EU 
capitals. Special mention should be made here of the technocratic expertise 
and diplomatic excellence of the Swedish Permanent Representation to the 
EU during the Presidency. In the series of interview held with the Swedish 
Permanent Representation SPR‘s officials, a regular comment was that the 
Permanent Representation was widely praised for being very successful for 
its intelligence reports and trouble-shooting. The Swedish approach was safe 
but dull, yet it achieved tangible results
455
. However, this did lead some EU 
delegations, led notably by Germany, to criticize the Swedes for being too 
rigid with the agendas for Union meetings
456
. 
 Furthermore, Swedish pragmatism also proved to be an asset. Not 
only was Swedish pragmatism indicative of performance credentials, but 
also of political commitment. A strong engagement to supranational 
solutions was indicated in the championing of the three Es. At the same 
time, the nervousness of the Persson government when launching 
preparations for the Convention on the Future of Europe also highlighted the 
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ambiguities of the Swedish attitudes towards the future evolution of the 
Union.
457
  
 As Ekengren
458
 identifies, Swedish civil servants chaired over 250 
Council working groups in approximately 1500 meetings during the 2001 
Presidency. During this time, the Swedish government acted as an ‗inter-
European link between EU levels of governance‘.459 In particular, the 
emphasis placed by Swedish policy-makers on multi-level consensus 
building – which includes not just cooperation between governmental and 
parliamentary actors but also non-governmental organisations, such as 
interest groups – could be viewed as evidence of enlarging policy networks 
at the supranational level in order to achieve consensus at the national one. 
For instance, the Swedish Presidency organised many meetings – nearly 100 
– that brought together key societal groups – such as student forums and 
organizations – from the EU and candidate countries in order to ‗fuse‘ these 
groups into the EU policy process. It proved to political observers that the 
Swedish political elite operated effectively in the EU compound polity and 
could even lead it for a short time. 
 The 2001 Swedish Presidency removed any last political obstacles to 
Sweden being viewed as a proactive European. It helped to partly remove 
some of the ‗stigma‘ attached to being reluctant to join the Euro with other 
member states and showed Sweden to be a good team player. Above all, it 
reinforced the point that Sweden was locked or ‗ratcheted in‘ to EU 
decision-making, if not quite to any vision of a federal Europe. The question 
is why did the Swedish social democrat establishment did undertake these 
efforts at the EU levels? 
 
4.3.1. REACH Registration Evaluation Authorization of 
Chemicals: nested games and strategic moves 
 REACH is the new EU regulation passed at the end of 2006, which 
addresses the production and use of chemicals, their control as to neutralize 
their potential negative impact on environment and human health. The 
complex co-decision process lasted for approximately 8 eight years and it 
was a ‗tour de force‘ between the Commission and the EP, on one side, and 
the different stakeholders, on the other
460
. 
 The different stakeholders involved in REACH were the chemical 
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industry, on one hand, and the environmental lobby groups such as 
Greenpeace, EEB, WWF, on the other hand. Their institutional counterparts 
were the Council, the industry associate and supporter, on one hand, and the 
Commission and the EP, the public environmental interests, on the other. 
However, in the different stages of the legislative process, the power play
461
  
changed throughout the way. Before the EP first reading, all the EU 
institutions were favorable to a ‗pro-environmentalist‘ REACH; after the 
first reading, the Council of Ministers became more and more hostile as a 
result of the strong lobbying undertaken by CEFIC. The shift took place 
after the Commission released its 2001 White Paper, which sent shivers 
through the chemical industry. It was the move of competency from the 
Environment Council to the Competitiveness Council which triggered the 
change in the institutional support on REACH: the Council became opposed 
to the initial draft proposal forwarded by the Commission and amended by 
the EP. It finally sided with the chemical industry lobbying, CEFIC, ICCA 
International Chemicals Agency and DUCC Downstream Users of 
Chemicals Coordination Group in an attempt to keep ‗untouched‘ the 
competitiveness of the European economy according to the Lisbon 
Agenda
462
.  
 The fight for REACH as a new regulation for chemicals in Europe was 
led by what the German media described as ‗the 3 three Swedish witches‘, 
while the crusade against them was led by ICCA and CEFIC, on one hand, 
and by the US permanent representation, European governments and their 
sponsored interest groups, on the other. The chief-argument – launched by 
the anti-REACH coalition – consisted in pointing out that Sweden did not 
have a chemicals‘ industry of any real importance: ‗What do Swedes know 
about the importance of the chemicals industry?‘463  
 One specific strategy – used was to be patronizing in the name of 
‗competitiveness‘ and portray the White Paper as a somewhat naive 
proposal from the people who did not really know what they were talking 
about. Not only did Sweden play an important role in the drafting of 
REACH, but it has also been the main promoter of the PPP polluter pays 
principle, the precautionary, risk assessment and sustainability principles in 
environmental law. Sweden had been one of the five member states initially 
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requesting a review of the chemicals regulation in the EU in Chester, UK in 
March 1998. It was the Swedish Ministry of Environment (ILSR 2005) 
which first defined EPR extended producer responsibility, which is based on 
the polluter pays principle but goes beyond a manufacturer‘s responsibility 
for pollution from product manufacture to make the manufacturer 
responsible for the environmental impact of a product from manufacture to 
disposal. ‗Product stewardship‘ is a related idea in that it is concerned with 
the environmental impacts of the product throughout its life-cycle in 
programs such as the IPP Integrated Product Policy and the eco-label. The 
precautionary principle as an official principle guiding policy dates back to 
the 1970s when it was incorporated into Swedish environmental policy. The 
first recognition of the precautionary principle in an international agreement 
came in 1982 when it was incorporated into the World Charter for Nature 
and adopted by the UN General Assembly (EC 2000:11).
464
 In short, the 
precautionary principle states that even where it is not certain that serious or 
irreversible harm will be caused, if it is likely to happen, action should be 
taken to prevent it. 
  Simultaneously with the White Paper on REACH, the Commission 
released the White Paper on Good Governance. It was not a coincidence that 
both were issued out in 2001 during the Swedish Presidency, the first in 
February 2001 and the latter in July 2001 – at the closing in of the 6 month 
European Council presidency Sweden wielded. What is more, the whole 
REACH initiative has started out as a Swedish initiative: the content of the 
White Paper was similar to a national Swedish regulation that had been 
developed over years in one of the most extensive committee investigations 
on chemicals ever. Sweden had prioritized the issue during its presidency in 
2001, the first green rapporteur was the Swedish MEP Inger Schoerling and 
the Swedish Chemical Inspectorate, KemI, had been involved in the 
preparations of the White Paper.  
 Right-wing and non-regulation think-tanks attacked one of the 
fundaments of REACH, the precautionary principle and described it as a 
‗good idea‘ that had been taken too far by the Swedes. For example, in an 
outrageous article under the headline ‗How Swede it is‘ in 
TechCentralStation, a free-market writer, Roger Bate, described the 
Swedish focus on environmental and health protection as being dangerous 
to innovation, jobs and progress: ‗Unless the Swedish folly with the misuse 
of science and precaution is exposed, other countries may follow down its 
path’465.  
 The REACH proposal reached a stall in June 2003 in the EP in an 
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attempt to delay the final vote on REACH and its adoption till the beginning 
of the next legislature by the coalition of Conservatives and Liberals. 
Moreover, the German Social Democrats supporting REACH were targeted 
with allegations of being anti-industry and complementary arguments 
centered on costs and jobs that easily find their way into the hearts of most 
politicians. Estimations by the CEFIC industry federation – through impact 
assessments and various reports (the Mercer Report) carried out by industry 
friendly experts – forecast a 12 million animals and a cost of 3.6 billion for 
testing. In the spring 2003, the stakeholders‘ meeting was delayed as the 
Commission was split between DG Environment and DG Enterprise. In 
May 2003, the Commission presented the draft Regulation as a joint 
document between DG Enterprise and DG Environment. Oddly, it was not 
the entire Commission which stood behind the document, as it should have 
been the case since it was a proposal from the Commission, but only two 
DGs. Lacking the official support from the entire Commission signaled that 
the Commission had internal difficulties with the proposal and, by 
consequence, there was a lot of room for improvement and changes. The 
Commission said it would use the comments received in the stakeholders‘ 
consultation to finalize the proposal, which would be presented before the 
end of the year. The submitted draft regulation contained ‗almost‘ none of 
the amendments requested by the EP. Instead, several of the demands from 
the chemical industry had been met and the draft regulation was a watered 
down version of the White Paper. The most obvious impairments were that 
the requirements for substitution of hazardous substances and the demand 
for assessment of all chemicals used in consumer products had been 
effectively taken out or severely watered down. Apparently, the anti-
REACH campaign, orchestrated by the US and EU chemicals industry and 
the US government, had been successful.  
 The real change came with the move of competency in the Council of 
Ministers from the Environment Council to the Competitiveness Council as 
a result of the industry offensive. Under the European Council meeting of 
the Italian Presidency, the heads of state decided that ‗the Council and the 
Commission must address the needs of specific industrial sectors...in order 
for them to enhance their competitiveness, notably in view of their essential 
contribution to economic growth. EU legislation should not be a handicap 
to EU competitiveness compared to that of other major economic areas.‘ 
That and the famous Blair, Chirac, Schroeder letter
466
 were the motives 
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behind the weakened proposal presented by the Commission. When this 
proposal was released at the end of October 2003, the scope of REACH had 
also been reduced meaning less bureaucracy, less costs, less data 
requirements, less reporting and less protection. Polymers had been 
excluded and the data requirements for the other substances produced under 
10 tones per year had been reduced. Therefore, chemical safety reports were 
not required anymore for substances below 10 tons. The general ‗Duty of 
Care‘ had been taken out, transparency – as advocated in the White Paper 
on governance released under the Swedish Presidency – had decreased and 
the impairments from the draft regulation had not been restored.  
 The attempt to dilute the proposal had been achieved institutionally by 
removing the Council competency, but a similar move was not possible in 
the EP European Parliament since REACH was formally still an 
environmental issue, handled in the codecision procedure, which entailed 
finding an agreement between Parliament and Council. The proposal had 
lately been assigned to the Social Democrats by the Environment 
Committee and the Italian MEP Guido Sacconi was appointed rapporteur. 
Likewise, institutional manipulations were also present in the handling of 
REACH by the different committees – the Legal Affairs Committee, the 
Environment and Public Health Committee and the Enterprise, Energy and 
Research Committee each claimed main competency over REACH, but it 
was only an attempt to delay the first reading up until elections when the 
next legislature, the 2004-2009 EP legislative would be inaugurated
467
. The 
primary purpose of these maneuvers was of a procedural nature: by creating 
a conflict of competence, the work of the lead committee – the Environment 
Committee – was to be stalled to stop the Parliament from adopting a first 
reading in this legislature. This strategy – to keep REACH out of the 
elections – worked accordingly because it became impossible to complete a 
first reading by the end of June 2004. REACH was finally adopted in 
December 2006 by the new legislative under the lead of the Environment 
Committee and its same president Guido Sacconi.  
 The first time long-term chemical pollution was officially addressed at 
a high level was during the 1972 UNCHE in Stockholm, where chemical 
pollution was recognized as an issue of global concern in the Stockholm 
Declaration. At the conference, a number of guiding principles for the 
protection of environment were adopted. These have been crucial in the 
aftermath of the UNCHE Conference when other instruments had to be 
successively developed.  
 Another important outcome of the 1972 UNCHE Conference was the 
agreement to create a new program for global environmental protection 
under the United Nations: UNEP. The latter has since become an important 
UN instrument concerning chemicals; it actually is now the main UN body 
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dealing directly with chemicals. Later, in the mid-1990s, negotiations to 
eliminate releases of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) were initiated. The 
negotiations focused on the twelve 12 most hazardous substances - the Dirty 
Dozen - and were finalised in 2001 in Stockholm, Sweden.  
 As with national environmental activities, the greater part of 
international environmental activities take place at the agency level, i.e. in 
SEPA. Due to its involvement with product regulation, the National 
Chemicals Inspectorate also has an international orientation. For instance, 
the control of chemicals of various sorts, such as pesticides and toxic 
chemicals, is a matter of high priority for Sweden and is discussed below in 
this chapter. The Chemicals Inspectorate is the agency responsible for most 
questions concerning chemicals while in the EU these types of questions are 
handled by a number of different directorates.  
 
4.3.2. Air Policies: the CAFE Programme 
 The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol were the first UN 
instruments whereby the man-made chemicals destroying the stratospheric 
ozone layer had been localized and banned
468
. In 1985, the Vienna 
convention was agreed upon as a framework convention which needs the 
development of measures in separate protocols. Thereupon, the Montreal 
Protocol was first adopted in 1985 and has been adjusted five times
469
. 
 The early diplomatic efforts on the environmental side were also 
related to the trans-boundary air pollution problems of acidification and 
eutrophication that Sweden suffers from. As the Swedish soil is rocky and 
easily permeable, the real motive behind the 1972 UNCED Stockholm 
Conference was to garner efforts to address these 2 two environmental 
problems particularly resented by Sweden.
470
 It is interesting to note how 
Sweden managed to use the conference to push issues related to acid rain 
and international air pollution.
471
 These actions of Sweden – in concertation 
with other similarly harmed northern states, led to the adoption of a 
management regime for LRTAP Long Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution 
in 1979.
472
 At a 1982 Stockholm Conference, Jan Nillson of the Swedish 
Environment Ministry synthesized and presented air pollution data in ways 
that were easily understood by policy-makers and that led to international 
cooperation on the problem.
473
  
 Three main factors help explain why Sweden became an 
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environmental leader state: one factor is geographic and the other two 
pertain to the neocorporatist-societal and foreign policy approaches, which 
were treated above. The first factor relates to the fact that Sweden, which is 
one of Western Europe‘s largest countries, suffers from a relatively high 
‗ecological vulnerability‘. The country is adversely affected by acid rain in 
particular as a result of strong prevailing winds and its geographical location 
but also as a result of the relatively low ‗buffer capacity‘ of its soils against 
acidifying substances (mainly sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). 
Because much air pollution is ‗imported‘ from other states, the effectiveness 
of domestic pollution abatement measures crucially depends on action taken 
in neighboring states and on the international level.  
Moreover, upon its EU accession, Sweden has intensified its 
lobbying efforts with the Commission and therefore sent a couple of its 
experts over to the Commission headquarters in an attempt to lay down the 
preparatory work – on acidification issues. Acidification remained an 
important priority for Sweden upon EU entry and Swedish pressure resulted 
in the adoption of a strengthened preventive EU strategy in 1997.
474
 The 
case of acid rain demonstrates the early and consistent ability of Swedish 
policymakers to engage in norm – and interest – driven environmental 
diplomacy related to atmospheric environmental issues. 
Acid rain has been a long-standing pollution problem which causes 
serious environmental pollution in Sweden (European Economic Agency, 
1999a; 1999b). Sweden has acquired considerable scientific expertise on 
acid rain and pioneered the so-called ‗critical loads‘ principle, which 
became enshrined into the Sulphur Protocol of the LRTAP Convention in 
1994. The ‗critical loads‘ principle constitutes a departure from the 
traditional approach to assign uniform emission reduction limits to a 
particular country; it instead aims to lower harmful (sulphur and nitrogen 
oxide) emissions to less than the critical (and environmentally damaging) 
threshold level on a regional or even local basis.  
Immediately after joining the EU, Sweden launched an initiative 
within the Environmental Council for a coherent EU strategy to combat acid 
rain. The Council subsequently asked the Commission to come up with a 
report which was published in 1995 (SEC (95) 2057). The Directorate 
General (DG) XI, which is a relatively small DG, is responsible for 
environmental issues within the Commission. It strongly welcomed the 
secondment of a Swedish expert who, in cooperation with a seconded 
British official, drafted most of the Commission‘s report. Curiously enough, 
the seconded Swedish expert was not a British government official, but had 
previously worked for the Swedish NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain, which is 
an NGO closely involved in negotiations of the LRTAP Convention. The 
Swedish government was aware that its acidification strategy was likely to 
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meet with stern resistance from the Southern member states – Spain in 
particular.   
Although I would not try to privilege the impact of interests in the 
detriment of ideas (and norms), I shall attempt to highlight their powerful 
consequences in the three sectoral policies exposed here, the CAFÉ air 
quality standards, chemicals regulation (REACH) and GCC.  
The case of acid rain demonstrates the early and consistent ability of 
Swedish policymakers to engage in norm – and interest – driven 
environmental diplomacy related to atmospheric environmental issues. My 
point here (in the formulation of hypothesis 6 and hypothesis 7 and to a 
lesser extent hypothesis 3) is that Sweden has shown a more norm driven 
foreign policy attitude regarding the environmental issues during the UN 
period than later in the EU where the interest–based proclivity dominated. 
Why is that so and what is the difference best norm – driven attitude vs. an 
interest – based attitude in environmental matters is the focus of this 
chapter. The reasons which motivated a certain type of attitude rather than 
another at one particular moment in time to the peculiar pertains to domestic 
politics dynamics and particularly to the internal split in the SAP over 
environment dominance during social-democrats‘ power. 
Precisely, I will try to highlight Swedish international activity in the 
UN in environmental policy sectors as norm-driven over climate GCC 
change as mainly while the Swedish participation in the CAFÉ and REACH 
inception and outcome as interest-driven. The dichotomy is not – however – 
clear-cut and there may equally happen for insular interferences to arise (i.e. 
at certain times moments and in certain policy settings, for REACH to 
become norm-driven rather than interest-driven or vice versa). Where this 
would be the case I would specify. 
For instance, in the case of the CAFÉ and the acidification problem, 
Sweden acted as an environmental leader and norm-shaper in the early 
phases of agenda setting and policy formulation. In these 2 policy phases, 
Sweden acted on the basis of a norm-based attitude using the power of ideas 
and research-based norms. On the contrary, in the sub-segment policy 
phases of CAFÉ, Sweden exhibited an interest-driven policy style attitude.  
For instance, early Swedish action regarding air quality standards 
date back to 1995. It was the first Swedish environmental action upon its 
EU entry. When the Commission‘s report was presented to the 
Environmental Council in December 1995, it concluded that the application 
of the BAT principle would leave many regions within the EU well above 
the ‗critical loads‘ threshold475. However, mainly for cost reasons, several 
member state governments were not prepared to accept the relatively 
ambitious reduction targets put forward in the Commission‘s report. The 
Council conclusions finally accepted a Dutch compromise proposal (which 
drew heavily on advice from the Swedish expert) but also asked the 
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Commission to come up with a less costly modified strategy. Subsequently, 
DGXI accepted support from two other Swedish experts, who were 
seconded to its offices in Brussels in 1996-98. Sweden has, therefore, made 
extensive use of trying to influence the Commission from ‗within‘476. 
The Commission‘s modified acidification strategy, which reflected a 
number of Swedish priorities, was finally published in March 1997
477
. It 
proposed the adoption of a 50 percent gap-closure target (namely that the 
‗critical loads‘ threshold level should not be exceeded in more than 50 
percent of the designated area) by 2010 compared to the 1990 base line. The 
most important measures proposed to achieve this aim included: the 
adoption of stringent national emission ceilings for sulphur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides and ammonia in a new directive; the revision of the large 
combustion directive; the adoption of a directive limiting the sulphur 
content of liquid fuels; the revision of the 1988 large combustion directive; 
the ratification of the 1994 LRTAP sulphur protocol; and the adoption of 
restrictions on emissions from ships. Sweden therefore not only succeeded 
in placing acidification onto the EU‘s agenda but also helped to frame the 
EU‘s pollution abatement strategy to counter acid rain. 
Sweden has taken unilateral action with regard to limiting (sulphur 
and nitrogen oxide) emissions from ships. The measures adopted should 
have led to a 75 percent reduction by 2000. They consist mainly of lower 
shipping dues for vessels which use low sulphur fuels and are equipped with 
advanced emission abatement technologies. This is another example of 
where the Swedish government has tried to set an example for others to 
follow and used policy instruments like taxes, which are commonly used 
within Swedish environmental policy. 
Five years after its entry to EU, Sweden has established itself as a 
normative leader regarding matters of clean air policy. Anyway, all things 
constant, it is true that after the second half of the 1990s, a whole lot more 
began to change in the EC legislative standards on the quality of air. It was 
as if a new thrust was there with the Community‘s 6-th EAP Environmental 
Action Programme which was soon followed by the ‗Thematic Strategy on 
Air Pollution‘ published by the COM in 2005. Whether there has been 
concerted lobbying by Swedish administrators in the Commission or 
whether Swedish environmental expertise efforts and international profile 
have paid out, is a matter of interpretation. Previously to Swedish adhesion, 
there have been other related directives which were passed: e.g. Directives 
1999/13/EC, 96/62/EC and the 1999/30/EC Directive called into action for 
reducing industrial emission limits and putting into place quality standards 
for ambient air as a means to control local air pollution levels. Nevertheless, 
considerable efforts have been undertaken by Swedish government experts 
to limit long-range trans-boundary of air pollution even before Swedish 
                                                 
476
 See footnote above 
477
 (COM(97)88) 
 217 
entry. For instance, the convention of trans-boundary air pollution, Sweden 
have hardly struggled for ever since 1967
478
. The methods which Sweden 
used as a state were the methods usually used for ensuring scientific 
backstopping in international organizations. These were effective means of 
lobbying as natural research is an all convincing argument in environmental 
international negotiations (especially on environmental issues). An example 
to it was the research initiated by researchers from Stockholm University, in 
particular by Svante Odin, on acid rain, which ultimately led to the 
European regional agreement on trans-boundary pollution, already in 1983. 
But, before this regional agreement had been signed, there was an early 
convention on the same matter as early as 1979 when Europe-wide 
agreement was reached under the Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution CLRTAP. This Convention fixed national emission 
ailing for 4 main air pollutants: VOCs – Volatile Organic Compounds, NOx 
– nitrogen oxides, NH3 – ammonia and SO2 – sulphur dioxide main 
responsible for the formation of acid rain formation.  
 The purpose of these international conventions and international 
agreements was to limit air pollution in the atmosphere, which was made 
even more serious by the trans-boundary character of the air pollutants 
(subject to long-range transports all over Europe). To figure out what role 
did the Swedish government experts and diplomats play in bringing about 
this international agreement on clean air is to try to stand out the actions and 
strategies used to obtain international consensus (like Putnam‘s two level 
plus game). It is about coordination and timing a bulk (a bunch) of actions, 
which all amount to a clear-cut example of normative influence – already 
singled out by Kronsell (2002)
479
 – in international environmental affairs or 
the birth of a new kind of diplomacy. 
 Basically, Swedish actions for reaching environmentally friendly 
legislation was the same in both the cases of REACH and CAFÉ: muddling 
through the disorder of multiple state interests and finally pushing 
preparatory conventions during the 2001 Swedish presidency of the CM 
Council of Ministers. Like in the case of REACH – where a global 
convention on POP was signed in 2001 – research were instrumental in 
moving the process forward. Precisely, after extensive studies on costs and 
benefits, in 1999 a new protocol to the convention was agreed – the 
Gothenbourg Protocol. The Protocol defines maximum amounts of 
emissions of VOCs, NOx, NH3 and SO2, to be attained latest by 2010. In 
addition, in 2001, as a follow-up to the Europe-wide Gothenbourg Protocol 
(1999), the European Union adopted a new directive which allocates 
emissions caps to each member state – the NECD National Emissions 
Ceilings Directive. 
 By the same token it should not be overlooked the fact that this 
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implementation directive has been pushed onto the COM agenda during the 
Swedish presidency of the CM shows that Swedish involvement - to 
determine the most cost-effective way to achieve specific air quality targets 
as a means to achieve significant reductions of ground level ozone, 
acidification and eutrophication – proves once again Swedish environmental 
leadership. Also, the additional fact is that this NECD was decisive as 
Sweden‘s paramount concerns are to stop acidification and eutrophication 
phenomena. An important observation which must be made regarding the 
NECD Directive is its final application and decision stages of procedural 
decision-making; the original NECD proposal had been fully supported by 
the EP and the COM, but was not accepted by the member states in the CM. 
 A recurrent pattern on concerning EU legislative proposals initiated by 
Sweden (see NECD and REACH) is their rather positive reception in 
supranational institutions like the COM, the EP and the European agencies 
and their rejection in intergovernmental fora of decision-making like the 
Council of Ministers. As well, at the environmental NGOs level, there is 
mitigated acceptation them being rather divided over the Swedish proposals. 
For instance, the EEB European Environmental Bureau has always been an 
instance favorable to Sweden inasmuch as it has been an early Swedish 
think-tank for the promotion of environmental-friendly initiative at around 
the EU premises. Like in the case of REACH (see further in this chapter), 
the CAFÉ legislative package was thwarted at the level of MS. Is this a pure 
coincidence or is there food for thought? Further matter is going to address 
Swedish preference into EU decision making.  
 A comparison bet the original COM proposal (a Swedish initiative) 
ceilings for air pollutants and the final targets set by the Directive 
2001/81/EC stirred up discontent among environmental. 
 
Table 1 Total reduction of air pollutants bet. 1999 and 2010, 
proposed by the COM in 1999 and the ones finally agreed as national 
emissions ceilings in the NECD by MS 
Air pollutant Original COM proposal Directive 2001/81/EC 
VOC 60% 54% 
NOx 55% 51% 
NH3 21% 14% 
SO2 78% 77% 
 
This change in the original proposal has been strongly criticized by 
environmental NGOs because the higher national emission ceilings set in 
the NECD in 2001 are a major barrier to meeting the desired air quality 
targets. 
 Despite the early awareness and a tax on NOx emissions of high 
domestic relevance, which has been implemented in Sweden in relation to 
stationary sources, Sweden is expected to fail to meet the NOx emission 
ceiling by 2010, even in the scenario taking all measures into account (acc. 
 219 
to the analysis of the AEA Report 2006). The Swedish seem to particularly 
prefer taxes as the best method of environmental policy enforcement. e.g. a 
tax on CO2 has been in force ever since 1992 or 2002, a tax on NOx, as well 
as the introduction of industrial permits which limit NOx and SO2 values to 
BAT Best Available Technology performance level as the SCR Selective 
Catalytic Reduction techniques in combination with primary measures]. 
Stationary sources of pollution are non-moving sources, fixed-site producers 
of pollution such as power plants, chemical plants, oil refineries, 
manufacturing facilities and other industrial facilities. There are hundreds of 
thousands of stationary sources of air pollution in the US. Stationary sources 
emit both criteria pollutants and HAPs hazardous air pollutants.  
 When noticing the emission ceilings for air pollutants under the CAFÉ 
program, there is a striking similarity (with regard to the adoption of targets, 
instruments and objectives) with the EU Burden Sharing Agreement 
Directive under the Kyoto Protocol. However, in the case of Sweden, the 
behaviour is rather different: compliance and early expertise at the agenda-
setting stage for CAFÉ and opposition and non-compliance with GHG 
targets for Kyoto
480
. 
 
4.3.3. GCC Policy 
 My research question aims at explaining the noticeable Swedish 
successes in the specific cases of CAFÉ and REACH and the Kyoto 
failure
481
 in the particular case of GCC. With respect to GCC, it was a 
Swede, Svante Arhenius, who in 1886 published the first paper warning of 
human-induced global warming.
482
 In more recent times, Sweden has been 
an active participant in combating GCC
483
. Swedes are, indeed, sensitive to 
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issues surrounding GCC. In the early days of the GCC issue, prior to the 
founding of the IPCC in 1988, the Swede Bert Bolin worked tirelessly to 
draw international attention to the scientific findings.
484
 
 Additionally, ‗Sweden has long made considerable efforts to cut its 
‘greenhouse gases’ of which carbon dioxide is the most important‘485. Prior 
to the EU‘s formal program requirements, Sweden engaged in cooperative 
GHG abatement (joint implementation) programs abroad, such as those in 
Poland, where the costs of abatement are lower than they are in Sweden
486
. 
Sweden also attempted to link its vote in the EU ratification of the UN 
Climate Change Convention to the unsuccessful adoption of a European 
carbon tax
487
. Carbon taxes are important to Sweden as it is also one of the 6 
six EU states that have a national carbon tax
488
. This tax has helped Sweden 
to maintain ‗a low profile with regard to CO2 emissions... 1990 CO2 
emissions from industry and energy had been cut out by 33 percent 
compared with the 1970 levels‘489. 
 However, Sweden‘s low profile is not simply the result of 
environmentally friendly taxes, but Swedish reliance on nuclear power is the 
explanatory key. Yet, the triumph over CO2 emissions in this way might be 
a Pyrrhic victory, as dependence on nuclear power contributed to the 
difficult intra-EU negotiations over the European position on GCC, in 
addition to preventing opportunities for Swedish influence in other 
international fora. 
 As a matter of fact, some Swedish actions with respect to GCC 
contrast with Swedish successes in framing the air pollution issue. Sweden 
makes for an excellent case study because of its general environmentally 
friendly behavior and the expectations that are associated with Sweden, a 
fact highlighted by Kronsell‘s model of normative influence. During 
Sweden‘s accession to the EU in 1995, the government insisted on a special 
provision attached to its accession treaty stating that ‗the right to choose 
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sources of energy would not be affected by EU membership‘490. This 
provision ensured that Sweden retained its right to use nuclear power. In the 
wake of the 1973-74 oil embargo, Swedish policy sought to reduce 
dependency on foreign energy suppliers.
491
 In this context, nuclear energy 
was seen as a clean and cheap source of energy and it was designed to keep 
the entire nuclear fuel cycle within Sweden.
492
 Despite mild controversy, 
these factors eased the introduction of nuclear energy in Sweden and large-
scale development of nuclear power began in Sweden in 1975
493
. 
 The Swedish government nearly derailed the EU GCC strategy over 
the question of the ‗flexible mechanism‘. This provision allowed a state to 
substitute some of its mandated national emissions reductions with either 
ET, sustainable joint development projects with developing countries or 
facilitating CO2-reducing activities such as planting trees
494
. At stake was 
the extent of any future ET regime: most EU member state governments 
sought to place a ceiling on potential emissions trading as those states felt 
that at least 50 percent of the mandated national emission reductions should 
come from the targeted state.
495
 Sweden, along with the Netherlands, 
initially threatened to block any efforts to limit ET, an outlook that put them 
closer to the US position than that of the EU, essentially driving a wedge 
into the European position. Eventually, a compromise position was found in 
which further study would take into account Swedish and Dutch 
reservations about the manner in which the Kyoto Protocol process would 
take shape.   
 It seemed rather queer that Sweden sought to block a proposal in line 
with many of its international and national priorities and past behavior. The 
answer can be found in the low CO2 emission rates in Sweden prior to GCC 
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emergence as a problem on the international stage. Unlike the US, Sweden 
had already cut many of its emissions. Sweden‘s behavior regarding the EU 
position was much more like a laggard than a leader, but the Swedish 
position reflects earlier leader behavior on GCC issues. The member-state 
sovereignty concerns surrounding nuclear power explain Sweden‘s position 
in this case. Indeed, it is significant that the two European states that 
objected to the EU proposal were states that are both facing a potential 
phase-out of their nuclear power generating capacity
496
. Were the Swedes to 
phase out nuclear power, coal would be the most likely substitute, given the 
paucity, cost and logistical and transport difficulties of other appropriate 
energy sources. This predisposes the Swedes to favor unlimited ET in the 
event that a nuclear phase-out were ever to become reality. 
 However, Sweden had exercised leadership on GCC issues in the past 
and possessed the normative factors to exercise its leadership at the very 
moment it opted to be obstructionist. Explaining this fact needs more than 
an economics analysis, which should take into account Kronsell‘s norm-
based influence factors – knowledge, experience and expertise. As discussed 
above, Sweden had been an active participant in international GCC 
discussions. Additionally, Sweden also possessed national experts and 
national policy experience in responding to GCC concerns and, more 
generally, environmental policy-making with respect to atmospheric 
concerns. This set the stage for other states to expect environmentally 
friendly behavior from Sweden. 
 Nearly unravelling follow-up negotiations to the Kyoto Protocol is 
hardly an act with which one would be most likely to associate Sweden. 
Nevertheless, member-state sovereignty concerns overrode Sweden‘s 
environmentally positive norm-based influence approach. The issue was not 
that Sweden was unwilling to pay the price for increased environmentally 
sensitive practices - its past attests to its willingness to do so - it was that 
Sweden wanted to make the decisions regarding the use of nuclear power, 
the balance of nuclear power substitutes and the location of any required 
emissions reductions for itself as a sovereign nation. 
 Sweden entered the detailed commitments phase of the GCC 
negotiations with a desire to protect its domestic situation. The problem 
posed by the EU institutions and negotiating fora was that they restricted 
potential Swedish policies on this important national issue. Not only were 
such actions initially constraining, but they had the potential to become 
more so in the future. Matlary notes that the EU Commission was 
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aggressively seeking ‗to enhance its role as an actor in international energy 
policy‘.497 The ultimate success of this endeavor is unknown, but such a 
goal furthered concerns about EU decision-making power versus that of 
member-state decision-making power. 
 The EU, as a governing structure, provides forums that enhance the 
efficacy of citizen involvement and transnational activism. Namely, EU 
institutions offered a potential space in which the legitimacy of the actions 
of the Swedish state with respect to the 1980 referendum could be called 
into question; this allowed for the possibility of challenges to Swedish 
authority as a result of EU commitments. These challenges to the Swedish 
state‘s authority and control could come from either environmentalists or 
from industry on issues related to GHG emissions reduction commitments, 
nuclear power use, the relative price or availability of power or the value of 
key economic indicators. Thus, the Swedish position on ET was much less 
about weighing and balancing the various components of sovereignty in 
some sort of sovereignty bargain (Litfin 1997)
498
 than it was a wholesale 
defense of the entire sovereignty package as it applied to energy choice. 
 Sweden certainly cared about the environment and had made 
progressive moves on the international scene to this effect in the past. 
However, norm-based behavior has its limits; it would be simplistic to 
expect that the Swedes‘ environmentally friendly norms would guide their 
international and domestic policy choices and responses all the time. It is 
worthwhile, however, to understand the conditions under which these norms 
fail to dominate. In this case, examination reveals the way in which all three 
policy making levels interact: the societal level – where public opinion 
provided an enduring, if flexible, constraint, the state level – a powerful 
actor, which sought to mediate between societal feelings on nuclear power, 
economic stability and GHG reduction commitments and, last but not least, 
the systemic level – where Sweden deviated from its usual norm-based 
foreign policy, akin to the focus on ideas in Barkdull & Harris‘ s typology, 
to a foreign policy that protected sovereignty, akin to the focus on interests 
in the typology. 
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CHAPTER 7 SAP AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PROVING 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL HYPOTHESES 
 
 
1. Welfare state and welfare provision 
1.1. Swedish social democracy and the ‗folkhem‘ concept 
1.2. Human rights and environmental rights 
1.3. A new welfare state?  
2. Environmental politics as domestic party politics 
2.1. Party politics: behavior and dynamics 
2.1.1. SAP ideological heritage 
2.1.2. SAP-the party state? 
2.2. Conflictual issues in Swedish politics 
2.2.1. The nuclear issue in Swedish party politics 
2.2.2. The nuclear referendum and the Greens 
2.2.3. Political alternatives to the SAP: the Left coalition 
2.3. The environmental split within the SAP 
2.3.1. The environmental hypothesis 
2.3.2. The internal party cleavages 
2.3.3. Implications of the environmental conflict for the SAP 
3. The Swedish public opinion and the SAP 
3.1. The characteristics of the Swedish pubic opinion 
3.2. The internal party cleavages?  
3.3. The environmental cleavage within the SAP  
 
 
1. Welfare and welfare provision 
 Only recently have political scientists taken up the study of welfare 
state expansion in the period after WWII, which represents one of the most 
important development of the political establishment in the democratic state 
in Western Europe. Although, there are many existent configurations of the 
‗welfare state‘ across Western Europe, one deserves particular attention as it 
stands out as an ‗almost perfect incarnation‘ of it. Needless to say, there is 
the ‗Swedish Model‘ I am alluding to. Essentially, there are two ways of 
‗looking‘ and ‗analyzing‘ the welfare state. The first and still somewhat 
underdeveloped line of analysis consists in considering the welfare state as 
the cause of certain political phenomena inasmuch as – based on Theodore 
Lowi‘s famous adage ‗Policy makes politics‘ – social policies and 
programmes matter for political outcomes. The second and by far the most 
common approach is to examine welfare state development as an outcome 
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of political struggles and interventions
499
. 
 In this case study research of Sweden and social democracy, I have 
chosen the first line of thought to address the change in the Social 
Democratic Party electoral output and its hegemony. A somewhat 
exhaustive attention is dedicated in the second chapter to describe the first 
social democratic victory in democratic elections from the second 
perspective of inquiry, namely that politics matter for policy choices. 
However, this is episodical and limited to the exceptional historical events 
which preceded the coming into power of the SAP in 1932 and soon after 
till the formation of the first social democratic government in the world. A 
special stress is laid on the ‗December Compromise‘, between the trade 
unions LO and industrial interest groups represented by the SAF, since it 
was the cornerstone for the ensuing Swedish neo-corporatism, which 
represented the backbone of Swedish social democracy. Further on, the 
subsequent chapters depart from Lowi‘s idea, precisely that the welfare 
programmes and policies supported by the SAP made way for its political 
consolidation. The main thesis is that SAP political bet was the welfare state 
and then the gradual extension of welfare to other areas than the social one- 
complementary to the social ones. SAP political position strengthened as a 
result of active labour market policies coupled with generous welfare 
benefits. Moreover, the party‘s different approaches to welfare – social and 
environmental – enabled it to extend its electoral basin and win over certain 
segments of the Swedish electorate, although ‗environment‘ tarried one of 
the most important friction within the SAP sympathisers, in addition to and 
completing the main cleavage within the party, that between democrats and 
internationalists or ‗influencers‘. Certain issues – related to the SAP‘s 
relationship with the environment, need further clarification, especially in 
what concerns the electoral implications of a pro-environmental 
programmatic outlook. For these reasons, ‗the environment‘ became a 
political issue for the SAP to the extent that it came to be associated with the 
‗EU‘ issue. Precisely, more and more supporters of welfare and social 
democracy migrated to the left of the political spectrum – to the Greens and 
Left Party (ex-Communist) or even to the extreme right – in protest with the 
championed entry to the EU, a position upheld by the SAP elites and leaders 
and by the bourgeois coalition.  
  Moreover, social welfare is different from welfare provision, but 
both are ‗two overlapping facets‘ of the ‗people’s home‘, the social 
democratic unifying slogan. The concept of welfare provision, which is 
present in the title, highlights the main thesis underlining this research, 
namely the argument that the Swedish Social Democrats extended the 
notion of welfare or folkhemmet to include environmental protection with 
the legitimate objective of securing the political consensus necessary for 
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remaining in power and winning elections. The idea according to which not 
only social rights are an attribute of social democracy, but also 
environmental rights and responsibilities, has been launched at the end of 
the twentieth century in the Scandinavian countries. The welfare extension 
was gradually carried out within the common strategic framework of 
enlarging citizenship rights from Karel Vasak‘s notion of first and second 
generation of human rights – civil-political and social rights (Marshall T. H., 
1950)
500
 to fourth generation of social rights – also known as environmental 
rights
501
.  Therefore, social provision is not sufficient as an end in itself – 
even if it became more and more unattainable, especially towards the end of 
the SD Social Democratic reign, i.e. after the repeated crises brought about 
by globalization and by the increasing liberalization trends throughout the 
economy.  
 Coming back to SAP and its electorate, broadening the idea of 
folkhemmet to encompass environmental rights helped the SAP to assert 
itself in front of an electorate more and more exigent, which had overcome 
the class cleavage of the mid twentieth century and was ready to embrace 
postmaterialist values (Inglehardt, 1977; 1997)
502
. With the highest human 
index of development in the world, with a population highly unionized (in a 
proportion of 80%) and equally benefiting from redistribution - from the 
unemployed to the middle class family or single parent, the SAP was faced 
with a value change based on stricter and stricter economic competition and 
environmental requirements. Typically, social welfare provision refers to 
any program which seeks to provide a minimum level of income, service or 
other support for many marginalized groups such as the poor, elderly, and 
disabled people. In Sweden, social welfare provision also comprised high-
quality public education and financial family assistance
503
. Besides, social 
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welfare provision implies the protection of human environment, which is 
seen as a citizenship responsibility
504
.  
 However, social welfare provision is only a facet of the wider 
concept of welfare provision, which implies a generalization of welfare into 
all aspects of human life. It stretches to encompass leisure, mental and 
harmonious physical development as well as the right to high-quality 
education as inalienable rights of the young and adult persons. In other 
words, it means the constant quest for individual improvement and 
development
505
. An interesting aspect of social welfare, which often gets 
overlooked, is that welfare provision is closely related to the enforcement of 
rule of law through the justice system. There are close links between social 
welfare and justice systems as instruments of social control. Those involved 
in the social welfare system are generally treated much like those in the 
justice system. Assistance given to those in the justice system is more about 
allowing an individual to receive fair treatment rather than social welfare. 
While being involved in the justice system often excludes an individual 
from social welfare assistance, those exiting the justice system, such as 
released prisoners, and families of those involved in the justice system are 
often eligible for social welfare assistance because of increased needs and 
increased risk of recidivism unless assistance is provided. In some countries, 
improvements in social welfare services have been justified by savings 
being made in the justice system, as well as personal healthcare and legal 
costs
506
. 
 Likewise, financial transactions and trade are not exempted from 
taxes in welfare states, where welfare provision is based on tax enforcement 
and the rule of law. The construction of the Swedish welfare state was 
related to the consolidation of the social rights by extending the right to 
social provision to all citizens, including the new immigrants. The 
                                                                                                                            
are sick, injured or unable to care for themselves; free antenatal and postnatal care; free or 
low cost public education for all children, and financial aid; welfare money paid to persons 
from the government, who are in need of financial assistance but who are unable to work 
for pay. 
504
 In relation to that, the ecological footprint lies at the core of the principle of 
environmental human rights. Specialists agree that there need to be two new environmental 
human rights: the right to an environment free from toxic pollution and the right to 
ownership rights of natural resources. The Aarhus Convention is a new kind of 
environmental agreement that links environmental rights to human rights. The ecological 
footprint calculates the degree of environmental depletion, which jeopardizes future 
generations‘ right to a clean environment. 
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conditions of social provision were enlarged to universalistic welfare 
benefits and successively broadened to encompass the new environmental 
rights.  
  
1.1. ‗Folkhemmet‘ – the ‗folkhem‘ concept – from an 
environmental point of view 
 I have delved into the beginnings of the SAP ascension on the 
Swedish political scene in the second chapter. With the danger of repetition, 
I would still remind some ideas important for the later evolution of the SAP 
– from the perspective of both its political becoming and electoral record. 
After a series of electoral defeats, at the beginning of the century, SAP 
increasingly presented itself as a ‗people’s party‘, able to bridge the gap 
between the middle and the working classes through a series of economic 
policies of neo-keynesian imprint. The most ambitious deal was the Rehn-
Meidner model and its most ambitious social engineering attempt, the wage 
earners funds. 
 It is interesting to note, however, the fact that Swedish society was 
not, at the turn of the last century, formed by a majority of working classes, 
but, was a mixed society, in which middle classes approached the half. On 
one hand, the folkhemmet approach prepared the ground for the smooth 
transition to social democratic economy, i.e. for the successful 
implementation of the environmental principles at the local level - with the 
Agenda 21 launched at Rio – and at the national level by means of a well 
coordinated political and economic strategy. On the other hand, it ensured 
the smooth transition from an early capitalist 20th century economy to a 
social democratic one with stage one and stage two keynsesianism. While 
‗folkhem‘ designates the welfare society, ‗vaelffaerdsstaten‘ or welfare state 
refers to the administrative organization of social policy and its application 
rather than to the prosperous and secure society.  
 Folkhemmet
507
 is a political concept that played an important role in 
the history of the Swedish Social Democratic Party SAP and the Swedish 
welfare state. It is also sometimes used to refer to the long period between 
1932-76 when the Social Democrats were in power and the concept was put 
into practice.
508
 Sometimes referred to as ‗the Swedish Middle Way‘, 
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 the people‘s home in Swedish 
508
 The Social Democratic leaders Ernst Wigforss and Per Albin Hansson (1930s) are 
considered the main architects of the Folkhemmet, with inspiration coming from Rudolf 
Kjellen. It was later developed by the Prime Ministers Tage Erlander (1940s-1960s) and 
Olof Palme (1960s-1970s). Another important proponent was Hjalmar Branting, who came 
into contact with the concept while a student at Uppsala university, and went on to become 
Swedish Prime Minister. 
 Hansson introduced the concept in 1928, saying that Sweden should become more 
like a ‗good home‘, this being marked by equality and mutual understanding. Hansson 
advocated that the traditional class society should then be replaced by ‗the people’s home‘ 
(folkhemmet). 
 The concept came at a time when nationalization was being questioned, and 
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folkhemmet was viewed as a midway between capitalism and communism, 
although it advocated typical Swedish values – such as growth and 
prosperity within a level playing field of uniformity and democracy, which 
some researchers consider nationalistic values
509
. 
 Since the 1930s, the idea of ‗folkhemmet‘ has been the fundamental 
idea underlying the creation of the welfare state. This was the utopian vision 
of the social democratic project, a way of operationalizing a classless 
society and trying to realize it through social engineering. It was a vision of 
society as a community-based on solidarity, equality and care for the weak, 
the poor and the disadvantaged. However, the idea of folkhemmet also 
became a metaphor that legitimized rather paternalist and interventionist 
decision-making towards the general public during the more than forty-four 
years of uninterrupted social-democratic government. The decision-making 
process did accommodate organized interests but, nevertheless, excluded 
many groups and interests, which never became a part of the established 
elite. As long as the belief in the creation of the welfare state remained the 
                                                                                                                            
marked the party‘s abandonment of the notion of class struggle, a concept fundamental to 
the early Social Democratic movement. Instead they adapted a planned economy and what 
would be called Funktionsocialism, where businesses were controlled through regulations 
rather than government ownership. The government would then also have more control 
over the individual, however, to the extent required to increase the wellbeing of citizens. 
 Good education was considered particularly important for building the new 
society. As a result, Sweden became one of the first countries in the world to offer free 
education at all levels, including all public universities. Also free universal health care was 
provided by the state, along with many other services. 
 Myrdal‘s influence has been an integrative fact of Swedish politics in the second 
part of the twentieth century. During the 1930s social engineering became an important part 
of folkhemmet. Alva and Gunnar Myrdal‘s 1934 book ‗Kris i befolkningsfraagan‘ (FTN 
‗Crisis in the demographic problem‘, partly inspired by Malthusianism and Jean Piaget) 
inspired a radical and progressive policy for how to deal with the growing population. A 
number of changes took place in this period including expansion of the public sector, 
Wigforss‘ economic policies, Gustav Moeller‘s reform of the pension system, and Gunnar 
Myrdal‘s housing policies. 
 In the 1940s - 1950s, old worn down houses that served as the overcrowded 
dwellings of the lower class were demolished. Instead, people were offered modern housing 
with bathrooms and windows to let light into every room, so called ‗funkis‘ in Swedish. In 
the same way, new housing projects - or ‗working class suburbs‘ - were constructed in the 
1960s – 1970s to fill the needs of the increasing population, the so-called Million 
Programme. 
 Alva and Gunnar Myrdal suggested a series of programs designed to help families 
but also regulations in the form of compulsory sterilization. This was meant primarily to 
prevent mental illness and disease, and was thus supported by the government. As in 
Canada and the US, however, racial politics also became involved, due to a strong belief in 
the connection between race and genetic integrity among leading scientists and those 
carrying out the sterilizations. In the later decades it was primarily the mentally ill who 
were forcibly sterilized, and around 62.000 individuals were sterilized over a period of 40 
years until 1976. The Swedish state subsequently paid out damages to those who were 
sterilized. 
509
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vision of the general public as well, consensus prevailed. Environmental 
concerns can, perhaps, provide the new vision legitimizing governmental 
intervention. 
 The apparent success of the project of folkhemmet, particularly in 
the 1950s and until the 1970s, came out of a conviction among the public 
and the elites that it was possible to plan and engineer an equal and just 
society based on solidarity (Hirdman, 1989)
510
. This conviction also affected 
the way that international politics was carried out: establishing solidarity 
with the Third World through, for example, foreign aid; being an 
international critic, particularly during the Vietnam War; and setting ‗a good 
example‘ in the international context. Environmental concerns fit quite 
neatly into this picture because the Swedish have a long tradition of living 
close to nature, as reflected in the principle of public access to private land. I 
would argue that the Swedish project aimed at creating a ‗perfect society‘ 
and exporting the model as a good example to the rest of the world was 
made possible mainly because of the economic prosperity in post-war 
Sweden. The policy style that emerged during this period was one of 
cooperation and consensus. Through negotiations between the most 
important actors, compromises could be reached that were more 
constructive and beneficial to all than if the relationship had been 
adversarial. One could argue that this was only ‗fair weather politics‘ and 
that as long as the economy was growing and all interests could be paid off 
through, for example, employment, wage increases, political or 
administrative appointments and different social support systems, the model 
worked. Another argument might be that such modernist politics does not 
function in a post-modern era. Post-modern politics lacks the universal 
unity, the homogenous identity and the belief in hierarchical, standard 
solutions which the ‗Swedish model‘ presupposes511. 
 
1.2. Human rights and environmental rights 
 There are basically two schools of thought on which the political 
philosophical question of human rights, which both center on the process of 
transformation of the state. There is the ‗Rokkan school‘ which has an 
intensive method of considering the relationship between ‗welfare‘ and state 
formation, that is it holds that social policy helped the process of state-
building by gradually extending and differentiating citizenship rights in 
concentric circles. There is the ‗classical‘ school view, which explains 
human rights as a triad consisting of civil, political and social rights and 
benefits, which corresponded to successive phases in the history of state-
building. Social rights were not only compulsory for the achievement of the 
first two kind of rights, but increasingly came to mean environmental rights 
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after the 1970s. 
 The question of social and economic equality befalls the question of 
environmental welfare in the very end. That is why I agree with Flora‘s 
approach according to which the welfare state was an answer to the 
problems of development and to the increasing demands for social and 
economic equality. More and more, economic equality came to mean the 
right to a clean environment, as well as the right of future generations to a 
non-polluted environment. Therefore, we came to speak about citizens 
rights as environmental rights. Likewise, the vice versa holds true in that 
environmental rights are citizens‘ rights512.      
 In the Swedish case, welfare consensus was achieved by the 
generalization and extension of social care services. State building through 
social policy was interpreted according to an idea rooted in Marshall‘s 
(1964) theory of the codification and gradual extension of citizenship rights 
to increasingly larger segments of the population. Both issues of who 
counted as a citizen and who was entitled to the benefits of social policy 
were crucial in the struggle over the building of the national state. Marshall 
had proposed viewing citizenship rights as consisting of civil, political and 
social rights which corresponded to successive phases in the history of state 
building: eighteenth century civil rights established individual freedom; 
nineteenth-century political rights inaugurated political freedom; twentieth-
century social rights provided the foundation for social welfare. According 
to Flora and Rokkan, all these consecutive rights contributed to the 
constitution of the nation state. I come hereby to claim - against or including 
Flora‘s and Rokkan‘s claims of national state consolidation, but anyway 
widening it, that human rights came more and more to imply environmental 
rights with the twilight of the twentieth century once the threats of 
overpopulation and climate change imposed themselves. 
 Since civil rights emerged as the rights of individuals to be free, 
particularly in the economic realm as they were concomitant with the rapid 
economic development of the industrial revolution. Political rights were 
conceptualized as strengthened individual civil rights that both permitted 
groups to perform as legal individuals (as the recognition of the right of 
collective bargaining demonstrated) and established universal suffrage. The 
development of social rights came as a consequence of trying to remove the 
barriers that locked the full and equal exercise of civil and political rights. 
Capitalist market relations, poverty and inadequate education tended to 
reduce these rights to mere formal capacities, a contradiction that created the 
necessity for social policy. The final phase of state-building involved the 
development of social programmes, which guaranteed that members of a 
national community became, as citizens, inclusively entitled to the material 
promises of civil freedom and political equality.  
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 For instance, Stein Rokkan also came to see the welfare state as the 
completion of the state-building process and territorial consolidation: it was 
the ‗creation of territorial economic solidarity through measures to equalize 
benefits and opportunities both across regions and across strata of the 
population‘513. The Rokkan school in comparative welfare state research 
(with Peter Fora as its central figure) interpreted the welfare state as an 
answer to two problems of development: ‗the formation of national states 
and their transformation into mass democracies after the French 
Revolution, and the growth of capitalism that became the dominant mode of 
production after the Industrial Revolution‘514. The first problem to which 
the welfare state was a solution concerned the increasing demands for social 
and economic equality, which are the demands that completed the 
Marshallian triad of civil, political and social rights. According to the 
Rokkan school, it is mainly through the extension of the concept of human 
rights that the nature of the state was transformed
515
. The second solution 
the welfare state provided was to demands for socio-economic security in a 
system of industrial capitalism that dislodged large masses of people and 
made them dependent on the vagaries of the labour market, thereby rapidly 
destroying traditional forms of social security... The purpose of the welfare 
state in Sweden was precisely the provision of protection, which was 
achieved by building the welfare state system
516
. 
 
 
1.3. A new welfare state? 
 Esping Andersen (1999) analyzed welfare regime types based on the 
principles of universalism and de-commodification of social rights. He 
found 3 three regime types: the ‗liberal‘ welfare state, the ‗corporatist-
subsidiary‘ welfare type and the ‗social democratic‘ regime type. The 
Swedish welfare state belongs to the third type, which is composed of those 
countries in which the principles of universalism and decommodification of 
social rights were extended to the new middle classes
517
. 
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 The social democratic regime‘s policy of emancipation addresses both 
the market and the traditional family. In contrast to the corporatist-
subsidiarity model, the principle is not to wait until the family‘s capacity to 
aid is exhausted, but to preemptively socialize the costs of familyhood. The 
ideal is not to maximize dependence on the family, but capacity for 
individual independence. To this account, the model is a peculiar fusion of 
liberalism and socialism. The result is a welfare state that grants transfers 
directly to children and takes direct responsibility of caring for children, the 
aged and the helpless. It is, accordingly, committed to a heavy social service 
burden, not only to service family needs but also to allow women to choose 
work rather than the households. 
 Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the social democratic regime 
is its fusion of welfare and work. It is at once genuinely committed to a full 
employment guarantee and entirely dependent on its attainment. On the one 
side, the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection. On 
the other side, the enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, 
universalistic and decommodifying welfare system means that it must 
minimize social problems and maximize revenue income. This is obviously 
best done with most people working and the fewest possible living off social 
transfers. 
 The concept of de-commodification lies at the core of the Swedish 
welfare state model. Therefore, this concept needs to be clearly understood 
in order to analyze Swedish societal cleavages and political system. It would 
be absolutely wrong to believe that the socialists had a blueprint for 
decommodification. The Swedish socialists fumbled between a variety of 
policies, many of which were objectively on unsound socialist footing – 
except for the Rehn-Meidner labor market policies.  
 Also, at the core of the Swedish welfare state is the idea of ‗social 
rights‘. The Swedish welfare type system springs from the Beveridge 
principle of universal rights of citizenship, regardless of the degree of need 
or extent of work performance. Eligibility rests instead on being a citizen or 
long-time resident of the country. Invariably, these types of programs are 
built on the flat rate benefit principle. In principle, this ‗people’s welfare‘ 
approach has a strong de-commodifying potential, but obviously 
circumscribed by the largesse of the benefits. The people‘s welfare system 
                                                                                                                            
implied that services and benefits be upgraded to levels commensurate with even the most 
discriminating tastes of the new middle classes and second, that equality be furnished by 
guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better-off. 
This formula translates into a mix of highly de-commodifying and universalistic programs 
that, nonetheless, are tailored to differentiated expectations. Thus, manual workers come to 
enjoy rights identical to those of salaried white-collar employees or civil-servants; all 
strata are incorporated under one universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated 
according to accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market and consequently 
constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favor of the welfare state. All benefit, are 
dependent and will presumably feel obliged to pay.‘ (Esping Andersen, G. 1990. Three 
worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity, p27 
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(the ‗folkhemmet‘) has taken strongest hold in the Scandinavian nations and 
has been a long-standing principle in the socialist tradition of social policy. 
Although never implemented, it has been a perennial ideal in German social 
democracy. 
 To an extent the three system-types mirror Titmuss‘s well-known 
trichotomy of residual, industrial-achievement and institutional welfare 
states (Titmuss, 1958)
518
. In reality, however, there are no one-dimensional 
nations in the sense of a pure case.  
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2. Environmental politics as domestic party politics  
 As I have already pointed out, environmental party politics is closely 
related to the EU environmental policy partly because ‗Policy makes 
politics‘519. On the other side, environmental politics is made up of two 
levels, international and domestic, Putnam‘s level I and II, respectively. To 
adequately address Swedish party politics and explain the environmental 
cleavage within it, one must explain the two levels and their mutual 
influence. At the international level, human rights were broadened to 
encompass environmental rights while at the domestic level, economic 
competitiveness goals determined the observance and implementation of 
strict environmental standards. 
 However, Putnam is also keen to highlight that ‗the domestic 
determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress 
politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-
economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections‘ (Putnam 
1988: 432)
520
. Aspects of ‗party politics in a fragmented democracy‘ and 
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‗declining neocorporatism’ – the research variables considered here, are 
therefore clearly evident at Putnam‘s level II521. At the end of the day, the 
outcome of international negotiations is dependent upon the size of the level 
II ‗win-set‘, i.e. the set of all possible level I agreements necessary to win a 
majority among domestic constituents when simply voting to accept or 
reject an international agreement
522
. Also, the interference between level II 
and level I could be better illustrated through a comparison between 
international negotiations – based on prisoners‘ dilemma and tit-for-tat 
games – and the national ‗nested games‘ through ‗veto points‘ (Tsebelis, 
1999)
523
. Most of all, any deal cut internationally by political leaders must 
meet the acceptance of those that could veto its ratification back home. 
 The duality ‗party politics‘ – ‗neocorporatism‘ is equally useful – 
besides being a yardstick to address internal politics, in clarifying the nature 
of these domestic constituents and the problems when the respective 
Swedish ‗win-set‘ accepts high degrees of domestic disagreement. The lack 
of party agreement on EU-related questions – especially the environmental 
cleavage and the free trade cleavage, combined with the transitional changes 
affecting the ‗party politics-neocorporatism‘ points, ensure that 
environmental threats are seen, at the public level, as an appendage to a 
larger debate on Swedish political and corporate traditions and levels of 
welfare provision
524
. 
 
2.1. Party politics: behavior and dynamics  
 As Gaffney notes, while the literature on European integration and 
political parties is voluminous, ‗The literature on political parties in the 
Union, however, is minimal.‘ There are various theoretical approaches to 
studying the way political parties behave in relation to voters , to each other 
and to the institutions of the state. Ware (1996)
525
 classifies them as being 
founded on, respectively, sociological, institutional and competition-based 
explanations. Naturally enough, all these approaches have their heuristic 
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value. They each have very different starting points, but the three 
approaches are by no means wholly irreconcilable
526
. 
 It is the third approach, the competition based approach associated 
with Downs and the rational-choice school, that most influences the 
framework employed by this study. It too is more concerned with analysing 
and predicting the behavior of parties than with explaining their genesis, but 
its focus is on parties‘ relations with voters and, crucially, with other parties. 
Downs developed a theory of spatial competition to explain parties‘ 
behavior in economic terms. His model envisages politics as comprising a 
single spectrum, and which will be the product of their economic interests 
and general place in society. Voters are assumed, first, to form these views 
independently of political parties, and, second, to pursue them rationally and 
self-interestedly. Politicians are assumed to be motivated solely by attaining 
power. Parties, therefore, are vehicles for the attainment of office; the 
attraction of votes and the winning of elections is simply a means to that 
end. Parties thus seek to maximize their vote by casting their electoral net as 
widely as possible. For Downs, ideology was but an instrument, a 
mechanism for making parties‘ policy platforms cohere, and thus allowing 
voters to cut their ‗information costs‘ in selecting the policy options most 
favorable to themselves. His model assumes that ‗Parties formulate policies 
in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate 
policies‘527. A related view of parties‘ motivation is that of policy-
pursuit, a notion addressed by Strom
528
. His conception retains the idea of 
party leaders seeking votes in order to enjoy the private benefits of holding 
office, but it appreciates that this incentive must be balanced by upholding 
the wishes of the party‘s membership and activists, whose goals are likely to 
be the implementation of particular policies. Party leaders need a committed 
(and often voluntary) rank and file for various reasons, including 
administration, recruitment, campaigning and, in some countries at least, 
finance. They cannot afford to disappoint it too often by appearing to put 
their own office-seeking before that of having party policy implemented. 
Furthermore, this conflict gives rise to another trade-off that party leaders 
have to face: between immediate vote-seeking and the longer term 
attainment of office and policy pursuit. Participation in government is not 
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always the best way to attain a party‘s policy goals. Particularly if the party 
concerned is relatively small and likely to be a junior partner in a potential 
coalition, the possibility of their impact on the government‘s policy being 
outweighed by their estrangement from their more ideologically motivated 
activists may dissuade the party‘s leaders from taking up office even when 
they have the chance of doing so. Activists may consider the party‘s 
ideology to be better preserved in opposition rather than in government, and 
to avoid alienating them, the leadership may concur. There is also the 
danger of association in the eyes of the electorate with unpopular or painful 
measures that the government feels impelled to take. These considerations 
might, therefore, contribute towards a longer term strategy. A party might 
decide that its policies would be better promoted by eschewing immediate 
office. 
 Strom thus proposes 3 three models of party: those of parties as vote-
seekers, as office-seekers and as policy-seekers. All are plausible, he 
suggests, but all have obvious shortcomings as well. What is needed, 
therefore, is a theory that combines an understanding of all 3 three types of 
motive and, just as importantly, predicts the circumstances in which one or 
other will predominate. Thus, Strom‘s framework assumes party leaders‘ 
goals to be primarily office-seeking; they are ‗political entrepreneurs‘. 
Others in the party will also be attracted to the prospect of personal, private 
benefits obtainable through its patronage. But, the inherent scarcity of these 
benefits will mean that more purposive, ideological goals – that is, the 
promise of implementing particular policies – will be needed to maintain the 
active support of most activists and members. So, while party elites will 
usually be willing to make policy compromises to attain office and, 
instrumentally, to win votes, pressure from the more ideologically motivated 
rank and file will constrain their scope for compromising the party‘s stated 
policy goals. 
 This in turn contains echoes of other important contributions to 
political science. Tsebelis‘s notion of ‗nested games‘ involves an attempt to 
explain apparently irrational behavior. A political actor, he suggested, might 
be involved in different but simultaneous interaction with other actors, and 
the effects of juggling different objectives in different arenas could, if the 
observer was not aware of all the games being played, lead to what apppears 
to be irrational behavior
529
. On the theory of party behavior, the 
understanding that party leaders have different goals, and that these can 
sometimes come into conflict, is presented most clearly by Hamel and 
Janda. They envisage a party‘s leadership as having different goals: votes, in 
competition with other parties; unity between itself, its membership and its 
associated organizations; and policy implementation, which has at different 
times forced Social Democratic leaders to bid for support form other parties 
in order to build parliamentary majorities. 
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 The rational-choice approach to explaining party behavior, within 
which all these scholars can roughly be located, tends, naturally enough, to 
downgrade the role of ideas within it. One significant and wider-ranging 
analysis of social democratic parties‘ behavior, which allocates explicitly a 
role for ideology in an explanatory framework, is Kitschelt‘s much 
discussed ‗The Transformation of European Social Democracy‘. His 
starting point is a critique of class-based theories of social democratic 
fortunes, which suggests that such parties are perennially caught between 
seeking to expand their ‗appeal‘ beyond a shrinking voter base in the 
working class, and losing their core support in the process
530
. He suggests, 
however, that the evidence for this thesis is patchy. Instead, he focuses on 
other variables such as the party system, which is envisaged in Downsian 
spatial terms. Given the existence of social cleavages in the voting public, 
parties should be able to identify and implement a ‗rational‘ positioning on 
the political spectrum that either maximizes their electoral support, captures 
the ‗pivot‘ of the party system (that is, it takes enough votes to preclude the 
formation of opposing coalitions) or furthers a strategy of ‗oligopolistic 
competition‘ (attacking another left-wing party in order to gain 
unchallenged access to its voter base). Why some manage to pursue 
successful strategies and why others choose less successful, ‗irrational‘ 
strategies, Kitschelt attributes to two factors: organisation and ideology or 
what he calls a party‘s ‘discursive tradition’. 
 The political parties literature is vast and it comprises the 
organization, functions and ideology of the party system. Of interest for this 
research, however, it is the link between party structure and votes. ‘The 
continuity of ideas over time’, Kitschelt suggests, ‘is a critical factor 
influencing the ways parties stake out electoral appeals and hammer out 
intraparty consensus.’531 According to Kitschelt, in Sweden, the discursive 
tradition had deeper and more powerful roots. In the Swedish case, Kitschelt 
argues, the ideology adopted by its main left-of-centre party was grounded 
in the debate between socialism and liberalism at the end of the 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th. This debate was mainly about the size and 
power of the state and its capacity for redistribution of resources. It created a 
range of arguments and viewpoints that were acceptable within a party, and 
it made both SAP and Labor ill-equipped discursively to respond to the non-
materialist, non-statist agenda of both the free-market right and the 
libertarian left. In Sweden, during the 1970s and 1980s, the left libertarian 
tide was caught not by SAP but by the Communist Left, Green and Centre 
parties, which all exploited a general disillusionment with the elitism, 
corporatism and statism of the political system. 
 By contrast, Aylott‘s perspective is more nuanced on the role of 
discursive ideology. Precisely, he argues, if the ideological and discursive 
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obstacles to Scandinavian parties‘ modernizing were greater, there are still 
problems with Kitschelt‘s conceptualization of the relevance of ideology to 
modern European social democratic parties. One is that it accommodates so 
many independent variables and nods to so many branches of the 
comparative analysis of party behavior, that most outcomes could be fitted 
within it. Thus, as one critic points out, ‘if parties can lose and gain 
strategic flexibility so readily, does Kitschelt’s theory have any predictive 
power?’532 Yet, paradoxically, even the few years that have elapsed since its 
publication have not been kind to it, in terms of the type of political 
developments it deals with: witness the current renaissance of the left 
throughout Western Europe. Indeed, it is questionable whether any single 
theoretical model can be applicable to so many diverse countries as those 
Kitschelt attempts to analyze – and even they, as he admits, exclude 
numerous very relevant cases. However, such an ambitious project was 
never going to be uncontroversial in its arguments, nor completely accurate 
in its predictions. Moreover, it has at least 2 two interesting characteristics 
that make it useful.  
 First, it combines an appreciation of ideology‘s salience with the 
estimation of other, less abstract variables, ones that are in large part 
compatible with the rational-choice-based framework employed in other 
parts of this examination of the Swedish Social Democrats‘ European 
policy. Kitschelt dissociates himself from the rational-choice school of 
political science, his main complaint being that too many of its assumptions 
are unrealistic. But some of the tools he uses to measure aspects of internal 
party organization and inter-party competition are very similar to, or 
sometimes identical with, those used by scholars who are bracketed with 
that approach, such as Panebianco and, especially, Strom. Indeed, Kitschelt 
uses the standard rational-choice method of taking a definition of rational 
behavior as a ‗baseline‘, and then using that to gauge the importance of 
exogenous variables to a given problem. In this sense, his theory provides a 
coherent ‗bridge‘ between different approaches to studying party behavior, 
which is helpful to the objectives of this investigation.  
 The model‘s second useful characteristic is that it deals, albeit 
relatively briefly, with the issue of European integration for a West 
European social democratic party in light of its purported change of voters‘ 
preferences. He posits that the EU will pose a dilemma for the centre left
533
. 
This seems plausible, a priori, when applied to the Swedish case and indeed 
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to those of its Nordic sister parties. It may be that opposition to EU 
membership in SAP reflected a left-libertarian rejection of the centralization 
of political power that the Union represented. The objective of this chapter 
is thus to test both (a) the ideological profile of the SAP‘s membership and 
(b) its correlation, if any, with the distribution of attitudes towards European 
integration within the party. Although, according to Kitschelt, SAP has not 
been very successful in mobilizing the left-libertarian cleavage, some of its 
internal conflicts in recent years suggest that some sort of non-materialist 
constituency has a presence within the party. If this is the case, one should 
be able to see how important it was in explaining its deep disagreement over 
the desirability of joining the EU. 
 Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, it may be that, Kitschelt‘s 
hypothesis notwithstanding, there is something else in the ideological 
tradition of Swedish social democracy that sits ill with the character of the 
European Union. Certainly, there are authors who claim to have identified 
something special, even unique, in its intellectual approach to government. 
Again, if this is the case, our survey data should be able to identify its 
influence in contributing to the relative Euro-skepticism to be found among 
the grassroots of the Swedish SAP. 
 
2. Environmental politics as domestic party politics 
2.1. Party politics and neocorporatism 
2.1.1. SAP ideological heritage 
2.1.2. 
2.2. Conflictual issues in Swedish politics 
2.2.1. The nuclear issue in Swedish party politics 
2.2.2. The nuclear referendum and the Greens 
2.3. The environmental split within the SAP 
2.3.1. The environmental hypothesis 
2.3.2. The internal party cleavages/conflict issues 
2.3.3. Implications of the environmental conflict for the SAP 
 
2.1.1. SAP ideological heritage 
 The end of the 1950s, a period of reference in the history of the 
Swedish social democratic dominance, corresponds to a forceful ascension 
of the Social Democrats, the SAP, and of the idea of ‗state‘. The debate on 
the ATP scheme, the pension‘s scheme, and the dissolution of the left 
coalition – between SAP and the Center Party, Centerpartiet – eased the 
symbiosis between the SAP and the state. On one hand, the SAP helped 
promoting the principle of the compulsory complementary retirement within 
the collective solidarity scheme; on the other hand, the SAP rests alone in 
government without the need of a coalition. The management of the ATP 
scheme attributes to the wide public the administration of these retirement 
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funds. At the beginning of the 1960s, the neo-corporatist consultations 
between the SAF and the SAP - held at the private residence of the PM Tage 
Erlander – provide to the opposition the pretext to criticize the so-called 
‗Harpsund democracy‘. Around that date, the historical deal between the 
social democracy and the ‗business‘ interests took place; it marked the 
climax of the neo-corporatist system and of the experts and technocrats‘ 
power.  
 Things like the nomination of the state and trade unions‘ 
representatives at the banks‘ and enterprises‘ direction committees, the 
‗industrial democracy‘ program centered on the ‗co-decision‘ principle at 
the workplace, the wage earners funds became the preferred targets of the 
liberals and of the conservatives. In the 1980s, the public sector and the 
welfare state are hardly criticized by the right coalition. Consequently, the 
SAF subsidizes offensive ideological campaigns against them, i.e. against 
the welfare state and the expansion of the welfare state, with the aim of 
withdrawing from the negotiated agreements of collective wage bargaining. 
Simultaneously, the ideological transformation of the old conservative 
tradition into a new party of neo-liberal imprint which scolds state and 
public sector‘ s inefficacity, excessive fiscality and passive collectivist 
culture urged by the Swedish type social democracy
534
. 
 In his study, ‗The New Totalitarism‘, Roland Huntford‘s study, ‗The 
New Totalitarism‘535, represents a comfortable departure point to envisage 
the principal themes of the conservative-neoliberal discourse on the social 
democrat state. Huntford, British correspondent in Scandinavia in the 1960s, 
places his analysis under Aldous Huxley‘s ‗Brave New World‘ mark: the 
Swedes have become accustomed and subservient to the sweet welfare 
uniformization in exchange for social and economic security; the social 
democratic power rests on the grasp of the technological discourse, the 
reverence towards expertise and planification, the control of television and 
education and a new culture forged by the state and through the state at the 
service of society. 
 However, the snag with Huntford‘s thesis is that he is too culturally 
and ideologically biased in favor of neo-liberalism and conservatism, typical 
of the English tradition. Thus, one might interpret it in the sense that 
feudalism had moderated the centralization and the state absolutism in 
Britain facilitating the emergence of the social contract and political 
liberalism whereas its absence in Sweden was the cause of a centralized 
autocratic tradition. This thesis is the negative version of the Scandinavian 
consensus and compromise, also reiterated in ‗Sweden: The Middle Way‘ by 
Marquis Childs. Contradicting tendencies are at work here because this 
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point of view identifies secular tendencies in Swedish society while in the 
same time it obliterates the dimensions of conflict and pluralism, which are 
still present despite neocorporatism and one party domination.  
 By the same token, Huntford reviews the different sectors where the 
fusion between the state and the party took place in Sweden. The first 
indicator is that not one single separation was established between the SAP 
and the state apparatus or the representative system in general; there was no 
mention of the other political forces and of the parliament except as useless 
opposition, i.e. as a legislative ‗freight company‘ according to the 
expression employed in the Riksdag. Therefore, the SAP inherited 
bureaucratic state structures, which were ‗dirigiste‘, but increasingly added 
its own view of industrial planning as well as an accrued participation of the 
organized interests. The longevity of the social democrats in power has 
permitted the nomination of a high number of affiliated social democrats 
and trade-unionists in high responsibility posts in public administration and 
specialized committees. In other words, the SAP has only reinforced a pre-
existent established tradition and consolidated it. It has equally associated to 
the public sphere a number of organizations historically linked to the labor 
movement. ‗The remarkable role of the trade unions is difficult to be 
conceived of outside a totalitarian framework‘ according to Roland 
Huntford. All these elements are important because they correspond well 
enough to the standard description of the social democratic captive state, a 
description which is tributary to ‗political culture‘ analyses instead of 
informed empirical analyses. 
 
2.1.2. SAP – the party state? 
 The question of the institutional relationships between the social 
democratic regime and the state has a crucial importance as to its effects on 
Swedish national policy-making. Except for its motive impact on social 
policy, this relationship has been long time neglected. Conversely, many 
studies address the unique character of the Swedish workers‘ movement LO, 
the economic and social reformism, the trade unions‘ role, the importance of 
the collective wage bargaining as well as the negotiations taking place 
between the social partners with regard to the growth objectives of the 
industrial policy. For instance, the crucial problem of the relationship 
between the state and the SAP is slightly omitted. The bulk of the literature 
on ‗social democracy‘ in Sweden failed to look after the institutional 
dimension of the relationship between the state and Swedish social 
democracy, treating instead the autonomous ‗continuities‘ of the 
administrative agencies. Due to these shortcomings, the contrary theses of 
elite conspiracy and social democrat infiltration of the university and 
intellectual milieus are advanced. 
 In Sweden, the first real reflection on the institutional evolution of the 
social democracy in the state apparatus happened in the 1980s. It was Bo 
Rothstein who first initiated it by publishing his study ‗The neocorporatist 
 243 
state‘. His work is not a depoliticized approach – which is a weakness in 
itself – of the concept of ‗neo-corporatism‘, facilitated by the apparent 
functional division and the standardized circuits of the responsibilities 
typical to the system. Rothstein is the first to examine the formalized modes 
of participation of the state organizations and the social democratic 
strategies to their regard. Given the relatively new perspectives, which 
intervened rather late because both social democrat dominance and neo-
corporatist arrangements came to be submitted at heavy pressures, there is 
possible that their efforts rested isolated. The scientific discourse continued 
to distinguish itself from a hegemony rhetoric, which privileged the notion 
of a ‗social democratic regime‘ rather than the organic assimilation of both 
the state and the party. 
 
2.2. Conflictual environmental issues in Swedish politics 
2.2.1. Environmental concerns at the political level 
 Ever since the turn of the century, organized protests and social 
movements have been incorporated effectively in Swedish policy-making 
(Micheletti, 1991)
536
. At the political level, the stable five-party structure is 
illustrative of this. These five parties were strongly affiliated with different 
organized interests. The Social Democratic Party, for example, had – and it 
continues to have at the present – very strong ties with the Labor Union 
(Landsorganisationen), the Agrarian Party (Centerpartiet) had ties with the 
Farmers‘ Association (Lantbrukarnas Riksfoerbundet) and the Conservative 
Party (Moderaterna) had ties with the Employers‘ Association (Svenska 
Arbetsgivarefoereningen). But environmentalist concerns were not 
adequately accommodated within this five-party structure. In 1988, the lack 
of accommodation led to a sensational feat: the Green Party managed to 
break the five-party dominance that had lasted for seventy years because the 
wide public interest in, and concern for, environmental issues was not 
adequately reflected in the political programmes of the traditional parties: 
they were aligned ‗on one single scale: the left-right axis‘ (Vedung, 
1988)
537
. 
 The Agrarian Party was the only party in the parliament with an 
ideology that deviated from the left-right ideological line because it had its 
base in a rural electorate. The party‘s concerns to preserve the countryside 
and decentralize decision-making could accommodate a green profile; this 
became the strategy employed by the Agrarian Party‘s leaders in the 1960s. 
Because of this and its stand against nuclear energy, the Agrarian Party 
gained extreme popularity in the 1976 election and attracted voters with 
environmentalist and anti-nuclear values. The Agrarian Party gained 24 
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percent of the seats in parliament and this shifted the orientation from the 
socialist coalition, which had lasted for forty-four years, to the bourgeois 
coalition. As part of a coalition, the Agrarian Party did not succeed in 
stopping nuclear energy and it was forced to compromise on its general 
environmental profile. As a result, its popularity declined rapidly. 
 During the campaign against nuclear energy, which preceded the 
1980 referendum, the different movements opposing nuclear energy 
collaborated in the ‗People’s Campaign Against Nuclear Power‘. Although 
the alternative supported by the campaign lost in the referendum, the 
People‘s Campaign brought together, mobilized and organized different 
grassroots movements. This paved the way for the formation of an 
environmentalist party, the Green Party (Miljoepartiet De Groena), which 
was founded in 1981. During the 1982 and 1985 elections, the Green Party 
had already gained seats in many municipal councils, but it was in the 1988 
elections that the Green Party was finally elected in the Riksdag with more 
than the 4 percent needed for parliamentary representation. 
 On 1 January 1987, the government established a joint Environment 
and Energy Ministry as a step in the direction towards fulfilling the 
ambitions of the Brundtland Report. This ministry was given the 
responsibility of coordinating environmental issues. Apparently, the 
coordination of energy and environmental issues by one ministry was too 
difficult and by 1990 energy issues had been repatriated to the Industrial 
Ministry. The Environmental and Natural Resource Ministry, which is 
rather small and employs 150 staff members, has the responsibility for 
environmental issues, while the other ministries also have environmental 
responsibilities, but they were more specific to their sectors. 
 
2.2.2. The controversial nuclear issue in Swedish party politics - 
the nuclear referendum 
 In 1980, Sweden held a controversial national referendum in which 
the majority favored the reduction and eventual phasing out of nuclear 
power within its borders. All three options of the referendum had in 
common the view that there should be no further construction of nuclear 
power plants; at stake was the phase-out date for existing nuclear power 
plants. While referenda in Sweden are advisory, in earlier referenda the 
Swedish Parliament followed popular sentiment on two out of three votes. 
Although the 1980s referendum was criticized for not offering voters an 
option to continue the nuclear program and the option selected by the largest 
number of voters was the least restrictive of nuclear power, subsequent 
governments have remained at least rhetorically committed to the eventual 
goal of a nuclear phase-out. 
 During the time preceding the referendum, ardent anti-nuclear 
activists were able to advance their cause on the grounds of the potentially 
environmentally devastating effects of nuclear power, particularly in the 
event of an accident. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the US 
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cast ‗doubts on both the reliability of nuclear power and, perhaps even more 
importantly, the credibility of the nuclear power industry‘. The Social 
Democratic Party, which had already been wavering on the issue of nuclear 
power, withdrew its support for nuclear power in Sweden and called for a 
national referendum. 
 Although the outcome of the referendum was initially cited as a 
victory for the preservation of nuclear power, the winning provision 
contained a poison pill: it allowed for the development of six nuclear 
reactors, but it also limited future expansion by stating that no further 
reactor construction would take place after those six were built. Thus, the 
approval of this provision potentially meant ‗the end of nuclear energy in 
Sweden after the 25- to 30-year lifespan of the new reactors‘. That time 
period was to allow Sweden to develop alternative energy systems based on 
renewable resources. From the ‗apocalyptic vision‘ that dominated the 
campaign to the outcome of the final vote, themes of environmental 
degradation related to nuclear power represented salient and real concerns 
for the majority of the Swedish polity. 
 However, during the time since the 1980 referendum, ‗nuclear 
energy has more than doubled its share of total energy production‘. 
Additionally, since 1980, scientific awareness about the negative effects of 
other energy sources has grown, making nuclear power relatively more 
attractive. In particular, the Swedish Parliament granted protected status to 
the four major rivers in the north of the country, thus diminishing the 
likelihood that increased hydropower could compensate for a shutdown of 
nuclear power plants. 
 In 1991, as a response to the increasing reliance on nuclear power, 
an agreement was reached between ‗various corporate and political actors 
in the energy sector‘ which held that the phasing out of nuclear power 
would be postponed until 2010, the expected lifetime of the youngest 
reactor. In 2000, however, nuclear power represented 46 percent of 
Sweden‘s gross electricity production, second only to hydropower. 
Sweden‘s energy consumption per capita is high, and, even including taxes, 
electricity prices for industry and households remain among the lowest 
compared to other industrialized nations. 
 In March of 2002 the Swedish government set forth the conditions 
that must be fulfilled before the decommissioning of nuclear reactors 
commences. Namely, Sweden‘s electricity consumption must be reduced 
and a secure, environmentally responsible alternative source of energy must 
be in place. However, few serious investments in alternative energy sources 
have been made. The above circumstances have contributed to an ‗informal 
reversal of the referendum‘. 
 The results of the referendum combined with the national imperative 
for economic growth leave the Swedish state in a difficult place. Although 
the referendum was non-binding, the Swedish government will not easily be 
able to abandon the referendum results as they reflect a deep split in society. 
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Environmental policy-making is frequently a conflict-ridden process, a 
tendency likely to be exacerbated in this instance. Perhaps more important 
than the outcome of the choices concerning the continued use of nuclear 
power is who will make these choices. 
 
2.3. The environmental split  
 The contours of division within Swedish politics, and particularly 
within the SAP, were always centered on the social and economic 
dimensions of the society. Thus, the environmental dimension was always 
associated in one way or another to these two dimensions. How important to 
the party‘s divisions over EU membership were the distinct ideological 
elements previously identified, i.e. strategies and methods? Can existing 
ideological conflict be correlated with support for or opposition to Sweden‘s 
joining the Union? The data contained in the statistical tables are used to 
generate the two environmental hypotheses and to test them. The division 
over whether or not Sweden should join the Union corresponds significantly 
to another fault line in the party‘s ideological profile, which helps to 
integrate the previous most important environmental contours of division. 
The most obvious explanation for a division amongst party activists over 
questions of supranational integration is that it underlined the social and 
economic cleavages at the domestic level. 
 In addition to the pro vs. anti-EU integration, or influencers vs. 
democrats, there are mainly two important cleavages within the SAP, the 
free-traders versus pragmatists and the greens versus greys. These two 
conflict issues caused the split between the SAP elite and its rank-and-file. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Free traders versus pragmatists 
 In other European countries, it has usually been the supporters of free 
trade who have been in favor of European integration and the opponents 
who have been more skeptical. This has been clearly demonstrated during 
the Euroskeptical stages that the French Socialists and Communists passed 
through (and in the latter‘s case may still be passing through), in the British 
Labor Party‘s radical-left phase during the 1980s and, perhaps, in the Greek 
Socialists‘ more nationalist stages. In Sweden, however, there is little 
evidence of a correlation between left-wing radicalism and protectionism of 
the type that would be likely to result in a Eurosceptical policy position. 
Indeed, the principle of free-trade is virtually unquestioned in the Swedish 
public debate
538
.  
 In fact, there is arguably more evidence that some Swedish Social 
Democrats opposed EU membership on the grounds that the Union was not 
sufficiently committed to free trade. How and why Sweden‘s labor 
movement became reconciled to free trade at an early stage of its history 
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was clarified in the previous chapters with the first research hypotheses
539
. 
 One social democratic activist once argued that ‗The EU is not a 
socialist community‘. In the next breadth, he defended free trade; argued 
that membership would force Sweden to raise tariffs against the rest of the 
world; criticized the EU for its predilection for economic planning, as 
epitomized by the CAP; and insisted that social democracy should not try to 
order the market, but rather to distribute its fruits through high taxes and 
welfare benefits. Johanssson expressed similar views
540
. 
 Although the EEA was considered sufficient for Sweden‘s economic 
interests by some pro-membership Social Democrats, others felt that it was 
not enough. The chair of the Paper-Workers‘ Union, for example, feared 
that non-tariff bariers, such as custom controls at EU borders, could still 
disadvantage Sweden if it stayed outside the Union, and that higher interest 
rates might jeopardize much-needed investment. By contrast, the EEA was 
seen by most leading Eurosceptical Social Democrat as, at least, a 
reasonable deal for Sweden, giving it the market access it required but 
avoiding involvement in the common trade policy, the CAP and EMU. In 
interview, Johansson praised the terms of the EEA as providing for free 
trade between Sweden and the EU while also having potential for 
developing certain ‗flanking policies‘, including a social dimension. For 
him, an EEA that added controls over currency movements would be his 
‗Utopia‘. In addition, an anti-EU trade union activist described himself in 
the interview as on the radical left, but also radically in favor of free trade, 
the market-led shift to a service-based economy, and even the need to attract 
international capital. The EU‘s regulation and bureaucracy, he argued, 
would only put investors off Sweden. 
 Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is that, to many Social Democrats, 
the EU represented a violation of the party‘s traditional acceptance of – 
indeed, enthusiasm for – free trade, being seen as a protectionist, 
mercantilist organization. This was reflected in opposition to EU 
membership. Supporters of accession, meanwhile, while certainly not anti-
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free-trade, took a rather more pragmatic approach to the issue. Support for 
free trade could be tempered by other advantages, political and economic, 
that joining the Union would confer. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Greens versus Greys 
 There was surprisingly little observable evidence in the referendum 
campaign of a division between Social Democrats who prioritized economic 
growth and those who prioritized non-materialist objectives, such as a clean 
environment. No interviewee gave the environment as his or her main 
reason for voting for or against the accession. Yet, there is an apriori case 
for environmentalism being an important element in the modern Social 
Democratic Party
541
. 
 The environment is clearly an issue in Swedish politics, but it is not 
always expressed in inter-party cleavages. The Greens were formed as a 
party in 1981; they first entered the Riksdag in 1988 and after 1994 
appeared to establish themselves as a parliamentary force. Previously, 
however, if a cleavage between materialists and post-materialists has 
existed, it has been overlaid by other political cleavages and utilized – with, 
it would seem, different fortunes – by the Left and Centre parties. Some 
observers suggested that, in fact, the ‗new‘ cleavage actually represented a 
reactivation of one of those ‗old‘ cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, 
namely the one between rural and urban economic interests. However, 
Bennulf argues that there is little in existing Swedish survey data to suggest 
the existence of a cleavage that is distinct from left-right, the only exception 
being over nuclear power
542
. In sum, there is little evidence that a significant 
materialism-post-materialism dimension exists in Swedish party politics, or 
even in the Swedish electorate. 
 Yet, within the SAP, there is evidence of a significant post-materialist 
lobby, which prioritizes environmentalism over economic growth. 
Differences between the ‗green‘ and ‗grey‘ wings of the party found 
expression in argument about plans for a bridge over Oeresund between 
Southern Sweden and Denmark. It was the subject of particularly bitter 
argument at the party congress in September 1990, where the 
communications minister succeeded in attaining only conditional approval 
for the project. Even this approval was hardly granted, in the face of strong 
opposition from SSU, the Federation of Social Democratic Women and 
Christian Social Democrats. They argued that the environmental impact on 
the area – especially if, as the Danes were insisting, the bridge would carry 
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only road traffic rather than trains – would be too great543. 
 A persistent and more damaging row has occurred over nuclear power. 
A referendum in 1980 on Sweden‘s nuclear program, held in the aftermath 
of the accident at Three Mile Island, found a plurality in favor of phasing it 
out by 2010. SAP and LO, many of whose members were concerned at the 
consequences on employment caused by relinquishing nuclear energy – 
backed this line, but it only just defeated another of the three options on 
offer to voters, that of closing the reactors forthwith. A good number of 
Social Democrats preferred this policy. Polls suggested that only about two-
thirds of the party‘s supporters backed its leadership‘s line, despite its 
mounting a strong campaign for a ‗cautious decommissioning‘. The issue 
was revived by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and once more it 
caused serious friction within SAP. In 1990, authority was given to 
negotiate with other parties on the manner of decommissioning, although 
this was still to be achieved by 2010.  
 A vague agreement for a five-year energy program was agreed with 
the Centre and the Liberals in January 1991. As Sweden‘s economic 
situation deteriorated, it seemed increasingly likely that the party might take 
a more pragmatic stance and lay more emphasis on the economic costs of 
decommissioning
544
. 
 Given the SAP‘s recent history, it would be a surprise if there was no 
clash of opinion between ‗grey‘ and ‗green‘ Social Democrats on Europe. 
The Stockholm branch of SSU, in a motion to the 1993 party congress, 
argued that it was impossible ‗to achieve equality by lifting the whole world 
up to our standard of living. If we are to achieve equality, the rich world 
must reduce its consumption. Yet despite this, growth remains the goal, 
growth that in today‘s form increases the use of resources and creates still 
more pollution. Demand for growth in the rich world is a motor of 
environmental damage and makes equality between north and south 
impossible. The course the EC has set out has one overriding goal: to 
increase economic growth and to make the EC even richer... It is impossible 
to implement an effective defence of the environment when free competition 
and economic growth are made to overriding objectives...At the same time 
the EC prevents countries from taking the necessary steps away from this 
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process increased. In February 1997, the Social Democratic government incurred strong 
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– the first such decision in the world. Even the future of Sweden‘s other nuclear power 
plants, which back then provided more than half the country‘s electricity, remained 
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negative development
545
. 
 In contrast, some leading supporters of membership, particularly in the 
trade unions, made it clear that their objective was to achieve precisely this 
sort of economic growth for Sweden. In any case, the fact that some 
categories of people – young voters, for example – were likelier to vote for 
the environmentalist Left and Green parties and were also more likely to 
have voted No in the EU referendum, gives us some basis to work out the 
greens versus greys hypothesis. It is that there was a fault line in the party 
that divided those Social Democrats with materialist objectives – such as 
economic growth – and those with non-materialist objectives – such as the 
protection of the environment. What‘s more, this cleavage was reflected in 
the division over the EU: materialists voted in favor because of the promise 
of higher growth for Sweden in the Union; and non-materialists voted 
against because of a wish to preserve Swedish environmental standards and 
because the EU was seen as being inherently favorable to growth at the 
expense of environmentalism. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Influencers versus democrats 
 This is an alternative hypothesis which only confirms the first two by 
testing the null hypothesis. Some Social Democratic EU supporters insisted 
that EC membership was a question of democracy. Ingvar Carlsson, PM and 
party head, claimed: ‗Democracy is more than discussing or negotiating. It 
is also being able to make decisions that matter.‘ Likewise, a contributor to 
the debate about the party‘s ideological direction put the argument 
succinctly:  
 ‗A state like Sweden is formally sovereign, but today this sovereignty 
is in practice redundant... Modern society’s development has upset the 
symmetry between influencers and the influenced, between those who take 
decisions and those affected. This relationship no longer applies within the 
border of the nation state. The borders between domestic and foreign policy 
have, quite simply, been rubbed out.  
 Thus, I see the EU as an attempt to create a new symmetry – a new 
order for decision-making in cross-border social questions.‘546 
 Such views are surely to confuse democracy with power. Democracy 
is about the way in which decisions are made; power concerns what those 
decisions are about. The more reflexive supporters of membership 
acknowledged that there might be a price to be paid in democracy for 
Swedish membership. However, they also stressed that for any country there 
has to be a balance between democracy and efficiency as well as between 
the economic and the political and that joining the EU would strike the right 
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balance for Sweden
547
. Although the ‗democratic deficit‘ concerned him, the 
single market needed supranational rule-making and the EC provided both 
the market and the means to regulate transnational exchanges – a 
fundamental social democratic objective. Supranational politics, Carlsson 
claimed, was needed to complement an internationalized economy, to 
‗reassert the balance between the social economy and the business 
economy... The European left needs common democratic institutions so that 
our political ambitions can be realized.‘ Comparing the EU with the EEA, 
he declared: ‗It is sometimes suggested that the EEA... is enough for 
Sweden. If I were a director of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, I 
would agree. But for me, as a Social Democrat, it is completely inadequate.‘ 
 For many opponents, however, the terms of this trade-off between 
democracy and influence were unacceptable. Theirs was an opposition on 
principle to the idea of becoming ‗regimented’ to a supranational polity. To 
Johansson, for example, democracy – or perhaps, more precisely, the 
Swedish notion of folkstyre (literally, people‘s steering or rule) – was an end 
in itself. A functioning democratic society, he argued, required the 
mechanisms of both ‗vertical and horizontal communication‘, by which he 
meant, inter alia, a common language, culture and media. The EU could 
never hope to attain this; its undemocratic institutions were all at odds with 
Swedish democratic tradition. This was his fundamental objection to EU 
membership. It can be characterized as a purposive nationalism, with the 
nation state seen as a means for achieving another goal – namely, 
democracy. A senior member of the Social Democratic pro-membership 
side agreed that the most perceptive and persuasive members of the No 
lobby – people like Johansson and Marita Ulvskog, Carlsson‘s former press 
secretary and by then editor of a newspaper in Northern Sweden, Dala-
demokraten – did not stress the economics of the issue since Sweden‘s 
integration with the European economy, consummated/achieved in the EEA, 
was already a fact. Instead, they emphasized non-economic objections to 
Swedish membership: democracy, sovereignty, internationalism. 
 This last hypothesis brings forward the idea that the division between 
opponents and supporters of EU membership in the SAP actually reflected a 
disagreement over the relative merits of Swedish democracy and Swedish 
influence. For the pro-EU side, expanding national influence was to be 
prioritized in this particular situation. For the anti-EU side, either the gain in 
influence did not compensate for the loss of democracy or it could not 
compensate, so important was the principle of folkstyre; either way, in this 
particular situation, the ‗democracy‘ goal was to be prioritized over 
influence. 
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 In the words of one member of the SAP‘s National Executive, democracy is not an end 
in itself, but has to be used to achieve something else. One senior figure from the lobby 
group ‗Social Democrats for the EU‘ admitted that the EU was not a democratic polity, but 
that was not the point because it was an international organization, not a state. 
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Testing the hypotheses 
Free traders versus pragmatists 
 This hypothesis is far from being an obvious one. The departing idea 
was that Swedish Social Democrats, far from being suspicious of free trade 
as many of their European counterparts historically had been, were in fact 
strongly committed to it. Moreover, rather than seeing European integration 
as a means of promoting free trade, people in the SAP who opposed 
Sweden‘s joining the EU did so on the grounds that the Union inhibited free 
trade, especially with the poorer countries of the world. 
 Four questions in the survey were designed to test whether this 
hypothesis had any explanatory worth and, for that matter whether Swedish 
Social Democrats‘ reputation for adherence to free-trading principles was 
actually deserved. More than less, free-trading recipes were not at their 
height during the social democratic reign, but since they always were the 
backbone of the Swedish polity, they have been integrated into SAP‘s 
ideological line. 
 The results from the first question in this section, ‗What is your 
general attitude to free trade?‘ suggest that the reputation is deserved. Over 
three-quarters of respondents (77.2 percent) were in favor of free trade, 
which itself is a notable balance of opinion in a left centre party. As for this 
issue‘s correlation with the European question, over nine out of ten probable 
‗yes‘ voters (91.7 percent) supported free trade compared to fewer than two-
thirds (65.5 percent) of probable ‗no‘ voters. The fact that so many 
Eurosceptics were in favor of free trade is, in a European context, striking. 
But it certainly does not bear out the suggestion that activists inclined to 
vote against the EU were actually likely to be more supportive of free trade 
than those inclined to vote in favor.  
 A similar inference can be drawn from the responses to questions 
pertaining to the EEA. Again, it is notable that from all the probable 
opponents of EU membership, only 59.6 percent were in favor of EEA 
membership. But, it must also be acknowledged that, from all the probable 
supporters of EU membership, the figure was around 87.6 percent. 
 Finally, in this section, activists were asked if they thought there 
should be limits to free trade between Sweden and countries with lower 
social protection. This was designed to test commitment to the principles of 
free trade under less abstract circumstances, which might be expected to 
prick a social democratic conscience. Opposition to trading with countries 
and firms whose workers suffer, for instance, poor working conditions or 
very low pay rates, has been a constant feature of left-wing politics 
throughout the West for the last half of the 20th century. On the other hand, 
because such conditions are largely inevitable in the poorest countries, 
precisely because they are poor, the counter-argument is that trade with 
firms and countries whose workers endure them is not only unavoidable, but 
also desirable, as the wealth created would ultimately improve the lot of 
those workers. If Sweden were to impose restrictions on trade with countries 
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that had lower social standards than its own, there would be none in the 
world with which it could actually trade freely. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1 Testing the free-traders v pragmatists fault line (Adapted from 
Regeringen Statistics, 1998) 
 
Referendum voting intention 
 
   Yes%     Uncertain%   No% total%   
 
What is your general attitude to free trade? 
 
For   91.7         71.4    65.5  77.2(N=234) 
Uncertain    7.5         25.7    29.2 19.8(N=60) 
Against    0.8           2.9      5.3    3.0(N=9) 
Total  100(N=120) 100(N=70)   100(N=113) 100(N=303)  
 
What is your opinion of Sweden‘s membership of the EEA? 
 
For   87.6         67.6    59.6 72.5(N=222)  
Uncertain    9.9         31.0    28.9 21.9(N=67) 
Against    2.5           1.4    11.4   5.6(N=17) 
Total  100(N=121) 100(N=71)   100(N=114) 100(N=306) 
 
Should there be limits to free trade with countries that have lower social 
protection than Sweden? 
 
Yes   42.9         56.1    57.7 51.4(N=152) 
Uncertain  27.7         24.2    23.4 25.3(N=75) 
No   29.4         29.7    18.9 23.3(N=69) 
Total  100(N=119) 100(N=66)   100(N=111) 100(N=296) 
  
 Thus, it is perhaps not wholly a surprise to find party activists divided 
over the question: just over half (51.4 percent) favored such restrictions, 
while the remainder was fairly equally split between those who were 
uncertain about them (25.3 percent) and those who opposed them (23.3 
percent). Nearly a fifth (18.9 percent) of those likely to vote against EU 
membership were also opposed to restrictions on free trade; this suggests 
that our fourth hypothesis, about the cause of free trade being a motive for 
some Social Democratic Eurosceptics, is not entirely without foundation. 
But this observation must be put into perspective. Whereas 42.9 percent of 
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probable ‗yes‘ voters supported trade restrictions, as many as 57.7 percent 
of probable ‗no‘ voters did so. 
 There is, then, some evidence that free trade was a reason for some 
Social Democratic activists to vote against Sweden‘s accession to the EU. 
However, it was at best a marginal factor. Certainly, there is no evidence 
that supporters of EU membership in the party were any less committed to 
free trade; indeed, all the data suggest that they were more committed. 
 
Greens versus Greys 
 As we have seen, the evidence that a materialist-postmaterialist 
cleavage exists within the SAP is reasonably strong on the observable 
evidence (for instance, the struggles over nuclear power and the Oeresund 
bridge), though the hypothesized correlation between this and the party‘s 
division over Europe is based on more fragmentary evidence. A correlation 
was perceived by a fair proportion of the sample: 20.4 percent considered 
the party‘s Eurosceptics to be primarily motivated by environmentalism. 
The three questions - corresponding to the three fault lines – in this section 
sought to ascertain the extent of any cleavage between materialists or ‗grey‘ 
Social Democrats, and non-materialists, or green Social Democrats
548
. 
 The first question asked simply ‗If you had to choose, which do you 
think should take priority in Swedish policy?‘ In the responses, there did 
seem to be a very apparent split in the party on this fundamental issue. Just 
over half (51.4 percent) thought that economic growth should be the 
priority; just under half (48.6 percent) thought that it should be protection of 
the environment. Moreover, if the evidence of a connection between this 
fault-line and the one over Europe is not overwhelming, it is certainly 
present and significant. Of those respondents inclined to vote in favor, 58.2 
percent had growth as their preferred policy priority compared to only 41.8 
percent who preferred environmental protection. Among those likely to vote 
against, the distribution was reversed: 43 percent preferred growth and 57 
percent who preferred environmental protection.  
 Similar results can be seen in the next question, which sought to get 
away from abstract concepts and to establish the existence of a materialist-
nonmaterialist fault-line on the basis of a substantive political issue such as 
nuclear power. Nearly half of the respondents (48.5 percent) were in favor 
of nuclear power in Sweden, nearly a fifth (19.8 percent), were uncertain 
and nearly a third (31.7 percent) were against. The division in the party on 
this crucial issue is thus clear. Likewise, but less emphatically, is the 
correlation between it and the EU question. From all the probable favorable 
voters, 60.3 percent were in favor of nuclear power compared to just 41.1 
percent of probable opposed voters. Those against it, meanwhile, included 
45.5 percent of probable ‗no‘ voters compared to only 21.1 percent of 
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probable ‗yes‘ voters. 
 
Fig 2 Testing the green v grey fault-line (Adapted from Regeringen 
Statistics, 1998) 
 
 
Referendum voting intention 
 
   Yes%     Uncertain%   No% total%   
 
If you had to choose, which do you think should take priority in Swedish 
policy? 
 
Economic growth 
   58.2       53.7  43.0  51.4(N=146) 
Protection of the environment 
   41.8       46.3  37.0  48.6(N=138) 
total   100(N=110) 100(N=67)     100(N=107) 100(N=284) 
 
 
Are you for or against nuclear power in Sweden? 
 
For   60.3       40.0  41.1  48.5(N=147) 
Uncertain  18.2       32.9  13.4  19.8(N=60) 
Against  21.5       27.1  45.5  31.7(N=96) 
total
549
 100(N=121) 100(N=70)     100(N=112) 100(N=303) 
 
 Influencers versus democrats 
 This hypothesis proposed an ideological fault line in the SAP between 
those whose priority was the enhancement of Swedish national influence, 
for which EU membership offered more scope than any alternatives 
(including, for example, EEA membership) and those whose priority was 
the preservation of Swedish democracy, for which national sovereignty was 
considered indispensable. Four questions attempted to test this hypothesis. 
 The sample was first asked to choose one of three statements relating 
to ‗your view of democracy‘. It did not succeed in highlighting much of a 
difference in priority among the respondents. Nearly nine out of ten (87.8 
percent) agreed that ‗it should not be compromised just for economic gain‘, 
with just over one in ten (12.2 percent) thinking that ‘sometimes it is 
necessary to balance pure democracy with considerations of efficiency - for 
example, when managing the single European market‘. A distinction was 
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 The hypothesis that suggested a correlation between, on one hand, the divide among 
Social Democrats over EU membership and, on the other, one between grey and green 
Social democrats, has received some firm support in this survey. It is certainly the most 
‗successful‘ of the hypotheses presented thus far. 
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observable when responses were controlled for voting intention; but, their 
numbers were too small when set against those who prioritized democracy 
over efficiency, to be very significant. Similarly, responses to the statement, 
‗Democracy and national sovereignty are fundamentally interdependent‘, 
also failed to illuminate much of a divide. Over three-quarters of 
respondents (78.2 percent) fully or partly agreed, with around a sixth (15.7 
percent) disagreeing. Again, there was some discrepancy between probable 
supporters – ‗yes‘ voters – (33.9 percent of whom fully agreed, 23.7 percent 
of whom disagreed) and probable opponents – ‗no‘ voters – (51.8 percent of 
whom fully agreed while 10 percent of whom disagreed). But, once more, 
the general distribution of responses in support of democracy and national 
sovereignty‘s interdependence is more noteworthy. 
 
Fig 3 Testing the influence v democracy fault line (Adapted from 
Regeringen Statistics, 1998) 
 
Referendum voting intention 
 
Yes%  Uncertain%         No%                       total%       
Which, if any, of these statements most closely accords to your view of 
democracy? 
 
It should not be compromised just for economic gain 
81.2   87.9                        94.6                             87.8 (N=259) 
    
Sometimes it is necessary to balance pure democracy with considerations of 
efficiency - for example, when managing the European single market 
18.8   12.1        5.4                               12.2(N=36)    
‗Democracy and national sovereignty are fundamentally interdependent‘. 
 
Fully agree  33.9    36.6            51.8                               
Partly agree 37.3    45.1            31.8 
Uncertain    5.1      7.0              6.4 
total 
 
Which, if any, of the following statements most closely corresponds to your 
views on the EU and democracy? 
 
The EU is a democratic organization 
 
 
The EU at present lacks democratic credibility, but it can be improved 
through reform 
 
 
 257 
The EU is undemocratic and inherently incompatible with true democracy 
 
total 
 
‗EU membership offers a means of reasserting political influence over 
multinational firms and international capital.‘ 
 
Fully agree 
Partly agree 
Uncertain 
Disagree 
total 
 
 Finally, a question sought to test whether the sample considered that 
‗EU membership offers a means of reasserting political influence over 
multinational firms and international capital.‘ Nearly half (48 percent) fully 
or partly agreed with the statement; not so many, but fewer, actually 
disagreed (39.1 percent). While 25.4 percent of probable supporters fully 
agreed and as many as 58.5 percent partly agreed, the figures for probable 
opponents – ‗no‘ voters – were only 0.9 percent and 10.5 percent, 
respectively. While those disagreeing with the statement comprised fully 
76.3 percent of likely ‗no‘ voters, the proportion of likely ‗yes‘ voters was 
8.5 percent. 
 It would see that the notion of a cleavage between Social Democrats 
who prioritized national influence and those who prioritized democracy, 
does find some supporting data. But, it could be argued that no social 
democrat would disagree with the objective of attaining maximum 
democracy or improving political influence over multinational firms and 
capital. What these questions identify are rather differences in judgement – 
about the scope for democratically reforming the EU and its capacity for 
controlling the international economy - instead of ideological objectives. 
Conclusions drawn – in relation to this particular hypothesis – must then be 
especially provisional. 
 
Conclusion on the basis of the three hypotheses 
 If there is one overriding impression from analyzing the arguments 
deployed here, it is that the stance of each side was multifaceted. In as much 
as there can be a ‗monolithic‘ ideological positions in any party, on any 
major political issue, the Social Democrats‘ discussion about the EU was its 
antithesis. 
 There was at least some evidence to support all three hypotheses 
offered in this chapter. Isolationist welfare nationalism did appear to 
motivate some opponents of membership. Some did think that the Union 
offered an inadequate basis for the radical left Social democracy they 
espoused. They sooner or later joined the ranks of the Greens and Left 
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parties, parties which are situated at the left hand of the Swedish political 
continuum. 
 By contrast, neutrality was extremely important to many likely ‗no‘ 
voters. While a few activists did see membership as a violation to their 
commitment to free trade, others did consider membership incompatible 
with democracy. The reasons were diverging, but, nevertheless, they 
belonged to contiguous beliefs regarding the way the EU was constituted or 
the way members made a fundamental connection between national 
sovereignty and democracy also known as the ‗folkstyre-folkhemmet‘ 
relationship. In exactly the same way as ‗neutrality‘ represents a typical 
Swedish value widely shared by the public, ‗environmental compliance‘ is 
now a fundamental component of the public and private spheres.  
 Yet, none of these motivations was – in isolation – a convincing 
explanation of the divide within the SAP. Indeed, aspects of the party‘s 
Euroskepticism were contradictory. For instance, the insistence on 
maintaining maximum levels of free trade or on support for EEA 
membership, can hardly be squared with fears for the EEA‘s effect on the 
Swedish environmental and social welfare or with a rejection of economic 
growth as the basic goal of public policy. In other words, the European 
debate within the SAP was extremely eclectic, with unlikely coalitions 
forming around either support for or opposition to accession. 
 The data also suggested there was little ‗attraction‘ to the ‗European 
ideal’ among the many supporters of EU membership in the SAP. Large 
numbers of probable ‗yes‘ voters were ambivalent about the European 
identity and Sweden‘s position relative to it. They believed that accession 
might threaten Sweden‘s environmental policies and doubted whether the 
Union offered much of an opportunity for re-establishing political control 
over a globalized economy
550
. 
 As far as our research questions are concerned, it is possible to 
surmise that the prospect of EU membership did activate certain ideological 
cleavages, the roots and expressions of which can be identified by 
examining the history and the development of the party. Of the three 
hypotheses, the two with most evidence to sustain are the one concerning 
‗influencers‘ versus ‗democrats‘ – which brings up the latent ‗left against 
right‘ cleavage existent within the party – and the one concerning the ‗grey‘ 
v ‗green‘ or ‗materialist‘ v ‗nonmaterialist‘ conflict. Hence, one might 
wonder whether a type of ideological coalition – comprising the traditional 
left and post-materialist Social Democrats – constituted the opposition to the 
party leadership‘s plans for Sweden to join the EU. Post-materialism here 
also means increased environmental concerns and a positive attitude 
towards free market and trade while respecting social welfare rights
551
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 All this suggests that other, essentially negative reasons – perhaps most plausibly, the 
fear of isolation – may have persuaded them to fall behind their party leaders‘ position. 
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 The post-materialist element might be connected - in a way that the data presented here 
cannot illustrate, to SAP‘s long-standing support among the rural and small-town working 
 259 
 An alternative method of explanation is thus presented in the last 
chapter, which tries to put forward a conclusion. This chapter‘s method has 
been essentially inductive: it has observed the characteristics of the Social 
Democrats‘ divide and sought to provide an explanation for it on the basis 
of observation. While it is true that this approach has yielded valuable 
contextual information, it would be necessary to consider deductive methods 
of inquiry.  
 
3. The Swedish public opinion and the SAP 
3.1. The characteristics of the Swedish pubic opinion 
3.2. Environmental rights and the catch-all party: SAP‘s falling 
membership and the demise of the mass party 
3.3. The party cleavages in the Swedish political system 
 
3.1. The characteristics of the Swedish pubic opinion 
 In contrast to other analysts, I argue that SAP‘s electoral defeat after 
2000 are not irreversible and that the party has tried to counteract by 
building sustainable environmental goals and objectives. Lavelle (2007) 
explains how SAP‘s electoral problems were ‗forced in‘ by the cleavage 
between the party‘s leadership and the party‘s rank and file on public 
expenditure cuts. However, all analysts admit that the budget cuts were 
inevitable as a result of globalization and the end of the post-war boom. 
What distinguishes them is the accent laid on SAP‘s adherence to neo-
liberal reforms and the role they are willing to grant to this factor.  
 It is not a coincidence that SAP‘s loss of office in 1976 coincided with 
the beginning of the international economic downturn that undermined the 
Swedish Model. The SAP had experienced considerable losses in support in 
1973, but Bo Saerlvik attributes these and the loss of office in 1976 largely, 
though not exclusively, to economic problems such as inflation and 
unemployment that shook the Swedish public opinion confidence in the 
welfare state. Swedish public opinion change is the vulnerable point and the 
crux of the debate on the internal constraints (Putnam level II) which raised 
distrust in social democratic programmatic tradeoff between growth and 
security. As a general trend, ‗The Social Democrats decline in periods of 
fast-rising prices and gain strength in periods of stable prices and economic 
growth‘ (Saerlvik, 1977)552.  
 SAP‘s continued decline since the 1970s is partly a consequence of 
the harsh neo-liberal reforms enacted prior to losing office in 1991 and after 
                                                                                                                            
class in Sweden. Alternatively, it could mean that something like Inglehart‘s generational 
theory of political values is in operation in the party – except that, in contrast to what he 
proposed, it manifests itself in the SAP as opposition to rather than support to European 
integration. 
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resuming power in 1994. Close to 25 percent of voters at the 1988 election 
placed themselves to the left of the SAP and an even larger proportion of 
voters in 1990 believed that the government ‗had gone too far to the right in 
its public sector cuts and in promoting a tax reform package that did 
nothing to reduce disparities in wealth‘553. During this period there was 
gathering union and ‗rank-and-file worker dissatisfaction with SAP 
economic and financial policies’, which coincided with an incipient 
electoral dealignment at the expense of the Social Democrats, as voters 
either switched parties or abstained from participating in elections
554
. SAP 
and its defeated leader attribute its electoral loss down to the voter backlash 
expressed by an certain reluctance among left voters to accept the opening 
of the Swedish economy to the global markets and movements of 
international capital. When Social Democrats came back to power in 1994 
they had to reform the welfare state and reduce benefits in a somewhat 
unbalanced system, which led to big electoral losses for the left in the 1998 
election. Ann-Marie Lindgren
555
 sees the loss of support as a consequence 
of the government‘s enactment of ‗harsh measures necessary to eliminate 
the huge deficit in the state budget handed over by the former liberal-
conservative government of 1991-1994‘. In the same vein, Persson later 
conceded that the ‘welfare cuts almost resulted in a loss of office for the 
Social Democratic government’. 
 Sociological factors – concerning the decline in the industrial working 
class - cannot explain major slumps in support such as those experienced in 
1991 and 1998. As Pontusson
556
 argues, such factors ‗are simply too long-
term and incremental to capture the timing and dynamics of the crisis‘. 
Many authors concur to observe that SAP‘s performance has declined 
sharply in recent times. As the SAP itself noted in its 2003 Report
557
, its 
performance in the 1990s has been ‗shakier‘ and electoral support in the 
1990s on average was 5 percent less than in the 1980s. For instance, the 
party has received less than 40 percent of the vote only four times since 
1930 (1991, 1998, 2002 and 2006) and each of these occurred within the last 
five elections. Although Pontusson referrs here to a more general crisis in 
Swedish social democracy rather than to an electoral one in particular, his 
point is relevant for what concerns the impact of welfare reform on the 
electoral score of the SAP. Arter made the point that, after the 2002 election, 
the party had received less than 40 percent only 3 three times. However, 
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subsequently to the 2006 elections, SAP‘s share of votes further declined 
substantially. 
 The vulnerable point when addressing SAP‘s continuous electoral 
degradation is European integration. The SAP‘s related push for European 
integration undoubtedly has also contributed to its loss of support. The 
reversal of the leadership‘s long-standing opposition to EU membership 
opened up a large gulf between itself and party supporters. Around 50 
percent of SAP‘s voters, especially those in blue-collar work from the LO, 
eventually voted ‗No‘ in the 1994 referendum on EU accession. There was a 
‗groundswell of opposition‘ within the party to membership and the SAP‘s 
pro-European stance ‗shook the loyalty‘ of party supporters (Arter558; 
Einhorn and Logue
559
). Miles (1997)
560
 argues that integration ‗reinforces 
the process‘ by which the SAP becomes progressively less social 
democratic and increasingly ‗classless‘ in orientation561.  
 Since EU membership is directly associated with the unpopular 
welfare cuts of the 1990s, advocation and support of European integration 
cost the party badly at the 1998 election. Among SAP supporters, opposition 
to the European project stems from a variety of sources such as concern 
over the ‗democratic deficit‘, the perception that neo-liberals predominate in 
Europe and the fear that reduced welfare and incomes will follow 
integration (Lindgren, 2005)
562
. Among the variety of problems for the SAP 
in the lead-up to its defeat in 2006 was the Euro debacle, which Persson 
himself rated as his biggest failure
563
. Despite some two-thirds of SAP 
parliamentarians urging a ‗Yes‘ vote, exit polls showed that a majority of 
SAP supporters (53 percent) and almost 70 percent of trade unionists, voted 
‗No‘564. 
 After the major drop in support in the year 1998, the SAP‘s vote did 
recover in 2002. Explanations for this positive electoral outcome include the 
impact played by the economic recovery, which allowed some increases in 
government spending in 1999 and 2000 whereby the SAP – once again in 
office – managed to deal with unemployment and to help alleviate the ‗pain‘ 
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caused by the cuts from the previous years
565
. The SAP‘s vote also 
improved in the context of division among the non-socialist parties and the 
lack of a clear cut alternative to the prime minister candidate. Even so, this 
result – of just less than 40 percent – was still very poor, historically 
speaking
566
. 
 The fact that the year 2002 – when the SAP came again back into 
power – did not signal a return to SAP hegemony was proved beyond doubt 
by its loss of power at the September 2006 poll when its share of the vote 
fell nearly 5 percent to 35 percent. Its worst result in a parliamentary 
election since 1920, the year 2006 showed that the SAP was bedeviled by 
high unemployment, which the conservative ‗Alliance for Sweden‘ 
nominated as its main policy focus and about which the SAP had little to 
say except to advocate supply-side measures in the labor market and 
education (While the Alliance – comprised of the Moderate Party, Centre 
Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals – successfully advocated liberal 
neo-monetarist solutions, ‗the SAP leadership quite simply lacked ideas 
about how jobless growth should be addressed‘ in the words of one SAP 
MEP
567
. 
 In addition, when confronted with the Left Party‘s proposal to expand 
public sector employment by 200 000 two hundred thousand jobs, the SAP 
ridiculed it by saying that ‗we all want world peace‘. This latter fact pertains 
to the relationship between SAP and the left coalition, which is going to be 
treated at length in the next subchapter. However, the SAP did pledge to 
raise unemployment benefits, build more homes for the elderly, improve 
their housing benefits and reduce the cost of dentistry, but the timing of the 
reforms‘ introduction was left open and would depend on the state of the 
economy and public finances: ‗Quite honestly, the scope for new reforms is 
extremely limited in 2007. They would come later in the term.‘568. 
 The fact that unemployment was a major weakness in SAP‘s electoral 
discourse is illustrative of the social democrats‘ inability to differentiate 
themselves as a viable alternative to the right-wing alliance. According to 
Pelizzo (2003)
569
, this manifest inability of the SAP in the electoral 
campaign has constituted the main reason for the defeat since the voters 
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couldn‘t distinguish anymore the differences between the center-left and the 
center-right parties. What is more, the Alliance had incurred ‗into traditional 
Social Democratic territory through pushing jobs as its main issue‘ as Aylott 
and Bolin (2007)
570
 don‘t fail to observe. In this sense, it is not surprising 
that some 56 percent of SAP‘s local associations chairpersons argued for the 
party to move to the left in the wake of the election defeat. 
 
3.2. Environmental rights and the catch-all party: SAP‘s falling 
membership and the demise of the mass party 
 SAP‘s membership rose from approximately 550 000 five hundred 
fifty thousand in 1946 to over one million in 1990 on the back of collective 
trade union affiliation to the party. This qualified the SAP as the ‗mass party 
par excellence‘ among its fellow social democrat parties in Western 
European democracies. According to Einhorn and Logue (2003)
571
, it then 
slumped to 259 000 in 1992 when collective affiliation ended
572
. The figure 
had fallen further to 177 000 by 1999
573
. The SAP admitted that its numbers 
‗have been declining for the last ten years, but this year... we have noticed a 
slight increase‘574. Indeed, in 2003, the party claimed a membership figure 
of 152 000. 
 In addition to the quantitative decline, there has been a qualitative 
deterioration: ‗The general perception is that the numbers of party members 
attending meetings have declined both absolutely and relatively. Many 
subsidiary Social Democratic organizations – clubs, newspapers, 
cooperatives and the like – have folded; others, such as sports clubs, have 
lost their political ties in the process of surviving. It is, rather, a proof of the 
ongoing phenomenon of the party as a social organization. The problem is 
particularly apparent in urban areas and, from all the movement parties, the 
Social Democrats have been most affected. 
 The slump in membership is, of course, not solely attributable to the 
party‘s neoliberal trajectory. SAP politicians themselves point to the decline 
in membership for other political parties and voluntary organizations and 
there is evidence to support their claims
575
. Yet, party membership decline is 
neither universal nor inexorable; examples of the opposite trend – left 
parties‘ membership increase – can be met in Germany and Australia with 
the Left Party and the Green Party, respectively, registering membership 
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growth. Also, while the SAP‘s absolute membership fell from 229 095 to 
162 578 between 1989 and 1998, the Swedish Left Party‘s membership 
remained at under 13000 over the same period. Similarly, the Greens‘ 
membership rose from 2000 in 1981 when the party was formed to a peak of 
almost 9000 in 1988 before dropping back to about 8000 in 1998 
576
.  
 The timing of the SAP‘s membership losses presents a problem for the 
sociological explanation for membership losses. Widfeldt‘s research reveals 
that membership did indeed decline after accounting for the discrepancy 
between ‗genuine‘ members and total members under collective affiliation. 
Although individual membership figures were apparently stable in the years 
between 1974-1991, the compulsory affiliation to the SAP through LO was 
definitively abolished in 1992. Membership was stable in the first part of the 
1990s, but fell dramatically by around 40 percent between 1995 and 2002, a 
trend that appears to be inexplicable according to sociological factors.  
 The SAP itself referred in 2003 to declining membership only over the 
past ‗ten years‘. An explanation more plausible than the sociological one is 
that membership stabilized in the lead-up to the party‘s re-election in 1994, 
but then fell out of disappointment with the neo-liberal measures that the 
SAP prescribed upon its return to power and which cost it dearly at the 1998 
election. While the evidence in this case is more circumstantial than in the 
others, the disaffected membership thesis is the most plausible one in terms 
of the capacity to explain declining membership in the 1990s. 
 According to a majority of analysts, rather than simply being rooted in 
structural causes or social trends, the sharp nature of the SAP‘s membership 
decline in the 1990s is undoubtedly related to the discontent caused by the 
party‘s abandonment of its traditional social democratic policy approach for 
a neo-liberal one. This may have contributed to earlier membership losses 
since the SAP‘s neo-liberal trajectory commenced prior to the 1990s, but it 
is impossible to know by how much. What is clear, however, is that since 
the 1990s there has been an internal SAP opposition which is convinced 
‗that the party has betrayed its ideals and voters.‘  
 The SAP has also faced ‗internal resistance‘ to its public sector 
reforms and members have resented the policy changes that have weakened 
party-union connections
577
. According to Aylott
578
, the economic reforms 
enacted since the end of the 1980s had ‗estranged the unions, but also the 
party’s rank-and-file members from the leadership‘. As a result of these 
policy trends, many members ‗are not proud of being social democrats‘579. 
 Furthermore, the lack of a social democratic identity is clearer and 
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clearer with the advent of social democratic loss at the ballots. As the 
Swedish parties have become less ideologically distinct, a decline in the 
party identification has appeared which contributed to the decline in 
electoral score. As the Swedish parties have become less ideologically 
distinct, this has contributed to a decline in party identification. According 
to SAP parliamentarian Margareta Israelsson, the declining membership 
problem is partly related to the weaker party-union links and to the fact that 
Swedish people find it increasingly difficult to determine ‗what is left and 
what is right and what is in the middle‘. Israelsson claimed that some 
members ask ‗Where are the social democratic ideas? Where is the social 
democratic ideology? I can hear them say that. They [the parties] all look 
the same today‘ (Israelsson, 2005)580. Aylott refers to the ‗widespread 
impression among its remaining members of a loss of affiliation with the 
trade union movement in the form of collective membership, which made the 
SAP to look like a ‘voters’ catch-all party‘ which prioritized electoral gains 
over policy
581
. It was clearly shown above, however, that neo-liberal 
policies have been costly in terms of votes, too
582
. 
 An additional factor in the case of Sweden, which would explain the 
timing of the post-1994 decline, is the great deal of angst within the party 
over European integration. Borrowing from the work of Arter, Miles 
(2000)
583
 argues that integration provided a ‗significant source of internal 
party friction in the mid to late 1990s‘. According to Nilsson (2003), there 
was no attempt at consultation with its membership when the SAP 
government in 1990 reversed its position on accession. Moreover, the 
proposal that Sweden should join the EU was sneaked in as just one point 
among many in a political crisis package submitted before the Riksdag. 
Aylott
584
 argues that anti-accession argument was the strongest at the grass-
roots level. Opinion polling in 1992 revealed that less than a quarter of the 
SAP members were in favor of full-EU membership with 47 percent against 
and 36 percent unsure. In addition to the fact that a decisive majority of 
party members were opposed to Sweden joining the EU, most surveys 
suggested ‗a clear elite versus «grassroot» split within the party‘. For 
instance, only half the SAP‘s membership went on to vote for EU 
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membership at the referendum in 1994
585
. Lending further credence to the 
suggestion that EU-related issues have been a factor in membership decline 
was the post-referendum call by some inside the party for the establishment 
of a breakaway anti-EU social democratic party
586
. The SAP leadership‘s 
support for joining the common currency at the 2003 referendum is likely to 
have deepened membership discontent. SAP international secretary Anne 
Linde concedes that half the party activists and social democratic voters are 
critical of the EU and that ‗we have clearly not been able to explain why the 
party elected people are in favor‘. EU debates intersect with the wider 
argument over the party‘s direction; whereas for the party traditionalists EU 
integration poses a threat to the ‗principles of Swedish social democracy‘ 
and the future of the welfare state, for the ‗modernizers‘ it is part of the 
wider project of reforming the Swedish model
587
. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 
  
 From the environmental perspective, the theoretical skeleton of this 
research is based on the ‗twin‘ concepts of ‗Europeanization‘ and ‗policy 
network‘ in international relations. They both help to bridge the gap 
between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as underlying theories 
of European integration. The dichotomy ‗intergovernmentalism‘ versus 
‗neofunctionalism‘ is present into all three main relationships upon which 
this research is structured and at both levels – domestic and international – 
of Putnam‘s dual game.  
 Apparently, from a theoretical point of view, Swedish debut activity 
in the United Nations - as an environmental leader against acidification and 
eutrophication – cannot be reconciled with its subsequent activity in the EU. 
That is because, theoretically, Sweden acted in a neofunctionalist manner 
throughout the whole UN period, relying partly on its ‗interests‘, partly on 
its normative behavior, as a creator of norms on the international stage.  
 Sweden‘s interests here mean its domestic interests at home, 
articulated in a neo-corporatist manner through collective bargaining and 
wage centralization. In turn, these interests had to be transposed into 
‗norms‘ at the international level able to achieve national foreign policy 
objectives. Most of the time, these interests were always articulated in an 
‗environmentalist‘ logic and bore upon normative arguments. 
 However, from a foreign policy point of view, the question of the 
environment has never been an issue of foreign diplomacy. The old ‗real 
politik‘ school of thought does not pay attention to else than concepts such 
as balance of power, interest and actors without any heed or hint to ideas of 
transnational cooperation and agreements. I intend to move beyond the 
‗realist‘ theoretical approach of international organizations, which merely 
conceives of them as arenas for national interest accommodation and 
conflict resolution to a broader understanding of international institutions as 
negotiated sectoral legal systems. This is exclusively due to the 
methodological fact that I am concerned with the importance of 
environmental policy in the domestic politics of one country. According to 
Oberthur and Gehring (2006)
588
, only negotiated institutions may be used   
instrumentally to bring about ‗collectively desired‘ change in the 
international system inasmuch as they constitute distinct systems of norms 
negotiated to balance the interests of the member states and other actors 
involved. They also include in this category – of negotiated institutions – all 
EU legal instruments such as regulations and directives, which they identify 
as ‗the suitable functional equivalent of specific international institutions at 
the EU level inasmuch as [...] they focus on limited functionally defined 
issue areas and possess separate communication processes‘. Although I am 
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not concerned here with the study of international institutional change or 
effectiveness, it is worth mentioning Keohane‘s definition of international 
institutions
589
 as ‗persistent and connected set of rules and practices that 
prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations‘. This 
definition opens up a starting point in my theory of environmental policy 
building as a coherent set of legal instruments brought on with considerable 
input from a leader country. Additionally, the leadership position of Sweden 
in formulating and setting up the environmental agenda is based on its 
‗positive‘ environmental record at the domestic level.  
 Since it is extremely helpful in accounting for the leadership position 
of a single actor in the international arena, I based this part of the analysis 
on environmental policy analysis or FPA as developed by Harris et al. 
(2002)
590
. His analytical approach underlines the crossover and interaction 
between domestic and international politics with the aim of examining 
environmental issues on multiple levels. That is, Swedish environmental 
leadership cannot be fully understood by looking solely at domestic policy 
and policy making, on the one hand, or by examining international politics 
and diplomacy, on the other. This research‘s independent variable – one 
state environmental leadership – focuses on the crossover between the 
domestic and international arenas of politics and policy making just as FPA 
does. As FPA pays attention to the crossover between these levels of 
analysis, and indeed includes each of them, it is a potentially productive 
way to of viewing the problem, its causes and potential solutions. One way 
of assessing the impact of the ‗environmental leadership‘ variable is to 
frame the environment issue in terms of environmental foreign policy, and 
to look in some detail at the actors and processes of foreign policy that, by 
definition, operate in the analytical space that crosses over between the 
domestic and the international. 
 Barkdull and Harris (2002) propose a framework typology that 
highlights a variety of potentially important variables in the shaping of 
foreign policies in particular circumstances related to addressing 
international environmental issues. The authors note that most theoretical 
approaches to foreign policy are of three major types based on the 
explanatory forces they emphasize: systemic, societal or state-centric.  
 These three broad approaches to understanding foreign policy – 
focusing on the international system, domestic society or the state – can be 
refined by simultaneously considering, in each case, the role of power, 
interests and ideas
591
. In brief, there are: the ‗realist‘ approach, the ‗liberal 
institutionalism‘ approach and the ‗constructivist‘ method. The first 
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approach – a power-based approach and often characterized as ‗realism‘, 
countries join international regimes due to hegemonic or oligopoly 
distribution of power in the international system. Hegemons or small groups 
of leading powers create regimes that serve their interests, and then force 
them upon their countries. Alternatively, interest-based theories – often 
associated with liberal institutionalism – posit that international cooperation 
stems from the desires of states to promote their interests in a given issue 
area. According to this perspective, hegemonic power is not essential 
because rational state actors will cooperate to achieve joint gains.  This 
latter approach, the societal or ‗interest-based‘ approach is privileged here 
in this research – together with the intergovernmentalist approach in 
international relations – as it is the underlying theoretical basis for the 
demonstration of both the first and second hypotheses from chapter three 
and chapter 6, respectively. 
 Yet another set of theories focus on ideas and on what Smith calls 
the ‗social construction of foreign policy‘592. Ideas can direct international 
actors toward new ways to pursue their interests, whether unilaterally or 
multilaterally. From this ‗constructivist‘ perspective, material interests and 
power may have limited influence compared to even more influential 
identities that the international system generates for global actors. This third 
B& H approach, the state approach, is not privileged here but it is used in 
combination with the ‗neo-constructivist‘ and neofunctionalist approaches 
in order to highlight the ‗validity‘ of the first two approaches – societal and 
intergovernmentalist. For instance, Swedish obligations to take on the 
initiative in many environmental issue areas, have influenced policy framing 
in this respect, but power configurations among European and other states, 
as well as assessments  of national interests in this context, mean that 
influence of those ideas in shaping environmental policy are substantially 
reduced.  
 By contrast, alternative theories state that there is a correlation 
between political culture and environmental performance. However, in the 
Swedish case, this kind of theories are infirmed by societal-
intergovernmental approaches and not at all explored in this research. 
Recalling Lijphardt‘s measures of consensus democracy, he comes up with 
a two indexes solution for assessing environmental performance in 36 
thirty-six democracies. The first is Monte Palmer‘s (1997) composite index 
of concern for the environment based mainly on CO2 emissions, fertilizer 
consumption and deforestation. This index ranges from a theoretical high of 
one hundred points, indicating the best environmental performance to a low 
of zero points for the worst performance; the correlation is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level and is not affected when the level of 
development is controlled for. The second index for assessing 
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environmental responsibility is energy efficiency. The most environmentally 
responsible countries, among which Sweden is topping the list, produce 
goods and services with the lowest relative consumption of energy; the least 
responsible countries waste a great deal of energy. The correlation between 
consensus democracy and energy efficiency is extremely strong (significant 
at the 1 percent level) and unaffected by the introduction of the level of 
development as a control variable. 
 Coming back to the theoretical structure of this research, its 
empirical skeleton is propped on a four dimensional axis, which highlights 
the main three relationships at stake. The first relationship is that between 
macroeconomic policy and social efficiency, or, in other words, between 
macroeconomic policy and SAP‘s long tenure in office because endorsed by 
a favorable public opinion. This relationship is stated and further 
demonstrated throughout the third and fifth chapters, with a small hiatus in 
the fourth chapter, which briefly describes the Swedish welfare state, its 
main components and characteristics.  
 Therefore, all three stages of the Swedish model had as an effect the 
‗fine-tuning‘ between labor and monetary policies, which stimulated, on one 
hand, innovation and competitiveness in the industrial sector, and, on the 
other hand, full employment and welfare on the market. These policy 
measures had a positive effect on economic growth and social democratic 
tenure in office up until the 1980s. After this period, financial speculation 
and unexpected fractures in the economic cycle demanded different 
economic measures able to ensure competitiveness of a small open economy 
such as Sweden‘s onto the world market, which became more and more 
globalized. I argue that these measures were all about sustainability, 
environmental standards and their application. 
 The fifth chapter highlights the effects of globalization on the 
Swedish welfare state and the consequent change in its structural 
architecture. The most important here is the impact of globalization on the 
Swedish labor market and employment levels since the Swedish MNC 
companies largely started delocalizing production elsewhere.  
 Chapter three details the so-called RM model or the Rehn-Meidner 
model, which was actually stage two keynesianism, a phase where economic 
development did not depend any longer on boosting demand and ensuring 
full employment, but, rather meant the ‗fine-tuning‘ of labour and 
investment policies together.  
 The second relationship at the core of the empirical structure of this 
research is that between the SD social democratic party, as a social 
democratic entity, ensuring continuity and the Swedish businesses. Here, I 
stress the role of neocorporatism in mitigating the relationship between 
party and businesses.  
 It is proved that the SAP and the SAP-led government triggered 
Swedish environmental activism and leadership by promoting ever higher 
environmental standards in the UN and EU as the best way to increase the 
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international competitiveness of the Swedish industry in accordance with 
corporate interests. The business or corporate interests were only interested 
into securing the competitiveness of their industries abroad (i.e. in 
international trade) as well as into Swedish participation in the SEM and 
EMU. The ‗other interests‘, especially the trade unions, were not opposed 
but sympathetic towards high environmental standards, supporting both the 
business and the government; they simply followed, but they were not 
active since the beginning. However, these ‗other‘ interests were always 
locked in neocorporatist practices at home. What I try to prove in this 
chapter is that business agreement on high environmental standards firstly 
endorsed by the SD government has been the modality through which they – 
the business – managed to secure international competitiveness, Swedish 
accession to the EU and subsequent participation to the SEM. 
 The ‗interest‘ variable is maybe the most conspicuous indicator of 
neofunctionalism as it is a theoretical approach which relies upon 
conceptualizing the interests of participating actors through the idea of 
functional, political and cultivated ‗spillover‘. Moreover, what 
neofunctionalism implies is that spillover is largely promoted by 
supranational elites and interest groups. In the Swedish case, ‗interests‘ 
represent the backbone of Swedish neo-corporatist democracyand they lie at 
the basis of any attempt to study ‗private interest government‘. Therefore 
there is no accident that, in the Swedish case, several authors have outlined 
the potential of neofunctionalism since it best captures the pre-accession 
dynamics whereby the national interests at stake were pushing ahead with 
the integration process. However, before proceeding to analyze the role of 
private interests in the Swedish environmental buildup, some distinctions 
need to be made. 
 First, there are mainly two periods of environmental developments 
which characterize Swedish involvement in shaping the environmental 
agenda: the UN period, i.e. the period before EU accession, and the EU 
period, from 1995 on. The UN period is marked by incrementalism and 
progressive adaptation to the political and economic demands of a rapidly 
changing world environment.  The Swedish diplomacy reacted promptly at 
the acid rain threat and set the UN acidification agenda accordingly. The 
novelty and ‗incidentality‘ of the situation triggered the unilateral initiative 
of the government and its outward tool of conflict resolution – diplomacy. 
However, later in the UN stage, ‗corporate‘ gradually acquired a ‗voice‘ and 
a weighty one in the process, too. At the end of the UN stage, the ‗entente 
cordiale‘ or the golden environmental triangle functioned at a double level: 
on one hand, between the Industriefoerbundet and the socialist government, 
and on the other hand, between Industriefoerbundet and labour. 
 Secondly, the distinction between ‗interests‘ is paramount and it 
must be highlighted in a way which does not leave any unnecessary 
misapprehensions. The ‗other‘ interests, namely the labor and the public 
interests were instrumental in creating consensus over the right 
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environmental strategies to adopt. The impact of the labor interests was 
mitigated because of the chasm created within the trade union bloc between 
LO and the TCO-SACO, the employees‘ union, over the issue of EU 
integration and the subsequent lowering of Swedish environmental 
standards. What was certain and there were enough warnings – in the 
political debates – was the fact that environmental issues triggered non-
negligeable economic side-effects such as readjustment and unemployment. 
 Thirdly, the distinction between the different environmental issues is 
paramount in order to identify the linkages between EU integration, SEM 
and EMU, on one hand, and welfare issues, on the other hand. In the next 
chapter, I am going to treat at length the relationship between environment 
and welfare state, on one hand, and between environment and the SAP, on 
the other. This chapter is focused on the relationship between corporate 
interests and governmental environmental policies. The triangle 
government-environment-corporate is analyzed from the point of view of 
their political implications for the welfare system, the backbone of the social 
democrat ‗folkhemmet‘. 
 All these actors (comprising the business Industriefoerbundet, the 
media, the public, the ENGO environmental non-governmental 
organizations, etc.) shaped the internal policy forum and were paramount in 
funneling ‗enabling conditions‘, that is the consensus behind Swedish 
environmental actions. The reasons for the unanimity behind the 
environmental cause pertain entirely to the economic neocorporatism which 
functioned in Sweden till the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, the environmental 
‗variable‘, when it first appeared at the beginning of the 1970s with the acid 
rains in Northern Europe, immediately triggered governmental responses. 
The role of the ‗other‘ interests and of the corporate interests, is still unclear 
at the debut of the whole environmental ‗affair‘. What is certain is that 
environmental pollution triggered the immediate response of the Swedish 
government and the organization of an international conference. By 
consequence, at the beginning, there were only the governmental interest 
and the national interest, which reacted to the environmental challenge, a 
fact which makes difficult to claim that Swedish environmental leadership is 
a case which can be proved only by neofunctionalism. However, while it is 
true that early Swedish UN environmental leadership is a classic example of 
intergovernmentalism, it is equally true that this initial governmental 
leadership becomes a sort of neofunctionalist ‗spillover‘ with Swedish EU 
membership. 
 The third relationship is that between different factions inside the 
SAP and their split within the party. This is highlighted in chapter seven as 
the environmental split, from the point of view of environmental rights seen 
as human rights and consequently as an extension of the social rights, 
promoted by the welfare state. This third relationship is backed by three 
different hypotheses which treat the different cleavages within the party. 
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 If at the beginning, the contours of division within Swedish politics, 
and particularly within the SAP, were always centered on the social and 
economic dimensions of the society, that is no longer the case. Thus, the 
environmental dimension was always associated in one way or another to 
these two dimensions. Statistical tables and questionnaires from the 
Regeringen Statistics Office are used to ascertain the ‗contours‘ of the 
cleavage within the party. The data contained in the statistical tables are 
used to generate the two environmental hypotheses and to test them. The 
division over whether or not Sweden should join the Union corresponds 
significantly to another fault line in the party‘s ideological profile, which 
helps to integrate the previous most important environmental contours of 
division. The most obvious explanation for a division amongst party 
activists over questions of supranational integration is that it underlined the 
social and economic cleavages at the domestic level. 
 For instance, the third hypothesis stresses the conflict between free-
traders, who favored free trade and were opposed to EU integration, and 
pragmatists, who were favorable to EU integration, but not necessarily 
opposed to free trade. 
 By contrast with other European countries, where the supporters of 
free trade were usually in favor of European integration and the opponents 
who were skeptical, in Sweden, the vice versa has been true. However, there 
is little evidence of a correlation between left-wing radicalism and 
protectionism of the type that would be likely to result in a Eurosceptical 
policy position. Indeed, the principle of free-trade is virtually unquestioned 
in the Swedish public debate.  
 In fact, there is arguably more evidence that some Swedish Social 
Democrats opposed EU membership on the grounds that the Union was not 
sufficiently committed to free trade. How and why Sweden‘s labour 
movement became reconciled to free trade at an early stage of its history 
was clarified in the previous chapters with the first research hypotheses. In 
part, this was unavoidable given the country‘s size and necessary 
dependence on exports for its prosperity. Besides, the promotion of free 
trade also found favor with Social Democrats who wanted to show solidarity 
with the poor countries of the world – a significant tradition in the party. 
Sweden could justly claim to have opened its markets to cheap third world 
production. By contrast, the EU – through its CAP – was far less a fair 
‗supporter‘ of poorer countries and promoter of third world development. 
The CAP – with its barriers to imported agricultural produce and, worse, its 
export subsidies that served to dump surpluses on the world market- was 
only the best example. 
 Although the EEA was considered sufficient for Sweden‘s economic 
interests by some pro-membership Social Democrats, others felt that it was 
not enough. The chair of the Paper-Workers‘ Union, for example, feared 
that non-tariff bariers, such as custom controls at EU borders, could still 
disadvantage Sweden if it stayed outside the Union, and that higher interest 
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rates might jeopardize much-needed investment. By contrast, the EEA was 
seen by most leading Eurosceptical Social Democrat as, at least, a 
reasonable deal for Sweden, giving it the market access it required but 
avoiding involvement in the common trade policy, the CAP and EMU. In 
interview, Johansson praised the terms of the EEA as providing for free 
trade between Sweden and the EU while also having potential for 
developing certain ‗flanking policies‘, including a social dimension. For 
him, an EEA that added controls over currency movements would be his 
‗Utopia‘. In addition, an anti-EU trade union activist described himself in 
the interview as on the radical left, but also radically in favor of free trade, 
the market-led shift to a service-based economy, and even the need to attract 
international capital. The EU‘s regulation and bureaucracy, he argued, 
would only put investors off Sweden. 
 Therefore, the third hypothesis is that, to many Social Democrats, the 
EU represented a violation of the party‘s traditional acceptance of – indeed, 
enthusiasm for – free trade, being seen as a protectionist, mercantilist 
organization. This was reflected in opposition to EU membership. 
Supporters of accession, meanwhile, while certainly not anti-free-trade, took 
a rather more pragmatic approach to the issue. Support for free trade could 
be tempered by other advantages, political and economic, that joining the 
Union would confer. 
 The fourth hypothesis, also known as the environmental hypothesis or 
‗greens versus greys‘, highlights how important the environment and the 
environmental standards are inside the Swedish Social Democrat Party.  
 There was surprisingly little observable evidence in the referendum 
campaign of a division between Social Democrats who prioritized economic 
growth and those who prioritized non-materialist objectives, such as a clean 
environment. No interviewee gave the environment as his or her main 
reason for voting for or against the accession. Yet, there is an a priori case 
for environmentalism being an important element in the modern Social 
Democratic Party.  
 The environment is clearly an issue in Swedish politics, but it is not 
always expressed in inter-party cleavages. The Greens were formed as a 
party in 1981; they first entered the Riksdag in 1988 and after 1994 
appeared to establish themselves as a parliamentary force. Previously, 
however, if a cleavage between materialists and post-materialists has 
existed, it has been overlaid by other political cleavages and utilized - with, 
it would seem, different fortunes – by the Left and Centre parties. Some 
observers suggested that, in fact, the ‗new‘ cleavage actually represented a 
reactivation of one of those ‗old‘ cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, 
namely the one between rural and urban economic interests. However, there 
is little in existing Swedish survey data to suggest the existence of a 
cleavage that is distinct from left-right, the only exception being over 
nuclear power.  
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 Yet, within the SAP, there is evidence of a significant post-materialist 
lobby, which prioritizes environmentalism over economic growth. 
Differences between the ‗green‘ and ‗grey‘ wings of the party found 
expression in argument about plans for a bridge over Oeresund between 
Southern Sweden and Denmark. It was the subject of particularly bitter 
argument at the party congress in September 1990, where the 
communications minister succeeded in attaining only conditional approval 
for the project. Even this approval was hardly granted, in the face of strong 
opposition from SSU, the Federation of Social Democratic Women and 
Christian Social Democrats. They argued that the environmental impact on 
the area – especially if, as the Danes were insisting, the bridge would carry 
only road traffic rather than trains – would be too great. A persistent and 
more damaging row has occurred over nuclear power. A referendum in 1980 
on Sweden‘s nuclear program, held in the aftermath of the accident at Three 
Mile Island, found a plurality in favor of phasing it out by 2010. SAP and 
LO, many of whose members were concerned at the consequences on 
employment caused by relinquishing nuclear energy – backed this line, but 
it only just defeated another of the three options on offer to voters, that of 
closing the reactors forthwith. A good number of Social Democrats 
preferred this policy. Polls suggested that only about two-thirds of the 
party‘s supporters backed its leadership‘s line, despite its mounting a strong 
campaign for a ‗cautious decommissioning‘. The issue was revived by the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and once more it caused serious friction 
within SAP. In 1990, authority was given to negotiate with other parties on 
the manner of decommissioning, although this was still to be achieved by 
2010.  
 A vague agreement for a five-year energy program was agreed with 
the Centre and the Liberals in January 1991. As Sweden‘s economic 
situation deteriorated, it seemed increasingly likely that the party might take 
a more pragmatic stance and lay more emphasis on the economic costs of 
decommissioning.  
 Given the SAP‘s recent history, it would be a surprise if there was no 
clash of opinion between ‗grey‘ and ‗green‘ Social Democrats on Europe. 
The Stockholm branch of SSU, in a motion to the 1993 party congress, 
argued that it was impossible to achieve equality by lifting the whole world 
up to our standard of living. If we are to achieve equality, the rich world 
must reduce its consumption. Yet despite this, growth remains the goal, 
growth that in today‘s form increases the use of resources and creates still 
more pollution. Demand for growth in the rich world is a motor of 
environmental damage and makes equality between north and south 
impossible. The course the EC has set out has one overriding goal: to 
increase economic growth and to make the EC even richer...It is impossible 
to implement an effective defence of the environment when free competition 
and economic growth are made to overriding objectives... At the same time 
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the EC prevents countries from taking the necessary steps away from this 
negative development.  
 In contrast, some leading supporters of membership, particularly in the 
trade unions, made it clear that their objective was to achieve precisely this 
sort of economic growth for Sweden. In any case, the fact that some 
categories of people – young voters, for example – were likelier to vote for 
the environmentalist Left and Green parties and were also more likely to 
have voted No in the EU referendum, gives us some basis to work out the 
greens vs greys hypothesis. It is that there was a fault line in the party that 
divided those Social Democrats with materialist objectives – such as 
economic growth – and those with non-materialist objectives – such as the 
protection of the environment. What‘s more, this cleavage was reflected in 
the division over the EU: materialists voted in favor because of the promise 
of higher growth for Sweden in the Union; and non-materialists voted 
against because of a wish to preserve Swedish environmental standards and 
because the EU was seen as being inherently favorable to growth at the 
expense of environmentalism. 
 The last hypothesis, the fourth, which should illustrate the rift within 
the SAP between pro-EU party members, the ‗influencers‘, and their 
opponents, the ‗democrats‘, who would rather influence the EU from the 
outside, is rather weak.  
 This is an alternative hypothesis which only confirms the first two by 
testing the null hypothesis, i.e. its strength is low compared to the first two 
hypotheses above. Some Social Democratic anti-EU members insisted that 
EC membership was a question of democracy and consequently Sweden 
should not join because it might lose its sovereignty. For them, Sweden 
could win much more from staying aloof. However, many agreed that 
Swedish sovereignty might be jeopardized by EU membership. They were 
opposed to EU membership as it could undermine Sweden‘s policy choices 
in agriculture, environment, energy and the common market.  
 The more reflexive supporters of membership acknowledged that there 
might be a price to be paid in democracy for Swedish membership. 
However, they also stressed that for any country there has to be a balance 
between democracy and efficiency as well as between the economic and the 
political and that joining the EU would strike the right balance for Sweden. 
 Nonetheless, opinions differed within the party even. Although the EU 
‗democratic deficit‘ was blatant in the eyes of many, the views were that the 
single market needed supranational rule-making and the EC provided both 
the market and the means to regulate transnational exchanges – a 
fundamental social democratic objective. The SAP leaders claimed that 
supranational politics was needed to complement an internationalized 
economy in order to reassert the balance between the social economy and 
the business economy.  
  For many opponents, however, the terms of this trade-off between 
democracy and influence were unacceptable. Theirs was an opposition on 
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principle to the idea of becoming ‗regimented‘ to a supranational polity. To 
many, for example, democracy – or perhaps, more precisely, the Swedish 
notion of folkstyre (literally, people‘s steering or rule) – was an end in itself. 
A functioning democratic society, he argued, required the mechanisms of 
both ‗vertical and horizontal communication‘, by which he meant, inter alia, 
a common language, culture and media. The EU could never hope to attain 
this; its undemocratic institutions were all at odds with Swedish democratic 
tradition. This was his fundamental objection to EU membership. It can be 
characterized as a purposive nationalism, with the nation state seen as a 
means for achieving another goal – namely, democracy. Also, the evidence 
was that the debate within the SAP did not stress the economics of the issue 
since Sweden‘s integration with the European economy, 
consummated/achieved in the EEA, was already a fact. Instead, they 
emphasized non-economic objections to Swedish membership: democracy, 
sovereignty, internationalism. 
 This last hypothesis brings forward the idea that the division between 
opponents and supporters of EU membership in the SAP actually reflected a 
disagreement over the relative merits of Swedish democracy and Swedish 
influence. For the pro-EU side, the influencers, expanding national influence 
was to be prioritized in this particular situation. For the anti-EU side, either 
the gain in influence did not compensate for the loss of democracy or it 
could not compensate, so important was the principle of folkstyre; either 
way, in this particular situation, the ‗democracy‘ goal was to be prioritized 
over influence.Therefore, many in the party supported the anti-EU side. 
 As opposed to the first stage of Swedish environmental leadership, 
the second stage is all about Europeanization and finding allies in the EU 
member states as a pusher of EU environmental legislation in the Council. 
The gap between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism in the 
portraying of party-state vs. society dimension is bridged by the 
europeanization and foreign policy theories. ‗Europeanization‘ designs 
processes of domestic institutional adaptation to the pressures emanating 
directly or indirectly from EU membership along with such phenomena as 
vertical and horizontal mechanisms of Europeanization/national compliance. 
Although ‗Europeanization‘ as such is a loose and ambivalent concept, 
which stretches along 5 five different definitions, the first of these 
definitions portrays Europeanization as ‗the top-down impact of the EU on 
its member states‘ in the work of Heritier et al.593. She defines it as ‗the 
process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting 
member states‘ policies and political and administrative structures‘. In this 
mode, the EU acts in a very top-down fashion through legal and other policy 
acts. The second definition explains Europeanization as ‗the accumulation 
of policy competences at the EU level’. Cowles et al. equate 
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Europeanization with ‘the emergence and development at the European 
level of distinct structures of governance‘.594 In this mode, Europeanization 
is synonymous with European integration – i.e. the creation of EU itself. 
The third definition assimilates Europeanization with ‗the growing 
importance of the EU as a reference point for national and sub-national 
actors‘595. In this apprehension of the term, Europeanization is akin to a 
lodestar or rising star that is difficult if not impossible to ignore. The fourth 
definition pertains to the work of Peterson and Bomberg (2000)
596
 and 
conceives Europeanization as ‗the horizontal transfer of concepts and 
policies in the EU between member states‘. The authors relate 
Europeanization to the similarly popular term ‗policy transfer‘, while others 
believe it even encompasses examples of ‗cross-loading‘. In this mode, the 
EU is at best a facilitator of inter-state transfer. In the case of Sweden, 
Europeanization could be equated with ‗bottom-up policy transfer‘, i.e. from 
Sweden to the EU level. Indeed, since 1995, Sweden has worked hard to 
minimize future Europeanization by uploading domestic policy to the EU. 
The last definition envisages the Europeanization phenomenon as ‗a 
two-way interaction between states and the EU‘. This definition arose from 
the empirical observation that states routinely preempt domestic adjustments 
by shaping an emergent EU policy in their own image
597
. In this mode, 
Europeanization is circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather 
than one off. Since the EU, therefore, is both a cause and an effect of 
national change, I have chosen here to represent it as a one-way bottom-up 
process starting from the national level to the supranational one, meaning 
from one national state level such as Sweden to the EU supranational level. 
This bottom-up conceptualization is different from the conventional one, 
which always assumes Europeanization as a top down process from the EU 
to the domestic level.   But, it is the definition which best fits the Swedish 
case of Europeanization, which is a crucial case, in Eckstein‘s words. 
Incontestably, EU-ization is more complex a process in which 
Europe, and especially the EU, become an increasingly more relevant and 
important point of political reference for the actors at the level of the 
member states‘ and the latter engage in intergovernmental and transnational 
policy networks that reach from Brussels into the domestic sphere. There is 
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evidence of EU-ization through convergence at three levels: the emergence 
of a European political agenda (whereby the process of problem definition 
shifts at the European level); the forms of interest representation; and the 
modes of operation of various actors. In the Swedish case, there is evidence 
of convergence at the two levels, of interest representation and modes of 
operation of the various Swedish actors involved in the process. Even more 
important was the fact that domestic environmental legislation had already 
been significantly developed prior to EU membership and consequently the 
level of convergence had not been correlated to EU-level agenda-setting. 
There are two key points to make here. The first one is that of 
causality, between structure and agency: EU-ization through convergence 
may occur as a loose transnational phenomenon and may be described as 
‗EU-ization‘; but for the EU to be identified as a prime agent, or facilitating 
structure in this process, in the Swedish case, is not easy. The evidence of 
direct causal effect is based on the fact that Swedish agency relies on 
cooperation and consensus-building while the structure of Swedish policy-
making is based on democratic accountability and transparency. 
Convergence as a result of EU participation is far from being inevitable. 
Usually, integration has significant asymmetrical effects and has been 
incremental, irregular and uneven. There are these qualities of 
differentiation that serve to restructure the interests and ideas of actors at the 
domestic level, providing the scope for advocacy coalitions on particular 
policies. However, that does not hold true in the Swedish case where the 
integration of European environmental laws at the national level in Sweden 
has been almost complete.  
 To exemplify, Radaelli
598
 defines EU-ization as multiple and 
simultaneous ‗processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, «ways of» 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies‘. It would be an all-encompassing definition of EU-ization, but 
there are many others which picture EU-ization either as an incremental 
process (Ladrech, 1994)
599
 or as a ‗set of policy networks specializing in the 
creation of authoritative European rules‘ (Cowles et al, 2001).600 In spite of 
the fact that authors tend to agree on the fifth definition of ‗EU-ization as a 
two-way street’ – that is as both a bottom-up and a top-down process 
because it chimes in with empirical accounts of the EU, they nonetheless 
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prefer using the first definition, that of EU-ization as a top-down process in 
their researches. Radaelli
601
 acknowledges this definition is best suited to 
employ when inquiring about a regulatory or market-correcting policy area 
such as the environment, in which the EU prescribes or imposes a relatively 
concrete model of domestic compliance, based on positive integration. 
 To the extent where a case study analysis of the SAP is bound to 
consider the country‘s policy leadership on environmental issues, the 
definition of Europeanization most used here is that of a ‗one-way, bottom-
up process‘. However, as Bomberg and Peterson (2000)602 remark, a certain 
bias in favor of ‗EU-ization as a two-way interaction‘ is inevitable as it is 
most reflective of reality. The second dimension of Europeanization also 
known as ‗uploading‘ refers to the projection of national ideas, preferences 
and models from the national to the EU level. In this view, it is a process of 
bottom-up where the states are the primary actors and agents of change 
rather than mere passive subjects. It emphasizes the roles played by the 
member states themselves. Europeanization is thus seen as a process where 
member states use the EU as an instrument to export domestic policies, 
models, preferences, ideas and details to the EU level. This is perhaps the 
most interesting dimension given that it is expected that only ‗states which 
command large resources, strong domestic pressure or dogged 
commitment‘ are able to change or forge a certain EU policy. Following this 
conception, the larger EU member states use the European level to further 
their national interests and increase their national influence. However, 
sometimes the EU also gives ‗small states the necessary institutional 
resources... to project their own interests as European interests‘ though this 
has received much less scholarly attention to date. One cannot deny the 
importance of the first dimension of EU-ization, the downloading aspect, 
but, since this aspect has already been extensively treated in the literature, 
but less attention has been placed on the projection of Swedish interests as 
European and the reasons behind it, this research is meant to fill this scholar 
gap. 
Briefly, I have decided to somewhat neglect the first dimension of 
EU-ization in favour of the second and of other ideas and concepts in order 
to answer the question ‗What kind of impact has Sweden had on the 
development of environmental policy?‘ It is a question that touches on the 
implications of the Swedish commitment to international policy-making, a 
matter whereupon this research focuses. This is particularly relevant as there 
is reason to believe that Sweden has exerted influence on parts of the 
institutional and political features of environmental policy. There are a 
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couple of concepts which ‗ring the bell‘: small states, foreign policy and 
‗uploading‘. Sweden is a small state, which constantly ‗uploaded‘ its 
environmental standards at the international level through foreign policy 
instruments. 
What is more, ‗Europeanization as a two-way street‘ appears to 
chime with many empirical accounts of how EU environmental policy is 
actually made.
603
 This shows that states do often try to shape European rules 
so that they align with their own national approaches and practices. The 
process of EU-ization is both an uploading and a downloading process. By 
working to ensure a ‗goodness of fit‘ between the two, states hope to reduce 
adjustment costs, achieve ‗first-mover advantages and reduce political and 
legal uncertainty by minimizing Europeanization‘. If, as has often been the 
case in the environmentally progressive states such as Sweden, European 
rules are based on the core feature of national policy, the misfit is likely to 
be low and the degree of Europeanization correspondingly weak. Even if, as 
some have suggested, the flow of influence was completely recursive and 
continuous, it would still be difficult to forge a rigorous research strategy 
because, in crudely positivistic terms, a two-way definition lacks a set of 
independent and dependent variables. 
I motivate my reasons for taking up a bottom-up direction of EU-
ization as purely methodological. The foreign policy argument of Swedish 
efforts of uploading strict environmental standards at EU levels before these 
standards reverberate into domestic policies. Intervening variables are not 
only institutional factors, but also policy style and interests. For instance, 
the foreign policy interests are represented by the norms and ideas promoted 
at the international level. 
Due to methodological grounds and the importance of the 
intervening variables, this research is based on the bottom-up dimension of 
the EU-ization process. The intervening variables play an important part 
into explaining the likelihood and direction of EU-ization; in overview, 
these are the institutional capacity to produce change, the timing of 
European policies and the policy structure. Boerzel and Risse (2003)
604
 use 
the distinction between policies, politics and polity to identify the three 
dimensions along which the domestic impact of EU-ization can be analyzed 
and processes of domestic change can be traced. They employ a different set 
of denominators to designate the same mediating factors; they use the two 
related concepts of ‗multiple veto points‘ and ‗formal institutions‘. Multiple 
veto points are niches in the political opportunities structure which 
effectively empower actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational 
pressures emanating from EU-ization. In a country‘s institutional structure, 
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these veto points enable actors with diverse interests to avoid constraints 
emanating from EU-ization pressures and, thus, effectively inhibit domestic 
adaptation (Tsebelis 1995; Haverland 2000).
605
 The more power is dispersed 
across the political system and the more actors have a say in political 
decision-making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus or 
‗winning coalition‘ necessary to introduce changes in response to EU-
ization pressures. A large number of institutional or factual veto players 
impinges on the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy changes and 
limits their empowerment. Yet, there is still a difference between different 
EU-ization outcomes and styles across member states with regard to 
transportation. While the German reform coalition was able to exploit 
European policies to overcome domestic opposition to liberalization, Italian 
trade unions and sectoral associations successfully blocked any reform 
attempt. On the other hand, formal institutions are institutions in the 
traditional sense which might provide actors with material and ideational 
resources to exploit new opportunities, leading to an increased likelihood of 
change and promoting domestic adaptation. The European political 
opportunity structure may offer domestic actors additional resources. But 
many are unable to exploit them when they lack the necessary action 
capacity. Direct relations with European decision-makers provide regions 
with the opportunity to circumvent their central government in European 
policy making. But many regions do not have sufficient resources 
(manpower, money, expertise) to be permanently present at the European 
level and to exploit the new opportunities. Other than veto points and formal 
institutions, there is an additional intervening variable called ‗change 
agents‘ or ‗norm entrepreneurs‘ which designate actors who mobilize at the 
domestic level. They do not only pressure policy-makers to initiate change 
by increasing the costs of certain strategic options. Rather, they use moral 
arguments and strategic constructions in order to persuade actors to redefine 
their interests and identities, engaging them in processes of social learning. 
Persuasion and arguing are the mechanisms by which these norm 
entrepreneurs induce change. They legitimate new norms and ideas by 
providing scientific knowledge about cause and effect relationships.  
By contrast, epistemic communities are more appropriate when 
analyzing the Swedish  case of environmental leadership or SEPL because 
this concept is more influential in inducing change, the higher the 
uncertainty about cause-and-effect relationships in the particular issue area 
among policy-makers, the higher the consensus among the scientists 
involved, and the more scientific advice is institutionalized in the policy 
making process. Epistemic communities are visible in the making of 
environmental and monetary policies in Europe. They appeal to collectively 
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shared norms and identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider 
their goals and preferences. Processes of complex or ‗double-loop‘ learning, 
in which actors change their interests and identities as opposed to merely 
adjusting their means and strategies, occur rather rarely. When addressing 
the EU-ization of a country and its party system, there is an imperious need 
of using the policy network literature. I particularly insist on the creation of 
epistemic communities as the best tool for uploading policies borne out of 
normative power at the supranational level. 
Recalling the former paragraph on policy networks and theories of 
European integration, I need to point out that these intervening variables are 
strict dependent on the point of view and particular theoretical lens through 
which one looks at. Veto points and formal institutions as mediating factors 
– conducive or inimical to EU-ization – belong to.  
So, by reviewing the literature on EU-ization facilitating factors, I 
have tried to introduce the idea that institutions and domestic veto points act 
as intervening variables within the framework of this research on the 
electoral transformation of the SAP. 
EU-ization is a vast theoretical tool based on various definitions, 
mechanisms and different – but not competing – logics. The logics of 
Europeanization are not to be confused with the negative or positive logics 
of integration; ‗the logic of appropriateness‘ and ‗the logic of 
consequentialism‘ are two different manners of acknowledging change 
induced by EU-ization, which are based on ‗new institutionalism‘ theories. 
The notion of there being two logics in the operation of institutions is based 
on the now classic study of March and Olsen (1984, 1989).
606
 They posited 
a ‗logic of appropriateness‘, in which institutions affect actor behavior by 
the latter internalizing the norms of the institution and developing identities 
that are compatible with it. In other words, actors develop a commitment to 
the institution or are persuaded of the legitimacy of its claims. A second 
logic – of consequentialism – affects the opportunities and constraints of 
actors within institutions; in other words, the distribution of power. Each of 
these aspects has been influential in the elaboration of EU-ization processes. 
Boerzel and Risse
607
 seek to combine the above two logics of March 
and Olsen. The logic of appropriateness – and the processes of persuasion – 
is placed within the sociological institutionalism approach. The logic of 
consequentialism, dealing with differential empowerment, is placed within 
‗rationalist  institutionalism‘, drawing on rational choice precepts. The core 
of Boerzel and Risse‘s arguments is that the two logics of March and Olsen 
are not incompatible. This is a distinctive position to adopt: ideas and 
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interests normally give rise to separate frameworks. They argue – quite 
persuasively – that both logics often occur simultaneously or they 
characterize different phases of the EU-ization process. Moreover, the 
impact of EU-ization is differential across policies, polities and politics 
because the determining factors of the two logics differ. 
Vertical mechanisms seem to demarcate clearly the EU level (where 
policy is defined) and the domestic level, where policy has to be 
metabolized. By contrast, horizontal mechanisms look at EU-ization as a 
process where there is no pressure to conform to EU policy models. Instead, 
horizontal mechanisms involve a different form of adjustment to Europe 
based on the market or on patterns of socialization. In horizontal EU-ization, 
the process is not one of conforming to EU policy which ‗descends‘ into the 
domestic policy arena as in a hierarchical chain of command. Horizontal 
EU-ization is a process of change triggered by the market and the choice of 
consumer best practice. More precisely, the vertical mechanisms are based 
on adaptational pressure; the horizontal mechanisms involve different forms 
of framing or policy learning. Environmental regulation is a case of positive 
integration achieved by means of both vertical and horizontal EU-ization 
mechanisms. Regulatory competition is a mechanism starting with vertical 
prerequisites but that has horizontal consequences. For instance, the case 
under investigation here – the EU-ization of Swedish environmental policy 
– proves that regulation is not only a policy-related issue, but can also have 
international and domestic implication. 
 Coming back to the interplay between sustainable growth and 
security in the Swedish model, one should bear to mind that the late 1960s 
signified a break with the post-war optimism regarding growth because 
‗growth‘ as explained in the Club of Rome Report means the extinction and 
depletion of resources in the long term. Concepts such as ‗ecological 
footprint‘ and ‗overshooting‘ changed the post-war view of growth as a 
promise for social development, which was replaced by understandings of 
growth as a threat to social progress and as a source of new problems in a 
changing, uncertain period of societal development. 
 Politics in the 1960s and 1970s were marked by the discovery of the 
outermost limits to growth. In the debate on the environment, as well as in 
the discussions on the social consequences of growth, it was pointed out that 
post-war economic expansion had led to the exhaustion of production 
factors such as natural resources or social capital. In politics, these 
experiences led to dystopic interpretations of the growth society‘s 
unsustainability and capitalism‘s inherent destructiveness, but also to 
attempts to reshape politics according to the new policy of growth, a policy 
which aimed to control growth.  
 The years between 1950s and 1970s are amply discussed in the 
historical chapter two, which discusses at length the political changes in the 
country, especially from a social democrat leadership point of view. 
However, the relationship between economic growth, welfare and 
 285 
environment is not adequately treated in that chapter, although it is relevant 
for social democrat ideology.  
 The Swedish third way was a hesitant experimentation with a new 
social democratic language around economic and social affairs based on 
choice, cost efficiency and individual responsibility. As the international 
center-left project came about in the mid-1990s, Swedish social democracy 
had already fallen out of love with the idea of third way, despite Goeran 
Persson‘s backing of the Blair-Schroeder document. Today, Swedish social 
democracy is again stressing its idea of a strong relationship between 
growth and security as a mark of distinction between the Swedish folkhem-
model and other models in the debate on the future of the European social 
model and against US-style workfare capitalism. 
 Others are looking at the Swedish idea, too. The Lisbon strategy, 
which Swedish social democracy put a lot of hope to and has sometimes 
claimed as the social democratization of Europe, defines social policy as a 
‗productive factor‘ and sets out a vision of the interplay between economic 
dynamism and social cohesion. British New Labor‘s claim that what‘s fair is 
also efficient, its discourse of social investment are also reminiscent of the 
Swedish idea of social policy as a productive investment. However, both the 
European discourse and the British discourse have so far differed 
fundamentally from the historical Swedish discourse around social policy. 
Both on the European level and in British politics, the productive aspect of 
social policy has been defined by what is termed ‗make work pay‘ and a 
stimulative approach to ‗dependency‘ which stands in rather sharp contrast 
to a Swedish reluctance to talk about incentives and a stress – in the 
Swedish discourse – on the close interplay between benefits and productive 
participation over the life cycle.  
 The Swedish discourse on the means of welfare and the new deal of 
the third way did not stress the responsibility side of the social contract. 
Conversely, it claims that security is the precondition of change for 
providing individual security in times of disruptive change. 
 In the rationalist and pragmatic neocorporatist culture of the Swedish 
model, social reform was inherently technocratic, with policy makers 
defining the nature of the social problem in terms of economic 
competitiveness‘ terms. Thus, social reform was translated in terms of 
‗security in development‘ and ‗sustainable growth‘ rather than in purely 
‗welfare‘ terms.  
 In the debate on the environment, as well as in discussions on the 
social consequences of growth, it was pointed out that post-war economic 
expansion led to the exhaustion of production factors such as natural 
resources or social capital. In politics, these experiences led to dystopic 
interpretations of the growth society‘s unsustainability and capitalism‘s 
inherent destructiveness, but also to attempts to reshape politics in order to 
refute and control this problematic side of growth. Thus, Social democratic 
politics in Sweden came to be characterized by a fundamental shift from the 
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post-war focus on economic expansion and profit, to a focus on sustainable 
development. This meant a change in the meaning and standing of the 
concept of growth in politics. In international economic planning, 
experiments were made with alternative measurements of progress, which 
took into account the spillover effects and negative externalities of 
production on society. Environmental problems were clothed in economic 
terms and discussed as negative entries that should be taken into account in 
assessments of growth. In the social planning, a parallel discussion on how 
to assess and measure the social costs of growth and find a basis for socially 
sustainable capitalism began. 
 The ideological changes within the SAP in the 1970s must be 
viewed in light of this generally altered understanding of growth. In the 
1970s, the so far hegemonic standing of the concept of growth in the 
Swedish Labor movement was challenged by a number of alternative goal 
formulations. Problems of economic and social development in sparsely 
populated areas in the Swedish north led to the formulation of a social 
democratic environmental policy linked to the regions. The SAP was faced 
with heated opposition from environmental groups over the exploitation of 
Swedish rivers for energy purposes and the so-called ‗battle of the elm trees‘ 
in the Stockholm Park Kungstraedgaarden in 1972. Also, the publication of 
Ralf Edberg‘ s ‗Skuggan av ett moln‘ (The shadow of a cloud) became to the 
Swedish debate what Rachel Carson‘s ‗Silent Spring‘ was in the US and it 
triggered a discussion within the labor movement on the conflict between 
growth and intangible resources such as clean air and water. The growing 
discussion on economic democracy, the work environment and eventually 
the wage earners‘ funds debate contained a similar juxtaposition of growth 
and intangible values, where the security and participation of workers were 
posited against production profits and rationalization.  
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